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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation seeks to understand the conjunction of faculty roles as teachers and as 
researchers. This understanding is pursued through philosophical analysis. Discourse ethics, in 
particular, is used as a framework by which to best understand the roles played by faculty and if 
the roles of teacher and researcher are, in fact, commensurable. The purpose of the work is two-
fold: 1) to develop a construct that may be used by future researchers to better understand the 
roles played by faculty, and 2) to suggest a best-construct that enables future researchers to 
propose how actual lived roles should be instantiated in the world.  
The dissertation reviews a series of university handbooks, professional association ethical 
guidelines, and philosophical arguments to establish how the roles of faculty are best understood. 
The investigation illuminates the tensions at the heart of faculty roles. This tension is not 
definitionally embedded in the roles of faculty as teacher and researcher. Rather, the tension 
emerges from the failure of institutions to fully actualize faculty roles as normatively grounded 
in human communicative interaction. As a result, the work suggests that in order to best resolve 
the cognitive dissonance that may be experienced as a result of role ambiguity, faculty should 
engage in a process of self-reflection and community dialectic in order to best determine how 
“faculty” can be actualized in a way that best benefits all stakeholders.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
 Chapter 1 lays out the motivation of the project as a means by which to understand that 
shifting roles of faculty as teacher and researcher as a result of the pressures applied to those 
roles by shift in the university paradigm to that of a “diploma market.” The chapter justifies the 
project’s research questions through an investigation of research that suggests both: 1) The 
university has already been radically redefined in its purpose; and 2) This redefinition is 
potentially harmful to both students and faculty. In order to understand this redefinition and its 
conceptual implication for faculty roles, two research questions presented later in the chapter 
emerge. Those questions suggest that this project is meta-analytical, potentially challenging the 
epistemology of educational research itself. In order to best answer these research questions in a 
way that acknowledges the self-reflexive nature of the work within the educational research 
paradigm, philosophical analysis, particularly discourse ethics, is an apt methodological 
approach. As the work will seek to understand and examine the emergent norms that emerge 
from the communicative actions of our conceptual role theoretical dialectic, it is the work of 
philosopher Jurgen Habermas that is best suited for the analysis. Thus, the chapter will introduce 
the project as both a descriptive and normative project that will use Habermas’ work as the 
philosophical methodology.   
 
Background and Contextualization of the Issue 
The university, as an institution in the U.S., is crumbling, according to some observers 
(Readings, 1996). This collapse of the institution, argued theorists like Readings (1996), Slevin 
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(2001), and Carter (2004), is the result of a fundamental paradigm shift in the way society 
engages education. The shift of which they spoke is the result of the corporatization of the 
university (Carter, 2004; Readings, 1996). Noam Chomsky, in a 2013 lecture, argued that this 
corporatization may result in “converting schools and universities into facilities that produce 
commodities for the job market, abandoning the traditional ideal of the universities: fostering 
creative and independent thought and inquiry, challenging perceived beliefs, exploring new 
horizons and forgetting external constraints” (Chomsky, 2013). This privatization, which 
Chomsky defined as “privatization for the rich [and a] lower level of mostly technical training 
for the rest,” is something he argued is happening “across the country” (Chomsky, 2013). Given 
the heavy emphasis on standardization, STEM, and assessment that seems ever increasing, there 
is good reason to believe that Chomsky is right: public education in the United States is 
becoming increasingly oriented towards the generation of “productive citizens.” Simply, it seems 
that the goal is not the generation of those who, through participation in a “liberal” education—
as argued by Dewey (1900), Bialostosky (1991) and Nussbaum (1998)—are an informed 
electorate, but, rather, the generation of workers who participate actively in the economy by both 
providing goods for that economy and purchasing goods through that economy. It should be 
noted that while the first notion of education requires that the electorate be well-informed 
regarding its own welfare and best interest, the second does not.  
  The shift towards privatization as we see it today may well have its origins in the 
economic troubles of the 1970s. A Carnegie Commission report, The New Depression in Higher 
Education by Earl F. Cheit, reported numerous concerns regarding post-secondary education and 
funding. According to Zumeta, Breneman, Callan, & Finney (2013),  
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The basic problem was that the cost of educational production was rising faster than 
institutional revenue, as the sharp funding increases of the 1960s began to slow, while the 
growth and expansion of faculty, staff, and programs continued apace. At about this time, 
the labor market for PhD’s, which had witnessed high demand relative to supply in the 
1960s, suddenly had an excess supply in many fields. (p. 67)  
As a result, the 1970s saw a great deal of argument regarding the question of, “To whom should 
the cost and burden of education fall?” Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980 saw a shift away from 
the general paradigm that the fiscal involvement of the government helped to alleviate social ills. 
The general notion that privatization can solve social problems became popular and remains 
popular today. As a result, the school choice movement (Ravitch, 2010) has gained much 
popularity, arguing that education best benefits from parents’ ability to choose to send their 
children to schools that are “most successful.” This idea of success, of course, requires 
assessment—an increasing concern since the publication of A Nation at Risk. Education as a 
whole, therefore, has been under increasing pressure to demonstrate measurable value (St. John, 
Daun-Barnett & Moronski-Chapman, 2012). Under the Obama administration it has become 
clear that the belief that schools should be able to demonstrate accountability and gains (if not 
gainful employment) is not limited to the K-12 public school system.  
Numerous proposals have been forwarded to defund programs that are themselves 
difficult to assess, do not produce an “employable skill,” or cost more than they produce 
(Zumeta, Breneman, Callan, & Finney, 2013). To quote James Slevin (2001), speaking of the 
university,  
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If the spirit is anything other than collegial, in its exact sense, then it is not a college or 
university. For the sake of having a name to name this thing that a college or university is 
not, I will call it a diploma market, an institution trading in commodities, selling and 
delivering instruction in order to sell and deliver the instructed. As it turns out, diploma 
markets are what most of the 3000+ postsecondary institutions may be in the process of 
becoming. (p.234) 
Research in academia is, of course, one means by which to judge production. Those faculty 
members who produce research—particularly research that, itself, can be capitalized upon (i.e. 
garner respect for the university, enables profit through publication, or enables profit through 
research and development)—are therefore highly desirable, as they produce something of 
tangible value to the economy of the institution and society as a whole.  
This shift towards production that Readings described has resulted in a perspective such 
that, “Teaching, we are told, is undervalued in favor of research, while research is less and less in 
touch with the demands of the real world, or with the comprehension of the ‘common reader’” 
(Readings, 1996, p.1). Gerald Graff (2003), in his book Clueless in Academe: How Schooling 
Obscures the Life of the Mind, argued that “academia reinforces cluelessness by making its ideas, 
problems, and ways of thinking look more opaque, narrowly specialized, and beyond normal 
learning capacities than they are or need to be” (p. 1) This is not to say that there is a necessary 
divide between teaching and research, but rather that the history of academia has been to create 
one. This generated division between teaching and research works in synonymy with the opacity 
of the research produced by academics to those outside of the academy to produce division 
between research and teaching. To Quote Graff (2003),  
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The view that academic writing is necessarily insular and obscure props up the 
overdrawn opposition between research and teaching. We are so used to opposing 
research and teaching that we overlook the fact that good research is itself pedagogical, 
often drawing on the skills of explanation, clarification, and problem-posing…central to 
good teaching. (p. 10)  
Thus, teaching is undervalued, perhaps, because it is seen as a proletariat labor-enterprise 
performed by easily replaceable workers, while research is similarly demeaned for failing to 
produce that which is “useful,” with immediacy, to the Gross National Product.   
The shift to a production paradigm, in which true value of education is determined by the 
generation of “useful” goods, therefore, causes a greater strain between teacher and researcher; 
the teacher role, when seen as “productive,” avoids the supposedly opaque uselessness of 
academic research, while academic research is also seen as a superior means by which to judge 
the production capacity of faculty. Thusly, the production paradigm shift places both the role of 
teacher and the role of researcher against the other, both of which must defend their usefulness in 
the language of productive economy.  
This shift has had numerous consequences: one specifically addressed by Readings is the 
significant increase in the usage of adjuncts hired solely to teach. “The redistribution of roles 
within units is already a reality: teaching is increasingly done by part-time and temporary full-
time faculty. The ‘units’ so ‘diversified’ have become incredibly ‘productive’ using this model, 
and with more powerless teachers, there is a whole lot more ‘collaboration.’ But it is a model 
based on an injustice and for that reason alone—though there are others— damages the quality 
of education (Slevin, 2001, p. 242). The consequences of the production paradigm that has 
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redistributed and diversified university roles such as teacher and researcher are grounded in the 
expectation that the university should produce employable workers, who themselves can 
“produce,” thusly maintaining the economy.  
Another shift caused by the current focus on a production paradigm is the significant 
pressure on faculty to produce research. The pressure has become so intense over recent years 
that ethical questions and concerns are beginning to emerge. In the Journal of Clinical 
Investigation, Neill (2008) reported a greater number of ethical violations seen by the journal. 
Researchers, under the pressure to publish, are now engaging in “ethical gray areas.” When the 
pressure to publish is sufficient, it is not unreasonable to worry that these “gray areas” may also 
include the misuse of their own students.  
Researchers who are under the pressure to publish are now turning to their own 
classrooms as research laboratories, which can be used for publication in education journals 
(Hutchings, 2002). An increasing number of teachers use their own students as research 
participants as a means by which to evaluate their own teaching practices—and, of course, 
simultaneously publish (Burns & McCarthy, 2010; Gan & Geral, 2010). Darling-Hammond 
(2010) suggested that the “gaming” of the standardized testing system has increased dramatically 
since the advent of “No Child Left Behind,” placing teacher’s careers and schools funding in 
jeopardy if students do not perform satisfactorily on high-stakes tests. Similarly, one may reason 
that the corporatization of the university has increased the amount of low-quality faculty research 
and arguably unethical faculty research due to increased pressure to publish.  
       Thusly, the roles of faculty as teachers and as researchers are both in flux, potentially in 
ways that conflict incommensurably. As the university enters into this revisioning of the 
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capitalistic educational paradigm, the roles of faculty may change significantly, so it may well be 
prudent to establish a clear understanding of how teacher and researcher in the university as 
faculty should best be understood.  
The University 
It may come as no surprise to post-secondary faculty that a significant paradigm shift has 
been taking place on the university level over the past two decades. Bill Readings (1996) wrote 
ominously about the “University in Ruins,” describing the collapse of university structure as we 
know it. Much of his text acts a revisioning of academic life, explicating what faculty should do 
as they wander out into the desolate landscape of academia: “To dwell in the ruins of the 
University is to try to do what we can, while leaving space for what we cannot envisage to 
emerge” (Readings, 1996, p. 176). This fundamental paradigmatic shift, as Readings saw it, is in 
large part due to the conceptualization of knowledge as a product to be bought and sold. As 
Reading stated, “The University is on the way to becoming a corporation” (1996, p. 22). This 
corporatization, suggested thinkers like Readings, Geoffrey Sirc, and Christopher Carter, is not 
just an eventuality; it is an inevitability. 
It is now common to hear politicians lament the uselessness of degrees in the humanities 
and argue for an increase in cost of those degrees that do not produce something deemed to be of 
sufficient worth by society. Interestingly, at the same time, a 2014 U.S. Department of Education 
press release reveals that federal regulations will also demand that programs that produce poorly 
balanced debt to income ratio over a series of years will be closed, encouraging what they term 
“gainful employment.” Whilst it seems that both ideas have the best interest of students and their 
financial futures in mind, they also are clear markers of what is most valued by our society—
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production of tangible things. Thusly, ideas, values, understanding, self-worth, reflection, 
compassion, enlightenment, and knowledge are means to that end, and the worth of a college 
education is now determined largely by the average income produced by a particular degree 
(Carter 2004). To quote Kögler (2015), “Politicians too often fall prey to reducing college to the 
production of job-conferring degrees, instead of seeing its function in the wider context of 
producing agents capable of participating productively in society as such, including the 
democratic political sphere” (para. 43). It is not a “liberal education” paradigm in which we now 
dwell; rather, the university has become the servant to a capitalistic end.   
Chomsky, (1995) wrote,  
[T]he educational system is divided into fragments. The part that's directed toward 
working people and the general population is indeed designed to impose obedience. But 
the education for elites can’t quite do that. It has to allow creativity and independence. 
Otherwise they won't be able to do their job of making money. 
Presumably he is speaking of the K-12 system, as supposedly higher education must allow for 
the creativity and independence of which he speaks. One comes to realize immediately, though, 
that in the twenty years since Chomsky wrote the above, post-secondary education has 
experienced greater and greater pressure to produce workers. It is difficult to express the 
emphasis on STEM in any other way. As the United States has begun to move into the post-
industrial “knowledge economy” described by Peter Drucker (1992), the idea of worker has 
begun to include the notion of the knowledge worker. To quote Drucker, 
Whereas the Grosstadt was founded on the industrial worker, the megalopolis is founded 
on, and organized around, the knowledge worker, with information as its foremost output 
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as well as its foremost need. The college campus rather than the factory chimney is likely 
to be the distinctive feature of megalopolis, the college student rather than the 
“proletarian’ its central political fact.” (p. 35) 
Thus, Chomsky’s apparent distinction between k-12 and college institutions is becoming 
increasingly irrelevant in our “knowledge economy;” there is a central worker to our economy 
and she is produced by the university. 
Readings (1996) noted that the U.S. University is becoming increasingly more proletariat 
as its focus becomes that of production and “practicality.” We see, synonymous with this change, 
a change in the way we think about faculty itself, as institutions rely more and more on part-time 
faculty to fill specific “practical roles” in our institutions. This reliance on part-time faculty who 
are employed only to teach to the specific bureaucratic needs of the institution and society 
represents the fundamental way our understanding of both purpose and content of knowledge 
have changed. The focus of post-secondary education—the modern public seems to demand—
should be on the production of citizens who have useful skills. Knowledge, at best, is now a 
byproduct of the more pressing corporate need.  
Corporatization 
The corporatization to which Readings was referring is not just external, insofar as the 
university is required to meet the demands of society, but internal as well. Christopher Carter 
explicated the way disciplines themselves have become corporatized in the university. He 
addressed composition specifically and the demands that have been placed upon composition by 
this new paradigm. Carter wrote, “As composition departments encourage students’ immersion 
in capitalist practice, they more openly and egregiously practice capitalist exploitation 
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themselves” (2004, p.190). It seems as if the institution, by virtue of teaching towards the end, 
must, by definition, become a tool of that end. Composition programs find themselves under 
significant pressure to focus on writing for work and only for work. 
Carter argued that as the institution orients itself towards the production of students who 
themselves produce measurable results, the means of assessment and the practices of pedagogy 
are becoming oriented toward those ends as well. This shift in understanding is similar to the 
impact high stakes testing has had on the K-12 fine arts curriculum. Intense pressure to teach the 
mandated curriculum hinders the inclusion of fine arts in classrooms (Oreck, 2004); according to 
the American Evaluation Association, fine arts teachers find that the curriculum has been 
narrowed to the tested subjects. Thus the institution of K-12 has molded itself to find the needs 
and demands of high-stakes education policy, and the curriculum reflects and emphasizes the 
culturally held belief that education is for jobs rather than for enlightenment. The result of such 
shifts has been a change in the way we think of knowledge, which now may be best defined as, 
“That which enables a student to find a lucrative job.” The institution as university, as a result, 
has become at odds with itself as Readings (1996) argued. 
Carter suggested that the most problematic result of this shift has been the emphasis on 
the needs and authority of university bureaucracy. Students are taught to follow the “rules” of 
composition in the same way that faculty are themselves taught to abide by the rules of the 
hierarchy of the institution. “They attempt to fill their roles within an administrative hierarchy 
while encouraging students to become suspicious of hierarchical structures. They attempt to 
prepare their students for the working world while nevertheless objecting to that world's 
exploitative practices” (2004, 186). The shift, then, to corporatization is in effect a kind of 
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symbiosis produced by the demand for students who will follow intellectual rules and, thus, a 
faculty that will do nothing more (so as to not waste the institution’s resources) than make sure 
they learn those rules. Simultaneously, faculty are increasingly aware that their worth as 
researchers is in question and they find themselves struggling to distinguish their roles from the 
roles of those faculty who are hired only to meet the productive bureaucratic needs of the 
institution. 
 
Figure 1. The Precarious Balance Required of Modern Faculty 
 
Carter chastised this victimized professoriate, though: “We do nothing to inhibit 
academic corporatism if we construct ourselves as gentle managers bound by the constraints of 
an unkind system” (2004, p.188). Simply, to educate students on the importance of free thought 
and critical thinking while at the same time sheepishly passing out departmentally developed 
rubrics, following state determined curriculum, and requiring that the students themselves 
respect the hierarchy of which we are a part is contradictory. The professoriate seems to, on the 
one hand, worry that students who do not acknowledge and respect the superior position of 
Faculty as 
part of 
beaurocracy
Faculty as 
researchers
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professors will be unteachable, while, on the other, hold on to the belief that the faculty 
themselves should not have to bow to a social hierarchy as it is in the pursuit of a far greater 
goal—knowledge. 
The professoriate, then, is placed between Scylla and Charybdis. On the one hand, it is 
important to meet the financial needs of the students to help prepare them for the world of work, 
yet, on the other, it is also fundamental to the core of a liberal education to recognize that work is 
not the purpose of knowledge. To quote Geoffrey Sirc,  
Of course I have students—many each quarter—who just want to know the tricks to 
writing, how to psyche it out. Who want the grades and the jobs. I don’t want to deny 
them that; I, after all, have a job. But there remains the way I choke on that system, the 
way we all do, ultimately. There is a profound dissatisfaction many of us feel at having to 
enable that system. (1995, p. 550). 
For this reason, it seems impossible for professors to help students learn to navigate the rules of 
the system without, at the same time helping to further instantiate a system that itself deems the 
fundamental goal of the professoriate unnecessary.   
The efficiently-functioning, productive university will turn students out as quickly as 
possible who have taken nothing but the necessary coursework their degrees demand. Additional 
knowledge, especially on the taxpayers’ expense, is deemed not just impractical, but immoral. 
The university, therefore, is under constant pressure to further cut back on general education 
programs, as coursework that seems unrelated to a specific major is a waste of both time and 
money. Students who take the time to explore additional electives are in danger of losing their 
funding and failing to earn a degree.  
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Faculty are expected to mimic the no-frills model of the institution itself. The more 
courses they teach, the more notoriety they gain for the university; the greater number of students 
they pass, the better numbers they produce for the university. “Student success rates” have 
become the new mantra of some institutions, suggesting that professors who fail too high a 
percentage of their students are failing to produce a useful product, and—perhaps worse—
wasting the students’ and the taxpayers’ dollars. In order to meet this streamlined end, the 
institution has sought an employee base that does the work that is required and only the work that 
is required. However, institutions of learning need more than that from their faculty. To quote 
Immanuel Kant, 
The university would have a certain autonomy (since only scholars can pass judgment on 
scholars as such), and accordingly it would be authorized to perform certain functions 
through its faculties (smaller societies, each comprising the university specialists in one 
main branch of learning): to admit to the university students seeking entrance from the 
lower schools and, having conducted examinations, by its own authority to grant degrees 
or confer the universally recognized status of “doctor” on free teachers (that is, teachers 
who are not members of the university—in other words, to create doctors. (1993, p.23). 
Our current demand for production, though, has left behind Kant’s notion that the university 
exists to produce “free teachers” and scholars both inside and outside of the university who, 
themselves, are capable of “passing judgment” on the effectiveness of the institution. 
Again we note that as a result of this demand for production, institutions have relied more 
and more on part-time faculty (June, 2014). These marginalized faculty members are generally 
not treated as part of the “actual” faculty, insofar as they do not participate in curriculum 
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development or faculty meetings and there is no research required of them. Often due to union 
regulations, the adjuncts themselves must work at numerous universities in order to cobble 
together fulltime work, for which they are significantly underpaid and, because none of their 
assignments is full time, they receive no benefits. The shift, then, is from the idea that the 
professoriate is an educated class that should add to the generated body of knowledge through 
research and education to one in which the “professors” are a service class that teach toward the 
end of helping students obtain degrees in profitable fields. The ranks of adjuncts are 
continuously growing as institutions find them a far more financially palatable and 
bureaucratically sound alternative. The fact, then, that these adjuncts rarely participate in any 
form of institutional self-reflection through research and participatory self-governance that might 
endanger the capitalistic ends of the institution is an added bonus. These adjuncts are far too 
busy trying to survive financially and professionally to be any real danger to the corporatization 
of the university, and they are largely ostracized by the shrinking professoriate that sees them as 
an underclass threatening the prestige and quality of the professoriate itself.  
The professoriate finds itself batting down the hatches against a world that is increasingly 
unaware of its worth and increasingly incapable of understanding what it produces. The enemy is 
found everywhere from those in society who lack the knowledge base necessary to understand 
the opaque nature of their research to the part-time faculty, of which two could take on a single 
professor’s course load without the costs of retirement plans, health benefits, and long-term 
commitment. Students, the public, and politicians are disparaged, largely behind closed doors, 
for not having the wisdom to know that what the professoriate produces within the ivory tower is 
essential to human flourishing, while the adjunct faculty members are looked down upon as 
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insufficient scholars and thinkers. The part-time employees have become the proletariat to the 
professorial bourgeoisies.  
As described by Audrey Williams June in the Chronicle of Higher Education, “Across 
the nation, colleges have undergone similar shifts in whom they employ to teach students. About 
70 percent of the instructional faculty at all colleges is off the tenure track, whether as part-
timers or full-timers, a proportion that has crept higher over the past decade” (2014). Where 
once, adjuncts were seen as experts in their field retired or employed full time elsewhere, 
occasionally invited to teach due to their practical expertise, they now teach the majority of 
general education courses at most universities and are often seen as a threat by the full-time 
faculty. The adjuncts find themselves forced to fly below the radar out of fear of the 
administration and, even, the students. (June, 2014) 
 The concern, then, becomes twofold when public perspective of academia is combined 
with the professoriate’s own treatment of adjunct teachers: On one hand, teaching is seen as that 
lowly tool that belongs to a proletariat class of academics, and on the other, research is demeaned 
by the public at large to whom much of it—if not most—is unintelligible, as an unnecessary 
waste of taxpayer funding. To quote, “teaching, we are told, is undervalued in favor of research, 
while research is less and less in touch with the demands of the real world, or with the 
comprehension of the ‘common reader.’” (Readings, 1996, p.1). Thusly, the professoriate must 
be wary of the label teacher and convince itself that such an occurrence could not happen in the 
university because professorial work is of such greater depth and breadth, as they watch the K-12 
system lose self-governance, respect, and tenure.  
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The Faculty 
The professoriate has, at least, a vague awareness that both K-12 teachers and adjunct 
faculty are in constant danger that their respective administrations will fire them as a result of 
student complaints and a lack of student success. June reported in her chronicle article that many 
adjuncts feel pressured to pass students, avoid contentious issues, and reduce the rigor of 
coursework in order to avoid bad student evaluations that may result in termination (2014). 
Simply, there is a growing awareness in the university that being a teacher hired by an institution 
to produce a product means following a corporatized set of rules that do not engage the system 
itself on any critical level. Teacher, as it has been redefined by the corporatization of education, 
now means, “One who provides a degree in exchange for the money produced the consumer.” 
Failure to provide that degree, if the student herself does not learn enough, is not, then, the fault 
of the student, society, or the administrator, but the fault of the teacher who has not supplied the 
fairly purchased product.  
The faculty, as a result of these demands and demeaning definitions, has become divided 
against itself, fundamentally contrary to the very notion of liberal education (Readings 1996). On 
the one hand the professoriate has become wary of the label “teacher,” as it now carries, 
connotatively, the weight of a public servant who is responsible only for the production of 
degreed students, and on the other it must be wary of the part time faculty who fulfill the 
institution’s bureaucratic ends without the annoying complications of having a body of 
professors who, themselves, act as evaluative and guiding force of the university. The faculty, 
thusly, is at odds with itself, seemingly directed towards contrary aims: the professoriate towards 
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increasing the general body of knowledge and the teachers towards the production of profitable 
degrees (Readings and Carter 1996). 
Readings’ claim in The University in Ruins certainly seems to suggest that the battle has 
been lost and the divided house collapsed. “Institutional pragmatism thus means, for me, 
recognizing the university today for what it is: an institution that is losing its need to make 
transcendental claims for its function. The university is no longer simply modern, insofar as it no 
longer needs a grand narrative of culture in order to work” (1995, p.168). Certainly, faculty 
members find themselves trying to construct a grand narrative that will continue to justify their 
existence as academics.  
Readings, though, suggested that this action is hopeless. The world has fundamentally 
changed in regards to what—and who—it values. Whereas a “renaissance man” would once have 
been considered the pinnacle of societal achievement, now, it is a man who makes a tremendous 
amount of money doing almost anything. Academia, without having realized it, has already 
accepted society’s rejection of knowledge and culture as valuable for its own sake. It has locked 
itself behind closed doors and now fights against itself, arguing that one form of knowledge is 
more “true” than another. Moreover, an internal conflict has arisen between “teacher” and 
“professor.” The faculty now find themselves crushed between the notions, if not the human 
embodiments, that teaching is inferior intellectually to research and that research is inferior 
practically to teaching. 
Teachers and Professors  
Not long ago, the researcher, himself, experienced an instance of this tension. In writing a 
paper for publication in the field of post-secondary education, the researcher was required to 
30 
 
change the usage of “teacher” to “faculty.” He was told that the term “teacher” would insult 
faculty in “higher education.” Consider the terminology we use to demarcate teachers and 
professors. Firstly, we use the misnomer—a rather insulting one at that—to discriminate between 
k-12 and post-secondary by referring to one as “higher.” More to the core of the definitional 
distinction is the realization of what the term “Professor” connotes. “Professor” means “to 
profess.” This is not an impressive thing, or something of which we should be proud. “To 
profess” simply means “to tell.” It means “to tell at.” In other words, we profess beliefs. Anyone 
can do that; this speaks nothing to either 1) the content of those beliefs or 2) the effectiveness 
with which one professes them. Being a professor, at its heart, suggests that one tell others what 
to believe in an authoritarian tone while they passively receive that knowledge from “on 
high(er).” Our very terminology smacks of an epistemology of divine revelation. Viewing this in 
conjunction with the perception of teachers as servants to a social and corporate machine makes 
it clear why the professoriate is insulted by the label teacher; the term professor suggests that 
one is free to profess without having to engage the machinery because one is, by default, worth 
listening to. 
Now, more than ever, it is imperative that we come to understand the integration of 
teaching and research in the professoriate. The role of professors as both teacher and researcher 
is simultaneously opaque and at odds with itself. As the professoriate seeks to distance itself 
from what is quickly becoming a service industry of teaching, with all of the indignities of the 
service industry, it relies on research as a means by which to demonstrate that the professoriate is 
producing something of worth that is not reducible to teaching only. There is danger, though, in a 
focus on research as a means by which to distance the professoriate from the corporatization of 
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the university. –Namely, the fact that the corporatization of the university, itself, encourages 
researchers to use students as the means of production. Hence, the students may find themselves 
the dialogical object. 
Publication 
In part, this change in understanding of the university is addressed through publication. 
Publication is a means by which the institution can demonstrate “production” and assess the 
productiveness of its faculty. As a result, many faculty working at post-secondary university 
institutions in the United States are under significant pressure to publish (Gad-elHak, 2004; 
Crane & Pearson, 2011). The pressure has become so intense over recent years that ethical 
questions and concerns are beginning to emerge. For example, in a 2008 editorial for the Journal 
of Clinical Investigation, executive editor Ushma S. Neill wrote, “The academic scientific 
enterprise rewards those with the longest CVs and the most publications. Under pressure to 
generate voluminous output, scientists often fall prey to double publishing, self-plagiarism, and 
submitting the ‘minimal publishable unit’” (p. 2368).  She reported a greater number of ethical 
violations seen by the journal. Neill suggested that these “ethical gray areas” may easily become 
significant and clear ethical transgressions. Researchers who are under the pressure to publish are 
now turning to their own classrooms as research laboratories, which can be used for publication 
in education journals (Hutchings, 2002). Students are now being asked by their teachers to 
participate in research not just outside of the classroom, but inside of the classroom; an 
increasing number of teachers use their own students as research participants as a means by 
which to evaluate their own teaching practices—and, of course,  simultaneously publish (Burns 
& McCarthy, 2010; Gan & Geral, 2010). This research, in which faculty publish findings for the 
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purpose of improving classroom practice (often using their own classes as research populations)  
is known as the “Scholarship of Teaching and Learning” (SoTL).  
  The potential harms to students are significant, and there is a growing body of research 
supporting the claim that students can be and are occasionally harmed when used as research 
participants. The potential to benefit students is also significant (Gordon & Edwards, 2012). The 
depth of the research thus far on harm done to student participants is rather shallow, and the 
breadth of the literature is largely focused on students in medical fields such as psychology or 
nursing. There is a growing body of research that suggests that participatory research, such as 
action research, can benefit students and is, itself, effective pedagogy (Burke & Cummins, 2002; 
Elmes-Crahall, 1992; Holly, Ahar & Kasten, 2005). In fact, Roberts and Allen (2013) conducted 
a qualitative study that suggests that the potential educational gains from using undergraduate 
student participants (such as understanding researcher behavior, increased content knowledge, 
increased understanding of being a research participant) outweighed potential costs such as 
emotional drawbacks. The fact, therefore, that faculty, being under significant pressure to 
publish, often turn to their students as a body of readily available participants and eager 
researchers is no surprise. 
Potential Harms 
What remains unclear is the best way to conjoin the role of teacher with the role of 
researcher in post-secondary education. Few researchers have specifically asked the question, 
“How does the conjunction of faculty as teachers, researchers, and servants affect students?” 
However, the body of research that suggests that students may be harmed when faculty think of 
themselves primarily as researchers is growing. Pat Hutchings (2002), generally considered one 
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of the foremost scholars in SoTL, conducted seven case studies in order to better understand the 
implications of SoTL research on student participants. She concluded that faculty and institutions 
must think carefully about the ethical dimensions of conducting research using one’s students. 
Daugherty and Lawrence (1996) conducted a survey study of 96 male college students in a social 
science course at The Citadel. The students were asked to complete a questionnaire that would 
evaluate their appropriateness for selection for further research. Based on their study, Daugherty 
and Lawrence concluded,  
We agree with those (e.g., McCord, 1991; Sieber & Saks, 1989) who have asserted the 
importance of continually reevaluating the ethics of research practices, and we believe 
that our study underscores the importance of considering the impact of participation on 
individuals. In addition to familiarizing themselves with the American Psychological 
Association's ethical principles (American Psychological Association, 1992) and with 
Korn’s (1988) statement of participant rights, researchers may be well served by having a 
collaborative model of research. As Gillis (1976) suggested, researchers may need to see 
students as unique collaborators in the research process rather than as subjects to be 
manipulated. (p.76) 
Clark and McCann (2005) considered these ethical implications through a double-blind peer-
reviewed investigation of research conducted in the field of psychology. They conclude after 
their review of 23 recent articles and studies that,  
Good research must be based on sound ethical practices, and the obligations researchers 
have are greater if they share other relationships with their subjects. In recent years the 
ethics of research have come under increasing public scrutiny, yet documents such as 
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Research Governance Framework for Health and Social Care (DH 2001) or National 
Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research Involving Humans (National Health and 
Medical Research Council 2001), do not explicitly refer to the issues surrounding 
lecturers researching students, or students researching each other. It may be timely for 
regulatory bodies to consider whether these research relationships need greater scrutiny, 
or governance. In the absence of guidelines, institutional ethics committees are left to 
ensure the integrity of such research. (p.50) 
Comer (2009) further buttressed Clark and McCann’s conclusions with an examination of 
student participants in nursing programs as a vulnerable population. Pecorino, Kincaid, and 
Gironda (2008) similarly conducted a literature review discussing the potential pitfalls of using 
one’s own students as research participants, specifically examining Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) policy and the protections provided by IRBs to students. The research suggests that 
without a set of best practices that are well grounded in ethical standards, well-evidenced by 
current research, and well-argued utilizing sound logic, the harm to students is likely to increase. 
Dangerously, questionably ethical use of students as research participants may become an 
established norm amongst educational institutions as the pressure to publish increases.  
Pecorino, Kincaid, and Gironda (2008) described the following potential harms of using 
students as research participants: 
 Academic: decline in completion and retention rates, decline in success 
rates/GPA, inability to perform at the next level of study, inability to develop and 
use skills that are needed beyond the classroom. 
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 Intellectual: failure to develop critical thinking skills, failure to develop 
information-processing skills, failure to acquire new knowledge. 
 Social: inability to function as a fully educated member of a democratic society, 
inability to realize socio-economic goals (career). 
 Psychological: decrease in self-esteem, increase in hostility towards the 
educator/institution, negative impact on future educational success (self-efficacy) 
 Economic: loss of time, loss of tuition, student loans. 
Consider the following hypothetical cases:  
1) A professor at a university that requires both teaching and scholarship on the part of 
the professoriate has had some difficulty publishing recently in her field of 
philosophy. Out of concern for promotion and tenure, she begins to consider other 
avenues of peer-reviewed publication. She discovers the growing field of SoTL 
research and realizes that some of her classroom activities may be publication-
worthy. In fact, last semester she introduced a change in course method, requiring that 
students now keep self-reflective journals. This is rather unusual for a philosophy 
class, but she found that it was effective. She decides, now, after the fact, that this is 
worthy of publication and begins reviewing the students’ journals for useful data. 
However, the students were not notified at the time of their writing that their work 
might be used for purposes other than their own educational growth. Perhaps more 
concernedly, the professor decides to quote portions of some of the journals to 
demonstrate how powerful journaling in a philosophy course can be.  
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One of the excerpts quoted, although names were changed, included some 
graphic, powerful details of the personal tragedies experienced by one of the students 
who described how philosophical reflection has helped her overcome that difficulty. 
In fact, a few years later, that same student decides to become a philosophy teacher. 
During her graduate course work she conducts research on philosophy teaching 
methodologies, only to realize that her own personal story has been published, though 
without her name. 
Of concern, here, is the realization that student artifacts, while useful for research, are often 
personal to each student. Students do not turn in their work under the assumption that it might 
become public knowledge or that it might be used to forward the professor’s research agenda. In 
fact, such work is often turned in as a matter of trust. I recall, anecdotally, a professor violating 
that trust by commenting in front of a doctoral class about the content of one of the cohort’s 
personal reflections. The class was horrified, and the student in question reported never trusting 
that teacher again.  
Trust requires that we place ourselves in vulnerable positions such that we choose to 
“take an ambiguous path that can lead to a beneficial event or a harmful event depending upon 
the behavior of the other person” (Swinth, 335, 1967). This “ambiguous path” is a vulnerable 
state such that the trusted individual’s capacity to do harm is increased. As such, maintaining a 
trust relationship requires that the potential harm is not actualized. For example, consider two 
persons: “Person A” and “Person B.” Person B trusts Person A. If Person A speaks poorly of the 
trusting Person B when B is absent, B’s vulnerability results in a violation of the trust she put in 
A—greater harm is done because of the greater vulnerability caused by the trust relationship. In 
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so doing, the integrity of the trust relationship is compromised. Thus, “One of the most important 
ways to manifest integrity is to be loyal to those who are not present”—an idea popularized by 
Stephen Covey (2005). Even if students are not present to defend themselves, they exist in a trust 
relationship with their teacher, and, as such, the trusting students are placed in a position of 
greater potential harm. Thusly, even if—as in the case above—the student is not aware how her 
work is being used, potential violations of the trust relationship remain possible.  
If anything, because the student is not present, the demands of the trust relationship are 
even more stringent because the teacher can engage in behavior that may harm the student 
without the student having any ability to prepare herself for that harm. The professor, therefore, 
cannot violate that trust, even after the fact (the student’s graduation, for example), without 
endangering the integrity of the teaching profession itself, as it is grounded in the trust 
relationship between student and teacher (Noddings, 1988).  
2) A professor of foundations of education also regularly publishes textbooks on 
educational psychology. His successful textbook publications include DVD’s that 
demonstrate effective and ineffective teaching techniques. In order to make these 
DVD’s more effective, rather than contrived, he video records teachers in actual 
elementary school classrooms. Each DVD includes discussions of each lesson’s 
strengths and weaknesses. One such lesson includes student manipulation of a 
balance. Students are challenged to understand the way weight at either end of the 
fulcrum changes the balance. Some of the students, as one can see on the video, 
almost immediately grasp the mathematics behind the balance. A few students, 
though—little Timmy in particular—struggle with the concept and do not seem to 
38 
 
master it before the end of the lesson. The DVD commentary discusses this fact, and 
notes that some students like Timmy may just not be cognitively developed enough to 
understand those concepts. In fact, education students watching the DVD often 
cannot help but laugh at how cute and futile Timmy’s attempts to understand the 
concept are. Problematically, though, 10 years later, Timmy, who has struggled 
mightily to become an academic success, has now enrolled in college as an education 
major. The required textbook that he has purchased, now revised over a series of 
editions, still includes the fulcrum and balance video, which, without his realizing it, 
Timmy is about to watch with his education class while his cute antics are laughed at.  
This outcome seems unlikely. Nevertheless, one wonders if the researching professor was 
thinking about the welfare of the videoed students as well as his own publication success. It 
could do serious harm to a young person to realize that he or she is used as the example of a low-
achieving or challenged learner.  
3) A sociology teacher now regularly publishes her findings in the SoTL field. She 
believes this is an important field and that her findings benefit other sociology 
teachers who would like to avoid her mistakes. As in the first case, this professor 
began publishing in this field by reflecting on previous artifacts produced by her 
students. Now, however, she has come to realize that an experimental approach is far 
more convincing. Specifically, if she wishes to show that a particular assignment, 
methodology, or treatment is more effective than other options, she must have a 
control group. As a result, she purposefully divides up her class sections by treatment 
and control.  
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The professor’s article will explore the powerful technique of having students 
teach each other the material before the exam. In fact, she knows this technique is 
effective, because last semester she tried it for the first time and she noticed what 
seem to be significant results. She thinks her findings will be more persuasive, 
though, if she can show that two content identical classes taught in the same semester 
differ only in the treatment. As a result, her 9am MW class will be required to go 
through a rigorous collaborative process of teaching each other the material before 
each exam. Her 9am TR class, however, will not be required to do so, and they will 
study as they see fit. As the professor predicted, at the end of the semester there is a 
statistically significant correlation between the treatment and students’ grades on the 
mid-term and on the final. In fact, the professor notes, with some pleasure, the power 
of her new methodology as she reports her findings: the TR class included two 
students who failed the class, while the MW course had nothing lower than a “D.” 
At issue here is the realization that the researcher has purposefully withheld a treatment 
that she believes, and has good evidence to believe, will help students succeed. In the medical 
profession this is clearly unethical. Medical researchers cannot withhold a known effective 
treatment just to observe the outcome. This fact makes demonstrating efficacy much more 
difficult, but for good reason: at the hearts of both medicine and education is the notion of 
“beneficence.” Note that if education is to be treated as a profession not dissimilar from the law 
or the medical field, then it must hold itself to similar rigorous ethical standards. Allowing two 
students to fail and potentially drop out of college in order to generate a more persuasive paper 
does not demonstrate much concern for the welfare of the students. This is why Peter Markie 
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argued that “a class must be a classroom first and a research laboratory second” (Hutchings, 
2003, p. 29). 
Some may argue that these questions can and should be resolved by the IRB, but consider 
the fact that outsourcing our ethical responsibilities to others does at least two harms: 1) The IRB 
process becomes far more tedious and complex. As the IRB must act both as an ethical and a 
legal agent, those ethical virtues which should be internal to researchers must be accounted for 
by the IRB. Thusly, the IRB is placed in the position of having to do the additional work of 
addressing what are likely obvious ethical problems and contradictions within the researcher’s 
proposal—problems that she should have, in fact, caught herself. 2) The IRB cannot be held 
responsible for the actual implementation and results of every act of research. Things can go 
wrong. Unexpected variables may appear. Once having gained permission to proceed from the 
IRB, numerous opportunities to do harm remain available. The IRB, the institution, the 
participants, the students, and the community all should be able to trust that even when leaving 
with IRB approval, researchers will still hold themselves to the highest ethical standards 
possible.  
Simply, one must wonder if the IRB acts as a means by which to alleviate professors of 
the cumbersome burden of having to be ethical. To some degree, it seems as if the IRB may well 
act as a means by which to outsource virtue. Lynn Sharp Paine (2000), in her article “Does 
Ethics Pay?” noted that corporations, when required to meet a minimum standard of ethical 
action, meet the minimum standard imposed on them; however, her research found that 
corporations, when required to develop their own standards developed more exacting ethical 
standards and were more likely to meet them. One wonders if, similarly, a problem arises within 
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the professoriate such that researchers will meet a minimum standard imposed on them, but 
would meet a higher standard if they were placed at the locus of moral responsibility for the 
ethical standards of their research. 
 
Figure 2. Ethical Research Behavior at External and Internal Locus of Responsibility 
There is an ever-growing body of research that suggests that university IRBs are 
insufficient for ethical research. Researcher complaints that the IRB hinders research are 
common, and, as a result, the tensions between researchers and their IRBs are increasing 
(Klitzman 2012).  Moreover, Melissa Swauger (2009) suggested that IRBs may hinder ethical 
research. She argued that requirements such as anonymity are not “necessary assurance of 
comfort for participants. Some participants may want their voices to be heard” (p. 78). The 
implication is simple: The IRB exists as a means by which to protect the institution from 
litigation as a result of unethical practice, not as evidence that the goal of the institution is to be 
ethical. Research practices that exist for the facilitation of voice as a means by which to combat 
marginalization are, arguably, undermined by restrictions required by institutional IRBs 
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primarily focused on preventing lawsuits. All of this makes it obvious that, with or without an 
IRB, unethical actions can be conducted by researchers, so the question how to develop, foster, 
and promote virtue in a professoriate that will—even if given carte blanche by the IRB—refuse 
to act unethically, remains pertinent and pressing.  
This conclusion is further supported by Miller, Birch, Mauthner, and Jessop (2012), who 
argued that ethical oversight by researchers themselves is preferable to that of IRBs, especially in 
the case of qualitative research. Swauger (2009) similarly argued that qualitative research, in 
particular, could be hindered by IRBs. It is important to note that in both cases the researchers 
argue from a feminist perspective somewhat grounded in the work of Carol Gilligan (1982), 
arguing for the importance of “voice.” McCarron (2013), however, argued that because, “Even 
with the noblest of intentions, researchers may do something that is ethically problematic, either 
through ignorance or unacknowledged bias,” review boards such as IRBs are necessary for the 
effective oversight of researchers who, intentionally or unintentionally, might do harm (p. 3). 
Note that even McCarron’s criticism self-reflectively notes that ethical agents must populate 
such boards. Thusly, it seems reasonable to conclude that the problem of ethical action remains 
one that cannot be solved by the appointment of a board; it remains a problem of identifying 
ethical individuals who then can act ethically as professors or as members of oversight 
committees and boards.   
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Contextualization and Definition of Foundational Assumptions, Axioms, and Concepts 
Roles in the New Paradigm 
 The question, now, is this: Given the corporatization of the university, the pressures to 
publish, and the shift in faculty roles for production, can the distinct roles of “teacher” and 
“researcher” as instantiated through the U.S. University be collectively instantiated as a coherent 
“faculty”? As a qualitative research project, the goal is understanding of the roles. First, those 
roles must be defined, and “role” itself must be understood as a construct. For that reason, Bruce 
J. Biddle’s construction of role theory will be used to set the foundation for understanding and 
distinguishing the different categories of roles. Into this construct, “faculty,” “teacher” and 
“researcher” can all be understood in relationship to each other and to society as a whole. Thusly 
discriminated, those roles then can be defined and then placed in juxtoposition for examination.  
The definition of the roles requires extensive examination of the literature in order to 
understand those roles as defined by philosophers, educators, researchers, professional 
institutions, the process of tenure and promotion, and professional journals. The argument will 
then be built by developing and defining both sets of roles and then placing them in conjunction 
in order to observe their logical, philosophical, and ethical results. These will be used to develop 
a construct that can then be applied to actual practice in order to best understand how the 
conjunction of the roles is best enacted.  
Thusly, a Gertzian “thickly descriptive” account of the roles can be provided as 
conceptual constructs. With those constructs in hand, the task of shaping a coherent whole that 
itself best defines “faculty” as a conjunction of teacher and researcher may be possible. If those 
roles are, in fact, commensurable, a coherent construct can be formed using a discourse ethical 
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methodology that can be used as a means by which to understand the actual instantiation of 
“faculty” in the world. The construct, then, that emerges from the theoretical conjunction of 
these roles provides a theoretical and normative framework that informs how these roles should 
be enacted in practice.  
 Problem Statement  
Given the corporatization of the university, as a device for the production of subjects 
useful to the work force, there is good reason to believe that the educational paradigm is 
experiencing a significant shift. As it does so, it may be the case that the roles of faculty also 
shift, perhaps in ways that are a detriment to student welfare, perhaps in ways that are a 
detriment to the general body of knowledge, or perhaps both. In order to best understand these 
changes, prepare for them, and perhaps even affect them, a clear understanding of the nature of 
these roles and their conjunction is needed. 
Purpose Statement 
The hope is to provide much-needed material to fill a gap in the current understanding of 
the student-teacher relationship when reconstructed as participant-researcher and the potential 
harms that may occur as a result of that relationship. The construct that may be produced through 
this philosophical analysis may help us deploy empirical strategies to better understand both the 
nature of the teacher-researcher relationship and what shape the incarnation the role conjunction 
should take. Step one, then, is to determine what shape the conjunction of the roles can take and 
then step two is to determine, if possible, what shape the conjunction of the roles should take.  
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Research Questions 
1) What coherent construct can be used to best understand the conjoined roles of teacher and 
research within the current educational context? 
2) What form should a construct conjoining teacher and researcher roles take? 
Overview of Theoretical Framework 
 The theoretical framework used in this dissertation will emerge from the conceptual 
framework developed by Bruce J. Biddle—role theory. Two particular understandings of role 
theory symbolic-interactionist and organizational role theory are especially appropriate for 
exploring faculty roles. Those two roles, when conjoined will act as the theoretical framework—
that actors perform roles established by organizations through both codified and non-codified 
scripts and actor roles are generated through interaction in a symbolic communicative medium 
constructed through discourse. That framework in conjunction with discourse ethics as 
developed by Jurgen Habermas will generate the construct needed to develop understanding of 
the conjunction of faculty roles.  
Significance of the Research 
This construct (of determining what shape the conjunction of the roles can and should 
take) would provide a cogent argument, grounded in ethical standards, that suggests a series of 
best practices for faculty who are expected to simultaneously teach, conduct research, and 
perform service. The construct developed through this dissertation may assist faculty and 
institutions in their endeavor to minimize harm and maximize benefit to students by virtue of 
producing a mechanism by which the conjunction of faculty roles can be better understood and 
through which, if the best practices are followed, students are less likely to be placed at risk. If 
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faculty, themselves, do not want to be understood as “teachers” because their work includes the 
role of “researcher,” then we must understand how these roles integrate, if one should have 
primacy over the other, and the potential benefits and harms that face students when educated by 
individuals who instantiate both roles.  
Delimitations and Limitations of the Study 
Of particular import, here, is the fact that criticisms of role theory include the tendency of 
role theory to take a seemingly conformative and normative stance regarding social roles 
(Jackson 1998). That is to say, one might argue that role theory engages and endorses social 
imperatives such that a role occupant should “endorse normative behavioral expectations for 
oneself” as well as hold “expectations for those individuals occupying counter-positions” 
(Jackson 14). While evaluating this criticism is beyond the scope of this work, the tendency of 
role theory to act as a normative construct will prove useful. This work, as it is undergirded by 
role theory—which itself tends toward normativity—will not only provide a description of roles 
as found in the literature, but will suggest that there is a normative component to that role 
construction—simply, that there is an kind of “best practice” when generating and playing the 
role faculty. 
This work is both descriptive and normative, but like all normative work, it must be 
revisable. One cannot simply avoid the traps of misunderstanding by making reference to 
previous research and the thoughts of others in the past tense when discussing what others should 
do. An imperative carries with it a force that requires of researchers the willingness to constantly 
revise and analyze their work. Thus, the very methodology of this work will require active 
discovery and revision through the development of the literature review. There will be no 
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standard “data collection” through empirical observation of the external world. Rather, this work 
will analyze and consider theories and definitions in order to gain greater understanding and in 
order to generate a useful construct. This fact, then, results in a constant act of addendum to the 
literature review as additional language is both discovered and generated that informs, changes, 
and develops the definitions and constructs analyzed. As noted by Michael Scriven (1997), when 
we conduct philosophical analysis, “We are not only analyzing the concept of definition, itself, 
which is a key tool in any kind of research and, hence, in educational research, but also looking 
into the nature of language” (137). It is not unreasonable to suggest, as the work turns now to the 
literature review, that the literature could—if the author had limitless time—continue its 
development and investigation ad infinitum as the roles of faculty are redefined continuously into 
the future. 
Organization of the Study 
This work makes no claim to being merely descriptive. Rather, it seeks to determine the 
basic axioms central to the roles under discussion. Thus, some assumptions must be taken, and 
those assumptions are normative. Once accepted, a device that can be used objectively can be 
developed and applied. This work, therefore, does not simply examine the roles as constructed 
by society; it is not a work of sociology. Rather, it is, to an extent, critical theoretical—it seeks to 
suggest a best construct that is justifiable both in the construct's empirical grounding in the social 
structure that defines faculty roles and in the construct's normative grounding in theories that 
suggest the best possible structuring of that construct. Thus, application of the developed 
construct does more than suggest that the subject does or does not conform to the described 
roles, but also suggests whether they should conform to that role as established by society.  
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Chapter Summary/ Conclusion 
 There are significant changes taking place in universities. These changes are in many 
ways the result of the corporatization of the university. This corporatization, for the purpose of 
producing degrees, has placed the professoriate in an untenable position. They must on one end 
meet the goal of doing what is in the best interest of the students’ knowledge while at the same 
time producing as much research and as many diplomas as they can. For this reason, some 
thinkers like Readings (1996) have argued that the university is in “ruins.” Others, like Slevin 
(2001) argued that universities are quickly becoming “diploma markets” no longer invested in 
student best interest or learning.  
 Regardless of if Slevin and Readings are correct, there is considerable, and increasing, 
pressure on the professoriate to publish. These publications help strengthen a university’s 
reputation and add to its prestige. Those who do not publish sufficiently, and in the right ways, 
will find themselves out of a job. This increasing pressure as led to an increase in unethical 
actions by some faculty (Neill, 2008). This is particularly concerning when the increase in 
pressure to publish has also led to an increase in SoTL research that uses one’s one students as 
the research population (Hutchings, 2002).  
 Students used by their teachers are at considerable risk as discussed by Pecorino, 
Kincaid, and Gironda (2008). These risks include academic as well as intellectual and emotional 
harm. Immediately one wonders if faculty can both meet the need to do research while at the 
same time teaching to the best of their ability. On one hand it would seem that research can 
buttress and inform one’s teaching (Burke & Cummins, 2002; Elms-Cranhall, 1992; Holly, Ahar 
& Kasten, 2005).  On the other hand, it seems as if the pressure to complete research, particularly 
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using control groups and experimental groups, could place students in harm’s way or at least 
place students in a situation in which they are receiving less than the teacher’s best in order to act 
as a control group (Clark & McCann, 2005).  
 The fundamental question then becomes, “Are the faculty roles of ‘teacher’ and 
‘researcher’ commensurable?” One wonders, moreover, if there are some ways in which those 
roles can be constructed to be more consistent while also meeting the demands of the 
fundamental definitions of “teacher” and “researcher” particularly as understood by the domains 
themselves? These questions, particularly pressing as the university continues to become more 
corporatized and both faculty and students are increasingly used for monetary ends, should be 
answered so that those universities which seek to best instantiate faculty as a coherent, and 
ethical, conjunction of teacher and researcher can do so in an informed way. The purpose of this 
dissertation, then, is to ascertain if those roles are commensurable, if they are coherent, and what 
construction of those roles would be most effective both ontologically and ethically. To do so 
will require a philosophical examination of definition through the application of role theory and 
discourse analysis and an ethical construction using the work of Habermas. 
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Introduction 
The purpose of this work is to generate a construct that can be used to better understand 
and analyze faculty roles in post-secondary institutions. Thus, the first step is to define those 
roles. In many ways, the act of definition will be the primary objective of this dissertation. Those 
role definitions, however, will not be generated ex nihilo—they will not simply spring, like 
Athena, fully mature from Zeus’s head. Rather, we will investigate the work of preeminent 
theorists, seminal literature, and institutional documents in order to form those roles. Note that 
“form” rather than “understand” is the operative verb. Although understanding those roles is 
fundamental to this project, the roles must first be in existence to do so. Thusly, we must have in 
hand, metaphorically speaking, the roles which we seek to understand in order to turn them 
about, take them apart, and experiment upon them. 
 In order to address the research question, this literature review will address the basic 
question of “What is a role?” as understood in the context of institutions and organizations. Role 
theory is currently the prevailing means by which to understand roles as social constructs. Thus, 
the first step in this review is the establishment and definition of roles as social constructs 
through the literature. Once having established an understanding of roles as social constructs, the 
review will then consider the major historical developments in role theory and examine, briefly, 
the different kinds of role theory in order to best understand what form of role theory best applies 
to the research question. To further understand and establish role theory as an appropriate 
theoretical framework for this dissertation, the dissertation will then consider contemporary 
forms of role theory and their applications to institutions. Such contemporary application of role 
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theory will demonstrate the appropriateness of the application of role theory to the question of 
faculty roles and the research question.  
Theoretical Framework 
Social Constructs 
Roles, although already in existence, maintain the odd ontological status of both being a 
thing-in-the-world and, yet, not a physical thing. We cannot simply go out into the world and 
physically pick up faculty roles. We cannot, however, simply define those roles as we please, 
either. The roles exist as constructs, specifically sociocultural constructs. Social construct, itself, 
must be defined before we can proceed further. Ian Hacking (1999), in his book The Social 
Construct of What?, provided a useful function for determining if something is a social construct.  
If “x” stands for a social construct, then 
(0) In the present state of affairs, X is taken for granted; X appears to be inevitable (P. 
12).  
(1) X need not have existed, or need not be at all as it is. X, or X as it is at present, is not 
determined by the nature of things; it is not inevitable. (p. 6). 
Hacking noted that “2” and “3” are often the case, though “social construction” does not 
necessarily include them.  
(2) X is quite bad as it is. 
(3) We would be much better off if X were done away with, or at least radically 
transformed (p. 6).  
Hacking then suggested that this function demonstrates that “gender” is a social 
construct. (0) it often appears, in the present state of affairs given the development of society, 
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that gender appears to be an inevitable fact about human beings. However (1) gender need not 
have existed; it is not a biological necessity. Thus, it is a social construct. Moreover, the use of 
gender as it is used is “bad” for many individuals who do not view themselves as “male” or 
“female.” Therefore it may be the case that (3), We would be much better off if gender were 
done away with. He writes,  
Undoubtedly, the most influential social construction doctrines have had to do with 
gender. That was to be expected. The canonical text, Simone de Beauvior’s The Second 
Sex, had as its most famous line… ‘One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman’ (de 
Beauvior 1049, II 1; 1953, 267)... Previous toilers in the women’s movements knew that 
power relations needed reform, but many differences between the sexes had a feeling of 
inevitability about them… One core idea of early gender theorists was that biological 
differences between the sexes do not determine gender, gender attributes, or gender 
relations. (p. 7)  
In other words, “What is socially constructed is not...the individual people… It is the 
classification” (p. 10). The social construct is not the agent in the world. Instead, it is a kind of 
classification. Note, however, that a social construct, as in the case of gender, is not just a 
classification; it is more than a label. The construct has a thing-in-the-world like quality to it, so 
much so that many people today still find gender confusable with biological sex. Certainly, 
feminist theorists would not think of woman as just a label; it is, as a social construct, the way we 
create, interact with, and understand woman. Thus, social constructs take on a life on their own 
through social interaction. Once labeled, we are no longer only interacting with “Jane”; we are 
now interacting with “a woman,” and in so doing we create what it means to be “woman.” 
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Faculty and its subset roles, teacher and researcher, seem to be the necessary result of 
the development of our society (0). Nevertheless, there is no physical fact or biological necessity 
for the existence of faculty, teacher, or researcher. Therefore, it may be concluded that faculty, 
teacher, and researcher are social constructs. Moreover, I am willing to venture that whether or 
not (2) and (3) hold in regards to the existence of faculty depends a great deal on not just how 
individual faculty members choose to act but, specifically, on the way society constructs that 
roll, in essence “writes the script.” This conclusion seems so obvious as to be teleological. Yet, it 
merits noting if Sirc, Readings, Carter and other like-minded theorists are correct and the 
university, as an institution, is undergoing significant changes, perhaps for the worse. If the 
social construct faculty is in the process of being significantly redefined, then, given the 
vulnerable nature of the population which it serves, we have good reason to concern ourselves 
with the potential harms of that redefinition.  
Hacking’s work does seem to effectively apply to faculty and its constituent roles: they 
are socially constructed and not biologically or physically inevitable. Thusly, these roles are 
themselves are not physical. Further insight into their ontological status is warranted, as 
Hacking’s definition does not seem to account for the fact that social constructs are so easily 
confusable with physical facts in the world (as is the case with gender). There are things which 
seem to be supervenient upon the physical world, impact the physical world, and are perhaps 
confusable with “things in the world” and, yet, themselves lack the physical necessity to be 
considered physical objects—thus passing Hacking’s test. What then is the ontological status of a 
role? 
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What is brought to mind is Gilbert Ryle’s (1949) discussion of mental constructs in his 
work, The Concept of Mind. In it, he describes the fundamental problem of identifying a mind as 
a Cartesian substance. The tendency, of course, is to treat the mind-object as a physical thing in 
the world, but one that is just of a different substance kind than the substance constituting the 
body. This Cartesian dualism, though, leads of course to numerous problems that need not be 
explicated here. It suffices to say that Ryle identifies a “category mistake” on the part of 
Descartes in his treatment of the mind as substance as opposed to what can be thought of as a 
construct of the brain. Simply, it is the same mistake one might make in trying to identify a 
university as a conglomeration of buildings because the university is thought of as a physical 
thing (as it has physical effects and we can interact with it physically). Ryle wrote, 
A foreigner visiting Oxford or Cambridge for the first time is shown a number of 
colleges, libraries, playing fields, museums, scientific departments and administrative 
offices. He then asks, `But where is the University? I have seen where the members of the 
Colleges live, where the Registrar works, where the scientists experiment and the rest. 
But I have not yet seen the University in which reside and work the members of your 
University.' It has then to be explained to him that the University is not another collateral 
institution, some ulterior counterpart to the colleges, laboratories and offices which he 
has seen. The University is just the way in which all that he has already seen is organized. 
When they are seen and when their coordination is understood, the University has been 
seen. (p. 6)  
What one comes to realize, upon reflection, is that universities are not physical things, despite 
the buildings. Indeed, we can burn the buildings to the ground and yet the University still exists. 
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This, though, is not reason to assert that the University is a spiritual thing, either. As the 
University can be killed by ceasing the interaction of its most fundamental components through 
the exchange of money and knowledge by students and professors, faculty roles are generated by 
the interaction of faculty, universities, and professional institutions, making them interactions 
generated themselves by sociocultural constructs that also exist as interactions (universities and 
institutions specifically). 
What this means, then, is that the analysis and understanding of these roles that this work 
seeks cannot be conducted by simply defining the roles as we see fit, nor is it a simple matter of 
observing the constructs out in the world. It is not illicit, therefore, for the researcher to consult 
the literature and theorists in order to conceptualize the roles. The roles are conceptual things, 
and thusly, it is through conceptualizing that the roles will be found. The roles, although enacted 
out in the world, are not observable things in the world. We can observe people teaching and 
researching, we can observe the buildings of the university, but we cannot see the roles. Rather, 
we must conceptualize the roles from the interactions of those things. As this work seeks to 
understand those roles at the earliest possible stage, we cannot begin with the inference of the 
roles from the observation of people acting out those roles, as we don’t know how to identify 
them yet as participants in those roles. Simply, we must avoid begging the question. One must 
ask, “How do I know that the subject is, in fact, fulfilling the role of teacher?” To say, 
“…Because she is a teacher,” begs the question and assumes that we already have access to and 
understanding of the role, allowing us to apply that role to subjects in the world. Firstly, 
therefore, we must understand what roles are, and then ascertain what the roles specific to this 
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inquiry are, then seek to understand those roles, and then that understanding can be applied to the 
world for further research purposes. 
One might ask if we are, though this process, begging the question by virtue of seeking to 
tease the roles out from the literature and theorists themselves. This is not the case, however. 
Because the roles, themselves, are sociocultural constructs rather than physical ones, finding 
them is a matter of finding out how they are defined. Their ontological status is one of definition 
rather than physical instantiation. The roles exist as they are defined (perhaps loosely, perhaps 
inconsistently, perhaps unclearly) by society and by culture, so they are therefore best 
understood through those definitions generated by the culture that instantiates the roles. The 
question, then, “Where can these roles be found?” is in the literature that defines the constructs 
lived by society. The question, “Where are these roles lived?” is best answered, “Out in the 
world.” Thus, we begin with examination of those thoughts that construct the roles lived by 
others so that future researchers may examine those lived roles with a construct in hand rather 
than armed only with the assumption that because the subject is labeled as such, that she is such. 
The construct developed here, then, will enable researchers to not only understand the 
roles better but also to identify if those roles are in fact not being instantiated by an agent, 
regardless of the label. Note that sociocultural constructs are more than labels and are more than 
ideas. Simply to say, “I have an idea of the Roman Empire” does not instantiate the Roman 
Empire as it once was in the world. The Roman Empire is more than idea, though it is not 
reducible to a physical thing. It was the interaction of agents in the world in a particular way; that 
interaction has ceased, thusly the Roman Empire has also ceased to be. If, then, society has 
generated the roles under discussion here, then there are those who live it and those who do not. 
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Some agents may even be under the impression that they instantiate a role, due to a label or 
simply a misguided belief, but by virtue of the fact that they do not actually interact in such a 
way as to generate the role, they do not actually fulfill that role. This is not to say that society 
cannot simply change what definitions are and how roles are best defined. This can be and is 
done. One must keep in mind, though, that such deep social constructs do not simply turn on a 
dime. They are thick and rich, and though they may be ever-changing, understanding such 
constructs requires the understanding the narrative arc of definition and construction that has 
lead up to the present moment.  
What has been established here so far, through examination of the literature, is that “role” 
is a sociocultural construct. Hacking’s (1999) work presents social constructs as categories that 
need not exist and are generated by society and culture—they are not physical facts in the world. 
Faculty roles are sociocultural constructs in the same way that gender is a sociocultural 
construct. Those roles need not exist; they are not physical nor inevitable. His work also reminds 
us that sociocultural constructs often can be “bad” insofar as those labels can do harm to their 
occupants (as in the case with gender). We come to realize, then, that if it is the aim of this 
dissertation to better understand faculty roles, we must consider the possibility that faculty roles 
may be similarly harmful.  
One then also understands, through the work of Ryle (1949), that social constructs are not 
just “ideas.” This is an essential realization because it is often our social tendency to ignore 
social constructs as less important than “physical facts in the world.” Our somewhat positivistic 
preference for empirical observation and “hard science” can easily lead to the dismissal of social 
cultural constructs as less powerful or less important. Anecdotally, one might note that recent 
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acceptance of “gender” as a social construct has resulted, largely, in greater focus on “sex” as a 
category, as if gender is now less important. The work of theorists like Bordo (1993) and 
Cixcous (1976) suggests that the converse is true. Gender, as a social construct, has great power 
and impact on society and the humans that live in and are defined by that society. As Ryle’s 
work demonstrates, our understanding of “university” as a kind of function does not make the 
university any less powerful. If anything, the fact that the university is not reducible to its 
physical parts grants it greater power, ensuring that it will continue to exist even after the current 
agents who comprise it die off.  
Moving forward, then, the understanding and formation of faculty roles, here, requires a 
better understanding of roles as social construct. These particular kinds of social constructs must 
be defined before an understanding of those roles can be generated. In this way, the theoretical 
framework of the dissertation is developed—through the establishment and understanding of role 
theory. It is upon role theory that the definitions established by this dissertation will rest. The 
conceptual framework that then will emerge, primarily through the development of the 
methodology, is grounded in this dissertation’s research paradigm. That paradigm rests on the 
fundamental assumptions of role theory: there are roles, and those roles are occupied by human 
agents. 
Review of Relevant Research 
Origins of Role Theory 
To quote Peter Markie (1990), “To be a professor is to occupy a particular institutional 
role, and that role may be defined by certain duties so that claims attributing those duties to 
professors are analytic” (134). This definitional-tautological relationship between roles and 
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duties has its grounding in a sociological theoretical framework known as role theory. That there 
are persons (actors) who, as a result of the scripted expectations of their duties, perform certain 
roles is a theatrical metaphor that we may now take for granted, but we must remember that it is 
a metaphor for understanding human behavior and that the metaphor has its origins somewhere. 
According to Bruce J. Biddle (1986), discussion of roles began to gain prominence in 
sociological circles with the work of George Herbert Mead, Ralph Linton, and Jacob Moreno 
early in the 20th century. Since their work it has been thinkers like Biddle himself who have 
made role theory a mainstay of sociological research, and contemporary conversation regarding 
human interaction in society. The assumption that we inhabit roles or play roles is, in fact, 
relatively new. As Biddle argued, the advent of our understanding of roles as essential to human 
interaction has its grounding in the developments of philosophy, sociology, anthropology, and 
psychology.  
George Herbert Mead is, perhaps, best known as a philosopher. In addition to his 
philosophical work, though, he had a profound impact on sociology in the early 20th century 
(Biddle 1986). Mead’s students collected their class notes and conversations with Mead and 
published them as Mind, Self, and Society in 1934. The work lays out the foundation for the 
notion of symbolic interactionism in which reality is understood as a product of social 
interaction. Through this interaction, reality is constructed by virtue of various social constructs 
formed by participation in society that produces a construct holism. One can see that the 
importance of roles emerges out of Mead’s metaphysic as it is the way an agent interacts with 
others—the role she plays—that generates reality. Even if one is wary of taking on Mead’s 
metaphysical baggage, the proposition that our social reality, the only world to which we have 
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epistemic access, is constructed through our interaction with others, seems cogent and 
descriptive of human engagement with the world. 
Ralph Linton was a particularly influential anthropologist who taught at Yale University. 
In his 1936 work, The Study of Man, Linton engaged the distinctions between status and role. A 
role, according to Linton, is understood as a set of behaviors that are associated with one’s status. 
Thusly, one performs a role by virtue of exhibiting the behaviors correlated to its status. Status 
itself can be divided, though somewhat loosely, between ascribed status and achieved status. The 
former being that status that is assigned regardless of one's characteristics or actions and the 
latter as the result of one’s effort. Roles, then, are understood by virtue of interaction, if one 
conceives as behaviors as one’s interaction with others, the world, or oneself. Thusly, Mead’s 
notion and Linton’s notion both locate human interaction with the world as defining of the self. 
Jacob Moreno’s work was influential in both psychiatry and in sociology. His 
introduction of the treatment technique psychodrama has had a significant impact on 
contemporary role theory (Biddle, 1986). The psychodrama requires that clients, as if in theater, 
play roles, often spontaneously. Moreno reasoned that through the playing of different roles 
while having to improvise within those roles spontaneously, the client may learn how she can 
inhabit new and different roles in her life. This understanding of role, as something one plays and 
inhabits, once again underscores the concept of role as defining selfhood. Note that psychodrama 
is conducted in a group context as playing a role requires interaction with others. Thusly, we see 
again the understanding of a role as that which requires interaction with others for instantiation. 
Without others to whom one may be some-thing, one cannot inhabit a role. That “being” requires 
action and interaction with others in order to both earn status and be ascribed status. The role, 
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then, is an interactive phenomena generated by agents within a social context that acts as a 
defining and selfhood-generating device. To quote Biddle (1986), 
“Roles” are conceived as the shared, normative expectations that prescribe and explain 
these behaviors. Actors in the social system have presumably been taught these norms 
and may be counted upon to conform to norms for their own conduct and to sanction 
other for conformity to norms applying to the latter. (p. 70) 
Thus, role theory has emerged over the last century as a way of understanding human 
performance through the metaphor of theater. Roles, then, are part of a dialectic—an exchange 
between actor and actor, actor and script, as well as actor and self.  
Perhaps because of its philosophical, psychological, sociological, and anthropological 
backgrounds, role theory has enjoyed little consensus. Biddle (1986) stated, “Confusion entered 
role theory because its basic theatrical metaphor was applied only loosely and because its earliest 
proponents [were]… different in the ways they used role terms” (p. 68). By 1986, Biddle came to 
describe role theory, in which he played an essential part in developing, as being sufficiently 
developed, yet, so convoluted that five different perspectives could be discriminated: Functional, 
Symbolic Interactionist, Structural, Organizational, and Cognitive. Although the differences 
between perspectives appear substantial, Biddle argued that “the problem is more terminological 
than substantive” (p. 68). He also argued that although theorists differ in the “assumptions they 
build into basic concepts, they are largely similar in philosophic orientation and in methods used 
for research” (p. 69). Specifically, Biddle held that it was expectation, more than anything else, 
that undergirds role theory: “Most versions of role theory presume that expectations are the 
major generators of roles, that expectations are learned through experiences, and that persons are 
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aware of the expectations they hold” (69). As such, the presumption is that humans are socially 
engaged reflectively and thoughtfully.  
Expectations 
In his earlier text Role Theory: Expectations, Identities, and Behaviors, Biddle (1979) 
explained expectations as relevant to his concept of role theory. He argued that expectations 
were a means by which to explain why roles persist even if the role isn’t “facilitated, rewarded, 
or reinforced in any obvious way” (p. 115). The role theorists, argued Biddle, suggest that the 
agent acts as she does because of “shared expectations:”  
Thus, family members “expect” the father to work in an office and the mother to cook 
meals and succor children, whereas both spectators and players “expect” the audience to 
cheer at a football match and would be surprised if they did so in church. (p. 115) 
These expectations form over time due to prior experience and represent, suggested Biddle, the 
meaningful whole constructed by the agent in order to make sense of those experiences. 
Therefore, “expectation connotes awareness, thus suggesting that persons are phenomenally alive 
and rational in their orientations to events” (p. 116). It is important to note that Biddle was not 
clear by what he means when he wrote, “rational.” I suggest that this rationality cannot mean that 
the agent is logical and consistent in her engagement with role expectations; otherwise, the 
notion of role conflict would be largely meaningless. Rather, rational means that the agent is 
engaged in the world cognitively, not just physically, as a behaviorist or a functionalist may 
explain human action (Biddle, 1979, p. 120). 
 Biddle (1979) argued that the understanding of expectations emerges from the 
dramaturgical notion in three stages. Firstly, there are the analogous scripts, those written forms 
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of rules. These occur in literate societies in the form of codebooks, laws, and rules of conduct. 
Secondly, spoken injunctions emerge as models for behavior. Ceremonial occasions in which 
rules are memorized and repeated en masse exemplify this stage. The Catholic tradition of 
reciting as a community the Profession of Faith is an example of spoken injunctions. Finally, 
there is the notion of “expectation in the mind of the performer. The journeyman carpenter builds 
a beautiful cabinet not because written instructions have been given him (or her) nor because of 
injunctions spoken by others, but rather because of his own internalized standards” (p. 117).  
From these stages much of the rest of our understanding of expectations can be derived. 
 Biddle (1979) noted that a series of assumptions emerge from the stages above that 
themselves must be teased out and examined. One recognizes that we have assumed that 
expectations are sanctioned, or approved of by others. We also assume that there is 
correspondence, insofar as the injunctions themselves match. Therefore, to make sense of role 
theory there must be phenomenal equivalence—the correspondence of the written or spoken 
injunction must also be equivalent to a phenomenally similar experience by the objects of 
expectations—thus generating the assumption that those who experience those expectations 
conform. Through all of this one can also infer that expectations are formed simply; the process is 
one of experience of assimilation to internalized shared expectation.  
 Expectations, then, can be further categorized. There are overt expectations. Those 
expectations are enunciated, so Biddle (1979) referred to them as enunciations.  Enunciations are 
so sufficiently clear and understood that they can be stated. This does not mean that they are 
stated or written down. For example, in the discussion in chapter 4 there will be both discussion 
of enunciated expectations as made clear by faculty handbooks. Some expectations are written 
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down and are clearly inscribed as clear requirements for professorship. One must, for example, 
take attendance in class. That expectation, though is inscribed as well as enunciated. Others, 
however are only enunciated. The handbook may require that teachers show respect for students. 
The action actions though involved in “showing respect” are too numerous to list. Thus the 
inscribed expectation of “show respect” also includes the enunciated expectation (one so clear 
that it could be said) “do not slap your student’s in the face with old fish.” Covert expectations, 
however, either are unknown or we refrain from enunciating for some reason. Biddle (1979) 
wrote, 
Our personal experience suggests that sometimes we hold an expectation but do not utter 
it. Moreover, it appears likely to us that others also hold expectations covertly. Consider 
the mother who threatens and then later punishes her children for not cleaning their plates 
at dinner time. We may also observe that she rewards her children when they do clean 
their plates, is careful to clean her own plate, avoids serving foods that seem to cause 
difficulty, discusses the matter with her husband, or is observed to consult a book on 
child psychology for advice. These several actions become explicable when we assume 
that the mother thinks her children should clean their plates. In short, we posit the 
existence of a covert expectation in her mind in terms of which she takes action. (p. 120) 
It is for this reason that behaviorism and role theory are largely incompatible. Covert 
expectations cannot be observed and they assume a reasoning consciousness behind the eyes of 
the actor. Moreover, one need not assume that even the actor herself is aware of her covert 
expectations as contemporary psychoanalysis would suggest. One may find oneself disappointed 
that a date does not offer to pay his or her portion of a dinner check, only to realize after the fact, 
65 
 
that this expectation was harbored—indeed, it may well be that the actor does not realize the 
expectation is harbored until it is unveiled during conversation with friends or a counselor. Thus, 
in order to make sense of our application of role theory we must assume that others have internal 
states that are not observable, and, as such, we can then infer that everything we observe in terms 
of roles (such as written codes, behaviors, and enunciations) may be insufficient for explaining 
human behavior. Simply, we may find that there are tensions between roles: though no clear 
contradiction is enunciated, it may be inferred, implied, and covertly harbored.  
 There are, of course, also written expectations. Biddle (1979) distinguished between these 
and enunciations because spoken injunctions are fleeting and “have only a transitory effect on 
the environment” (p. 121). However, inscriptions—written expectations—in effect “bind time, 
and the person who inscribes his or her thoughts in the public record has earned a form of 
immortality impossible in the preliterate society” (p. 121). For numerous reasons, Biddle’s 
conclusion, here, seems hasty. Certainly the arguments forwarded in Plato’s Phaedrus suggest 
that writing does not necessarily capture the truth of the author’s intent for posterity—rather, 
writing enables others to subsume and adjust the thoughts of others as they see fit. Further, I 
suggest that the power of dialectic is unintentionally underestimated by Biddle’s statements 
above. The reverberatory power of spoken word, whether passed on through Homeric repetition 
or as an ocean current through a gathered crowd, the transitory effect of the spoken word through 
dialectic is also its force. Thus, an analysis of roles would be sorely under evidenced if it only 
examined the written expectations and ignored those enunciations articulated between subjects, 
behind closed doors, and through implication. 
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 For the purpose of further clarity, Biddle distinguished between “subject persons” and 
“object persons” (1979, p. 122). Subject persons are those who enunciate or hold an expectation 
of another (including oneself). Object persons are those “whose characteristics are at issue in the 
expectation” (p. 122). Biddle went on to clarify,  
The subject person is a real, observable human being. The object person appears only as a 
referenced identity and may not be present, may have lived only in the past (or will live 
in the future), or may even be fictitious—from our viewpoint as social analysts. (p. 122-
123) 
Biddle gave no reason for the requirement that the subject person must be a human rather than an 
institution.  This is one reason why Wickham and Parker (2007) went through pains to 
conceptualize role theory for contemporary role contexts. The comedy that is contemporary 
politics aside, there is certainly a current trend toward the understanding of institutions such as 
corporations as “persons.”  The world of Peter French (1995) suggests this understanding may 
not be wholly insane if corporations are understood as actors that can self-reflectively consider 
their wellbeing into the future and, moreover, act to pursue that wellbeing. Thus, given the 
contemporary understanding of corporations, it may well be that “subject person” may be a term 
applicable to institutions, or perhaps even societies, that themselves hold expectations of others. 
 Biddle (1979) went on to discriminate between individual and shared expectations. 
“Those expectations that are held uniquely by a single subject person are individual 
expectations, whereas those that correspond among subjects are termed shared expectations” 
(p. 123). The application of these two notions helps explain human behaviors when there is a 
disagreement between the individual expectation maintained by a subject person and the shared 
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expectations held, for example, by a family unit. Tension can be generated by the limits of the 
social system, which do not allow for the sharing of expectations across boundaries.  
Of particular importance when engaging the roles generated by societies and institutions 
is the distinction between personal expectations and positional expectations. Personal 
expectations are held for specific object persons such as Nicolas Michaud. Positional 
expectations are held for object person positions such as graduate students. Thus Biddle argued 
that there are three distinctions commonly made for types of expectations: individual versus 
shared, personal versus positional, and expectations  for self versus expectations for other.  
Expectations as understood in role theory are modal. They can, argued Biddle (1979), 
take on the quality of expressing a prescription, cathexis, or a description. Those expectations 
that take on the prescriptive mode are normative and express how the subject should or should 
not react—“Suzie should or should not…”. Expectations are in the cathexis mode if they express 
the feeling about a characteristic—“I do not like it when Suzie…” Those that seem to offer an 
objective statement about the characteristic are descriptive—“Suzie did her job.” The descriptive 
mode can also take on the quality of past, present or future. Biddle, then, uses those modes to 
generate a chart into which different expressions of an expectation can be depicted: 
Table 1 
Prescriptions Cathexis 
Descriptions 
Past Present Future 
I should  I like  
I have I am I will 
I should not I dislike 
She should  I like her action 
She did She does She will 
She should not 
I dislike her 
action 
Modes of Personal Expectation    Adapted from Biddle, 1979, p. 125 
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Different implications result from the different modes of expectations. Statements of prescription 
may indicate consequentiality, so one may infer that the object understands what may occur if a 
certain action is taken. Cathexis may imply that certain rewards or punishments have been 
experienced in conjunction with particular characteristics, while present-tense descriptions 
suggest a stability over time. Biddle, though, did not generate such a chart for positional 
expectations. 
  Biddle (1979) did confirm that the above modes are entirely arbitrary and that 
expectations could be classified under different sets of modes. He wrote,  
In the long run, however, the discrimination of three modes appears to be based on 
semantic features that occur frequently in Western languages. When we speak of the 
characteristics of others or ourselves, we often discriminate those things we believe in 
from those we advocate and those that would please us. There is no intrinsic reason why 
additional modes should not be discriminated. (p. 130) 
In addition to underscoring the way language generates the world and our ability to understand it, 
Biddle’s assertion above suggests that it may be possible to generate a similar chart for positional 
expectations by considering the modes that are emphasized in English when discussing what 
might be considered the expectations of institutional persons. In fact, a similar chart of modes 
may then be developed that diverges little from Biddle’s own, as exemplified below: 
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Table 2 
Prescriptions Consequentiality 
Descriptions 
Past Present Future 
We should  We are rewarded 
We have We are We will 
We should not We are punished 
They should  We reward when 
They did They do They will 
They should not We punish when 
Modes of Positional Expectation    
In the chart above, the only difference from Biddle’s original depiction is the replacement of 
singular pronouns with plural to either indicate the community of subjects that constitute an 
institution (We) or the community of objects that constitute the positional role (They) and the 
replacement of consequentiality for cathexis. Consequentiality is a mode that Biddle (1979) 
himself notes is a potential expectation mode. In order to avoid concerns that institutions cannot 
themselves experience like or dislike, the emphasis, rather, is on behavioristic reward and 
punishment. A philosopher such as Peter French may then infer something similar to affective 
states on the part of an institution from behaviors that seem to demonstrate cathexis, but 
consequentiality meets many of the same categorical needs without engaging metaphysical 
debate on the ontological statues of an institution’s feelings.  
Contemporary Work in Role Theory  
 As previously mentioned, according to Biddle (1986), five perspectives have emerged as 
role theory has developed. Although these five perspectives are understood by Biddle as largely 
differing only terminologically, understanding the fundamental differences between them proves 
useful. Although they are all grounded in expectation, as stated above, they may be said to differ 
in a philosophical sense in the way they use roles to explain human behavior. 
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 Functional Role Theory 
Functional role theory emerges from Lindon’s work. Focusing on the “characteristic 
behaviors of persons who occupy social positions within a stable social system,” roles are 
understood as a shared and normative experience (Biddle, 1986, p. 70). Thus the functional 
perspective is particularly useful when addressing questions of positional roles. Bates and 
Harvey described social structures as “collections of designate social positions, the shared norms 
which govern differentiated behaviors” (Biddle, 1986, p. 70). Thus one might argue, from a 
functionalist perspective, that universities are essentially their collection of faculty, student, and 
administrator roles and the shared norms that govern the behavior of those positions. Functional 
role theory, however, is not as popular as it once was due to its emphasis on positions, as many 
roles do not have a position with which they are associated (Biddle, 1986, p. 70).  
Symbolic Interactionist Role Theory 
The symbolic interactionist perspective can been seen in direct connection to Mead’s 
work. It emphasizes individual agents who, through social interaction, interpret their own and 
others’ behaviors (Biddle, 1986, p. 71). “Actual roles, then, are thought to reflect norms, 
attitudes, contextual demands, negotiation, and the evolving definition of the situation as 
understood by the actors” (Biddle, 1986, p. 71). This places symbolic interactionist role theory in 
a far better position to understand roles that themselves are not positional, and, rather seems to 
understand roles as part of a social dialectic. The difficulty, suggested Biddle (1986), is that the 
symbolic interactionist is often guilty of using “fuzzy and inapplicable definitions” as well as 
ignoring empirical research findings (p. 72). This same fuzziness, though, enables the symbolic 
interactionist to continue to understand roles of actors in positions beyond the expectations 
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expressed by an institution by considering the role as a construct produced by a manifold and 
constantly evolving organism.   
Structural Role Theory 
Conversely, another perspective that has its genesis in Linton’s work is Structural Role 
Theory, which rejects the amorphous quality of symbolic interactionist role theory. Structural 
role theory is a mathematically expressed, axiomatic theory that focuses on structured role 
relationships. The structuralist seeks to identify patterned behaviors that are directed toward 
persons or sets of persons (Biddle, 1986, p. 73). Sympathetic to the structured nature of explicit 
logic, structural role theory avoids many of the fuzzy pitfalls of role theory in general. This 
avoidance of vagueness, though, tends to cause the structuralism to avoid investigation and 
discussion of phenomenal experience, which is, argued Biddle, (1986) part of the broad appeal of 
role theory. 
Organizational Role Theory 
Most empirical research utilizing role theory has taken place from the perspective of 
organizational role theory (Biddle, 1986). The organizational role theorist is particularly 
interested in the development and structure of organizations. “Roles in such organizations are 
assumed to be associated with identified social positions and to be generated by normative 
expectations” (Biddle, 1986, p. 73). Because organizational roles, though, are generated by 
numerous groups (formal associations, informal groups, society at large) and by multiple role 
participation, organizational role theory understands agents as often subjected to role conflicts. 
Biddle notes that organizational role theory “implies that organizations are rational, stable 
entities, that all conflicts within them are merely role conflicts, and that the participant will 
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inevitably be happy and productive once role conflict is resolved” (1986, p. 74). As the focus of 
this dissertation is on the university as an organization, organizational role theory seems apropos. 
Biddle’s criticism, though, must be kept in mind. The roles played by actors are not reducible to 
constructs developed by institutions; the roles themselves are occupied by reflective agents who 
may experience and express expectations in a multitude of ways.  
Cognitive Role Theory 
Cognitive role theory, like organizational role theory, is also a perspective taken in much 
empirical research (Biddle, 1986). Of particular interest is the development of techniques for 
measuring expectations, and measurement of the impact of those expectations on social conduct. 
Cognitive role theory has within it numerous subfields, including studies addressing the 
effectiveness of role playing in psychotherapy, understanding the behavior of group norms and 
the roles of leaders and followers, and research on role taking based on the work of Mead and 
Piaget (Biddle, 1986). Interpretations of role taking have included the assumption that “this term 
refers to the degree to which persons attribute sophisticated thoughts to others” (p. 75). Cognitive 
role theory, however, is criticized for failing to take into account the importance of social 
positioning in favor of focus on the individual. 
 Biddle’s work tends to lend itself to empirical study. Despite numerous criticisms, role 
theory remains useful as a means by which to generate a narrative of interaction through the 
metaphor of the theatrical stage. Biddle, himself, noted that role theory, thus far, has failed to 
generate a set of propositions regarding human behavior about which there is consensus amongst 
role theorists (1986, p. 86). This potential weakness of the system is also a potential strength. As 
long as one does not posit some sort of ontological Truth about role theory, role theory remains a 
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useful means by which to understand why actors act as they do. The review of Biddle’s work 
suggests that role theory is a useful narrative. The weakness that there are numerous perspectives 
is, in fact, again a potential strength. One must posit different perspectives in order to engage a 
fruitful dialogue. Thus, consideration of numerous narrative perspectives which all ground their 
understanding in their narrative that human agents are participants in social context that, as a 
result of experience, produce expectations, produces a broad dialectic. 
Role Conflict 
Expectations, though constitutive of roles, can be contradictory. This fact is of particular 
interest to this dissertation. A role, such as faculty, may be comprised of other roles, such as 
teacher and researcher. These sub-roles, though, exist as constituted by sets of expectations. 
Reason suggests that these expectations cannot be identical sets—otherwise there would be no 
need to differentiate the roles. It may be, though, that the expectation sets comprising 
constitutive sub-roles themselves may be consistent with each other—none of them negate any 
of the others. If they are consistent it may also be that they are coherent, if by coherent we mean 
they are consistent and they imply each other, support each other, or are intuitively constructive 
in conjunction with each other. Conversely, the sets of roles may conflict with each other. The 
sets may be internally inconsistent by virtue of negating each other definitionally, or externally 
inconsistent through an implied consequence that is, itself, incommensurable with expectations 
within a constitutive set. Similarly, constitutive role expectation sets may be internally 
incoherent by virtue of being consistent, and, yet, having no connection to each other or by virtue 
of being externally incoherent by producing an agent whose behaviors are consistent, yet have no 
relationship to each other. Internal and external inconsistency of expectations are called role 
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conflict defined by Biddle (1979): “Role conflict is said to occur when someone is subjected to 
two or more contradictory expectations whose stipulations the person cannot simultaneously 
meet in behavior” (p. 160). 
James Montgomery (2005) attempted to logicize problems of role conflict. His work 
specifically focuses on problems of contradiction in self-concept. His system falls into the 
category of structural role theory as he sought to formulize roles and actor behavior. He wrote, 
“[B]ecause it cannot admit logical contradictions, standard logic is an inappropriate model of 
human reasoning in real-world social systems where individuals experience role conflict as a 
consequence of inconsistent roles, norms, and constraints” (p. 34). Thus, Montgomery used non-
monotonic logic to generate a model of actor behavior that allows for change as a result of 
contradiction.  Simply, rather than a collapse of the system due to the introduction of a 
contradiction, non-monotonic logic mimics common-sense reasoning and allows “tentative 
derivations that may be retracted in light of new information” (p. 34). This suggests that role 
conflict experienced by human agents does not result in a collapse of their rational system—
rather those contradictions may result only in a shift of behavior or may go unnoticed until the 
contradiction itself is articulated coming into the focus of an agent’s practical reason. 
Montgomery’s (2005) work suggests that that agent’s very self-concept is constantly 
revised as the result of interaction with contradiction. Individuals, due to self-concepts and 
norms, choose actions that observers use to make attributions about the individual (p. 34). Thus, 
a feedback loop of self-absorption is generated, in which the agent assimilates the attributions of 
others into the self-concept, revises, and then takes further actions that produce observer 
attribution that themselves are then assimilated (pp. 46-50). Thus, the experience of role-conflict 
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propels the agent forward through a series of behavior corrections aimed at a consistent self-
concept. He wrote,  
My analysis has focused on the long-run ‘absorbing selves’ generated by the social 
system. The central result is that absorbing selves exist only when norms are logically 
consistent. Intuitively, logical inconsistencies in the normative system permit multiple 
attributions, undermining the stability of the self. (p. 67) 
A balance is achieved by the absorbing self that adjusts to new attributions and changes in norms 
as long as they remain consistent. Inconsistency, however, produces an instability that does not 
result, necessarily, in the explosion of irrationality described by formal logic, but rather in a lack 
of balance in the self-concept.  
 Montgomery (2005) did not address the psychological implications of an imbalanced 
self-concept. As is the case with much structural role theory and formulized logical exploration 
in general, focus is given largely to syntactic issues, leaving the semantics for others to engage. 
His work suggests, though, that while a Charles Taylor-esque broken personhood may not result 
from the introduction of inconsistent norms into the framework of an agent’s self-concept, an 
unstable personhood may. Instability, in this case, seems to mean the state of seeking 
consistency. The imbalanced self seeks balance, likely through an attempt to identify those 
norms which must be ignored, changed, or eliminated.  
 Further, although understated by Montgomery (2005), I suggest that the unstable self may 
experience a great deal of psychological turmoil. If Montgomery is correct and the absorbing-self 
is one who exists in a kind of norm-action equilibrium with her environment, then the unstable 
self does not experience such equilibrium. Moreover, if the stable self is an absorbing self, 
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capable of assimilating attributions in a way that makes sense to her and producing actions that 
themselves result in attribution that she can consistently assimilate, then the unstable self may 
exist in a state of impermeability. Simply, she cannot assimilate the attributions of others without 
conflict with the norms that comprise her self-concept, and, thereby, cannot interact with the 
world in a way that allows forward movement of her self-concept. Montgomery’s work seems to 
suggest that the unstable self becomes a stagnant agent, unable to effectively engage the 
environment until a consistent input-output balance is achieved. The person may not be broken, 
but she is immobilized.  
 Role theory, then, provides a means by which to understand relationships between human 
actors and the world in which they live. Role theory provides an understanding of the social 
forces that direct human action and expectations. One can, for instance, hypothesize that 
particular actions by an actor are the result of “role conflict.” Moreover, one may use role theory 
in a predictive way, hypothesizing that unless such conflict is resolved, broken personhood may 
result. Role theory, by no means, provides exhaustive accounts, nor necessarily, given the many 
forms of role theory, consistent accounts of human action. It does provide, however, multi-
variant ways of understanding human actions that are useful as analog devices. If one can access 
the script and the actor’s understanding of the script, one may generate an analogous 
understanding of why the actor acts as she does. For this reason, role theory has proven useful in 
examinations of the interactions of actors within institutions, particularly when there is conflict.  
Applications in Role Theory 
In order to better understand role theory and the ways in which it may or may not apply 
to the university paradigm, current examples of role theory as used in research are warranted.  
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Two particular cases will be explicated here, one in which role theory is applied to a care 
oriented profession, healthcare, and one in which it is applied to a corporation. Not only does this 
research then provide us with an understanding of the ways in which role theory can be used as a 
conceptual framework for research and analysis; additionally, these two studies fit two prevailing 
paradigms in universities: that of care and that of business. Given the research (Readings 1996; 
Carter 2004) that suggests that universities are becoming increasingly businesslike, we cannot 
reasonably only consider role theory as it applies to educational expectations and other care 
oriented paradigms. In order to understand the role of faculty, one must also consider the way 
role theory helps develop understanding of those who work in business, as the university is also a 
business enterprise.  
In “Role theory: A framework to investigate the community nurse role in contemporary 
health care systems” (2007), Brookes, Davison, Daly, and Halcomb investigated nurses’ 
perceptions of their roles. They define role theory as “a conceptual framework that defines how 
individuals behave in social situations and how these behaviors are perceived by external 
observers” (p. 146). The aim of Brookes, Davison, Daly, and Halcomb’s research was to 
establish whether role theory is an effective means by which to understand nurses’ roles in 
contemporary health care. They hinged their research on the work of Schuler, Aldag, and Brief 
(1977), arguing that “role theory can also serve as a conceptual framework in which to relate the 
properties of the organizations and the individual.” In this way, their research serves an excellent 
example of contemporary application, rather than theorization, of role theory. 
 Through their application of role theory as a conceptual framework, Brookes, Davison, 
Daly, and Halcomb (2007) first established that the “nursing role” can encapsulate several 
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discrete tasks: personal caretaker, clinician, educator, manager, administrator, and researcher (p. 
147). Note that these tasks, themselves, may be understood as sub roles within the “nursing 
role.” The application of role theory is used by the researchers specifically to establish how the 
nursing role is established. They came to understand it through a “role episode” (Thomas & 
Biddle, 1966): “A role episode is a cycle of role sending, a response by the focal person, and the 
effects of that response on the role senders” (Brookes, Davison, Daly, & Halcomb, 2007, p. 149). 
Nurses, then, are understood by the researchers as role occupants who receive a sent role. 
 Role senders have particular expectations and anticipations of the role occupant’s 
response to the role expectations, in the case of Brookes, Davison, Daly, and Halcomb (2007), 
such a role sender may be a community nurse overseeing the role occupant. That supervisor has 
particular expectations of the role occupant that themselves comprise the “sent role.” Having 
received the “sent role,” the nurse/role occupant performs the role as enacted through behavior. 
That performance is judged by social norms, rules, demands, and the expectations of the role 
sender as well as society at large (p. 150). “In essence, this ‘role episode’ or ‘role negotiation’ is 
real-life behavior with all the complexities of genuine social situations” (p. 150). Simply, they 
argue that the role occupant does not just enact the role set, but, rather, participates with the other 
actors in creating a dynamic and ever shifting role interaction. In this way, the definition of a 
“mutually satisfactory definition of the role” is collaborative (p. 150).  
 Brookes, Davison, Daly, and Halcomb (2007) focused particularly on role conflict to help 
further develop understanding of nurse actors. They suggested that role conflict emerges when 
incompatible roles are required of the actor: “In meeting one set of expectations, the role 
occupant is unable to meet the expectations of another group” (p. 150). Further, the researchers 
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focused on a specific form of role conflict defined by Burke, et al. (1991). “Role overload” exists 
when the demands of a particular role exceed the individual’s capacity to undertake the given 
role” (Brookes, Davison, Daly, & Halcomb, 2007, p. 150). The role occupant understands what 
is required but lacks the ability to perform the role due to limitations on time, skill level, 
education or other such factors. In application to nurses, the researchers wrote,  
This might occur when a newly graduated nurse is allocated a clinical case with a level of 
complexity beyond their clinical competence or when an experienced nurse with a 
complex clinical case load is given additional administrative duties and is unable to 
complete both aspects of the role. (p. 150) 
Note, then, that role theory goes beyond a prima facie assumption that an agent simply cannot 
perform a particular task. The role itself and one’s ability to perform the role, both in the eyes of 
the occupant and sender, are both placed in jeopardy.  The actor is not simply being asked to do 
more than she can do. She is being required to perform a role that she cannot. Thus, her own 
understanding of the situation may not be reduced to “I cannot perform this task.” It may, rather, 
be understood as “I cannot succeed as a nurse.” 
 Role problems can also arise, argued Brookes, Davison, Daly, & Halcomb (2007), when 
a role is ambiguous. Role ambiguity is understood as a lack of clarity regarding projected roles 
and expectations (Major, 2003; Schuler et al. 2007). Brookes, Davison, Daly, and Halcomb 
(2007) provided the following example of such role conflict caused by role ambiguity: “the 
traditional role and scope of practice of community nurses has become threatened by the 
increasing numbers of specialist services and there is an increasing potential for service 
duplication and conflict (p. 151). Simply, nurses may not understand what their expectations are. 
80 
 
It seems, in their example, that role ambiguity arises not just because of a lack of clarity on the 
part of the role sender, but because there may be a lack of clarity regarding the role sender itself. 
One may be unsure who the role sender actually is. In this way, role conflict and ambiguity may 
find themselves intertwined. The role occupant may be unsure as to which set of expectations to 
follow and conflict arises when those expectations are inconsistent with each other.  
 Both of these notions—role conflict and role ambiguity—may provide greater 
understanding of faculty roles as well. Understanding that role conflict may exist if the faculty 
roles of teacher and researcher require inconsistent acts would be revealing and concerning. It 
may also be the case that there is ambiguity regarding role expectations or role senders. Should 
occupant of the “teacher” role focus primarily on the expectations sent by students and 
professional associations, but researchers focus primarily on the expectations of the public at 
large and the institution? It may well be that such ambiguity leads to role conflict as well. If 
students send the expectation that faculty place their welfare first, but the institution expects that 
faculty will fail, regardless of pedagogical intervention, a certain percentage of students, then 
role conflict arises. Brookes, Davison, Daly, and Holcomb (2007) described the result of such 
conflicts and ambiguity in health care as “role stress and role strain” (p. 152).  
 According to Hardy and Conway (1998), role stress is a social condition in which the 
obligations of the role are poorly defined, conflicting, or impossible to meet. “Role stress 
precipitates role strain that manifests itself in frustration, tension or anxiety” (Brookes, Davison, 
Daly, and Holcomb, 2007, p. 152). Such role stress and strain may result in severe problems for 
an institution. “When role strain is prevalent, dissatisfied tension-ridden healthcare workers may 
be drained of energy and commitment to both the organization and their professional values” (p. 
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152). Certainly, then one may be concerned that potential role conflict between “teacher” and 
“researcher” leads to the above described problems. If it is the case that such role strain exists 
among faculty, perhaps by the very nature of the roles defined for them, then role theory 
provides a potential explanatory device for faculty actions. If, for example, there is an increase in 
unethical activity among faculty, role theory may suggest that it is due to the decrease in the 
commitment to organizational and professional values described above. Note that, as discussed 
in chapter 1, such an increase has been observed.  
 As a result of both the understanding developed of nurse roles through the application of 
role theory and the predictive power of role theory (particularly through the notions of role 
conflict and role stress) Brookes, Davison, Daly, and Halcomb (2007) argued that role theory is 
an effective means by which to understand nurse behavior. Moreover, role theory provides a 
means by which to understand role changes. To quote, “From a structuralist perspective, the role 
of the community nurse in Australia has evolved significantly over the last fifty years” (p. 153). 
That structuralist perspective enables researchers to make claims regarding why the role has 
changed: “The community nurse role has responded to social, political and economic 
perspectives together with changes in both global and national healthcare management” (p. 153). 
Moreover, they can make claims as to how such role changes explain changes in actor behavior: 
“An understanding of role perceptions and interactions can assist in the advancement of 
professional issues decreasing role conflict and role burden” (p. 153). As a result, the researchers 
suggested the need for further exploration and testing of models based on role theory in order to 
better “facilitate the professional development of community nurses” (p. 153). Such exploration 
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and conceptual testing of faculty models is the primary goal of this dissertation in order to better 
understand the best means by which to instantiate the role “faculty.” 
 Marginson and Bui (2009), in their “Examining the human cost of multiple expectations,” 
used a survey of middle-level managers to show that role conflict can lead to a decrease in 
performance. They considered, through field research, a series of coping strategies that may help 
alleviate the stress of such role conflict. In their analysis they suggest that “positive outcomes 
may result from establishing forces for ‘creative innovation’ alongside ‘predictable goal 
attainment’” (p. 59). It is important to note that these positive outcomes only resulted in cases in 
which the manager was able to “cope with multiple, conflicting role expectations” (p. 59). Their 
research, thus, to some degree suggests that the best way of alleviating the stress of role conflict 
is to hire managers who are good at dealing with role conflict.  
 Margison and Bui (2009) argued that managers often confront multiple, often conflicting, 
role expectations. Moreover, they noted that managers are often expected to react positively to 
multiple, yet contrasting, role expectations. Such conflicts, the prevailing paradigm of business 
suggests, lead to “creative innovations” and “fruitful dynamic tensions” (p. 60). A manager may 
be required, for example, to acquire material that is unavailable through normal channels while at 
the same time being prohibited from using anything other than normal channels (Kahn et al., 
1964, p. 20). Thus, the manager may find a way to acquire the material, but her stress results 
from the fact that said acquisition may be either dubbed “innovative” or “illegal” depending on 
the judgment of the role sender.  
 It is important to note, here, that the role stress experienced by the role occupant is in part 
the result of the inability to predict the response of the role sender in the role cycle. Because 
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there is a contradiction inherent to the expectations themselves, any response may result. In a 
philosophical sense this is known as “explosion.” Contractions, propositions such that both “A” 
and “Not A” are held to be true result in an infinite number of possible responses. To place the 
problem in ordinary language, if I am told to both write my dissertation in its entirety and not to 
write it at all, my response becomes difficult to predict because any response is warranted. I 
cannot tell if the expectation requires that I do or do not write my dissertation.1 In the case of a 
manager who is required to take on conflicting roles, she cannot predict with any certainty the 
response of the role sender. The manager may examine the role of the sender and attempt to best 
articulate which expectations are associated with that role (Is my supervisor occupying a role that 
is more rule based or “innovative”?) but she cannot be sure. Either action may result in either 
dire consequence or significant reward, hence the role stress.  
 Such role conflict, argued Margison and Bui (2009), begins as objective role conflict but 
becomes psychological role conflict. “Psychological role conflict arises when the manager 
perceives objective role conflict and assesses that failure to comply with conflicting expectations 
may have potential negative consequences” (p. 61). Margison and Bui argued that psychological 
role conflict can lead to significantly diminished performance on the part of the individual actor. 
Resultant effects may include “job dissatisfaction, a perceived inability to influence decision-
making, an unfavorable attitude toward the superior, and lower levels of reported performance” 
(p. 62). Khan (1974) argued that such psychological role conflict can harm one’s health. 
Moreover, as argued above in the discussion of Montgomery (2005), it can lead to a sense of 
broken personhood.  
                                                 
1 See the work of Graham Priest for more detailed analysis on the problem of “explosion” and potential solutions 
to violations of the law of non-contradiction.  
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 Margison and Bui (2009) collected data from a survey of managers of a major 
telecommunications corporation. In so doing they tested two hypothesis: 
H1: Combining expectations of innovation with expectations of budget-goal attainment increases 
psychological role conflict, leading to a decrease in performance. 
And 
H2: Combining expectations of empowerment with expectations of budget-goal attainment 
increases psychological role conflict, leading to a decrease in performance. (p. 63) 
Additionally, the researchers engaged in field study in order to better understand the 
organizational structure and hierarchy. The survey results were measured using qualitative 
analysis techniques in addition to the inclusion of in-person interviews with managers and 
narrative analysis. Kahn et al’s (1964) instrument to measure role conflict was used to access the 
results of the survey for correlation at a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.71. The result of their factor 
analysis and SEM results present “significant path coefficients” suggesting modestly high 
reliability and internal consistency (p. 71). The survey then suggests a significant interactive 
effect on role conflict and an indirect negative effect on performance. The results also suggest 
that, aside from budget-goal attainment, expectations alone have no statistically significant 
impact on levels of role conflict. Thus, hypotheses 1 and 2 are supported.  
 The results of the interviews also supported the above conclusion, according to Margison 
and Bui (2009). Managers reported making budget “trade-offs” in order to meet the need for 
innovation. Those managers who were capable of making such tradeoffs described themselves as 
having low levels of psychological conflict. Those who were capable and willing to make such 
tradeoffs were also the ones who reported and were shown to be the highest performing 
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managers. The researchers reported, “Our study contributes evidence to suggest that… high 
performing managers may be better able to cope with multiple, conflicting role expectations 
involving budget-goal attainment” (p. 75). At no point in their research did Margison and Bui 
suggest that a potential solution to such objective role conflict and psychological role conflict 
may be generating consistent expectations of managers. Thus, their research supports that role 
conflict can lead to low performance, but also supports the best means by which to improve 
performance is to hire managers who demonstrate the ability to cope with conflicting role 
expectations.  
 One wonders, though, if such recommendations address the heart of the problem. Is the 
best means by which to deal with role stress hiring people who are good at dealing with that 
stress. If anything, this seems to suggest a kind of social comfort with the idea that agents should 
act in inconsistent ways. Such comfort is especially disconcerting in care professions, such as 
healthcare and teaching. I remain unconvinced that the best solution to the potential conflicts 
generated by inconsistent researcher and faculty roles is hiring faculty who are comfortable with 
harming students when the institution demands it while at the same time occupying a role in 
which the students as role sender expect to be treated benevolently. It would seem that such 
solutions, if anything, are likely to encourage deception and duplicity. 
 Biddle’s (1997) work seems to demonstrate that it is best if institutions provide consistent 
roles. Recall that Khan (1974) argued that such role conflicts can lead to health problems. It is of 
importance to note, then, the significant difference between the ways of dealing with role conflict 
between the healthcare paradigm and the management paradigm. In their 2007 research, 
Brookes, Davidson, Daly, and Holcomb suggested that the role sender should address the 
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concern of conflicting expectations. There is no discussion of hiring those nurses who are better 
able to deal with inconsistent expectations. In the corporate paradigm, however, Marginson and 
Bui (2007) made no mention of role senders assessing their inconsistent expectations and instead 
suggest that higher performance is correlated to the ability of managers to cope with differing 
expectations.  
 French’s (1995) discussion of Corporate Internal Decision (CID) structures illuminates 
the way differing institutions may address questions of inconsistency in role expectations. The 
CID structure is the summation of corporate policy, stated objectives, unstated objectives, and 
other such rules that comprise the decision making process of the corporation. Although new 
agents may enter and exit the corporation, the CID structure largely stays the same, as it is the 
foundational organizational belief set that governs the behavior of the institution. If the CID 
structure requires that its managers be both willing to be innovative and yet follow the rules, then 
the inconsistency is at the very heart of the corporation itself. If, on the other hand, the CID 
structure is care-centered and places the welfare of individuals as a primary concern of the 
institution, then such inconsistencies are undesirable if they lead to psychological role conflict as 
described by Khan (1974). 
 Note that while community nursing is not a corporation, it is an institution, which may 
also have a CID structure. Social institutions and vocations may not often be as explicitly defined 
by a written CID, yet they are governed by a series of norms and rules both explicit and implicit 
to the institution. It seems that Brookes, Davidson, Daly, and Halcomb’s (2007) research 
indicates that the flexibility of such institutional CID structures might be at the heart of the 
emerging role conflicts. Unlike a business CID structure, which may be more explicitly stated, a 
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community CID structure may change with the personalities that instantiate it, as it is not as 
clearly defined through written pronouncements, goals, and corporate philosophies. Thus, as the 
institution changes, new personalities occupy supervisory roles, new expectations may arise that 
conflict with old expectations or current expectations. The ideas put forth by Brookes, Davison, 
Daly, and Halcomb (2007) seem to suggest that such ambiguity is potentially harmful and the 
institution would do well to clarify its expectations. 
 Perhaps a bit disconcertingly, corporate CID structures may well be built with an 
assumed inconsistency. Whereas the more flexible CID structures of community organizations 
may result in greater numbers of role conflicts, the notion that inconsistency, particularly when it 
may bring harm to others, is undesirable provides industries such as health care with imperatives 
to remove the inconsistency. Conversely, the nature of corporations to embrace inconsistency in 
order to maximize profit while simultaneously maximizing efficiency and benefit does not result 
in an initial inclination to address the inconsistency at the heart of conflicting roles. Rather, the 
solution becomes to hire those who can deal with such conflict. Note, however, that Margison 
and Bui’s (2009) research suggests that managers who are most capable of coping with such role 
conflict know when to make tradeoffs. Simply, they know that they cannot meet both sets of 
expectations fully and are capable of—perhaps comfortable with—failing to meet those 
expectations. Certainly, this kind of risk-taking behavior is at the core of business and profit 
making, and may not be inherently harmful. 
 We must consider, though, in the context of this dissertation, if such tradeoffs are 
desirable if the roles of teacher and researcher lead to role conflict. Is the best solution one that 
matches the paradigm of health care, thusly suggesting that we change the institutional 
88 
 
requirements, or one that matches the paradigm of business, suggesting that we hire those who 
are comfortable making tradeoffs? The obvious concern is how often such tradeoffs can lead to 
unethical behavior. In the context of Margison and Bui’s (2009) research, such tradeoffs were 
often in terms of budget. The manager was willing to risk lower profit in order to meet a long-
term goal or expectation. Making such tradeoff making may not always necessarily be so 
innocuous. Consider the case of the Ford Pinto. The trade off in that case came at the cost of 
human lives. Ford, once having conducted a cost/benefit analysis, determined that the tradeoff 
should be paying lawsuit damages rather than recalling the explosive automobile. From the 
perspective of the corporation, the tradeoff was entirely a financial one: should one take the cost 
of refitting the bumpers or should one take the cost of paying lawsuits of families who lose loved 
ones? That financial cost, though less in the case of the lawsuits, is not necessarily justifiable 
ethically; moreover, it was likely inconsistent with the corporate philosophies espoused by the 
corporation CID structure. 
 Consider recent allegations against General Motors (GM). With little difficulty, a brief 
online web search locates numerous community initiative pages from 2001-2010, a time in 
which the company repeatedly asserts its vested interest in the welfare of its consumers. Yet, at 
the same time, the corporation was knowingly producing cars that did not meet safety 
standards—resulting in numerous deaths. Such violation of their own claims to beneficence seem 
only possible if their CID structure itself allows for contradiction, hence the danger of 
contradiction in a CID structure. We must consider, therefore, the possibility that even if many 
educational intuitions allow for inconsistency and role conflict in their role sending, such 
inconsistency may be undesirable ethically. One would be especially cautious to embrace 
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inconsistency, as Margison and Bui (2009) seem to have done, when taking into consideration 
the health of the role takers (Kahn, 1974). Can we delineate when faculty should make ethical 
tradeoffs for the sake of research, pedagogy, or their careers? The research above seems to 
suggest that the answer itself will emerge, definitional, from the paradigm of the institution and 
its CID structure. If it is a care-oriented institution, unlike many corporations, then the structure 
may demand that such tradeoffs minimize harm to individuals. It is noteworthy, however, that 
educational institutions may be at a crossroads—as both Readings (1996) and Carter (2004) 
argued—as universities take on greater and greater business-like roles. 
Suggested Improvements to Role Theory for Contemporary Application.  
One may criticize role theory when it is used to understand organizations. For example, 
there is a lack of clarity or agreement regarding whether role conflict, role ambiguity, and role 
overload are separate constructs or if they exist as components of each other (King & King, 
1990). Wickham and Parker (2006) concluded that organizational role theory (ORT), in 
particular, suffered from numerous difficulties. For example, ORT is currently insufficient for 
explaining the behavior of agents within organizations and must be buttressed with the inclusion 
of notions of multifaceted employees, employer recognition/facilitation, and 
compartmentalization. Perhaps most generally, role theory suffers from its status as an analog 
device. It is a means by which to make an analogy between agents in the world and theater, and, 
as such, is always subject to myriad interpretations and the danger of verification bias.  
 This work accepts the suggestion made by Marginson and Bui (2009): role conflict, role 
ambiguity, and role overload will be considered separate constructs that may exist in a subset 
relationship. Understanding them as distinct, though, provides the opportunity for greater clarity. 
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Thus, it may well be the case that role ambiguity is a form of role conflict, but in the discussion 
here clarity is facilitated by noting that a particular role ambiguity within the university creates 
role conflict that may lead to role overload rather than simply that, “there is role conflict.” This 
seems reasonable in light of the fact that role conflict need not be caused by ambiguity, but may 
be caused by conflicting expectations about which there is nothing ambiguous. In the parlance of 
logic, this is the distinction between problems of contradiction and problems of vagueness. The 
logical intuition that we should avoid contradiction is not endangered by our willingness to 
embrace the possibility that some of our ideas are vague. We should assume, then, that because 
an institution is vague regarding its expectations, the faculty are encouraged to act inconsistently. 
Similarly, if we discover that our expectations of teachers and researchers are inconsistent, we 
may not want to absolve universities for such inconsistency by attributing it to a “vagueness” 
problem.  
 In “Reconceptualising organizational role theory for contemporary organizational 
contexts,” Wikham and Parker (2006) argued that organizational role theory as it is currently 
understood is inadequate for application to contemporary organizations. They stated, “The 
source of the controversy stems from the observed difficulty firms have with integrating the 
work-role demands they place on their employees with the increasingly complex array of non-
work roles employees enact for their overall well-being” (p. 441). Simply, Wikham and Parker 
contend that changes in the way we think about work and organizations make ORT outdated. 
Classical ORT, for example, cannot adequately address concerns regarding the integration of 
work life and home life due to technology. Many professionals—if not most—are now 
considered “on-call” at all times because we have email. An employee who neglects to answer 
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her email over the weekend, although she is not officially scheduled to work on those days, will 
likely find herself facing ridicule or discipline for her “oversight.” Members of organizations are 
multifaceted in ways that were not the case during the development of ORT. 
 As stated earlier in this chapter, ORT focuses on the roles that individuals enact in 
systems that are pre-planned, task-oriented, and hierarchical (Biddle, 1986). Work roles 
prescribe the behavior that employees are expected to enact effectively (Katz & Kahn, 1966). As 
a result, argued Wickham and Parker (2006), ORT implies two essential points: 1) each 
individual confers and accepts a “role” that is reflective of the organization’s CID structure and 
2) in order for the organization to function efficiently the roles must be effectively 
communicated and understood (p. 443).  
 According to Biddle (1986), Organizational Role Theory hinges on four assumptions: 
1) That an employee “take” a role given to them by members of the organization. 
2) There is consensus regarding the expectations of the roles. 
3) Role takers comply to the behavior expected of them. 
4) Role-conflict will arise if expectations are not consensual. 
The first assumption is that employees “take” a role conferred upon them by the organization. 
Wickham and Parker (2006) argued that this assumption is insufficiently robust argued because 
employees are now often required to take on multiple roles in the workplace. Those roles may 
not have been made clear, nor “taken” by the employee; they are simply expectations that the 
employee take both the explicit roles and the implicit roles in their multiplicity. Employees now 
multi-task in a way that requires that they enact multiple roles (Lindbeck & Snower, 2001). As a 
result, employees may take the following actions to address the conflicting demands: 1) choosing 
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between roles, 2) compromising the behavior expected in the role, or 3) withdrawing from the 
situation entirely. What was referred to by Marginson and Bui (2009) as a “trade-off” is a 
significant concern to theorists such as Wickham and Parker (2009), Lindbeck and Snower 
(2001), and Vliert, (1981). The assumption that employees take on a singular role given to them 
by an employer is too simple for contemporary work life. Thus, Wickham and Parker (2009) 
argue that ORT must now take into account the notion of a “multi-faceted” employee. 
 Wickham and Parker (2009) also took exception to the classical ORT assumption that 
employees and employers share the same understanding of role expectations. The idea that there 
is a pre-defined, agreed-upon consensus on role expectations does not take into account “the 
complexity of the array of non-work roles enacted by employees that impact at the workplace, 
and the fact that these roles necessarily change over time” (p. 446). The work-life balance as 
shifted and continues to shift as a result of technology that enables employers to contact 
employees at any time and any place, but also enables the employer to request that work be done 
at any time and any place. Long gone are the days where a boss was unable to reach an employee 
on vacation. Moreover, the employee would no longer have to leave the vacation in order to 
return to the workplace to complete some piece of emergency business. Now, one need not have 
one’s laptop to bring work on vacation, simply having a smart phone makes it not unreasonable 
for an employer to request that a vacationing employee answer a set of pressing emails or other 
such work. Thus, the classical ORT assumption that there is a pre-defined and static set of 
expectations for employees is insufficient. ORT must be updated in order to allow for a new 
understanding that employees upon entering employment will likely be asked to fulfill many 
different roles and meet many different expectations over time (Wickham & Parker, 2009).  
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 Finally, Wickham and Parker (2009) took objection to the role-conflict assumption of 
ORT. To be clear, this is not to say that they argue against role conflict. They do argue that role 
conflict is the result of conflicting role expectations. However, they argue that those conflicting 
role expectations are insufficiently explicated in classical ORT. “An increasing body of 
research…indicates that role-conflict in the work place can actually result from conflict between 
work-roles and non-work roles” (p. 446). Thus, role conflict in ORT is not only the result of 
inconsistent roles or role ambiguity in the work place. One may find that one’s roles as father 
and as employee conflict, and as a result suffer great job dissatisfaction. One may also find that 
one’s roles as father and as employee cause role overload. Although this addendum to classical 
ORT seems obvious and intuitive, it is important to note that due to the shift in work and home 
life balance, the potential for such role conflicts has become even more prevalent.  
 The understanding of classical ORT as revised to integrate multifaceted roletaking 
situates ORT as perhaps the best means by which to understand the role of faculty. Initially, one 
may be concerned that ORT does not take into account the many obligations of teachers and 
researchers outside of the institution. ORT, though, that considers role taking as multifaceted is 
well suited to the consideration of faculty beyond just as described by the institution. This 
analysis, then, will rest heavily on organizational role theory, but as revised to understand faculty 
as multifaceted and engaged in a role that is constantly in flux, and defined by expectations that 
originate both from the university and outside of it.  
 The final concern mentioned at the beginning of this section is of role theory as 
particularly subject to confirmation bias as a result of its existence as a kind of analog tool. Like 
the face of a clock, role theory does not provide a direct and exact description of the state of 
94 
 
affairs; it provides an analogy through which to understand the current state of affairs. We 
understand role takers like actors who accept scripts that, as discussed above, are ever changing. 
We must therefore be careful to not simply use role theory as a way to explain behavior however 
we see fit. The best means by which to avoid the problem of confirmation bias in this case is to 
avoid the misuse of analogy in the first place. As discussed by Eisner (1991), the goal of 
qualitative research is not digits or facts about the world, but understanding. Analogies, as 
metaphorical devices, enable understanding rather than knowledge in the positivistic sense. For 
example, understanding that his “anger is a towering inferno” also requires the understanding 
that “his anger was not a towering inferno.” The metaphor clarifies the intensity of the anger 
while at the same time obfuscating the fact in the world. 
 When applying role theory to the world, one must keep in mind that one is applying a 
metaphor to the world in order to draw an analogous relationship. Those explanations that help 
generate more understanding are preferable, but not necessarily “right” in a factual sense. Rather, 
they simply help us better make sense of the world. Thus, I suggest a kind of coherentist picture 
of role theory rather than a correspondent one. Conclusions derived using role theory should not 
be judged based on their “correspondence” to reality, but rather by their coherence to the rest of 
what we know—how much sense they make when considered with the rest of our body of 
knowledge.  
 A final concern, previously unmentioned but of particular relevance to faculty roles, was 
examined by Jiao, Richards, and Hackett (2013). In their “Organizational citizenship behavior 
and role breadth: A meta-analyitic and cross-cultural analysis” Jiao, Richards, and Hackett used 
role theory to analyze organizational citizenship—the importance placed on courtesy, initiative, 
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leadership and other behaviors for the good of the organization. Their research was a meta-
analysis of thirty one studies in order to ascertain the perspectives of employees regarding the 
importance of organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) to their jobs. In this analysis, the 
researchers determine that, to the detriment of our organizations, employees do consider OCB 
part of their job, but employers tend to narrow job expectations in regards to those behaviors. 
“Organizations relying heavily on OCB for their success may need to adopt HR practices that 
convey broader role expectations” (708). Jiao, Richards, and Hackett’s findings seem to echo the 
argument made by Wickham and Parker (2009) that classical organizational role theory needs to 
be adjusted to take into account the multi-faceted nature of contemporary work-life.  
 The meta-analysis suggests that role theory and those who apply it need to take more into 
account than only the requirements delineated by employers, again emphasizing that a 
dissertation such as this needs to take more into account than the expectations of employers as 
explained in handbooks or written job expectations. In fact, the actual roles of teachers and 
researchers may have very little in common with the roles as explicated by institutions. This 
project is not simply descriptive, but normative. Philosophical analysis, as will be discussed in 
depth in chapter three is not restrained to analysis of what the state of affairs is, but can consider 
both logically and ethically what the state of affairs should be. Thus, the analysis of faculty roles 
will take into account university documents, but will not be constrained by them as both Jaio, 
Richards, and Hackett (2013) and Wikham and Parker’s (2009) research suggests. Importantly, 
the research of Jaio, Richards, and Hackett (2013) also reminds us that faculty roles are not 
constrained to “teacher” and “researcher.” Faculty, at least so many institutions claim, are 
required to participate in “service.” Although interviews regarding whether or not faculty believe 
96 
 
they are required to place much importance on service and whether or not they do so falls 
beyond the scope of this project, it may well be that service will play an important role in 
understanding not “how” teaching and research are conjoined but “how should” they be so.  
Organizational Role Theory Revised 
 Given the review of the literature, it is likely the case that organizational role theory 
provides the best theoretical framework upon which to ground the conceptual framework of this 
dissertation. ORT, though, as discussed above, is somewhat inadequate for understanding 
contemporary organizational relationships. Yes, organizational role theory is the most often 
applied theory and the one for which there is the most support in the literature. Additionally, 
ORT is, indeed, the best suited to discussions of organizational relationships, as it hinges on the 
relationships between role senders and role takers as understood in organizational paradigms. As 
discussed by Wickham and Parker (2009) and Jaio, Richards, and Hackett (2013), to be 
applicable to contemporary organizations, ORT must be adjusted for an understanding of 
multifaceted role takers who experience significant shifts in role expectations over time as well 
as a concept of ORT that encompasses those expectations and roles that are not clearly defined 
and, yet, are essential, such as organizational citizenship behaviors.  
 It is important to note that this dissertation is not focusing on universities, but rather on 
the roles of faculty, and, thus, ORT is not necessarily perfectly applicable to our analysis. In 
some ways the symbolic interactionist theory might be best suited for an understanding of roles 
that are developed through dialectic, interaction and interpretation. Thus, I propose that this work 
utilize role theory as “community-dialectical role theory.” To say that understanding faculty 
roles, here, uses organizational role theory is a bit disingenuous, as the revisions necessary to 
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generate a robust understanding change it significantly; moreover, the focus is not on the 
organization, but on the instantiated roles and how they should be instantiated. Roles, however, 
are not just individual instantiations. As discussed above, roles are social constructs—they are 
community constructs as developed through dialectic and symbolic interaction. Thus, this 
dissertation is using organizational role theory, but one heavily altered so as to not give primacy 
to the expectations as generated by the organization itself and the purpose of the work goes 
beyond understanding how members are situated, but how should they be situated and why. 
 Thus, the idea of community-dialectical role theory as the burgeoning conceptual 
framework emergent from the theoretical frame of role theory is one that can be used to 
understand organizations primarily as communities of dialectical agents that create their roles 
through symbolic interaction. This construct, then, is not reducible to symbolic interactionist role 
theory because the focus is not just on individual interpretation and understanding, but communal 
interpretation and understanding. 
 McKnight and Block (2010), in The Abundant Community, generated an effective means 
by which to ground such a conceptual framework. The understanding of “community” as “that 
which is constitutive of identity” is a communitarian notion well explicated by Charles Taylor 
(1989). As argued by Readings (1996), the university is quickly becoming a business-model 
enterprise. Understanding, though, the interaction of its faculty cannot, yet, be reduced to that 
simple classical ORT model. Faculty members remain dynamic participants in the university and 
as such, remain citizens of the university. Citizenship, as understood by McKnight and Block 
(2010), is the participation in a democracy. As long as some free voice is maintained by 
university faculty, they remain, at least to some degree, active participants in their institution as 
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citizens; thus, their roles cannot be reduced to purely organizational models. The faculty engage 
in dialectic with each other and the institution itself to develop a constantly shifting CID 
structure, the very self of the university. In this way, the faculty continue to participate in the 
definition of their own roles and the construction of their own identity through dialectic as 
described by Taylor (1989).  
 As discussed in chapter one, though, the shift in the university is a shift from a citizenship 
to a consumer model (McKnight & Block, 2010). This shift can be understood on both an 
individual level as discussed by McKnight and Block or on the university level as discussed by 
Readings (1996) and Carter (2004). To focus solely on ORT would be to focus on a “system life” 
–“a managed life, a life organized around products, services, and beliefs of systems” (McKnight 
& Block, 2010). However, the university is not yet completely understood in terms of a 
consumer society, though this trend towards a demand that our educational institutions 
“produce” something seems ever-increasing. As such, organizational role theory is not wholly 
incompatible with understanding faculty roles either and the roles cannot be best understood 
solely through symbolic interactionist role theory.  
 Organizational role theory and symbolic interactionist role theory parallel concepts used 
by the discoursed ethical frame that will be explicated in detail in chapter 3. This parallel 
suggests that organizational role theory and symbolic interactionist role theory are not separate 
and distinct, but, rather, that there is a supervenient relationship. The discourse ethical frame 
describes a systemsworld and a lifeworld that are used to understand human agency and society. 
The systemsworld is the world of organizational structure and bureaucracy and the lifeworld is 
the world engaged on the “human” level—the world of purposes, hopes, and emotional states. 
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Thus, one sees a clear parallel between forms of role theory and discourse ethical frames. 
Organizational role theory is a role theory that articulates understanding from the positioning of 
the systemsworld. It understands human agency as something participated in by members of 
bureaucratic, structured, and machine-like organizations. Symbolic interactionist role theory 
understands agents as embedded in language. Humans play the roles defined for them by others 
through communicative action. Thus, symbolic interactionist role theory is embedded in an 
understanding of human agency in the lifeworld of qualitative communicative states.  
 The relationship, though, between the systemsworld and the lifeworld is one of 
supervenience between them. The lifeworld and the systemsworld depend upon each other, but 
the lifeworld provides the more basic structures. From the lifeworld emerges the structures and 
organizations that seek to meet human purposes. The interactions of agents in the lifeworld give 
rise to those bureaucracies that seek to meet human ends. Thus the systemsworld is supervenient 
upon the lifeworld. Similarly, organizational role theory is supervenient upon symbolic 
interactionist role theory. While it may seem, prima facie, that organizational role theory would 
be the more basic, upon which symbolic interactionist role theory would rest, the realization is 
that symbolic interactionist role theory, while more complex, frames the more basic human 
interactions that result in the generation of organization. It is through communicative action that 
organizations are developed. Thus, organizations emerge as means by which to meet the 
symbolically communicated ends produced by humans. Due to the complexities of human 
symbolic exchange, its ever-shifting quality, and the opacity of human internality, understanding 
of human interaction as reduced to movement within organizational structures becomes a 
reductionist heuristic for understanding human interaction. Thus, the ability to understand human 
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action through organization emerges from the symbolic interactions that produce those 
organizations, and maintain them, in the first place. To understand human interaction in its 
fullness, then, as paralleled by the supervenient relationship of the systemsworld and lifeworld 
requires that one engage a conjunction of organizational role theory and symbolic interactionist 
role theory as similarly supervenient.  
As this project began in chapter 1 with the discussion of the shift taking place in the 
university, it seems reasonable that the conceptual framework used to understand faculty roles 
can also describe that shift, leaving both organizational role theory and symbolic interactionist 
role theory insufficient. Community-dialectic role theory, as I have defined it, focuses on the 
shifts in dialogue that produce community and community change. That community can be 
understood as an institution, country, or university.  
 This project, then, will seek to understand faculty roles through dialectic, change and 
normativity. In order to do that, to first establish what faculty roles should look like, a 
methodology that both acts a means by which to examine and define constructs (rather than 
measure them) as well as develop them (rather than report perspectives on them) is necessary. 
For this reason philosophical analysis is the best means by which to conduct this research 
project. The goal is not to measure a construct, nor is it to simply to describe it. The goal is to 
create a construct by which such measurements can take place. Thusly, a conceptual framework 
such as community-dialectic role theory is necessary in order to understand faculty as more than 
that defined by the given and accepted roles of organizations, but as active dialectical citizens in 
the generation of their own multifaceted roles as faculty. The first step, then, is to establish 
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through dialectic with the literature what the conjoined teacher-faculty role should look like 
given the demands of logical consistency, ethics, and selfhood as a community construction.  
Explication of Theoretical Concepts 
Developments in Symbolic Interactionist Role Theory 
 In order to best apply the conceptual framework of “community dialectical role theory,” 
the components that comprise it should be well understood. The literature above demonstrates 
that Organizational Role Theory is perhaps the most commonly used form of role theory. 
Meade’s work, which is the heart of symbolic interactionist role theory, the other essential part to 
community dialectical role theory, has received less attention as Meade described it. Instead, the 
development and application of his intuitions was brought to its culmination in the work of 
Jurgen Habermas. Thus, it is here that one finds a clear path from the role theoretical grounding 
of this work to a methodology of discourse ethics as developed by Habermas and applied in this 
dissertation. Habermas, a renowned sociologist and philosopher, developed a means by which to 
understand agents’ actions in the world as both constructing and constructed by assumed norms 
embedded in language. In his seminal text, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action 
(1990), Habermas elaborated on his conception of discourse ethics and constructed a framework 
by which moral norms can be impartially judged. He connected the idea of ethics through 
discourse, as communicative ethics, to the theory of social action drawing much of the latter 
from Meade’s work. The idea that world-making is the result of an intersubjective dialectic or 
interaction is a philosophical refinement of role theory by Habermas. Herbert Blumer (1969) 
coined the term “symbolic interactionism” when analyzing and applying Mead’s work. Blumer’s 
interpretation of Mead continues to inform sociology and the social interactionist school of 
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thought. That perspective, that Agents are understand as active participants in the symbol making 
and symbol using that construct the roles that construct their identities and their institutions, is 
understood, in part because of Blumer as an interpretive act. Agents share and perceive symbols 
that they interpret in order to construct the roles they believe to be expected of them. That 
interpretive step is what connects discourse ethics to role theory. Habermas, in his own 
sociological work, understood dialectic to be an interpretive act of world making—an act so 
powerful that Habermas made a significant shift from description to proscription. In 
understanding the way one makes the world through the interpretation of others, and understands 
the roles instantiated by agents to be intersubjective construction through dialectic, one comes to 
realize the importance, if not primacy, of discourse in effective world-making.  
Thus, it is through the work of Habermas that one sees role-theory cease to be only one of 
many ways to understand the grand sociological actions of humanity but as a means by which to 
understand how agents create not only their world, but the world for each other. As such, one 
comes to understand the normative import of discourse ethics. As symbolic interactionism is not 
just a means by which an agent comes to construct her role for herself, but constructs roles for 
others, there is normative implication as we are no longer simply suggesting that others play a 
role or instantiate an identity, but we are creating, with them, the identity of the other.  
Habermas, in his text, The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume Two Lifeworld and 
system: A Critique of functionalist Reason, said of communicative action:  
Communicative action relies on a cooperative process of interpretation in which 
participants relate simultaneously to something in the objective, the social, and the 
subjective worlds, even when they thematically stress only one of the three components 
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in their utterances. Speaker and hearer use the reference system of the three worlds as an 
interpretive framework within which they work out their common situation definitions. 
(1987, p. 120)  
In the above quotation, one can see the influence of Meade’s symbolic interactionist intuitions as 
understanding actors as interpreters of symbolic action developed to a far greater degree. 
Habermas showed that our moral intuitions are not simply embedded in tradition or inscribed 
expectations, but rather are embedded in the presupposition of social interaction that are 
necessitated by the rules of discourse necessary for any society—thusly they have a universal 
quality. Discourse ethics, thus, aims to provide a means by which moral questions can be 
answered through engagement in authentic dialogue with other agents. This system of both 
understanding and normative application will be explicated in greater depth in chapter three 
through examination of the works of Amy Allen (2009) and Hans-Herbert Kögler (2012). 
Habermas’ work provides a robust means, if not a full metaphysic, for understanding why actors 
play particular roles and the embeddedness of their scripts in communicative action.  
 Both the normative framework of discourse ethics and the social theories developed by 
Habermas have found consistent application in the philosophy of education. Notably, Thomas J. 
Sergiovanni applied Habermas’ understanding of social systems to the development and analysis 
of the educational system in his text, The Lifeworld of Leadership: Creating Culture, 
Community, and Personal Meaning in Our Schools (2000). The text rests heavily on Habermas’ 
distinction between “the lifeworld” and “the systemsworld.” Sergiovanni says of the lifeworld 
and the systemsworld: 
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Habermas uses the language “systemsworld” and “lifeworld” to describe two mutually 
exclusive yet ideally interdependent domains of all of society’s enterprises from the 
family to the complex formal organization… When we talk about the stuff of culture, the 
essence of values and beliefs, the expression of needs, purposes, and desires of people, 
and about the sources of deep satisfaction in the form of meaning and significance, we 
are talking about the lifeworld… The systemsworld, by contrast, is a world of 
instrumentalities, of efficient means designed to achieve ends. (2000, p. 5) 
It is through these social domains that interpretation occurs. One’s understanding of one’s 
situation within society, one’s very identity, is both understood through and constructed by the 
lifeworld and systemsworld. Thus, these domains are both constructive and normative. 
Habermas, in The Lifeworld of Leadership: Creating Culture, Community, and Personal 
Meaning in Our Schools, said of the lifeworld and interpretation: 
Every new situation appears in a lifeworld composed of a cultural stock of knowledge 
that is “always already” familiar. Communicative actors can no more take up an 
extramundane position in relation to their lifeworld than they can in relation to language 
as the medium for the processes of reaching understanding through which their lifeworld 
maintains itself. In drawing upon a cultural tradition, they also continue it… 
Communicative actors are always moving within the horizon of their lifeworld; they 
cannot step outside of it. As interpreters, they themselves belong to the lifeworld, along 
with their speech acts, but they cannot refer to “something in the lifeworld” in the same 
way as they can to facts, norms, or experiences. The structures of the lifeworld lay down 
the forms of the intersubjectivity of possible understanding. (1987, pp. 125-126) 
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The systemsworld, conversely, is the foundation for the development of those things that are 
perhaps most commonly discussed in the context of educational leadership: management, 
organizational structure, allocation of capital, and systematization. To quote Sergiovanni, “the 
former [the lifeworld] is a world of purposes, norms, growth, and development, and the later [the 
systems world] is a world of efficiency, outcomes, and productivity” (2000. p. 5). It is therefore 
the lifeworld that should drive the systemsworld, as it is in the lifeworld that our norms are 
grounded. 
The inclination to assume that one or the other is more or less valuable should be 
avoided. Perhaps one who is sympathetic to understanding the world as interpretive, 
intersubjective, and agent-driven would believe in the superiority of the lifeworld while, 
conversely, one who believes the world is best understood through the movement of capital 
through the systemization of organizational processes would argue for the primacy of the 
systemsworld. Both, however, are necessary for understanding the roles played by agents in 
society by virtue of the fact that agents do engage through the interpretive act of communicative 
action while also existing in a world that is determined and driven by systems and organizational 
frameworks that guide their actions. Thus we conjoin of organizational role theory and symbolic-
interactionist role theory into “community dialectical role theory.” 
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Figure 3. Lifeworld and Systemsworld’s Symbiosis in Community Dialectical Role Theory 
 The result of the realization that both components are necessary for understanding agents’ 
actions in an educational institution was the development of Sergiovanni’s text. Although neither 
domain is valueless, Sergiovanni argued that the lifeworld must be generative; it should be the 
force that drives the systemsworld (2000, p. 6). He argued that when organizations are 
functioning properly the lifeworld is at the center of the organization. “When a school makes 
decision about means, structures, and policies designed to servce its purposes and values, the life 
world is at the center (Sergiovanni, 2000, p. 6). He argued the balance of a well-functioning 
organization is thrown off, however, if the school’s decision are about the school, rather than 
about the purposes and values of the school (p. 6).  
 Further clarification of Habermas’ notions were made when Sergiovanni demarcated 
within schools the Habermasian distinction between “expressive and normative action” and 
“teleological and strategic action” (2000, p. 6). Sergiovanni wrote, 
Schools grow and maintain their lifeworlds by taking “expressive” and “normative” 
action.” Expressive action is when parents, teachers, and students express their individual 
needs, visions, values, and beliefs within the cultural context of the school. Normative 
action occurs when they seek to act in ways that embody the school’s shared values, 
visions, and beliefs. Schools grow and maintain their systemsworld by taking 
“teleological” action and “strategic” action. Teleological action involves the setting of 
objectives and the creation of systems necessary to achieve them. And strategic action 
involves making appropriate choices among alternative courses of action with the intent 
of maximizing value. (2000, pp. 6-7)  
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Consideration of the examples above suggests that when a school places the systemsworld as 
generative of the lifeworld, the norms and purposes of the school become to maintain the 
bureaucratic existence of the school rather than the bureaucracy existing for the flourishing of the 
students and agents that comprise the organization. The system becomes such that it seeks to 
maintain itself as a primary good and those agents that comprise the system become component 
parts to the systemworld. Habermas (1987) discussed the problem of the overtaking of the 
lifeworld by the systems world as the “colonization of the lifeworld” (pp. 173, 335-336). Both 
Habermas and Sergiovanni held that either the lifeworld or the systemsworld must be generative. 
“Either the lifeworld determines what the systemsworld will be like or the systemsworld will 
determine what the lifeworld will be like” (Sergiovanni, 2000, p. 7).  
In a rather intuitive example, Sergiovanni discussed testing as an example of the 
colonization of the lifeworld by the systems world. “When the lifeworld dominates, testing 
reflects local passions, needs, values, and beliefs. Standards can remain rigorous and true but are 
not presumed to be standardized, universal, or all-encompassing” (2000, p. 8). Fourteen years 
later, as U.S. educational system moves into the “common core,” Sergiovanni’s concerns seem 
realized. Teachers are now provided with “curriculum maps” that determine, precisely, day-by-
day, not only what standard students must master, but what objective must be completed. 
Regardless of individual student difference or need, the system presumes that good teachers will 
successfully move students through the objectively important mastery of standards. “As the 
systemsworld dominates, however, what counts is determined more narrowly by bureaucratic 
mandates, politics, and other outside forces” (Sergiovanni, 2000, p. 8). As the standards and 
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testing movements have gained greater purchase, one can see the colonization of the lifeworld by 
the systemsworld.  
It is no longer the norms and purposes of the lifeworld, the flourishing of students for 
their own benefit and the benefit of the agents comprising the greater social scheme that drives 
education. Rather, students are now educated to benefit the system itself… as a commodity that 
needs certain skills in order to maintain the economic system that generates the school system. 
Thus, one can now determine the success of a school by virtue of its ability to produce students 
who can function as a component of the system itself, specifically as workers within a great 
economic device. Whether other lifeworld norms are achieved becomes unimportant; students 
need not be creative, critical, or healthy so long as they can, in a standardized fashion, 
demonstrate the skills necessary to work in the system and demonstrate only those values—such 
as patriotism, work ethic, and belief in the superiority of capitalism—necessary to maintain the 
system. 
 
Figure 4. Systemsworld Eventually Sublimates Lifeworld 
 
Other theorists have also argued for the importance of Habermas for the understanding of 
and development of educational systems. Interestingly, the focus, is not always on Habermas’ 
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notions of lifeworld and systemsworld. Habermas’ concepts are so intricate and well-developed 
that one can read an entire text dedication to one application of Habermas’ ethics without 
encountering an essential aspect of that theory. Perhaps the best explanation for this phenomena 
is the fact that Habermas did not simply develop an applied ethic, nor did he only develop the 
normative framework upon which that applied ethic emerges. He developed, as well, the 
ontological grounding in language of ethics and a metaphysic of human social and psychological 
interaction that inform his normative ethic and its applications. 
Patrick Jenlink (2004), for example, rested his work heavily on Habermas’ notions of 
dialectic and discourse ethics without reference to the lifeworld systems world approach. In his 
article, “Discourse ethics in the design of educational system: Considerations for design praxis,” 
Jenlink argued for the importance of the application of discourse ethics to the design of 
educational systems. His work suggests that without such grounding in discourse, educational 
systems are likely to fail ethically because educational systems are dialogical by nature (2004, 0. 
237). 
Praxis is of special importance to Jenlink. “Praxis is a state in which one engages 
critically, reflectively, and intentionally in an inquiry that belongs intrinsically to a project of 
self-understanding (Jenlink, 2004, p. 238). Education—an endeavor dedicated to the 
development of human beings—must engage praxis as the intersection of theory and practice 
requiring self-reflexivity. That reflexivity required by those systems are inherently based on the 
development of agents. Note, then, that without mention of it, Jenlink grounded his work in the 
social metaphysic of Habermas—systems must be grounded in the norms of the lifeworld in 
order to be ethical. 
110 
 
Jenlink was particularly motivated by the importance of democratic discourse explicated 
by Habermas. Jenlink wrote,  
The ethical consequences of systems design rests in large part with whether or not the 
design process provided opportunity for authentic participation and was socially and 
culturally inclusive—active participation by all including marginalized populations and 
socially and politically disadvantages publics. (2004, p. 239) 
Simply, design discourse is teleologically framed towards the inclusion of numerous 
perspectives, thus it is democratic in nature. This discourse, though, must be understood as 
praxis—as self-reflective through the dialogical process. “Design discourse seeks to ensure 
inclusive participation of those who are the benefactors and beneficiaries [of the system]” (2004, 
p. 239). All stakeholders must not only be taken into account, but must be able to participate in 
the dialogue in order to design the system ethically. Thus, it is essential to hear all voices—to 
care for all populations—in order to sustain the educational lifeworld, and the responsibility falls 
on the university to instantiate faculty roles in a way that incorporate the essentiality of the 
lifeworld. 
 Discourse ethics, therefore, particularly in the case of education, is well suited to the 
democratic teleological end of full inclusion in dialogue, and, thus, an effective means to both 
understand as well as construct faculty roles.  
Discourse ethics realize the limits of an individual stance. The systems designer as moral 
agent will never truly be able to determine if moral actions are justifiable or not. In this 
sense, discourse ethics is an answer to designing systems in a pluralistic society where 
many diverse perspectives of what is ‘good’ exist… (Jenlink, 2004, p. 243-244) 
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Discourse ethics requires that we step outside of the boundaries of our solipsistic self and engage 
the Other in discourse for the purpose of generating understanding and meaningful ethical 
consensus. This process will be detailed further in the methodology. For the purposes of this 
chapter, however, one notes that Jenlink proceeds to engage a discourse between numerous 
ethical positions held by different theorists in order to mediate them through discourse ethics for 
the purpose of demonstrating the importance of discourse ethics in the development an ethical 
educational system in a pluralistic society. 
 The importance of Habermas for social justice, as a means by which to include even 
marginalized voices, including the marginalized is furthered by the world of Rauno Huttunen and 
Mark Murhy (2012). In their “Discourse and recognition as normative ground for radical 
pedagogy: Habermasian and Honnethian ethics in the context of education,” Huttunen and 
Murphy argued for the importance of Habermas in grounding the work of Paolo Freire. Freire 
(1970), in his famous Pedagogy of the Oppressed, forwarded his thesis of “radical pedagogy,” 
both indicting and inciting the educational establishment. Freire argued that education acts as a 
means of oppression and must, instead, act as a means by which to producing flourishing in all 
students. Huttunen and Murphy, however, noted that Freire’s work—while normative—lacked 
grounding for that imperative. Habermas’ work, however, demonstrates the social necessity of 
the inclusion of all voices in ethical discourse. Thus, they argued that Habermas’ work functions 
as a solid foundation for radical pedagogy. 
 The details of Habermas’ discourse ethics will be developed further in chapter three. 
What is essential to Huttunen and Murphy’s work (2012) is the united effort of moral discourse 
that engages the voice of all participants. Habermas, through his process of immanent criticism, 
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provides a means by which to investigate the validity of morality claims based on those norms 
forwarded by the system itself. If dialectic with that system (from those who make up the system 
and propose its norms) demonstrates incoherence, then something is amiss. What Habermas’ 
work forces one to recognize is that a system may seem coherent if it omits some stakeholders 
from the dialectic. Hence Huttunen and Murphy’s (2012) argument that Habermas’ work helps to 
ground radical pedagogy: simply, one may come to recognize that once all stakeholder voices are 
engaged in the dialectic a seemingly coherent system is demonstrated to undermine the very 
values and norms the system seeks to support—discourse ethics requires that one not only 
engage the seeming objectivity of the systems world but also include the voices that make up the 
lifeworld. Thus, if the roles of faculty as teachers and as researchers are in tension, it may 
because of the sublimation of the lifeworld to the systemsworld resulting in the silencing of both 
students and faculty voicing.  
 Importantly, Huttunen and Murphy (2012) did not think that Habermas’ work was 
sufficient to support radical pedagogy in its fullness. They included the further development of 
Habermas’ work by his student Axel Honneth. Honneth’s work enables those who investigate 
educational systems to move beyond immanent criticism to a question of “recognition.” This 
move on the part of Huttunen and Murphy enables them to avoid the possible criticism that an 
internally coherent system that specifically excludes certain voices—not through incoherent 
error, but intentionally—remains incoherent externally. An institution, universities, for example, 
may then generate the roles of employees in an internally consistent way, while at the same time 
excluding some student voices (failing students for example), yet, remain externally inconsistent 
with the lifeworld praxis that teachers should seek to benefit all students. 
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 Honneth (2007) developed a “theory of recognition” in which the recognition of oneself 
is dependent on recognition by the other. Kögler (2012) further expands on and addresses issues 
that arise from this notion of selfhood and will be explicated in chapter three. The notion, then, 
that selfhood requires not just the recognition of the self, but requires that one be recognized by 
others then further justifies the inclusion of other voices in ethical dialogue. Honneth’s (2007) 
work details the deep social embeddedness and dependence on the recognition of oneself by 
society in order to engage both oneself and society.  
“To achieve a productive relationship toward oneself, human requires recognition of her 
ability and achievements. Indeed we can view the entire human life as a long struggle for 
recognition. That is why friendship, care and love constitute the basic level of 
recognition. That is why friendship, care, and love are the most importance forms for 
recognition in Honneth’s practical philosophy” (Huttunen & Murphy, 2007, p. 145).   
In this way the application of Honneth to Habermas creates a kind of positive right teleology for 
the importance of care in normativity. It is insufficient to include all stakeholders; one must 
recognize the need for recognition, for care, as fundamental to human identity. 
 With Honneth’s addendum to Habermas in mind, and the grounding of radical pedagogy 
in a rational social metaphysic of care, one can now engage the process of developing a 
methodology for the philosophical investigation of educational systems. If Honneth is correct, 
then care will play an essential role in understanding education as a system that engages agent 
identity. As such, one can apply discourse ethics as a means by which to investigate the 
conceptual systemsworld and lifeworld of education in order to develop both an understanding 
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and a normative framework for a coherent paradigm grounded in care as essential to the identity 
of stakeholders in education.  
Conceptual Framework 
Applying Habermas 
One comes to understand if any of the roles are what Bruce Biddle (1979) described 
interdependent—“the degree to which roles are mutually facilitative” (p. 78).  If these roles are 
beyond commensurable, beyond coherent (insofar as they are consistent and can be shown to 
work together), and, in fact, depend on each other, conceptually, then the project of determining 
their interrelation is well-grounded. It may well be the case that the roles as we come to define 
them are inconsistent, or incoherent, but this would not imply that there is no normative result. If 
the role of teacher and the role of researcher are themselves inconsistent, then one should not, if 
one seeks to generate coherent notions of faculty that can be effectively applied in the real world, 
require that faculty occupy both roles. However, if one role—teacher, for example—is best 
situated in the lifeworld and the other—researcher—is best understood as part of the 
systemsworld then Habermas’ system provides an effective means by which to mediate those. 
They are interdependent, as Biddle uses the term. In either case, or any case that then lay 
between the ends of inconsistency and interdependence, then discourse regarding the best means 
by which to understand those who occupy those roles and generate expectations for them is 
necessary. Thus, Habermas’ discourse ethics, as a means by which to both understand and 
generate dialectical interdependence, should be explicated further.  
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Habermas and Kant 
Habermas argued that morality exists in a community of selves. His work forwards the 
work of Immanuel Kant while at the same time boldly defying it. Kant argued that there can be 
reasoned to be a Categorical Imperative. Kant’s notion of this universal rule rested heavily on 
the importance of reason and the ability of one to logically develop moral rules. This imperative 
itself states, “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it 
should become a universal law” (1785/1993, p. 30). Simply, “ought implies can.” If one cannot 
apply the rule without the rule collapsing on itself, then it is an irrational rule and must be 
discarded. It is important to understand that the Kantian notion does not hinge on the importance 
that everyone understand the rule or dialogue about the rule, rather Kant is arguing that any rule, 
by virtue of being an imperative cannot be biased to one person or perspective. Thus, if I were to 
say, “I want to murder,” then I must assent to the proposition that “murder is right,” as 
suggesting that “murder is right only for me” is simply an irrational bias for oneself. Therefore, 
the rule must be applicable to everyone. The logical result of the application of such an 
imperative universally, though, is that it becomes impossible to murder because everyone is 
dead. Similarly, lying, stealing, and breaking contracts all result in the inability to follow the rule 
because universal application of the rule defeats the purpose of the rule, and, therefore, the rule is 
inconsistent with itself and is irrational. 
Interestingly, the Categorical Imperative does not just apply to those things that we 
should not do. If one were to apply the question, “Should I use others only as means to my 
ends?” one quickly comes to realize that this is an impossible rule to universalize without 
making it impossible to get what one wants—which is not to be treated only as a means to 
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others’ ends. Thus, Kant was able to forward the second form of the Categorical Imperative, 
known as the principle of respect, which he believed to be equivalent to the first form: “Act in 
such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, 
always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means” (p. 30). Thus, the Categorical 
Imperative denies one the ability to do certain things while also requiring that one must also 
concern oneself with the welfare of the Other. 
Habermas, though, noted that there were some significant problems with Kant’s 
formulations—notably, the lack of discourse. The Kantian rule system is one that is engaged 
from an armchair. This problem is similar to the problems Carol Gilligan (1982), author of In a 
Different Voice, noted in stage six—abstract moral reasoning—of Kohlberg’s system of moral 
development. Morality is discursive; one cannot simply ask the question, “How should I live?” 
That is not, despite common misconception, the central question of morality, which is, “How 
should I live with others?” Without others, the question of morality is moot and the answer is, 
simply, “However I want.” Habermas’ ideas require, therefore, that we take into account the 
viewpoints of everyone who could be affected by the adoption of an imperative. Kant’s system, 
one realizes, is deeply embedded in the systemsworld, ignoring the implicit norms and 
assumptions generated through the communicative action of the lifeworld. Note, however, that 
Kant’s system has an appealing cognitivism—it rests on the notion that there are moral truths. 
Habermas is able to maintain that cognitivism without appealing to abstract moral truths, but, 
rather, moral truths embedded in the rules of rational discourse. 
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Habermas and Rawls 
In contrast to the way that John Rawls (1971) required that one imagine that one does not 
have any affiliations with the world, Habermas required that one consider the perspective of 
others. Habermas was critical of Rawls, noting that one should not simply stand behind the veil 
of ignorance and imagine oneself without any affiliation, but, rather that one should actually 
engage the perspective of others. Again, once considering the essential question of morality, 
Habermas was well grounded—to imagine that one is in no position, as Rawl’s suggested we 
should, is much like asking “How should I live?” but what Rawls neglected was that the power 
of his system requires discourse in his second step. One must imagine what it would like to 
occupy the position of the other. For example, realizing, “If I come into the world as x, I will be 
marginalized because of the social system, so we then should make a world in which being x is 
not marginalized, because I would not want to be marginalized.” This is not to say that Rawls did 
not point out that one must consider entering the world as other agents, it is that his system 
requires no discourse with them. Simply, how can one, from one’s armchair, engage the position 
of the Other? One is likely to think that the Other is fine as she is, and see no reason to make 
change. 
Thus, a Habermasian perspective requires that we lift the veil and engage the position of 
the other through dialogue so that we can ask ourselves, “How will the application of this 
universal moral rule affect all agents?” One then can develop moral rules, rights, and duties 
based not just on what one imagines the effects to be based on a universal rule, but one that 
actually takes into the account the will of the Other as articulated through discourse. It is 
noteworthy that Kant’s system, itself, generates Habermas’ own system if Kant’s system is 
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applied without bias (which Kant failed to do). If one were to ask oneself what the implication, 
logically, of the rule, “I should make rules without considering the perspectives of others” would 
be, one would quickly realize this is impossible to do. To suggest the above as a universal rule 
makes the very notion of universal rules inconsistent. Everyone would then be required, 
logically, to begin making universally applied rules that cannot be actuated because they do not 
have sufficient understanding of those agents who are required to participate in the rules. Thus, 
the rule defeats itself and collapses. For that reason, it can be asserted that even Kant himself 
must acquiesce to Habermas’ thesis; universality requires discourse. We must tear down the veil 
and converse.  
Habermas’ propositions 
Habermas forwarded a series of propositions based on the realization that discourse is 
necessary for genuine engagement in moral reasoning and that there are rules that are implicit in 
the act of discourse itself. One realizes, quickly, that investigation of rational discourse reveals 
that there are imbedded assumptions in that discourse. One cannot have rational discourse 
without, for example, attending to the thesis of the Other. To ignore it is to not engage in rational 
discourse both by definition and by the implicit norms and values of discourse itself. Thus 
Habermas, when analyzing moral discourse, realized the following:  
1) A universal rule that sets the conditions for impartial judgment must constrain “all 
affected to adopt the perspectives of all others in the balancing of inters” so that, “All affected 
can accept the consequences and the side effects [that] its [of a rule’s] general observance can be 
anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests (and these consequences are 
preferred to those of known alternatives possibilities for regulation)” (p. 65). 
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2) “Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of 
all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse” (p. 66).  
3) All affected must be able to participate freely; we cannot expect their consent “unless 
all affected can freely accept the consequences and the side effects that the general observance of 
a controversial norm can be expected to have for the satisfaction of the interests of each 
individual” (p. 93).  
Thus, given Habermas’ principles, one must take the perspective of everyone else, 
especially when generating moral imperatives. If one wishes to avoid the issue of 1) failing to 
take the perspectives of others and 2) engaging unbridled and unwarranted hubris, one must 
actually discourse with others in order to understand their perspective. The methodology of this 
philosophical analysis then, will apply Habermas’ discourse ethical position to the question of 
the normative framing of the roles teacher and researcher, however they are best defined and 
conjoined (or fail to conjoin). To ignore the propositions presented by Habermas is to not engage 
in rational discourse. 
Performativity 
Habermas also developed fully the means by which to critique a system or set of 
propositions through the application of immanent critique. This form of analysis, which focuses 
on the coherence or lack thereof of propositions that are proposed to constitute an epistemology, 
itself generates the need for discourse in order to best understand the actuation of the definition, 
particularly if those terms defined identify rational agents. Habermas’ work relies on and further 
justifies the work of Karl-Otto Apel, who explained the logical grounding of rational discourse 
and rule making. Much in the same way that Kant’s system explains that one cannot be expected 
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to follow rule (x) if rule (x) makes it impossible to follow rule (x), Apel argued that there are 
rules of discourse by virtue of the impossibility of engaging discourse without those rules.  
Habermas explained Apel’s notion of a performative contradiction—a notion alluded to 
earlier in this chapter. The rules of dialogue suggest that performative contradictions can occur 
by virtue of our participation in dialogue. For example, as Habermas explained, I may argue that 
I do not currently exist. However, by virtue of uttering the statement, “I believe I do not exist,” I 
also assert my own existence. Thus, I am guilty of a performative contradiction and should not 
make the statement. In much the same way that Descartes’ Cogito cannot be syllogized without 
engaging contradiction (by virtue of a priori logic knowledge as already proven to be doubtable 
by the methodological skepticism, thus the Cogito is better understood as a meditation), one 
cannot assert one’s lack of existence in dialogue without performing one’s own existence. Thus, 
the rules of dialogue emerge from one’s performative contradiction. 
Interestingly, a defense of dialetheism (that there can be true contradictions) articulated 
by Graham Priest (1998) in his, “What’s so bad about contradictions?” hinges on avoidance of 
performative contradiction. Of course for the dialethesist to avoid contradiction plays 
immediately into Habermas’ hands, even while demonstrating the possibility that true 
contradiction may exist. Priest notes that a fundamental argument against his proposition is the 
realization that if there can be true contradictions, then it may be argued that anything a 
dialetheist (one who believes in true contradictions) may say may itself be a contradiction and, 
therefore, this includes the statement “I am a dialetheist.” In other words, might we accuse the 
dialetheist when she says “I am a dialetheist” of potentially meaning, “I am a dialetheist, and I 
am not a dialetheist” if true contradictions exit? One might argue, then, that nothing that the 
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dialetheist says can be trusted. Priest argued, similarly to Apel, that one would not assume this of 
the dialetheist because of the rules of ordinary language. One would not state only a conjunct 
(truncate the full statement by saying “I am a dialetheist”) when the conjunct and its negation (I 
am a dialetheist, and I am not a dialetheist) are known to be both true. I would not, in ordinary 
language, say, “It is raining” if I also know “it is not raining.”  
Similarly, I would not state a disjunction if I know which disjunction of an exclusive 
disjunction is true. I would not say “It is raining or it is sunny outside,” if I know “it is raining” is 
true. (Thus, I need not worry about the logical rule “add” resulting in nonsensical statements.) In 
the same way, I would not state only part of a true contradiction either. It seems that both Priest 
and Apel hinged their arguments on the embedded rules and norms of discourse as articulated by 
Habermas. Importantly, those actions which generate lack of understanding by violation of those 
norms, values, and rules do not generally thrive in language (if only because they themselves fail 
to be understood). Thus, emergent from ordinary language, one finds logical and normative 
rules—Habermas’ cognitivism, in other words.  
Habermas and Honneth  
Habermas’ work is further applied and developed by Axel Honneth. Two of Honneth’s 
seminal texts, The fragmented world of the social: Essays in social and political philosophy 
(1995) and The Critique of power: Reflective stages in a critical social theory (1991) explicate 
the development of social philosophy as it culminates in Habermas. Particularly, Honneth’s work 
develops and further justifies the critical theory developed by Habermas and the Frankfurt 
School.  
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 Critical theory, of course, is known and appealing to educational circles. It can be 
understood as a rejection of the systematized and positivistic paradigm of sociology as an 
attempt to generate an objective “hard science” for the analysis of human interaction. Rather, 
critical theory, as explained by Max Horkheimer (1972) is oriented to both understanding and 
changing human interaction. Critical theory recognizes that objective observation is impossible. 
No observation of social interaction can take place without 1) impacting the social world and 2) 
being experienced and understood through the subjectivity of the agent observers. Horkheimer 
held that critical theory was at its best when it met three criteria: 1) it explains the problems in 
our current social paradigm 2) it identifies practical means by which to fix those problems and 3) 
it justifies why those problems are in fact problems and why they should be resolved. One comes 
to realize, then, that this dissertation itself is at least playing at critical theory. The work seeks to 
explain and identify faculty roles, identify if those roles are in fact commensurable, and seeks to 
identify the best possible constructions of those roles. One notes, however, that the dissertation 
may not meet Horkheimer’s criteria insofar as it may not address the practical means by which to 
fix the problem.  If faculty roles are, in fact, incommensurable, there may be no way to mediate 
between them as constructed by our current social reality. 
 Honneth’s work develops the Habermasian approach to critical theory and situates it in a 
historical framework. Honneth (1995) wrote: 
The idea of making the struggle for recognition into prescientific point of reference for 
critical social theory requires, namely, not only reflection in social theory and a diagnosis 
of the present era, but also a concept of the person that is capable of explaining how the 
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claim upon the recognition of one’s own identity is anchored within the particular subject 
(1995, p. xxii).  
This notion of the recognition of one’s own identity is grounded by Honneth in Habermas and 
George Herbert Mead. What Honneth recognized is that the critique of society, particularly in the 
paradigm of critical theory, requires an understanding of the actor within society. The formation 
of identity, then, as introduced by Mead and developed by Habermas, understands actors as 
generated by intersubjective communicative activity. The roles are not simply played; they are, 
as my own community-dialectical role theory suggests, constitutive of identity. Much in the way 
that Charles Taylor (1989) developed his thesis of community as constitutive of identity, 
community-dialectical role theory, and more importantly Habermas, understands the actor as 
entirely a linguistic construction—a construction of intersubjective symbolic action.  
The agent in the world exists as created not just by symbols, but by language. Her 
ontology is grounded in the social world. Whatever her “physical” instantiation may be, it cannot 
be understood, discussed, or perhaps even perceived without its creation (not merely description) 
in language. Thus, understanding roles, as they are linguistically inscribed, mediated, and 
generated, for Habermas and Honneth, would be to understand the very identity of the agent 
comprised of those roles. Honneth (1995) argued “In positivism, empirical knowledge of reality 
is reduced to a mere search for facts, since such knowledge is separated from any philosophical 
self-confirmation” (p. 64). Thus one comes to understand that our preconception of actors as 
separate “things” from their social world is an assumption grounded in positivism. The 
positivistic thesis, though, is one that is grounded in the assumptions and demands of societal 
labor: “the production of theoretical statements subserves the same interest of a mastery of 
124 
 
physical nature by which the activity of labour is already guided on a pre-scientific level” 
(Honneth, 2005, p. 64). What positivism, then, does is “cut them [the sciences] off both from the 
consciousness of their own societal roots and from the knowledge of their practical objectives” 
(p. 65). Honneth’s argument, then, suggests that understanding human interaction is undermined 
when attempting to use a tool that believes itself to be objectively separate without assumptions 
that both limit and define it—assumptions that will, particularly in the case of positivism, blind 
researchers as to their impact on and intersubjective connection to that being observed. 
Habermas’ thesis, though, avoids many of the positivistic pitfalls that attempt to create 
separate and objective observes (both of external social environs and of the self): 
Nevertheless, a theory has gradually emerged from Habermas’ works which is so clearly 
motivated by the original objectives of critical theory that it may be accepted as the only 
serious new approach within this tradition today; the anti-functionalist impulses detected 
in the thinking of the marginal members of the institute have reached theoretical self-
awareness in this theory and hence have become the frame of references for a different 
conception of society. (Honneth, 1995, p. 86) 
Linguistic understanding becomes necessary, both normatively and epistemically, for human 
interaction: “The life-form of human beings distinguishes itself by an intersubjectivity anchored 
in the structures of language; therefore, for the reproduction of social life, linguistic 
understanding between subjects represents a fundamental, indeed the most basic, presupposition” 
(p. 86). Thus one comes to recognize that any endeavor that seeks to understand the human actor 
either as a 1) means by which to represent (reproduce) the engagement of actors in the world or 
as 2) a means by which to change the engagement of actors in the world, must recognize the 
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fundamental import of symbolic (linguistic) interaction as the grounding and generator of human 
interaction as actors.  
 Moreover, the creation of identity itself, the generation of the actor herself, is a 
linguistically mediated event.  
Because human beings by nature are only able to form a personal identity as long as they 
can grow and move within the intersubjectively shared world of a social group the 
interruption of the process of communicative understanding would violate a 
presupposition of human survival which is just as fundamental as that of the collective 
appropriation of nature. (Honneth, 1995, p. 87)  
If one wishes to understand faculty not simply as a denotatively defined construct that can be 
objectively manipulated, one must engage the linguistic and symbolically mediated act of role 
creation through intersubjective dialectic. Roles are not simply defined in a positivistic and 
objective “faculty handbook” way, no matter how appealing that may be. Roles are generated, 
maintained, and reproduced through intersubjective role-formation with other actors and 
institutional entities that construct the social world. Thus, “culturally invariant validity claims are 
stored in the communicative speech acts through which individual actions are coordinated, and 
that these are historically differentiated gradually in the course of a process of cognitive 
rationalization” (p. 89). Understanding an agent’s role requires investigation, and, thus, 
participation, in the communicative speech acts that define that identity.  
 The importance of Horkheimer’s three criteria for effective critical theory becomes 
immediately clear when considering Honneth’s and Habbemas’s construction of identity. To 
understand the role, one must participate in the intersubjective creation of the role, and to 
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participate in the intersubjective creation of the role is to participate, oneself, in the act of 
generating the social construct. Simply, one cannot observe the role and actually understand it 
without participating in the speech acts and commutative actions that themselves construct the 
role. To do so, though, then means that the “observer” is an active participant not just in 
“understanding” but in “generating” and, thus, helping to produce and maintain the 
role/construct. As such, the researcher cannot be morally distant from the social construct. The 
researcher is not simply observing; she is now generating, and, thus, if that role does harm, she is 
helping to perpetuate a role that itself does harm. For this reason, critical theory is normative: it 
notes the problems of constructs and seeks, through its own generativity, means by which to fix 
those problems.  
 The Habermasian argument, as explained by Honneth, is intuitively appealing to 
educational researchers. Consider a researcher who wishes to understand the interactions of 
students in Taiwan with their teacher.2 The researcher observes the teacher show the students 
how to draw a particular figure on the board. The teacher then asks the students to draw the 
figure on their own paper on their desks. Once having completed this assignment, the teacher 
then calls on the student who she observes cannot draw the figure to show everyone else how to 
draw the figure on the board. The student attempts to draw the figure, the teacher asks the class if 
the figure is correct, and the question is met with a resounding “No!” Of course, at this moment, 
the researcher may assume that this child will be in deep need of therapy for life, having been 
humiliated by her peers.  
                                                 
2 This example is developed based on the following article: Li, J., Fung, H., Bakeman, R., Rae, K., & Wei, W.-C. (in 
press). How European American and Taiwanese mothers talk to their children about learning. Child Development. 
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What the researcher, though, as a “separate and objective” observer does not understand 
is the symbolic interactions of the class. She does not know that “intellectual struggle,” rather 
than “intellectual giftedness,” is how “intelligence” and “worth” is defined in the language and 
communicative actions of the Taiwanese. Thus, she does not understand the events that have 
unfolded before her. Had she known and observed further, she would have realized that the 
students value greatly the ability of their peers to come to knowledge rather than, as in the States, 
to be gifted with ability. The researcher would observe that the student stays in the front of the 
classroom, attempting to draw the figure correctly, until she does and is met with applause and 
accolades from her classmates. The child does not feel as if she is the “last one” to learn 
something, rather she feels that she has accomplished something fantastic in front of her peers 
and has been lauded appropriately for it having demonstrated her willingness to engage 
intellectual struggle. 
Thus, one realizes that without embeddedness in the communicative actions that 
construct social environs, one does not actually understand what is observed. Moreover, once the 
researcher realizes that she has observed a radically different way of understanding intellectual 
struggle, is she not under the moral obligation to share this knowledge as a participant in 
education? Simply, critical theory as described by Horkheimer, would require that if students are 
in fact better off in educational environments that laud intellectual struggle rather than giftedness 
by birth, researchers are obligated to share that knowledge and help develop that understanding 
here in the States. Thus, it seems that Habermas and Honneth were correct: embeddedness in 
linguistic frames is required understanding, and that understanding necessitates normativity.  
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Habermas, therefore, identified a “pathology” in the paradigm in the development of 
“civilization” and social interaction. 
Just as the aim of psychoanalysis in the theoretically guided interpretation of a life history 
is to liberate the individual from an unperceived pathology, critical social theory, along 
the way toward an enlightened interpretation of the history of civilization, is supposed to 
liberate the species from a disturbance, a “pathology” in its process of self-formation. 
(Honneth, 1991) 
The separation between the “lifeworld” and “systemsworld” is this pathology as a result of the 
attempt to separate agents from the lifeworld whether for scientific, capitalistic, academic, or 
perhaps even research ends. Engagement with the world, if it accrues significant ontological and 
moral baggage, is energy-demanding. One comes to realize that a philosophy, an economy, a 
research paradigm, or any system that does not acquiesce to the demands of both understanding 
and normative obligation will have to do far less. This describes a pathology as developed in 
human life: our systems seek separation from their embeddedness in identity formation and from 
moral obligation. Habermas, himself, largely focuses on the seeming automaticity that develops 
as the separation and differentiation of the systemsworld and lifeworld allows for an assembly-
line approach to social life in which only that which is necessary is engaged, as if the 
systemsworld can be engaged without impact on the lifeworld. Moreover, “The rationalization of 
the lifeworld makes possible an increase in systems complexity which enlarges to such an extent 
that the released systemic imperatives outstrip the comprehensive ability of the lifeworld which 
is instrumentalized by them (Habermas, 1987, p. 232). One wonders: can critical theory provide 
the necessary resolution to the problem of the subjugation of the lifeworld to the systemsworld? 
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 Honneth further argued that the distinction of systemsworld and lifeworld is now meeting 
with opposition. The university system and its increasing systemsworld approach to education 
seems to suggest that Honneth and Habermas are correct, the systemsworld/lifeworld distinction 
is collapsing in such a way as to give primacy to the systemsworld. Simply, the very academic 
tools that we use to identify the problems themselves are becoming lost to systemsworld 
necessities and demands. The systemsworld becomes the entirety of social life and agents can 
only be understood as participants in that system. Thus, the collapse of the humanities becomes 
inevitable and, now, understandable.  
The humanities lack the language necessary to justify their world in the systemsworld. 
They are not valuable to the systemsworld; rather, the humanities generate, evaluate, and 
investigate the norms, values, and products of the lifeworld. The attempt to find systemsworld 
justification of the humanities results in their collapse into systemsworld, commodities-driven 
“systmanities.” A clear example of this event is the attempt of music teachers to justify the world 
of music courses to the system by arguing that music courses help increase math scores and thus 
are valuable in the paradigm of STEM. There is no language of value that music can speak that 
can be understood in the systemsworld without appealing to systems-norms. The end result is the 
sublimation (which I will take to mean both “redirection” and “subjugation”) of music to STEM 
ends. Music courses are canceled in favor of more math courses, their teachers are coopted for 
math tutoring, and their students are only valuable insofar as they can produce justifying STEM 
test scores.  
This, then, requires that one consider perhaps the most common criticism of Habermas, a 
criticism explicated by Daniel Vokey (2008) in his “No remedy for cultural conflict: The 
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Inability of discourse ethics to resolve substantive moral disagreement.” Vokey’s concerns were 
primarily that 1) self-defeating relativist conclusions follow if Habermas collapses the distinction 
between what is justified and what is true and 2) that what should “count” are those arguments 
left to those who can engage in actual discourse. These concerns, though warranted, are not 
decimating to Habermas’ case. 
Vokey (2008) acknowledged that moral reasoning seeks to be, and is best when it is, 
impartial. –Thus his concerns for relativistic contradictions. Honest and open consideration of all 
viewpoints seems to smack of relativism, potentially leaving open not just counter-intuitive 
moral permissibilities such as beating problematic students, but contradictory rules such as “do 
not beat students (in these cultures)” and “do beat students (in those cultures).” Ethical relativism 
would be especially problematic for a system like Habermas’, which is cognitivistic and holds 
that there are universal moral truths. 
The cultural relativistic concern, however, is not a pressing one. Habermas’ system does 
include all voices. However, those voices must engage in rational discourse. Those belief sets 
that cannot justify themselves without appeal to dogmatism or tautology would not survive the 
discursive process. Thus, Habermas need not capitulate to relativistic demands. Yes, all voices 
should be heard. No, not all voices are rational. Powerfully, this suggests that Habermasian 
discourse ethics acknowledges the value and import of every voice in the dialogue, while 
allowing for the possibility that some voices allow that their own arguments are irrational, if only 
based on their own internal inconsistencies.  
More pressing is Vokey’s second concern—that there are those whose voices are given 
more value because of their ability to participate in dialogue. This problem may be exacerbated 
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by Habermas’ formation of identity thesis. Simply, one wonders if Habermas and Honneth— 
through their arguments for the formation of identity through interaction with the Other in the 
symbolic medium of dialogue—deny all entities who do not participate in dialogue identity. 
Thus, an odd result may be reached: those who cannot participate in dialogue are not even the 
Other, and, thus, merit no concern whatsoever. To be an Other is to have an identity, but to not 
have identity is simply to ____ . …There is no term for lack of identity that would not instantiate 
Otherness, so that we remain unable to articulate. This problem, however, is remedied through 
two potential answers: 1) bite the bullet ask assert that there is indeed no reason to concern 
oneself with those who lack identities, i.e. chairs, fetuses, and non-human animals, or 2) remind 
oneself that language and identity formation is not a Cartesian single-subject action. Rather it is 
an intersubjective action. As such, to engage any object in language is to begin to generate, 
within oneself, identity for that object. Thus, we have the ability to voice others, if we deem it 
rational to consider the genuine possibility that they are agents in the world. I suggest, through 
the investigation of Kögler’s (2012) work in chapter three, that this voicing will enable one to 
enlist the agreeance of the most obdurate solipsist through rational discourse.  
 
Summary and Imperative 
Organizational Role Theory and Symbolic-Interactionist Role Theory are, by themselves, 
insufficient for developing a robust understanding of faculty roles. In conjunction, however, as 
community-dialectical role theory mediated by the world of Habermas, role theory presents a 
viable option for developing understanding of faculty roles through engagement with the 
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linguistic, symbolic, and communicative actions that generate those roles. Such engagement 
requires discourse, as explicated through Habermasian discourse ethics.  
Discourse ethics has a significant history in educational analysis in order to both 
understand changes that take place in education and to make suggestions regarding the form by 
which such changes should take place. Perhaps most notably, Sergiovanni’s (2008) analysis of 
the U.S. educational system applies Habermas’ understanding of the systemsworld and lifeworld 
in order to identity the pathology disturbing the equilibrium of our collective educational 
cognitive paradigm and its physical instantiation in the world. The systemsworld Sergiovanni 
notes has come to dominate the lifeworld of education, thus causing many of its problems—most 
pressingly, subjecting learners to the systemsworld, insidiously through the “beneficent” guise of 
education. True engagement in moral discourse would require, as Habermas explicated, the 
inclusion of the needs and voices of all stakeholders in education, especially the students, in the 
development of educational policy. 
Honneth’s explication of Habermas suggests that the sublimation of the lifeworld by the 
systemsworld may take place without notice. The ever pressing redirection of social energy to 
that which bears the most fruit with the least effort seems to lead inexorably to greater 
systemification. Thus, in the context of this dissertation one wonders if the systemification, 
commodification, and commercialization of the university is similarly inexorable and the result 
of a larger sublimation of the lifeworld by the systemsworld. Understanding this phenomena 
requires a discourse-ethical investigation of faculty roles. One must engage the philosophical 
enterprise of deconstruction, immanent critique, definition, and normative evaluation through 
investigation of the communicative action that produces faculty roles. What the above research 
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makes clear is that the application of community-dialectical role theory cannot be done without 
the uncovering of norms embedded in our communicative action through cognitive dialectic with 
the symbolically expressed and norms (expectations) that construct faculty roles. Moreover, the 
research project itself must admit that in order to understand the roles it must participate in the 
generative linguistic process that produces the roles, and, thus, the moral imperative to change 
society for the better remains looming. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
 The analysis of institutional roles requires that there be a means by which to uncover the 
norms assumed and, perhaps, inscribed, by our communicative action. Community-dialectical 
role theory suggests that roles are generated, explicitly and implicitly, through verbal interaction 
between agents as understood through symbolic-interactionist role theory and through the 
inscribed roles generated by institutions as understood through organizational role theory. Thus a 
means by which to uncover not only the inscribed roles, but the implicit norms governing those 
roles is necessitated. This dissertation itself seeks not only to understand the conjunction of 
faculty roles, but to develop a normative construct conjoining those roles rationally. Discourse 
ethics, I contend, is the best means by which to understand and uncover faculty roles as well as 
develop a normative framework for them.  
In a philosophy dissertation, the next step would likely be to begin the analysis of faculty 
roles through discourse analysis. The paradigm of educational research, however, does not 
normally include philosophical analysis as a form of research in and of itself. Thusly, before 
moving forward into a deeper explication of Habermas whose work was introduced in chapter 2, 
one first must justify the application of philosophical analysis to the research questions 
established earlier.  
Therefore, chapter three begins with a discussion of qualitative research and the ways in 
which philosophical analysis is always present in such research. Explication of philosophical 
analysis in educational research is developed beginning with Scriven, Flew, and Soltis, while at 
the same time reminding the reader that this chapter is both explication and an example of 
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philosophical analysis.  
This chapter will then justify why discourse ethics, in particular, is so very applicable 
given the theoretical framework of role theory and the conceptual framework of community-
dialectical role theory. This shift away from Scriven to Habermas is justified by noting that 
despite Scriven’s claims, the distinction between different forms of philosophy is nonsensical. 
Particularly of import is to note that in defining philosophy (in order to justify the move into 
philosophical analysis), philosophy itself is a “lived” science that requires holistic inquiry into 
various epistemologies. Thus, this work challenges the epistemological biases of educational 
research—particularly when solely positivistic. In this way, numerous epistemic inquiry methods 
are justifiable for the production of understanding, including narrative (though not used in this 
particular dissertation), narrative analysis, and dialogue form. In this way, the essential question, 
“What is the difference between conceptual analysis and philosophical analysis?” is answered by 
noting philosophy as lived, dialogue-based, and holistic in its epistemology.  
I will suggest that a deconstruction of the term philosophy suggests a fundamental lived 
experience. I will then argue that review of our own underlying assumptions of the terms 
“philosophy” and “philosopher” suggest that philosophy is a lived experience and is best 
understood as part of the lifeworld rather than the systemsworld.3 Conversely, conceptual 
analysis is more a part of the systemsworld in which dialogue is subservient to the needs of the 
paradigm governing the analysis. Philosophy, I will argue, requires constant application through 
dialogue with the world, revision, and authenticity—particularly insofar as it requires that one 
                                                 
3 The use of the term “systemsworld” emerges in this dissertation  from Sergiovanni’s (2000) work The Lifeworld of 
Leadership. His own understanding of Habermas was of systems that themselves, like the lifeworld, cannot escape 
from their worldly embeddedness. The systemsworld is the world of instrumentalities that often emerge as 
management systems (p. 5). 
136 
 
participate in the world dialectic rather than coldly analyze the concepts as if one can separate 
oneself from their embeddedness in the lifeworld. I will do this to unveil the fact that the above 
meets the promise at the beginning that this chapter acts not just as an explication of 
philosophical analysis, but as a participatory demonstration of it, both deconstructing the terms 
and uncovering the norms governing our conventions when we even say “philosophy,” thus 
engaging Habermas.  
The details of the methodological approach will then be elucidated. This elucidation 
expounds on the ways that the project will use role theory as a means by which to deconstruct the 
roles as we understand them and then use discourse ethics as a means by which to make sense of 
and uncover the norms and expectations of role theory with the intention of producing a 
normative construct. Essential literature is explored in order to unpack Habermas’ discourse 
ethics and consider not only its particular appropriateness to the project, but also potential 
criticisms to the methodology (paying special attention to Amy Allen’s work). Solipsistic 
concerns (to which the author is sympathetic) are addressed and set to rest noting (by a series of 
philosophical moves inspired by Allen, but also moving beyond them) that the solipsist has 
excellent reason to use discourse ethics, even if she refuses to reject solipsism. Having satisfied 
the skeptic, the chapter proceeds to consider researcher positionality, limitations of the 
dissertation, credibility, and warrant. The end game will note that philosophical analysis, in 
particular discourse ethics, is self-reflexive commentary, and, thus, that form of “rigor” is met to 
the highest degree by virtue of the methodology itself, given that the author remain transparent in 
his reasoning.  
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The Qualitative Paradigm 
What is Philosophical in Qualitative Research? 
This research project hinges on the development of definitions that, once clarified, can 
then be investigated for consistency and coherence when conjoined. Thus, it is philosophical 
analysis that best meets the needs of the research question. The project remains qualitative, as it 
is an understanding of those definitions and the ways in which they interact that is sought, but it 
will also engage the normative frame that is also a hallmark of philosophical inquiry. This is not 
to imply that qualitative research and philosophy are somehow exclusive, but, instead, to 
acknowledge that there is a paradigm of social science qualitative research and a paradigm of 
philosophical inquiry that are often treated as different disciplines. Research suggests that 
philosophical analysis is of particular use for a research project such as this one, and it is of 
particular importance to all research—particularly in education, as discussed by Michael Scriven 
(1997) and Jonas Soltis (1968).  
To begin, there is little discussion of “philosophical analysis” as a research methodology 
in qualitative research in academic journals. Moreover, a quick review of the textbooks in 
qualitative research does not even suggest that philosophical analysis as a methodology exists. 
Patton’s (2001) Qualitative research & evaluation methods, Creswell’s (2012) Qualitative 
Inquiry & research design and Tracy’s (2013) Qualitative research methods: Collecting 
evidence, crafting analysis, communicating impact consider potential methodologies such as 
narrative research, phenomenology, grounded theory, ethnography, and case study without any 
mention of philosophical analysis. Interestingly, as the literature review demonstrates, it is not 
unusual for educational researchers to use Habermas or other philosophers, notably Dewey and 
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Noddings, as conceptual grounding for their work and as a means by which to generate a 
framework for teleological normativity. Despite the abundance of philosophy used by 
researchers, philosophical analysis itself is generally relegated to course-specific “Philosophy of 
Education” titles as if qualitative and quantitative analysis are themselves fundamentally distinct 
from philosophical analysis.  
Interestingly, however, these texts do often use philosophy and analysis as part of their 
discussion of qualitative research. Philosophy and analysis are terms used by the textbooks to 
describe the way a methodology will be applied and conclusions drawn or, as in the case of the 
following quote, indicate a distinction between research and the abstract world of philosophy:  
Exhibit 1.3 provides a sampling of contrasts between traditional tribe-centered initiations 
and modern youth-centered coming-of-age celebrations. These kinds of polar contrasts 
can sometimes set up a Hegelian dialectic of thesis and antithesis that leads to a new 
synthesis. In philosophy such contrasts derive from the ruminations of philosophers; in 
qualitative research such thematic contrasts emanate from and are grounded in fieldwork. 
(Patton, 2001, p. 7)  
Patton’s claim above, though, could not be made without a philosophical framework, nor could 
the fieldwork—that presumably cannot include document analysis and theoretical analysis—be 
examined without philosophical analysis. Patton cannot derive “such contrast” without the 
Hegelian dialectic to which he alludes as a framework through which to make sense of the data 
from the field research. Moreover, it cannot be said that the contrasts emanate from the fieldwork 
without an agent through which the data from the fieldwork are transposed and organized. This is 
all work of philosophical analysis. Qualitative researchers know, as argued by Eisner (1991) in 
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The Enlightened Eye, that in the case of qualitative research, “The self is the instrument that 
engages the situation and makes sense of it” (p. 34). Patterns do not exist out in the world; the 
researcher generates them through communicative action.  
The interpretive act of seeing the data as patterned is a philosophical endeavor; it takes 
place in field of the mind. It is philosophical analysis. Thusly, the distinction that Patton drew 
between philosophy and qualitative research immediately collapses when considering two points: 
1) the frameworks applied to data used in qualitative research (and perhaps all research) are 
themselves philosophically defined constructs (gender, coming-of-age, celebration, role) and 2) 
the data also are interpreted by the qualitative research instrument—the self. Here we see Mead’s 
(1934) symbolic-interactionistic approach to selfhood and agency is both assumed by and 
evidenced by the qualitative research paradigm. The construction of actors as mediated by their 
social communicative understanding of “self” as that which is created by interaction with the 
Other is reflected in the qualitative paradigm. The data that one interprets are not solely 
interpreted by a separate and distinct “mind,” but by a self that is generated by what one 
perceives as the self-construct and as perceived by others. That self, then, in conjunction with 
other selves, develops through symbolic interaction the symbols themselves that are used to 
communicate and act as the very grounding for communicative action—namely, social 
constructs. One notes, therefore, that the very assumption that there are constructs that can be 
analyzed is a philosophical assumption, and the belief that it is through agents that these 
constructs are measured and understood is a philosophical thesis. 
While it may be the case that quantitative researchers can argue that they do not need 
philosophical analysis in order to make sense of their data because they have statistical tools for 
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analysis, qualitative researchers do not use mathematical systems to make sense of the data. 
Rather, they, using reason and logic, organize the data in such a way that they find makes sense 
by generating patterns they consider meaningful… All of which is philosophical analysis. As 
argued by Stubley (1992),  
Herein lies the value of philosophy as a method of inquiry. Placing understanding as the 
ultimate end, philosophy works in the realm of ‘lenses.’ Whether the particular 
methodology is that of analytic or linguistic philosophy, process philosophy, 
experimentalism, or phenomenology, philosophy seeks to identify and evaluate the lenses 
through which we construct experience. (p. 44)  
Thus, Patton and other textbook authors and researchers are on much more stable ground when 
they do not eliminate philosophical analysis from the research milieu and, rather, as they often 
do, engage it tacitly as the fundamental device used to analyze, interpret, and conclude. As 
Habermas would likely contend, examination of these texts would reveal a series of implicit 
assumptions about the most effective ways to analyze data meaningfully. Those assumptions, 
however, hinge on philo-logical axioms. What one comes to realize is that philosophical analysis 
is not absent from qualitative research, it is fundamental—so fundamental that it is often 
overlooked.  
They are philosophers like Habermas who provide tools to engage, particularly, such 
overlooked embedded values and norms. Habermas, particularly, is noted for his “immanent 
critique” (also found in the work of Marx). Habermas’ refinement of that tool of analysis is a 
philosophical device wherein one uncovers assumed social norms and beliefs that themselves 
may be revealed to be incoherent or inconsistent when considered from the perspective of the 
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social frame that embeds those norms. For example, a society may claim to be altruistic and 
invested in the best interest of others, but one may realize that in that same society it would be 
considered inappropriate to bring a child to a mall Santa Claus to tell the jolly old saint what she 
will give rather than what she will get. Thus, one comes to realize that there are shared 
assumptions about appropriate action that need not be inscribed, and, yet, they reveal our shared 
social norms. An immanent critique would suggest that there is a clear inconsistency from the 
socially voiced claim that a society is altruistic while at the same time harboring the embedded 
assumption that children should tell Santa what they want rather than what they will give.  
Justifying Philosophical Analysis  
Jonas F. Soltis’s 1968 text, An Introduction to the Analysis of Educational Concepts, 
evidences the essential role philosophical analysis plays in educational research. His work is not 
just a justification of philosophical analysis, but it is also a model of the analytic techniques used 
by philosophers as applied to educational concepts. It can be difficult to explain analytical 
techniques, and, thus, Soltis aimed to participate with the reader in applying analytic techniques 
“to take advantage of the opportunity to view and evaluate the perspective on education offered 
by the application of the techniques of contemporary analytic philosophy” (p. xi). Similarly, in 
his argument for the importance of conceptual/philosophical analysis in his chapter in 
Complementary Methods,” Michael Scriven (1997) stated,  
Before I discuss these two interpretations let me call your attention once more to the fact 
that we are now doing conceptual analysis. This chapter is not a long-winded historical 
introduction to some examples; it is an example. And we are not only analyzing the 
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concept of definition itself, which is a key tool in any kind of research and, hence, in 
educational research, but also looking into the nature of language. (p. 137) 
 It may well be that qualitative inquiry often follows in that spirit—demonstrating rather than 
explicating philosophical analysis. Thus, in that spirit, this chapter on methodology will not 
simply act as a historical account of philosophical analysis, but will also act as an example of 
philosophical analysis by virtue of considering, comparing, and generating definitions, 
examining counter-examples, and grounding claims in evidence that has been structured to 
produce a coherent framework for understanding.  
All qualitative analysis, if it engages in philosophical analysis to clarify, investigate, and 
examine concepts, terms and definitions, is an act of philosophical analysis. Michael Scriven 
(1997) stated, “Many researchers have thought that the first part of their job—analysis of the 
concepts that are going to be studied—could be done, or could be done better without any help 
from philosophers (p. 132). What is key here is the realization that the first part of the job is 
analysis. Perhaps because researchers often analyze information after they are collected, it can be 
easy to take for granted that the concepts to be researched must be analyzed first. One must 
clarify the constructs measured, explicate the nature of the constructs, and justify why such 
measurement will do something of interest and use. All of this, by Scriven’s definition of 
conceptual analysis, indicates that “one crucial part of philosophical expertise,” is a means by 
which to develop a “sound understanding and definition” of the concept in question (p. 132). 
Simply, one may inherit the construct to be researched from others and, thereby, assume that no 
analysis of the concept is necessary, yet it was that previous analysis that developed and defined 
that construct for use. 
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Consider, though, Anthony Flew’s (1960) discussion of supposedly intractable 
philosophical problems and the means by which they may be solved. In his edited volume, 
Essays in Conceptual Analysis, his paper “Philosophy and language” discusses the importance of 
clarifying terms: 
For in elucidating the ordinary uses (as opposed to philosophers’ suspected misuses) of 
some of the rather limited range of words around which our controversies tend to cluster, 
it has been noticed that the conceptual equipment provided by ordinary (here opposed 
particularly to technical) language is amazingly rich and subtle; and that even the 
classical puzzles cannot be fully resolved without elucidating not merely the formerly 
fashionable elite of notions but also all their neglected logical hangers-on.” (p.34) 
Simply, the problems that arise between notions may be resolved by the examination and 
clarification of those terms that are assumed and, yes, support the notions in question. If there is 
a tension between teacher and researcher as chapter one suggests that there is, examination of 
the terms and notions that support those terms may suggest a resolution to the problem. Through 
examination of their use in ordinary language one may come to reveal that conceptual tensions 
are created by their misuse rather than any intrinsic meanings. This approach is, at its heart, both 
Derridian and Habermasian. The immanent critique of Habermas is perhaps one of the most 
obvious means by which to examine the use of ordinary language as a means by which to 
uncover the underlying norms and assumptions that govern our actions, as well as a means by 
which to identify contradiction and incoherence in those underlying assumptions.  
Scriven warned that “lack of conceptual analysis may result in definitions that include 
many things [the researchers] wanted to exclude, and exclude things they wanted to include” (p. 
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132). Simply, how can one measure or apply a construct without first knowing what the 
construct is or is not, or at least positing its definition for the purpose of challenging that 
definition? Thus, it is philosophical analysis that undergirds every dissertation by virtue of, at 
least, providing the definitions of the constructs to be used and by providing the tools necessary 
to develop understanding or draw conclusions from the data that, itself, is presumed to be 
reflective of those constructs.  
Philosophical analysis is a method. According to Stubley (1992),  
At the core of almost all of the different approaches [to the philosophical method] is an 
analytical process, commonly described as conceptual analysis, which uses paradigmatic 
examples to define and clarify the meanings of particular terms and concepts. Consistent 
with the definition of philosophy as a method of inquiry which seeks understanding 
through the juxtapositioning or challenging of ideas, examples which illustrate the core 
meaning or most typical usage of a term are thrust against counter-examples that 
illustrate what the term is not. (p. 45) 
Stubley’s worry suggests that philosophical analysis is a means by which to apply tools such as 
juxtaposition, presentation of counter-examples, and reduction ad absurdum to concepts, 
constructs, ideas, and definitions in order to develop understanding. The data used, then, rather 
than being interviews or documents, are concepts, ideas, and notions. (Arguably, so a 
philosopher of language might suggest, all data whether transcribed interviews or even videos of 
events are all actually concepts, ideas, and notions). The data, then, are concepts, and the tool is 
analysis—examination, definition, and systematic investigation of those concepts’ meanings and 
implications.  
145 
 
The result of the analysis is not just a breaking down, it is a development. To clarify a 
notion and identify what it is and is not is to unveil a construct—a concept or idea defined in a 
context that provides meaning when applied and investigated. As defined by SAGE publications 
in order to help define their engagement with quantitative research, “a construct is that abstract 
idea, underlying theme, or subject matter that one wishes to measure.” To measure a construct, 
however, one must have the construct—it does not appear ex nihilo. It falls under the purview of 
philosophical analysis to generate that construct, which itself the analysis must be able to justify.  
Therefore, it is philosophical analysis that produces the constructs investigated and used 
by research. Moreover, philosophical analysis is a method that extrapolates data in the form of 
concepts and interprets that data using the tools of philosophy—definition, logic, narrative and 
linguistic analysis, all of which can be understood as lenses of experience, ways to construct 
understanding. Lens examination hinges on the examination of definition, as meaning is a 
fundamental way in which we construct our experience (Eisner, 1991). Thus, given the tools of 
the philosophical methodology, Stubley (1992) concluded that philosophical inquiry is “a 
reflective meditative activity which scrutinizes the lenses through which we construct 
experience” (p. 49). The common error, I suggest, is the assumption that reflective and 
meditative inquiry cannot scrutinize, that they must be so subjective as to lack rigor and access to 
knowledge. Clearly, this is false: the very act of scrutiny requires that one know what one is 
scrutinizing, which itself requires that one clarify one’s terms and categories and apply 
interpretive devices in order to make meaning. 
Philosophical Analysis and Definition 
There is a joke about philosophers:  
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Question: “How many philosophers does it take to change a light bulb?”  
Answer: “Define change.”  
This joke makes light of the philosopher’s need to define what one means before taking practical 
action. This hesitation to act before definition may well be why Scriven’s (1997) writing is 
preoccupied with justifying the importance of conceptual analysis. He argued that there is a lack 
of conceptual-analytic training in “virtually all programs for educational researchers,” which has 
doomed “conceptually incompetent researchers… to rush into building a lifetime of research on 
a foundation of conceptual sand” (p. 136). It is this fear of building upon conceptual sand that 
causes philosophers to hesitate to change the metaphorical light bulb. 
Scriven wrote, revealingly,  
Teaching is, in fact, a very difficult notion to define, and if you decide that you can define 
it any way you like or if you think it is a very simple notion to analyze, you will finish up 
doing a great deal of research on a process which is definitely not teaching, and is only 
related to it in some obscure way. (p. 136) 
Moreover, I am willing to suggest that this hesitation is warranted not just when a concept is 
unclear, but especially when it is believed to be very clear.  
Those concepts that we have trusted the longest are the ones that, by virtue of their 
familiarity, are now most likely challenged the least, and thereby conceptually dangerous as they 
may go unscrutinized when new knowledge, techniques, or minds enter the research arena.4 A 
                                                 
4 Again, Gettier’s (1963) work comes to mind; the notion he challenged was a definition, a long established 
well respected definition in epistemology of knowledge as “justified, true belief.” It did not require the most 
renowned mind of the last two thousand years to demonstrate the invalid nature of the definition of knowledge, just 
a mind that was willing to ask a seemingly inane question that challenged the prevailing dogma. The result of 
Gettier’s questioning has been a continued resonance on the field of epistemology as philosophers desperately 
attempt to resolve what might be an intractable problem. 
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more pressing example than light bulbs is the definition of another commonly assumed and 
accepted construct…“man.” Many people assume that they can identify a man when they see 
one. They assume that they can define man, and need spend no time analyzing the concept man. 
One may then imagine that it is not unlikely that man and men are often constructs used in 
dissertations to help measure some other construct wherein man itself is never analyzed or even 
defined. This is exemplified in the case of measuring men’s preference for particular colors, 
wherein preference is the operative construct that the research will clarify and define before 
proceeding with the research. One is likely to assume that man need no definition, that the 
construct is sufficiently well defined, and the researcher need not even provide the definition—
nonetheless justify the origin of the definition; it is simply an inherited and assumed cultural 
construct.  
It is not difficult to imagine, though, a research project such that the construct man 
requires clarification and definition, if not justification. Consider a project that investigates the 
experience that self-identified men have with sexism and discrimination. If the men are self-
identified men, there may be transgendered individuals who participate in the research who act 
as undesirable outliers in terms of their responses. The researcher may seek to avoid such 
problems by requiring that only “men” who were born genetically sexed as male can participate. 
I suggest that a justification for such exclusion is necessary. To exclude transgendered men 
without justification is to assume that they are not what they perceive themselves to be, which 
certainly seems antithetical to qualitative research, which is so heavily reliant on perception. 
Moreover, such exclusion, particularly if it is ad hoc, acts as a form of institutional genderism by 
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reinforcing the conceptions and norms that exclude transgendered individuals from the 
conversation by denying them voice.  
One might argue that to engage such in depth definition analysis (particularly to the point 
of turning an entire dissertation into philosophical analysis) is to slow down the research process 
unnecessarily. One might argue that it would be far more expedient, and aesthetically simple, to 
use “operational definitions,” definitions that can be understood as simplifications or 
quantifications of what were once messy concepts, as is the case when describing someone as 
five feet seven inches tall rather than as short. One might wish to avoid engaging in 
philosophical argument pertaining to what short actually means, but measurement in feet and 
inches is easy to use, state, define, and defend. 
 So why not simply redefine “short” as being five feet seven inches tall or less, and move 
on? To quote Scriven (1997),  
The people who favored the move towards operationalist redefinitions had virtually no 
training in the capacity to analyze the prior concept, so they really had no way in which 
to make the key test of the superiority of their prosed simplification. They just favored it 
because it was new and simpler, and they felt that the messiness of the old concept was an 
impediment to research (it was) and probably reflected many confusion of people with 
unscientific training (it probably did) and hence had no redeeming feature—which is 
where they made their mistake. For the messy concept contains all the subtlety that 
experience has forced upon it; it reflects the real phenomena, perhaps not clearly but 
usually rather comprehensively. Since the most important part of science is accurate 
reflection of reality, this part of the matter cannot be dismissed lightly. So, although some 
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limited trades of simplicity for accuracy are possible, you would have to do the 
homework first—or be very lucky. (p. 140)  
The replacement of concepts with operationalized definitions that seemingly require no 
clarification or investigation does make research more expedient, but leaves open the possibility 
that we are not measuring what we claim and leaves us far less capable of justifying why we 
believe the measurement means something about the concept we have redefined in a positivistic 
way (e.g., to say that my measurements in inches says something about shortness is tenuous if I 
cannot explain the connection between a particular height in inches and shortness). It is for this 
very reason that researchers concern themselves with construct validity—“construct validation is 
the process of collecting evidence to support the assertion that a test measures the construct 
claimed by the test developer” (Worthern, White, Fan, & Sudweeks, 1999, p. 141).  A construct 
is understood as that, “unobservable, postulated attribute of individuals that we create in our 
minds to help us explain or theorize” (Worthern, White, Fan, & Sudweeks, 1999, p. 141).  Thus, 
as Scriven (1997) suggested, we cannot forget that the concepts, the constructs, we purport to 
measure are, at their core, unobservable concepts generated by human minds for the purpose of 
generating understanding.  
It is important to note that Scriven argued that IQ and intelligence is one of the few cases 
in which operational definitions work and thus the positivist’s project does not collapse entirely. 
I remain unconvinced. He argued that the body of experts who judge intelligence will often fail 
to as accurately describe the intelligence of an agent as an IQ test will. I believe this begs the 
question. We have already assumed that IQ measures intelligence rather than being a measure 
that reports and translates the answering of questions and solving of problems into the ability to 
150 
 
answer questions and solve problems. While congruent, answering questions and the ability to 
answer questions are not identical.  
Perhaps even more importantly, intelligence, as operationally defined, fails to take into 
account the arguments regarding the many kinds of intelligence, and thus, in a way best likened 
to Michael Foucault’s (1964) explication of madness and reason, creates for itself a paradigm of 
intelligence that is defined by the powerful (the definers of knowledge) who happen to be, 
coincidentally, those who are identified by the test as intelligent. To say that one is intelligent is 
deeply connected to what one knows and what one can do with knowledge, and knowledge is not 
best understood as a thing in the world, but rather, as a construct defined by those with the power 
to do so. Consider, for example, the definition of mental illness. Those with the power to define 
it do so. Thus, what we know about transgendered individuals is determined by the operational 
definitions generated by the medical community and their definition of transgender as a kind of 
mental disease. 
The Positivist Critique of Philosophical Definition.  
This is all to say that, as Scriven (1997) noted, the issue hinges on positivism. It would 
likely be the positivist who has the most to criticize about philosophical analysis as a 
methodology. Positivism has proved useful. It is a scientifically-minded, Occam’s razor-oriented 
tool that suggests the world can be understood in machine-like ways. Specifically, logical 
positivism holds that metaphysical problems can be ignored. The positivist suggests this not out 
of flippance but due to the philosophically developed thesis proposed by the Vienna Circle of the 
1920’s, comprised of such eminent members as Moritz Schlick, A.J. Ayer, Rudolf Carnap, and 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, who argued that only that which can be observed need be treated as true. 
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This observation thesis is generally known as the “principle of verification.” Unfortunately, 
though perhaps comically, the principle of verification cannot itself be verified, and, thus, 
positivism falls on its own sword and was criticized heavily, to the point of utter refutation, by 
Willard Van Quine (1951) in his Two dogmas of empiricism. That is not to say that there is no 
neo-positivistic philosophical revolution or that positivism is a dead theory. Rather, I suggest that 
positivism, thus far, has failed to eliminate the need for “messy definitions” of the world because 
it has failed yet to provide understanding.  
Rather, as Quine suggested, there is good reason to believe that science—and, 
therefore—research is verified as a holism rather than through individual propositions. We 
cannot reduce our statements of truth to immediate empirical experience. Those statements only 
can be meaningful in a context of other statements regarding truth. Rather, understanding of 
given statements is generated through the connection one makes with other such statements 
within the domain. In a way reminiscent of Piaget’s learning theory, the field of research cannot 
be said to be one that exists in direct correspondence to empirical observation; rather, our beliefs 
are verified by virtue of their connection, or lack thereof to other beliefs—thus, they are judged 
not solely based in immediate experience, but on the holism of understanding generated by one’s 
experience schema. 
 Understanding and clarifying concepts, therefore, cannot be done in a vacuum. It cannot 
be done without language, without connection to other terms, and without definitions of those 
connecting terms. We verify the truth and falsity of new propositions by judging it against the 
whole of our belief schema. It may be argued that we generate a narrative of our 
experience/belief schema—an overarching arc of understanding that explains, justifies, and 
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clarifies the summation of our belief set. We do not just verify new information, as Piaget 
suggested, by comparison to particular beliefs, rather, as Quine implied, we verify them by virtue 
of ascertaining whether that information makes sense under that arc narrative. It is through 
narrative—the connection of events and facts—that we make sense of experience, not through 
individual events (which cannot even be called facts without context) of experience. The 
definition of a term is meaningless to us outside of the context of other terms and beliefs. The 
definition of teacher, without the context of education, student, and knowledge, will not make 
sense to us. Moreover, if we attempt to define a term and that definition does not make sense 
within the context of our arc narrative, we fail to understand it and may reject it rather than 
rewriting the story. 
To say that gravity is caused by the exchange of gravitons is accurate and all that is 
necessary for us to understand gravity from a positivistic standpoint. Why, and how attraction is 
caused by the exchange of tiny particles, though, is hard to make sense of. In a Humean way, one 
fails to see how the conjunction of the events “a graviton is exchanged between particle A and 
particle B” and the event “the apple fell” equates with the causal story. The narrative is missing, 
and, thus, even if the positivist is right and the definition of gravity is accurate, without an 
understanding of the causal story it is a vacuous definition. Conversely, to define gravity as the 
warping of space such that objects make metaphorical dimples in space-time, and, thus, objects, 
much like marbles, roll into those dimples, seems to make much more sense—but  it is a messier, 
more complex, and metaphorical definition. This sense making of messy definitions evidences 
Quine’s argument that the holism of context is necessary for understanding singular terms. As 
the purpose of this work is to understand the conjunction of faculty roles, we need more than 
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posited, operationalized definitions; we need definitions that connect to other terms that we can 
define, use metaphors that help makes sense, and, when conjoined, generate a narrative that 
makes sense. We can be assured, then, that this project will be messy, thick and rich.  
Definition Ad Infinitum  
One might find that, very quickly, that one cannot act at all if one must define all terms 
used in one’s research as well as justify them before conducting research. As each concept itself 
is reliant on others, perhaps ad infinitum, one would find oneself unable to change what is now 
the proverbial light bulb. Scriven’s argument for the importance of conceptual analysis is not 
intended to prevent research, nor should it. Rather, the concepts used themselves to support our 
research are often ceteris paribus concepts—all things being equal, their definition is generally 
accepted and understood (Dancy, 1993). Thus, one is freed to examine, in detail, one concept 
without having to define all ceteris paribus concepts. One must also accept, though, the very real 
possibility that the constructs that support one’s research are themselves always revisable and 
may require redefinition. Moreover, as in the case with constructs such as men, as the earlier 
example demonstrated, the researcher would be wise to consider carefully that which (or who) 
she eliminates from a classification—particularly without explaining why. It behooves the 
researcher, therefore, to make certain, at the very least, that the constructs measured and used for 
measurement are themselves well defined, if one does not have an eternity to define all of the 
ceteris paribus concepts.  
Avoiding the trap of building one’s research on a grounding of sand, then, at least 
Scriven (1997) and Soltis (1968) suggested, requires that one begin with definitions. Soltis wrote 
of educational concepts,  
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The ideas to be dealt with are quite ordinary and central to the educational enterprise. As 
such, they provide a basic point of departure for anyone concerned with education, from 
the layman and neophyte to the accomplished educational practitioner and scholar. Yet 
they quickly become puzzling ideas, which on careful examination lead to a chain of 
questions and answers in which the last link is more frequently another frustrating 
question than a pacifying answer. (1968, p. x) 
Simply, as Soltis noted, there are many definitions of educational concepts; there is no shortage 
among politicians, the general populace, and even educators of conflicting ideas about what 
education is and what it should do. As a result, educational institutions, like the university, find 
themselves not only in flux but in contradiction with each other and themselves. Thus, to best 
understand where the institution should go—to engage the departure to which Soltis referred—
requires not just that we know we are here, but to know how we should define “here.”  
It is for this reason that I suggest that this work does not begin with definitions simply 
because Scriven and Soltis argue that this is what philosophical analysis does; rather, I suggest 
that the work should begin with definitions because it is, in this particular case, the best place to 
start. We understand that the university is changing; we also understand that education has 
tremendous power to do harm as well as benefit both learners and the society in which they 
participate. We understand that the role faculty play, as defined by society, as well as their lived 
instantiation of those roles as communicative action, has the potential to do the aforementioned 
harm and good. If we wish, then, to suggest that the roles should take a particular form, then we 
must, as we have done, define those roles and provide justification for that justification. This act, 
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the act of definition, deconstruction, and normative construction, is the heart of philosophical 
analysis.  
Defining Definition 
Ironically enough, the term definition itself is one that can mean many things. It would be 
useful to consider the field of semiotics—the study of signs and symbols and how they are used 
in communicative efforts—in order to provide a working definition for what we mean when we 
define a term. To take a discourse-ethical perspective, we need to review the way in which we 
use definition in order to begin to ascertain the underline assumptions that accompany our 
communication of the idea “definition.”   To ask someone for a definition too often results in her 
proving a “dictionary” or denotative definition. Such denotations are often our first resort when 
asked to define a term. Further analysis, however, of our conversational conventions reveals that 
such Webster-eque definitions are often insufficient to capture the holism of meanings that 
accompany a term: there are, of course, many connotations that construct the meaning of a term 
as well. If, in our conversation, we still find that we cannot grasp what the Other means when she 
says a thing, we may resort to ostension as a means by which to provide a direct example. Thus, 
a definition is constructed through a symbolic communicative process with the other by 
forwarding a series of denotative, connotative, and ostensive meanings that, in conjunction, 
define the term in our social framework. 
As definition analysis and construction is essential to much philosophical inquiry, further 
clarification regarding the tools of definition is warranted. According to Nöth’s (1995) 
Handbook of Semiotics “denotation,” in traditional semiotics, indicates a primary meaning, 
whereas connotation indicates the secondary meanings. Nöth explained ostention in terms of 
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literally pointing to a thing. The three of these notions together provide a robust definition of a 
term by virtue of providing the primary meaning, the secondary meanings, and indicating an 
actual instance of that thing. Thus it can be suggested that one understands a term if one can 
provide all three definitions of that term. 
For example, to provide a definition of “Earth” would likely require that one identify a 
dictionary definition which may inform one that “Earth is the 3rd celestial body orbiting the sun, 
Sol, at an approximate distance of 93 million miles.” The connotation, however, would allow for 
the implications, assumptions, and associations the term may inspire, such as “soil, Gaia, life, 
and home.” Finally, ostension requires that one actually indicate the thing—in essence to give an 
example. An example of “Earth” would not include a “globe, a map, or a picture” as these all are 
models or representations. To provide an example of the Earth, which of itself there is only one, 
would require that one point at the Earth. It is important to note that constructs, unlike proper 
nouns indicating singular subjects, can have many examples as the construct: it, in some sense, 
exists as a set of which there can be many members, as is the case with teacher. It seems that 
there is not much else that one could do to define a term. Moreover, when we, in our ordinary 
interaction with other humans, observe an agent engage all three forms of definition when 
explaining a concept, we assume that the agent understands the term. I suggest that is because 
the ability to provide those three definitions acts as evidence of understanding, perhaps even 
challenging Nöth’s (1995) suggestion that there is a kind of primacy to denotation. Given our 
communicative social frame, it may well be connotations that support the bulk of our meaning.   
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Definition, Intention, and Dialogue 
There is something to be said, here, about the problem of intention and John Searle. 
Searle (1983) would likely argue that my above assertion is patently false by virtue of arguing 
that intention is essential for understanding and intention is not demonstrated by my above 
proposition. Intention in this case—not to be confused with purposefulness—refers to the idea 
that our thoughts are about something. In rebuttal, I suggest that there is no means by which to 
access intention inside the mind of another (certainly not “scientifically”) and that it is only 
through the rich connection of dialectical experience that one can presume intention on the part 
of an Other. As Derrida (1977) noted in his reply to Searle in his afterward to Limited Inc, 
“Toward an ethic of discussion,”  
If by pragmatic concept you mean one that is empirical and approximative, I have trouble 
seeing how it would be able to found, theoretically, seriously, a theory (Searle’s, which is 
intentionalist through and through, treating intention as the founding principle of all 
speech acts that are serious, literal, and meaningful). Nonplentitude will be treated as 
though it were an extrinsic accident, even if it in fact occurs frequently, even if it takes 
place everywhere. This I call “fundamental intentionalism” –Searle’s. In this case, I do 
not believe that the concept of “intention” can be treated as  “pragmatic concept,” not at 
least if by that you mean a concept that is empirically useful, provisionally convenient, 
constructed without great rigor. (p. 128) 
Derrida (1977) suggested that one cannot simply divorce intention from its metaphysical 
plenitude, as it is metaphysical in its very teleology.  
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Perhaps a clever constructed machine could fool us into believing it understands 
definitions with one act of denotation, connotation, and ostension, as Searle suggested in 
refutation of Alan Turing. Turing, though, had a point if we interpret him as underscoring the 
centrality of dialogue to the mind. In the case of humans, we assume that repeated linguistic 
interaction, the robust dialectic itself of numerous cases of such definitions, that demonstrate the 
potentiality of a coherent belief-set constructed by such definitions held by the agent, is evidence 
of understanding. I suggest, therefore, that the ability to provide a denotative, connotative, and 
ostensive definition is the core evidence of understanding substantiated by a robust dialectic that 
continues to confirm the original proposition of understanding. Thus, it is in the context of 
dialectic (not humanness, English, or logic) that intention is evidenced. 
Thus, if understanding is demonstrated, at least at the burgeoning fundamental degree 
necessary for engagement in full dialectic, by providing denotative, connotative, and ostensive 
definition, then the methodology of this philosophical analysis requires that we do so with the 
terms I will presume to define. Much of this has already been accomplished through the literature 
review and the development of the conceptual framework. Role, faculty, teacher, and researcher 
have all been defined through examination of documents, institutions, and theories that generate 
those roles. It will be the work of chapter four, though, to continue that process by synthesizing 
those definitions, examining them, ostensively pointing to them by virtue of examples, and 
justifying them. This final action of justification is a normative process. As such, philosophical 
analysis is not normative by virtue of arbitrarily asserting the value of one definition over the 
other, but rather by virtue of justifying the construct as valid through universally applicable 
logical and dialectical principles.  
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Normativity and Definition 
Note that Scriven (1997), Soltis (1968), and Stubley (1992) did not spend time with the 
normative work of philosophical inquiry. Their work largely hinges on the philosophic tradition 
of parsing out concepts. Construction of concepts and normativity is just as central to the 
philosophical enterprise. Moreover, in his 1960 text, The Language of Education, Israel Scheffler 
argued that three types of definition are particularly useful when engaging educational concepts: 
stipulative, descriptive, and programmatic. Stipulative definitions are those that are suggested for 
use in a particular work, largely to avoid confusion. If one writes, “For the purposes of this work, 
term x will refer to instances of y,” then one is proposing a stipulative definition. Presumably, 
stipulative definitions are synonomous with Scriven’s operational definitions. Descriptive 
definitions are those that purport to describe the term in question. These definitions are 
commonly understood as the previously discussed denotative and connotative definitions, for 
which a given term may have a series of descriptive definitions due to common usage. 
Programmatic definitions are those that entail a normative value; they suggest that x should be 
the case. To say that “education is that endeavor that benefits students through learning,” is both 
descriptive and, implicitly, normative as it is suggesting that there is a certain rightness of or 
obligation of the educational enterprise to benefit learners. 
Solits (1968) suggested that Scheffler’s above demarcations are particularly useful when 
engaging philosophical analysis in education specifically because of the importance of the 
programmatic notion of definition. He wrote, 
[T]his is the intended upshot of this discussion: a search for the definition of education is 
most probably a quest for a statement of the right or the best program for education, and 
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as such is a prescription for certain valued means or ends to be sought in education (p. 
11). 
Such programmatic definitions may also be considered axiomatic: from them, by the rules of 
implication, other propositions can be derived, in this case as directives. Such programmatic 
definitions prove profoundly useful in drawing conclusions that are justified tautologically. If 
education is best understood, for example, as a social institution that exists for the benefit of 
agents through learning, then one can conclude, through the rules of equivalence, that education 
should benefit learners and should promote learning, by definition. Similarly, Peter Markie 
(1990) wrote, “to be a professor is to occupy a particular institutional role, and that role may be 
defined by certain duties so that claims attributing those duties are analytic (p. 134). By analytic, 
Markie was referencing the notion of knowledge gained by definition. Thus, we can say we 
know what duties are attributed to professors, by definition, and those duties are synonymous 
with the expectations of the role, thus, analytically speaking, to know the duties is to define the 
role explicated by Biddle’s explanation of organization role theory.  
The Naturalistic Fallacy  
Researchers might immediately balk and forward Moore’s (1903) argument regarding the 
naturalistic fallacy: “is does not imply ought.” Moore is correct about the category of “is” he 
discusses. One cannot rationally say, for instance, that because rape does exist it should exist. 
One can say, though, that a light bulb is an instrument that gives off light; therefore, that light 
bulb should give off light by virtue of the definition of light bulb. In this way, one should not 
equivocate between the kinds of shoulds involved in these two different instances.  
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The naturalistic fallacy is best understood in terms clarifying the distinction between 
existent phenomena and moral imperative, whereas programmatic definition is better understood 
in terms of conditionals generated by definitions: if x is defined as (equivalent to) y, then y 
should be equivalent to x. The should does not emerge out of moral force somehow manifested 
by virtue of the existence of empirical truths; rather it emerges categorically from the form of 
definition itself—a definition grounded in our symbolic action. By this, I mean that 
programmatic definitions of the kind I am describing all share the same should—x should be an 
instance of y because x is defined as y as generated by our linguistic-social constructs. We may 
call these tautological programmatic definitions. 
Sheffler’s (1960) definition, though, of programmatic definitions does not necessarily 
hinge on such tautological equivalencies. As demonstrated above, he is suggesting that certain 
endeavors, as is the case of defining education, hinge on certain moral imperatives, which 
themselves guide the construct (defining) process as the norms that undergird our 
communicative action. If I am a chef, for example, my search for the definition of chocolate may 
hinge on the implied fact that I want the best possible tasting chocolate. Thus, the definition of 
chocolate that I produce may suggest that certain objects in the world normally classified as 
chocolate (Hershey’s Kisses, for example) should not be called chocolate because they do not 
meet the implicit criteria of “exemplary taste sensation.”  
Consider, as a further example, my own original misunderstanding of the definition of 
critical theory when entering the doctoral program. Originally, upon reading the textbook 
definition of critical theory, I believed critical theory to be that educational research that seeks to 
benefit learners. Thus, I was able to define critical theory as having normative content and, 
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therefore, different from all other forms of educational methodologies that do not. I was 
immediately corrected, however, and informed that all educational research has, at its core, the 
goal of benefiting learners, by definition (simply because it is educational research) and, 
therefore, all of it is normative in that way. Thus there is a tautological programmatic definition 
imbedded in “education” and assumption of beneficence. Critical theory was not different 
because it was normative, I was told, but because of its focus on voice, hermeneutics, and focus 
on the marginalized; thus the whole of education research engages a tautological programmatic 
definition.  
Moreover, further examination of the definition reveals that the implicit assumptions of 
critical theory are grounded in the philosophical and sociological works of Axel Honneth, 
Habermas, and Horkheimer. Thus, one comes to recognize the entire enterprise of education as 
supervening upon critical theory. Thus, Sheffler’s (1960) notion of programmatic definition 
gives way to Habermas’ unveiling of the fundamental grounding assumptions that mediate 
language and discourse. To say this, however, is not just to say that intersubjective linguistic 
events with external agents are mediated by logical rules, but even internal linguistic events, 
which themselves cannot happen without the symbolically mediated interpretation of language, 
necessitate and assume specific rules of dialogue and understanding. What Habermasian 
reasoning reveals when applied to Sheffler is that programmatic definitions are themselves 
programmatic because of their embeddedness in intersubjectivity. Thus, all definitions exist not 
in a vacuum, but carry with them normative force and the assumption that their definitions are 
understood.  My realization regarding critical theory was that all education could only make 
sense in our symbolic framework if it was in its essence critical theoretical—a sociological 
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enterprise that is defined by the communicative action of explication, intersubjectivity, and social 
improvement.  
Normativity, therefore, arises from the very defining process in many ways. The 
programmatic definitions, as Sheffler described them, are those that occur when our analysis 
leads us to say, “We should define teaching as x.” Moreover, tautological programmatic 
definitions emerge as we come to realize that there are hypothetical imperatives we can infer 
from the definition based in the definition—“If we define teaching as x then we should…” As I 
will be giving arguments for why particular roles should be defined in particular ways and 
considering the implications and imperatives that arise from those roles, this is a normative 
project. The largest normative force, though, will come from the construct developed by this 
project, from the holism of definitions and roles in conjunction that will suggest that 
understanding of roles as instantiated is best achieved through the lens of this construct and thus, 
by definition, the best way to instantiate those roles is described by the construct. This 
normative quality must itself be defensible and logically grounded. In fact, it may need to be best 
understood as a kind of moral fact, qua Habermas. 
Error in Exclusion 
One may have noted early on in this chapter that Soltis (1968) made reference to his 
placement in “analytic philosophy,” as if the act of analysis and rigorous concept analysis is 
specific to a particular field in philosophy. His work seems to further reject the idea that 
philosophy may have aesthetic or narrative qualities. To quote Soltis, “To make language of 
education work, we must be clear about its intent and meaning and not be swayed only by its 
imagery and poetry. The analytic temperament and techniques should prove most useful to any 
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practicing educator in getting him to think through with care…” (p. 74). It would seem, prima 
facie, that this preference for “the analytic temperament” over the imagery and poetry makes 
definitional sense. If the analytic tradition is dedicated to the rigorous, objective, and systematic 
parsing of terms as they can logically be related to each other, then analysis is an apt description 
of what analytics do. However, this distinction is simply outmoded and outdated. The 
philosophies of language to which Soltis may have been referring in this rather broad stroke do 
not assume poetic philosophical meandering; they are, themselves, conceptually rigorous.  
It is immediately clear from a reading of Habermas and Honneth—both of whom will be 
explicated in more detail shortly—that there is little reason to concern oneself with a lack of 
rigor on their part. I suggest, however, for the purposes of this work, and out of the philosophical 
principle of charity, to consider Soltis’s criticism of poetic language, which may be understood 
as a rejection of anything considered “unnecessary” to the rhetorical process. Clearly, we lose the 
power of dialectical narratives such as Plato, and the importance of even those narratives 
generated by Einstein when he asked himself, “What would it be like to travel on a beam of 
light?” Human understanding seems to ground itself in analogy. Such analysis is found in 
narrative and figurative device. To assert that truth is only accessible through the parsing of 
concepts that themselves are symbolic and mediated through communicative action is an 
irrational bias. 
This bias might find itself grounding the belief that the world can only be understood 
mathematically or through symbolic logic. It is difficult to suggest, though, that the semantic 
content generated by mathematical or physics-oriented descriptions of the world is itself not a 
kind of narrative framing of the world (as neither mathematics nor physics have been 
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demonstrated to be the fundamental truth of the world). Rather, they are narratives that help 
human agents make sense of the world—they assist in the production and justification of an 
agent’s narrative schema. For philosophy to ignore any tool that may generate understanding is 
incoherent with the very enterprise of philosophy, as a Habermasian immanent critique of the 
philosophical enterprise suggests. 
Narrative, metaphor, and analysis 
I do not say this to suggest the primacy or supremacy of narrative, only to suggest that it 
is, at the very least, essential to our understanding and our ability to comprehend. The emphasis 
placed on understanding the world through a logically grounded frame requires resting our 
discourse upon the idea that our beliefs should not be paradoxical or self-refuting (known as the 
law of non-contradiction) is overwhelmingly productive and useful. Thus, we see the usefulness 
and inclusion of Habermas’ ideas; it is in them that we see an in-depth explication of the inability 
to engage dialogue and discourse without the assumption of logical and rational rules of 
discourse.  
To quote Habermas,  
Just as someone interested in a theory of knowledge cannot adopt a standpoint outside his 
own cognitive acts (and thus remains caught in the self-referentiality of the subject of 
cognition), so too a person engaged in developing a theory of moral argumentation 
cannot adopt a standpoint outside the situation defined by the fact that he is taking part in 
a process of argumentation… For him, the situation of argumentation is just as 
inescapable as the process of cognition is for the transcendental philosopher. (1991, p. 
81) 
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Having engaged the process of term clarification, the self-referentiality of that act (that there are 
terms, those terms have meanings, those terms should not self-negate), that meaning is shared 
through language, narrative produces understanding, discourse produces both rules and 
understanding, are all assumed. They were assumed as soon as I wrote down a sentence that I 
believed would communicate meaning to a potential reader. Thus, we are not simply examining 
Habermas’ notion of dialectic, nor are we only using his notion of dialectic: we are currently 
performing his dialectic.  
Finally, I suggest that the bias shown by Soltis (1968) against figurative language is a 
hindrance to philosophical analysis and, unlike the rest of his thesis, should be discarded as a 
simple but harmful bias. Understanding language without figurativeness is impossible. To 
engage in philosophical analysis of the kind described here is to investigate definitions, to 
attempt to connect terms to meanings. Terms, though—as Saussure (1972), Derrida (1977), and 
Scriven (1997) pointed out—do not have a metaphysical connection to the objects they identify. 
Those connections are arbitrary, though not meaningless or weak. According to Scriven (1997), 
So there is some sense in which the world does not define what language has to be used 
in describing it; we do that defining; we create those languages. Moreover, these 
languages emerge in their respective cultures entirely as a result of the language building 
and language learning activities of those societies and individuals, not as a result of some 
law connecting the local climate or crops or social structure with language forms. 
Languages are obviously arbitrary in the sense of being conventions rather than laws of 
nature. All that, however, is not to say that these languages are now arbitrary. They now 
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have very strict rules, and if you take any one term from any one of them and give it a 
new definition, you will not be speaking that language. (p. 138) 
Thus, as Nietzsche wrote in “On truth and lie in an extra-moral sense,” all language hinges on 
metaphor—connections between terms and ideas that themselves have no intrinsic connection, 
but once juxtaposed are now connected and produce meaning. All language, not just the 
commonly understood metaphor, requires the connection between two unlike things, and thus, 
engaging figurative language is essential to understanding. I should think this would be of 
special importance in qualitative research—as the claim is that understanding is the primary goal 
of such research.  
It is common that one does not understand a term or a concept until provided with a 
metaphor. One might say, “I don’t understand what you mean when you say teachers, in the end, 
cannot be held responsible for what learners choose to learn.” In reply, one might provide the 
metaphor, “What I mean is—teaching is like being a salesman. In the end, the car salesperson 
cannot force the customer to buy the car; the final decision, no matter how good the salesperson 
is, is up to the customer. Just like the teacher cannot force the learner to buy the idea.” The light 
bulb might then go off, and we hear, “Oh. I understand!” The irony is, of course, that 
“salesmanship” is not what the explicator “meant,” even if she suggests, “what I mean is.” 
Literally speaking, what she means is her first statement: teachers cannot be held responsible for 
what learners learn. Teachers are not salespersons, and the connection between the two is purely 
metaphorical.  
Researchers might reply, “But I can give definitions by ostention, thereby ignoring the 
need for narrative and metaphor.” Ostension will not suffice, however. Consider asking for 
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clarification for the word chair. I might then point to a particular object and say, “That is a 
chair.” What I have done is generate a performative metaphor. Literally, the word chair can only 
connote the word chair: a symbol, a series of squiggles. Figuratively, through the arbitrary 
connection between that sign and a concept, we then connect the concept to a particular object in 
the world. The object and the concept, though, are also not literally the same thing. So to say, 
“That is a chair” is inaccurate on every level except the metaphorical… the word that is not the 
word a chair; the object is not the word chair, and the word chair is not the concept chair, nor is 
the object. What we mean when we say, “That is a chair,” is none of those things listed above. 
We mean only, “That is a chair,” and understanding—through the metaphor—is generated, while 
literal analysis of the event leads only to confusion.  
Context of Methodology and Theoretical Framework 
Given the above, I suggest that Soltis did, in fact, more accurately make a distinction 
between conceptual analysis and philosophical analysis. Consider immanent and etymological 
critique of the term “philosophy.” The perhaps cliché definition of philosophy as philia sophia 
grounds the etymology in the ancient Greek “love of wisdom.” While over-quoted, the fact 
remains that the etymology of the term philosophy is useful. The definition reveals a grounding 
of philosophy in lived experience. Philosophy was not originally defined as a “study of.” While 
it may not be uncommon to encounter a “PHI 101” definition of philosophy such as “the study of 
the deepest questions humans can ask,” we realize that philosophy is not simply a domain of 
inquiry that remains separate and distinct from lived human experience. While current trends in 
academia seem to suggest that each mode of inquiry—physics, mathematics, social sciences, 
linguistics, and the like—are in fact separate studies of different phenomena, philosophy reminds 
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us that there is a binding drive behind inquiry: the search for understanding, and, thus, 
“wisdom.”  
I suggest that philosophy is therefore not best defined as a kind of “Ivory Tower” 
enterprise where the philosopher locks herself away amongst her tomes never to be seen again. 
Rather, I suggest that even if locked away, the philosopher engages a constant life of inquiry. To 
seek wisdom would not be a nine-to-five job. Rather, seeking wisdom is a lifetime endeavor that 
results in the questioning of all assumptions and the investigation of all events. Simply, unless 
the philosopher is having her meals delivered to her and sleeps in the philosophy department, she 
must exit into a world that will present to her new questions and problems ad infinitum. If to be 
an artist is to live a life of art—to consume, produce, and live art, then a philosopher, by analogy, 
consumes, produces, and lives philosophy. The philosopher would not be simply satisfied with 
the parsing of definitions during work hours and then tunelessly whistle on her way home—each 
moment presents a new moment of artistic inquiry that requires engagement if one truly “loves 
wisdom.” Philosophers, like children, are likely to hear often from their friends, “Do you have to 
question everything?” to which the answer is, “Yes, of course, because I love to understand.” 
Our immanent critique additionally reveals that our concept of philosophy may well be 
infected by the primacy of the systemsworld in contemporary western society. 
Commercialization places the value of the system before the value of the norms and agents who 
comprise the system. The world of academia, as chapter one has argued, is under tremendous 
pressure to capitulate to the demands of the commercialized systemsworld. Philosophy, as a 
lived experience that requires consistent dialectic with the world, is in direct opposition to the 
sublimation of the lifeworld by the systemsworld. If the goal of philosophy is one that is 
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inherently based on the value of wisdom then philosophy is, by definition, a lifeworld enterprise. 
Wisdom is not valued for its usefulness to the system, but, rather, for its intrinsic intersubjective 
worth.  
Thus, it may be reasoned that “conceptual analysis” falls under the category of a tool that 
can be used from either a systemsworld or a lifeworld approach. It may either be the 
deconstruction of terms and concepts for the purpose of forwarding instrumental aims or as a 
tool for understanding the norms, values, and constructs created through our linguistic 
framework. Philosophy, then, often uses conceptual analysis as a means by which to engage the 
world more authentically. If the purpose of philosophy is to understand the world in order to 
more fully participate in and know it, then, as a lifeworld endeavor, it will have at its ready 
numerous epistemologies that enrich our understanding of existence. Similarly, the conceptual 
analysis of Soltis (1968), is one tool of many accessible to philosophy (including deconstruction, 
symbolic logic, hermeneutics, ethics and so on). I say this not only to justify moving beyond 
Soltis and Scriven so that we may engage normative philosophy, immanent critique, and 
deconstruction, but also to suggest that future dissertations even in the paradigm of education 
might consider using narrative frames to produce understanding. Although this work will stay 
fundamentally in the discourse-ethical frame, there are numerous tools available to philosophers 
of education in future dissertations and no tool should be excluded ad hoc if the aim is wisdom 
rather than confirmation of one’s bias.  
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Clarification of Discourse Ethics and Explication of Seminal Literature 
Habermas and the Paradigm of Education  
The work of Habermas is discussed in chapter 2. To clarify further, however, one must 
understand that the work generates discourse ethics through the recognition that dialogue itself 
requires certain shared presuppositions. To engage in discourse is to assume of series of 
grounding axioms that, while on one hand may seem obvious, are, on the other, often taken so 
for granted as to be forgotten or ignored. We assume, for example, that in reading this work that 
we are capable of understanding each other, exist, and can generate arguments that will or will 
not prevail depending on the strength of the evidence. Thus, unique to discourse there are 
underline presuppositions that structure our communication.  
These assumptions, however, are also continent on objective rationality. A discourse-
ethical presupposition for rational discourse is that everyone capable of engaging in the dialogue 
is equality entitled to participation in that dialogue. This is a rational presupposition hinging on 
the presupposition that we engage in discourse because we want to come to understanding or 
truth. Thus, Habermasian ideas may be understood as an immanent critique of dialectic itself. To 
investigate any particular instance of discourse is to begin revealing a series of assumptions that 
themselves are grounded in presuppositions that, while unstated, are necessary for rational 
discourse. Thus, we, by virtue of participating in the discussion tacitly agree to those 
presuppositions. This does not mean, that once faced with the presupposition we will agree, only 
that, according to Habermas, if we are engaging in open and rational discourse we will consent to 
the truth of the proposition by virtue of the fact that we have been accepting it, albeit tacitly, all 
along. 
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To engage in rational discourse, then is to assume that we are using language in the same 
or a similar way, to assume that we are unwilling to ignore any relevant argument, to assume that 
we will accent to the force of a better argument, but not to any other force, and, importantly, that 
we are motivated to dialogue in the first place because we wish to develop a better argument. 
Notice, that these presuppositions run afield of both Michel Foucault and what seems to be actual 
practical engagement in argument. The notion of force and power, of great importance to 
Foucault’s work, would be one he would take special issue with insofar as he argued it was 
power that generated “rationality” in the first place. In other words, Habermas’ ideas may have 
difficulty justifying what rationality is without begging the question or appealing to some 
authority.  
Secondly, actual human engagement in argumentation seems to include often a great deal 
of ignoring other arguments and acceding to worse arguments for some invalid reason. In other 
words, humans seem to be rather irrational. It is important to realize, however, that both of these 
concerns ignore the crux of Habermas’ argument which is a hypothetical imperative… if we 
wish to engage in rational discourse… then we should. The concern of begging the question is 
alleviated through the recognition that it is our own embedded norms of communication that 
generate the defining characteristics of rational discourse in the first place for practical reason. 
Simply, we would not engage in discourse if we did not believe it was possible for a better 
argument to prevail. While it may be true that we engage in such discourse with great 
irrationality, we also must assent to the fact that we are, contradictorily, presupposing that the 
discourse can lead to the elevation of a better argument. As such, we are bound, by our own 
presuppositions to put aside our biases and irrationality in order to engage in the discourse that 
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we have, by virtue of engaging in discourse, of which we have already accepted the rational 
precepts.  
Such thinking lead Habermas to fundamental conclusions regarding not just dialectic, but 
normativity. To engage in rational discourse is to accept that the consequences of the discourse 
must be to the satisfactions of everyone’s interests. The dialectic must include everyone who has 
an interest in the discourse, and it may not exclude any relevant argument. Thus, this 
cognitivism, this foundational moral truth, is one of inclusiveness. We find at the heart of our 
intersubjectivity the assumption that others should be included, otherwise dialectic would not be 
rational. We know this, in part, because when our own interests are excluded from the dialectic, 
we recognize both it as unfair and irrational. To ignore a relevant argument is not to engage in 
rational discourse, if I have an interest affected by the discourse, to ignore me is to ignore my 
relevant arguments, and thus engage in irrationality.  Thus, Habermas’ principle may be 
considered one of “universalization.” It is a universal principle of inclusion of everyone’s 
interests.  
The rational result of that principle is Habermas’ contention that norms can be considered 
valid when they meet with the approval of all affected. Notice, then the grounding of morality in 
rationality. The questions of “rightness” and “wrongness” can be understood in terms “validity.” 
A norm is invalid, logically untenable if it does not meet with the approval of all affected for 
rational reasons. To reject a norm because one wishes to engage in a way that excludes the 
arguments of others or establishes a norm that is not to the satisfaction of others is to engage in 
irrationality. Thus, we all must accept, argued Habermas, that to engage in ethical discourse is to 
assent to the truth of the proposition that 1) we must consider the consequences of all affected, 
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include all relevant arguments and voices and 2) the validity of norms are not determined by 
moral intuition but instead its rational acceptability of all affected. 
The work of Øjvind Larsen (2009) in his The Right to Dissent: The Critical Principle in 
Discourse Ethics and Deliberative Democracy clearly illuminates the applicability of discourse 
ethics to the educational paradigm. Of the many modes of philosophical analysis, Discourse 
Ethics enables one to engage immanent critique, ontological grounding, and normativity, perhaps 
most robustly. Larsen’s work applies discourse ethics to the general problems of modern society 
in order to both better understand those problems and suggest resolutions to those problems, 
much in the same way this dissertation proposes to do.  
Larsen (2009) stated that his work, in fact, emerges from a problem similar to the one 
described in this dissertation in chapter one. In much the same way as the roles of teaching and 
research are finding themselves separated and “homeless,” he suggests that so does ethics in 
regards to society:  
My thesis is that this is because [ethics] does not have a natural place in the production of 
modern society. To the contrary, the transformation of modern society results in ethical 
relationships being limited to a particular circumstance that can only be integrated with 
difficulty into modern social institutions. (p. 37) 
One can see the similarity in projects, then. As the University continues to shift towards greater 
and greater commercialization and commodification, care and invested teaching and research are 
finding that they do not fit naturally into the social reality. “To the contrary,” the transformation 
of the modern university results in invested teaching and research being limited to particular 
circumstances that can only be integrated with difficulty into modern educational institutions. 
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 Larsen then applied discourse ethics to the problem of modernity in order to determine 
both why ethics no longer fits in social reproduction and how its bifurcation from social norms is 
best understood.  
[Habermas’] discourse principle “D” assumes that norms for action must be deemed as 
valid, something to which all possibly affected parties will be able to consent as 
participants in a rational discourse… The discourse principle is a universal non-partisan 
and neutral principle for argument, which can then be differentiated and operationalized 
in a number of different discourses, including moral discourse and discourse on 
democracy. (p.199) 
Larsen was then, having distinguished between democracy and discourse ethics, able to apply 
discourse ethics to modern society and democracy itself because rational discourse is not 
synonymous with majority rule. Democracy seems to suggest that all voices can be heard and 
heard just once (insofar as voting is concerned); rational discourse, however, suggests that all 
voices should be heard and considered without bias.  
 One realizes, then, that the question of faculty roles is not just one of description nor is it 
one of dictation or majority rule. Faculty roles should not just be determined by some seemingly 
democratic process and they should not just be investigated; they should be formed through 
rational discourse—thus the application of discourse ethics. “Moral problems touch on universal 
problems that, in principle, concern all human beings” (Larsen, 2009, p. 204). If this is the case 
then the question, “How should faculty roles be constructed?” is a moral problem that touches on 
universal problems that, in principle, concern all human beings. Faculty as they educate 
vulnerable populations and are the generators of our social epistemology have significant 
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societal impact. Thus, the way their roles should be constructed touches on broad human 
concerns, just as Larsen suggests and, “To these correspond moral discourse in which moral 
problems are subject to a universal trial through rational discussion about the validity of the 
moral statements and thereby whether they are right or wrong” (p. 204). Simply, Habermas 
affords us the ability to 1) construct and reconstruct faculty roles in a way that make rational 
sense given the rule of discourse itself and 2) include the import of all voices without bias in the 
construction of those roles. 
 Finally, as Larsen’s (2009) text suggests through its application of Habermas, the right to 
dissent is effectively empowered and respected through discourse ethics. “The right to dissent is 
not only the critical principle of discourse ethics and deliberative democracy – it is the basis of 
freedom in modern society” (italics my own, p. 9). This ability to include not only assenting 
voices in deliberative practice, but dissenting voices is a power that is particularly useful when 
considering normative assembly of constructs. When engaging the instantiation of roles as well 
as the form those roles should take it is essential that the ethical perspective not just acknowledge 
dissenting voices, but incorporate them fully into the deliberative process. Thus, as demonstrated 
analogously through Larsen’s work, discourse ethics as engaging rational deliberative processes 
in order to both understand and generate normative constructs is particularly apropos to a 
process that is already hinged on Mead’s (1934) understanding of roles as generated through 
symbolic (dialectical) interaction.  
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Explication of Seminal Literature Justifying Discourse Ethics  
The Application of Habermas  
To apply Habermas will require that we engage three fundamental steps. 1) To engage in 
immanent critique of the social construct as a means by which to reveal the norms and values 
embedded through symbolic interaction 2) To consider the existence of the construct and its 
components within the life and systemsworld and 3) To engage the process of discourse ethics as 
a means by which to both evaluate and generate a normative framework through dialectic.   
The first step will also take on a Derridian deconstructionistic methodology. Habermas’ 
immanent critique is powerful and revealing and will be made more so through the engagement 
of etymology and investigation of narrative framing. The symbolically mediated framework of 
Habermas’ construction of identity can be understood as the construction of self-narrative 
through participation with others in dialectic. Thus, the Derridian perspective enables one to 
further pars out the norms and concepts identified through Habermas through investigation of 
their interaction with other terms and their own potentially contradictory self-reference. Simply, 
The deconstructionistic addition to the Habermasian immanent critique will enable the 
investigation of definitions within the domain as both socially mediated (in the search for 
Habermasian coherence) and narratively consistent through their adherence to other terms. Note 
that it is the Habermasian critique, however, that remains dominant as the adherence of terms, 
their différance to each other, is the result of social interaction.  
The second step requires that we consider the understanding of the definitions we have 
developed as part of the lifeworld and systemsworld. The roles, as they are both inscribed and 
symbolically mediated through discourse, must emanate from the lifeworld of subjects and 
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intersubjectivity and/or the systemsworld of applications and instrumentality. Understanding 
faculty roles, as well as how they will continue to develop, requires understanding the ways 
those roles are expressed as components and generators of life- and systemsworld values. This 
analysis, then, requires close consideration of the communicative actions that produce faculty 
roles. Examination, as organizational role theory would have it, of the inscribed expectations of 
faculty roles will be insufficient; consideration of the full dialectic, both external and internal, 
that generates faculty roles is necessary. This dialectic includes those norms assumed by the 
terms, the assumed as well as inscribed expectations in faculty handbooks, and the actual lived 
experiences reported in research by faculty who are exploring the shifting paradigm of faculty 
existence. 
The third step requires the application of discourse ethics to the process of understanding 
how faculty roles should be constructed. Analysis of faculty roles, as well as analysis of their 
participation in the life- and systemsworld (as both generative of and generated by those worlds), 
enables one to consider then how those roles should be constructed by agents in the world. Thus, 
the analysis of faculty roles requires not only abstract reasoning regarding the most consistent 
expression of faculty roles, but a dialectic that assumes Habermas’ cognitivist universalized 
principles of dialectic. These assumptions not only provide rules for dialogue, but are likely to 
act as norms that should be embedded in the expression of faculty roles as linguistically 
mediated actions. Simply, to understand how faculty roles should be incorporated will require 
not only that one voice all stakeholders in the university, but that one also construct faculty roles 
as honest dialectical constructs supporting the lifeworld—in other words as constructs that 
themselves promote the inclusion of all voices.  
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Further analysis of the construct developed will consider, though perhaps briefly, 
Honneth’s Theory of Recognition. This notion will be justified by the engagement with Amy 
Allen (2009) and Hans-Herbert Kögler (2012) that will take place when considering the 
problems of skepticism for Habermas. Honneth’s and Kögler’s concepts of identity formation act 
as means by which to move beyond the immanent critique of Habermas into the ability to voice 
the Other as a means by which to include the marginalized in normative dialectic. The Theory of 
Recognition enables the development of a normative framework for faculty roles that include the 
voices of those who are constitutive of the “I” yet remain voiceless in the systemsworld 
development of faculty roles—despite both being generative of the university and being 
participants in the lifeworld of the University. The recognition of these voiceless generators of 
identity, as, for example, in the case of adjuncts, is a particular strength of Honneth’s Theory of 
Recognition. Whilst the dialectical domain generated by the university permits the silencing of 
adjunct voices, and thus, there is not internal inconsistency, as the very dialectic of the university 
defines adjuncts as voiceless, Honneth’s system recognizes them, nonetheless.  
Potential Problems 
Some skeptics raise questions for Habermas. By this, I mean those who believe 
knowledge to be fundamentally elusive. Foucault raised concerns that may be shared by 
consistent skeptics regarding the ontological claims made by Habermas regarding the nature of 
individual and societal identity. These are both concerns addressed by Amy Allen (2009) in her 
“Discourse, power, and subjectivism: The Foucault/Habermas Debate.” The questions Allen 
addressed are immediately relevant to Vokey’s (2008) concerns mentioned in the previous 
chapter, specifically, the concern regarding solipsism and the ability to include the voiceless in 
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the moral dialectic. The work of Hans-Herbert Kögler (2012) demonstrates, however, a means by 
which to address the solipsist concerns, while maintaining the integrity of discourse ethics.  
Allen constructs the tension between Foucault and Habermas in the following way: 
…the entanglement of power and validity only poses a serious problem if one assumes 
that there are only two possible ways of understanding the relationship between power 
and validity: either validity is reduced to nothing more than power and autonomy to 
nothing more than disciplinary subjection—a position that Habermas rightly sees as 
normatively and politically disastrous but wrongly imputes to Foucault—or validity is 
understood as wholly distinct from and unsullied by power relations—in which case the 
purity of pure reason slips in through the back door, a position that Habermas himself 
aims to avoid. (p.26) 
Allen understood that Foucault’s thesis seems to require that all validity—truth—be reduced to 
power relations, a thesis that seems to be anathema to Habermas. The Habermasian ontology 
hinges itself on the cognitivist factualism of the existence of true moral statements. It would 
seem, then, that Foucault and Habermas are incommensurable, as one asserts that truth is nothing 
more than power relationships (those in power determine truth) and the other asserts that the 
truth of moral statements is revealed in the embedded necessities of rational discourse.  
Firstly, it should be noted, however, that Allen (2009) recognized that Foucaultian 
understanding of power and power-relations as they construct society is a viable thesis. She 
stated, “With respect to Habermas, overcoming the one-sided emphasis on communicative 
rationality in his account of subjectiviation would require Habermas to confront more directly 
the implications of the necessary and unavoidable role that power plays in subjectivation 
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processes” (2009, p. 25). She also, notes, however, that Foucault’s own understanding and 
discussion of communicative rationality and its import for power relations is heavily 
underdeveloped:  
In order to overcome the one-sided emphasis on power in his account of subjectivation, 
Foucaultians would need to develop some of the very underdeveloped ideas about 
communication, reciprocity, and the distinction between power and domination that are 
mentioned in Foucault’s late work and to think through how these ideas bear on the issue 
of subjectivation. (p. 24) 
This is all to say that Allen noted a significant missing component in Foucault’s power thesis that 
can be made more sense of when understood within the dynamics of communicative rationality. 
Habermas’ own thesis, however, is buttressed by an acceptance and consideration of the 
importance of power relations in the construction of dialectic. Simply, what is considered 
“rational” may as Foucault stated, be determined by those in power. Habermas need not concede 
that this power-defining of “rational” be epistemically true, only that it acts as a communicative 
barrier to genuine rational discourse.  
 Allen was, however, able to (interestingly, through rational discourse) bring together 
Habermas and Foucault, despite their apparently significant differences. “There is a third, and 
better, possibility: to give up on the demand for purity altogether. Doing so would mean 
acknowledging the unavoidable entanglement of validity and power, but without reducing the 
former to the latter,” (Allen, 2009, p. 28). It is there, in her statement “without reducing the 
former to the latter” that the tension between the two thinkers can be resolved. Allen suggested 
that one can recognize the “entanglement” of validity and power without suggesting that power 
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is validity. Allen recognized, however, that in so doing one must take a more pragmatic and 
contextualist perspective of Habermas. I suggest that Allen’s shift enables a problematic 
skeptical question: “How does one know that power and validity are not one and the same, if they 
are so often “entangled?” Simply, there seems to be a problem of an epistemic gap. Allen 
contended that validity is not reducible to power, yet one is hard-pressed to find any situation in 
which validity is not determined (seemingly) by power relations. Thus, even if there is a 
difference between the two, we seem to lack epistemic access to that difference.  
 The Habermasian response to the skeptical question is to note that the very asking of that 
question requires the assumption of certain norms and conventions that assume rational discourse 
is possible and is hinged upon the belief in truth external to power relations. Allen carefully 
addressed each iteration of the skeptical argument, noting its failure, the details of which are 
unnecessary here. What I will address is the one argument Allen noted may gain some traction, 
but moves past quickly, noting that Habermas himself may address the entirety of the argument: 
“It is not obvious that the skeptic could not opt out of argumentation without opting out of 
communication action in general” (Allen, 2009, p. 13). Simply, the consistent skeptic who notes 
the Habermasian critique of her performative contradiction in engaging the argument in the first 
place may withdraw from the argument. Habermas suggests that this results in an impossible 
withdraw from the totality of communicative action. Allen was not so sure, but she did not have 
the time to exhaustively engage the details of the Habermasian reply to such an extreme claim 
that “the Foucaultian skeptic would no doubt want to question” (p. 13). I suggest, however, that 
there is another tactic that can be taken to answer all such skeptical concerns in a way that 
satisfies both the intellectually honest skeptic and the Habermasian. 
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I intend to prove that cognitivism is not necessary for the rational adoption and 
application of discourse ethics. The reason I seek to do this is as a means by which to reach out 
to those who may be fictionalists, anti-theorists, and skeptics. I do not want the application of my 
own work to be limited to those who are willing to take on the commitments of cognitivism. 
Rather, I suggest that a discourse ethic is so powerful, so rational, as to motivate the rational 
skeptic to consider seriously its use in applied ethics, as we will engage in chapter four. 
 Consider the Habermasian account: “Indeed, Habermas maintains that we might ‘call 
moral only those norms that are strictly universalizable, i.e., those that are invariable over 
historical time and across social groups’” (Allen, 2009, p. 8). This notion is appealing, yet it 
seems to rest on a strict cognitivism regarding moral truths. Habermas, however, suggests a 
means by which to escape the problems of asserting that there are “moral truths” through 
analogy:  
Habermas notes a prima facie analogy between truth claims—claims about what the 
objective world is like—and normative rightness claims—claims about how the 
intersubjective world should be ordered: Truth claims are to facts as normative claims are 
to legitimately ordered interpersonal relations. (p. 9) 
Moreover, “… [Habermas] argued that cognitivism can be successfully defended if we give up 
the strong claim that normative claims are truth candidates and instead adopt the weaker position 
that normative claims are analogous to truth claims” (p. 9). Normative claims, then, act similarly 
to truth claims. Normative claims’ connection to the structure of interpersonal relations is like the 
relationships between facts and truth. I take this to mean that in a way similar to how our 
“factual” statements’ validity are contingent upon their connection to the truth, normative 
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claims’ validity rest upon the structure of interpersonal relations. I suggest, however, that 
Habermas does not need this analogy. In fact, the analogy seems dangerously close to an 
acceptance of positivism if we suggest that truth claims are made true by their correspondence to 
the truth. Clearly, this is not what Habermas must mean. Rather, in his analogy he seems to 
suggest that the truth coheres in the same way interpersonal norms cohere to each other through 
relationships and symbolic interaction. –Thus Allen’s (2009) claim that acceptance of 
Foucaultian power dynamics requires something of a pragmatic reading of Habermas. I suggest 
that pragmatism is a more coherentist picture. 
 Simply, one of the skeptic’s major concerns is the ability to connect statements about 
truth to truth. Habermas does not need this. Truth, instead, becomes a matter of interpersonal 
relations, not so dissimilar from the way Foucault understood truth through power relations. If 
the Habermasian argument is taken to mean that interpersonal relations generate truth (that 
which we claim to be true) and is made understandable through the coherence of norms to each 
other through symbolic interaction, there is no need for a cognitivism that the skeptic would find 
problematic. Simply, our interpersonal relations do generate truth, insofar as they generate all of 
the rules, norms, and even logical laws that we use to communicate and understand truth. Even 
laws such as the “Law of Noncontradiction,” which may be considered laws of thought rather 
than laws of nature, would be better understood as rules that emerge necessarily from dialectic—
understandable interaction between others is impossible without them. Truth, then, is reduced to 
“necessary for understanding between agents.” 
 Both the Habermasian and the skeptic may take affront to the above. I suggest, however, 
that both the Habermasian and the skeptic have good reason to engage the genuine possibility 
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that the other is correct and consider a palatable middle ground. There is something of a subtle 
and intuitive assumption in the criticism of the skeptic for being inconsistent. If she engages 
argumentation, she is acknowledging that she can understand the other and that she is part of a 
communicative web. This statement, though, assumes already an external point of view that the 
skeptic cannot take—and if she does so, she is simply falling into the cognitivist’s trap. Rather, 
the skeptic must maintain that she does not know that she is having the conversation, that she 
does not know that what she is saying is understood, that in fact, she does not know that she is 
saying. Rather, she engages a seemingly insane solipsistic positioning. 
What if were to play the consistent skeptic and maintain that I do not know that what I 
am writing is understood? I would recognize that others may claim that in my writing I 
acknowledge their existence, yet, I do not. Rather, I maintain that I may be delusional in 
believing that others are engaging my writing or even that I am writing at all. Moreover, I 
recognize that in using the term “I” I am engaging in a communicative action. However, I also 
recognize that this “I” is vacuous and theoretically could be used by any agent in order to 
indicate her subjectivity. Thusly, that “I” does not belong to “me.” Saying “I” is, potentially, a 
delusional act of self-voicing by an agent that does not genuinely exist. Surly, such statements 
seem insane, but I suggest that they merit acknowledgement, if not consideration, for reasons 
that should be listed shortly. Moreover, I maintain that the solipsist has good reason to adopt a 
discourse ethics perspective, even without accepting Habermasian cognitivism.  
Firstly, the skeptic’s insane position is one that enables learning. By this, I mean that 
skeptical challenges, if they are honest rather than obdurate, require that we revisit and revise our 
beliefs. This genuine praxis is one that is necessary to Habermasian dialectic. So, though one 
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need not acknowledge that the skeptic is “right,” one should consider the possibility that, 
insanely, the skeptic is presenting a belief that she believes could be right.  
Secondly, the skeptic’s position is one that enables the rejection of assumed culturally 
beloved beliefs. This is perhaps, in regards to the importance to Habermas of including all voices 
in the generation of universal moral rules, the best reason for the Habermasian to engage the 
skeptic. As stated by Allen (2009),  
Foucault acknowledges that communicative relationships can and do play a role in 
disciplinary institutions such as the educational system, but these relationships and their 
connections to disciplinary power remain under developed. Moreover, the one-sidedness 
of these account helps to explain certain persistent features of the critical reception of 
their respective authors. Habermas’ relative inattention to the power-ladenness of 
subjectivication arguably makes it difficult for him to offer a satisfactory critical-
theoretical account of some of the most pressing social problems of our time, including 
sexism and racism, which are reproduced and maintained, in large part, through the 
production of subordinating modes of identity. (p. 24) 
Simply, skeptical positioning enables one to question beliefs that are deeply held or defined as 
rational by a culture, as in the case with sexism and racism. Although Habermasian rationality 
would seem to suggest that within even a biased domain, regardless of power imbalance, rational 
agents could recognize the importance of including the marginalized in discourse, this is not 
always the case. A skeptical position, while somewhat annoyingly willing to ignore that which 
seems to be most rational, by its very nature, must question all beliefs, and, thus, positions one to 
consider criticism of social inequity that is considered rationally grounded by an unjust society. 
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In essence, the skeptical argument acts as a means by which to prepare the way for a 
Habermasian immanent critique of such a society.  
Finally, the skeptic, if Habermas is correct, should be included in the moral dialogue.  It 
would be fruitless to spend our time trying to prove Habermas incorrect in his dealing with the 
skeptic, as Allen effectively reconciles Habermasian cognitivism and the Foucaultian skeptic. 
Let us consider a different tact. Consider, instead, that the skeptic’s argument does gain traction 
with Habermas. In fact, let us assume, just for the sake of devilish advocacy, that Habermas must 
acknowledge that some solipsists will not be swayed by his arguments. What then?  
Habermas argued that in order to engage in argumentation at all, speakers must 
presuppose that all participants understand that argument to be a cooperative search for 
that truth and are motivated to agree or disagree solely on the basis of the unforced force 
of the better argument. (Allen, 2009, p. 11) 
I suggest that the honest skeptic hopes that Habermas is correct. Though she may not engage the 
discourse because she believes it is true, she may do so because she hopes it is true and that, 
through dialogue, she is, in fact, talking with someone other than herself. Thus, given the 
importance of inclusion of all voices in moral discourse by Habermas, even those skeptics who 
remain consistent should be included in moral discourse. Those skeptics, however, are under the 
onus to engage in intellectually honest discourse because it is in their communicative interest to 
engage dialogue as if there is the hope that there are others and those others understand the 
skeptic. The skeptic may put this in terms of a useful, though potentially fictional, narrative one 
tells oneself—it may be delusional, yet, it produces understanding. Whether, through rational 
discourse, the skeptic believes that she is coming to better understanding of externality or if she 
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believes she is coming to better understanding of herself is irrelevant. Discourse ethics aims 
towards inclusion and assumes a cooperative search for truth, and the honest skeptic must 
genuinely consider the possibility (as she is a skeptic) that she is wrong about skepticism and is 
rationally warranted in hoping she is wrong and, thus, is warranted in engaging in rational 
discourse. 
 Thus the skeptic has good reason to engage discourse and engage it rationally, though she 
may not accept the cognitive premise. She can recognize that the rules of communication, 
whether rules of language, the mind, or of symbolic action, are rules that define her ability to 
understand; thus, in her honest search for understanding (and potentially truth), she is rationally 
motivated to engage in rational discourse as illuminated by Habermas. What, though, of the 
problem of the elimination of those who do not have voices as discussed by Volkey (2008), who 
argued that such exclusion is decimating to the discourse ethic, so decimating as to result in “no 
remedy for cultural conflict”?  
 Volkey’s (2008) concern, which I believe is reduced to a solipsistic question, is best 
answered in “Agency and the Other: On the intersubjective roots of self-identity” (Kögler, 2012). 
Kögler returned us to the work of G.H. Mead, significantly developing it to the conclusion that 
“the Other’s irreducible agency is constitutive of the self’s capacity to establish an identity” 
(2009, p. 47). This identity was understood by Kögler as a “socially situated narrative self-
interpreting process” (p. 47). In this way Kögler’s work seeks to maintain an understanding of 
human agency that 1) has the capacity to affect real change in the world 2) has the ability to 
understand its own effects vis-à-vis the world and 3) and has the ability to differentiate between 
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her or his causal powers by reconstructing the “intersubjective roots of self-identity” to help 
“enhance and improve our understanding of reflexivity and self-identity” (p. 48).  
 Kögler’s work rests on Mead’s (1934) understanding of the self as its own object. Of 
course, it is the ability to make sense of selfhood as such without the “objectification” of the self. 
If the self holds itself as an object, how can it engage in reflexive self-understanding without 
removing itself from the 1st person immediacy of experience? Intersubjectivity becomes the key 
to selfhood, insofar as agents represent to themselves the Other that is expressed of themselves 
by other agents. Selfhood emerges when one can recognize the Otherness inherent in the 
experience of oneself by other Agents, understand that object as an Other represented by the 
Other and thus can create a shared domain of perspective exchange. “This is so because each 
agent is now, so to speak, able to leave their practically assigned role in the intersubjective 
action-circle and switch, in an imaginary act, his or her perspective with that of the other” 
(Kögler, 2012, p. 52). They become capable of sharing perspectives and understanding their own 
Otherness as experienced by the Other. It is, in the context of role theory, “an explicit mode of 
role-taking, such that ‘taking-the-attitude-of-the-other’ now becomes an explicit cognitive act for 
the agent, another desideratum for a theory of self-consciousness can be provided” (p. 52). 
Through this articulation, Kögler demonstrated the means by which agency is dependent on 
intersubjective relation and perspective-taking. To exist is to be known by the Other. 
 The lynch-pin of Kögler’s argument is what presents the solution to the voiceless mind 
problem brought to light by Volger (2008). Simply, there is an ethical debt that is created by the 
self to the other because of the necessity of the other for the self.  
190 
 
If the self thus understands her own full creative-reflexive agency as enabled by the 
other, she now has to extend the very mode of recognition that makes her own existence 
as agent possible to the other… ethical recognition demands in addition that the other is 
always essentially projected as a reflexive agent who is capable to critically distance 
herself from her own context, who is able to transcend and transform the given beliefs 
and assumptions, and who is herself able to take the perspective of the other vis-à-vis 
herself. (Kögler, 2012, p. 61) 
Thus Kögler’s work requires that we do more than “voice” the other, it requires that we 
recognize the agency of the other as it not just necessary but causally responsible for our own 
agency through the exchanging of perspectives. 
 Volger’s (2008) concern, then, is addressed by arguing that those who cannot speak up 
for themselves must be voiced, to the very best and most honest of our ability. While the concern 
that this simply amounts to “speaking for” the marginalized could not be “spoken over” in this 
way. Rather, they must be voiced, if they cannot speak for themselves in such a way that 
acknowledges the ethical debt established by Kögler for agency itself. Thus, those who are less 
rational or who cannot voice themselves, for whatever reason, remain part of the ethical dialectic 
as voiced by those who have the ability to do so in such a way that recognizes their importance 
for the existence of both 1) the self and 2) the dialectic.  
 I suggest, further, that this notion established by Kögler, while it may seem incompatible 
with solipsism, is not. I suggest this by virtue of a “perspective taking” on the part of solipsism. 
The solipsist who is skeptical about other minds would recognize that all conversations are acts 
of “voicing.” The honest solipsist must acknowledge that she is at the very least generating all 
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voices. Given the Habermasian realization of the essential characteristics of rational dialogue, 
there is no reason to believe such rules simply disappear if one is only in dialectic with herself. 
The rules that govern understanding remain embedded in dialectic regardless of one’s 
engagement with others or with the self. Proper skeptical positioning would require that the 
solipsist acknowledge that either her agency is generated by herself, and thus all voices are 
generated by herself, and thus all voices are her own, and thus she has no rational reason to 
choose some voices as having greater important than others (and in so doing accept the 
Habermasian notion of discourse), or she must acknowledge, as Kögler contended, that her 
agency is generated by others.  
 More importantly, the perspective-taking described by Kögler (2012) can be understood 
through the perspective of Mead’s symbolic interactionism as a kind of an “imaginary game” in 
which one imagines the perspective of the other. In so doing, the agent must acknowledge that 
she does not know for sure what the thoughts, perspectives, and feelings are of the other and 
always be prepared to revise her assumptions of those thoughts, perspectives and feelings. In this 
way, the agent recognizes that she is voicing the other as the other is voicing her, and it is 
through this exchange of voices and iteration of self-reflexivity that dialectic is created. One 
accepts what the other has to say, and remains prepared to revise that perspective upon further 
interaction with the voiced Other. As such, I see no reason to require that only those who can 
speak or who seem sufficiently rational can be included in the dialectic, as Vokey’s argument 
seems to suggest. Rather, honest self-reflexivity would require that one remain open to the 
constant perspective making of the Other when generating the Other (namely the self). Thus, 
when given sufficient reason, the rational self engages in the attempt to perspective-take with 
192 
 
non-self others. This act of constant attempts to perspective-take mimics Mead’s developmental 
account of childhood. Children attempt to generate selfhood through others and for others, often 
finding that their attempt to perspective-take for chairs, teddy bears, and cartoon characters bears 
no fruit. Yet, that honestly skeptical position that there may be others like myself who generate 
myself, for whom I am an Other is a perspective we learn to distance ourselves from through 
societal imperative, and, I argue, through a rejection of the rational and democratic inclusion 
articulated by Habermas.  
 This is all to say that discourse ethics need not fall prey to skeptical or solipsistic claims. 
Rather, a discourse ethic is one of few philosophies that allows for full engagement with such 
skeptical positionings; it, through the primacy of the lifeworld, remains constantly prepared to 
engage the perspective of others for the purpose of rational discourse. One must acknowledge 
that rational discourse must be revisable as new perspectives are brought to bear. This 
revisability is not in conflict with skepticism, but, rather, embraces the skeptical willingness to 
consider that one’s perspective is not the sole perspective. Moreover, the ethical indebtedness 
owed by the self to the other requires that the Habermasian acknowledge her own voicing of 
others and consistently consider the perspective others who are not yet voiced, but yet may 
generate through some unknown means one’s own selfhood. In so doing, the Habermasian 
system does not just avoid Volkey’s concern for marginalization; Habermas actively combats 
marginalization through an ever-present attempt to include all voices.  
 Thus, we have established not just the clear and logical link from the work of Soltis in 
educational philosophy to the application of Habermas to educational philosophy; we have 
effectively practiced the act of philosophical analysis. This chapter, thus far, has engaged the 
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process of concept analysis as detailed through Scriven, Flew, and Soltis in order to understand 
better what we mean when we say “definition.” Having accomplished this, we then 
deconstructed terms such as “philosophy” in order to identify why philosophical analysis is not 
simply a tool used by qualitative research, but is a lived experience that is practiced, as well, on 
its own for the purpose of living a life of wisdom. Finally, the work deliberated on both the 
strengths of Habermas as his work relates to this dissertation and those who might dissent such 
as Foucault and the “consistent skeptic.” Having addressed the concerns of both Foucault and the 
skeptic, discourse ethics demonstrates and ability not simply to deconstruct and eliminate those 
concerns but rationally incorporate those concerns in the act of deliberative rationality. Thus, the 
chapter mimics the process of self-reflexivity, acknowledging its “Otherness” in light of critical 
works, and generating agency through the process of perspective sharing, rather than perspective 
eliminating. In this way, the methodology has critically engaged the process of immanent 
critique, engaged the situation of itself in the social schemes of life and systemsworld, and 
engaged critical and rational discourse while voicing the dissent of the Other in order to produce 
a consistent holism. As such, the work acts as not just an explication of, but an example of, 
philosophical analysis.  
Researcher Positionality 
 As has been discussed throughout the methodology, the researcher’s positionality is that 
of skepticism. However, that position is also a one of prudence. Prudent skepticism suggests that 
one need not be restricted in one’s dialectic by skepticism. One engages what may, or may not be 
the world, not because has reason to believe in “Truth” but because one hopes that there is more 
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to existence than solipsism, and, if there is a world, it is more prudent to attempt to engage it, 
than to remain constrained by the epistemic void.  
 Ethically, the researcher is deeply sympathetic to care theory. He is especially motivated 
by care theory when it is applied to education. The care theoretical perspective is one that he 
believes is essential to an inclusive holism of dialectic that moves beyond world making into 
worth making for the betterment of the community. It is his positioning that students, and there 
welfare, should be always the primary directive of educational discourse. 
 The researcher has been a student at the University of North Florida for seventeen years, 
most of those years as a full time graduate student. The impact of that time as a student has been 
such that it is left the researcher often cynical regarding the intention of educational institutions 
to benefit all students. While an institution may place before incoming students mottos and catch 
phrases that suggest the importance of each individual student, he has found that there are 
occasions in which educational institutions place their own welfare first.  
Conversely, however, the researcher has also experienced the power of education and 
elected to remain in an educational setting, as a college student for over 17 years. He has been 
profoundly impacted by a few individual professors who demonstrate tremendous devotion to 
their students and to the development of knowledge. It is because of his observation of 
professorial care reason in conjunction with the observation of institutional harm and deception 
that the researcher first noted that, for some professors, there is a tension in the academy. These 
brilliant and dedicated educators seemed trapped between meeting institutional demands while 
also meeting their own personal mandate to educate each student as if she is intrinsically 
valuable as a learner.  
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During his time as a student the researcher has also acted as a graduate teaching assistant, 
adjunct instructor, and currently teaches high school English. Both teaching experiences, as well 
as his long term engagement with the university as a student, inform his analysis in this 
dissertation. It is important to note that the researcher has not been a professor. He has not been 
expected to publish research nor engage in service. He has experienced the pressures associate 
with attempting to work full time as an adjunct across multiple institutions, in some cases 
teaching as many as nine classes a semester. His experience as an educator has informed the 
analysis of his findings. He cannot understand the role tension experienced by the professoriate, 
he does however have practical experience with learners. As such, he has discovered that the 
most effective means by which to educate has been through creating a highly invested classroom 
environment in which the students know that the instructor cares about them and the material. 
Thus, as a student and as a teacher the researcher found the work of Habermas 
particularly compelling as a means by which to generate understanding faculty roles. The 
inclusive nature of discourse ethics fits neatly on the dialectical frame generate both inside the 
classroom and throughout the collegial institution. The process of knowledge production through 
constructive and intersubjective inquiry is a personal experience had by the researcher that he 
found powerful and effective. Similarly, his personal experience with learners has led him to the 
belief that care is a necessary condition for effective education. While his observation has been 
that some institutions allow for the fact, and perhaps expect, that some students will fail, he 
believes that, if the knowledge is truly important, the caring educator considers every failure, her 
own. As such, the researcher’s analysis of the data incorporates the Care Ethics of Nel Noddings.  
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Credibility and Ensuring Rigor 
Credibility and Trustworthiness   
To ensure the credibility and trustworthiness of this dissertation, a number of measures 
have been taken. Firstly, the dissertation has adopted a series of well-established methods. As 
evidenced here, in the methodology, philosophical analysis as a well-respected mode of inquiry. 
The work of Anthony Scriven and Jonas Soltis both provide foundational groundwork not just in 
the tradition of philosophy, but in the tradition of exploring education through the application of 
philosophical analysis. Philosophical theory, particularly in conjunction with sociological theory 
has a history of productive application in educational research. The work of Habermas, in 
particular, has been demonstrated to have a productive history both in educational theory and 
research as well as in organizational research.  
To further ensure credibility, the researcher has had frequent debriefing sessions with his 
dissertation chair and methodologist, both in person and via email. The researcher has met 
regularly with the dissertation chair to ensure that the process of the dissertation, particularly the 
development of the methodology, maintains a high level of rigor and quality. Dr. Kögler, both a 
professional philosopher and a foremost expert on the work of Habermas, has been actively 
engaged in every step of the dissertation to ensure that the process is philosophically sound and 
that the researcher engages the application of Habermas accurately.  
The dissertation endeavors to follow a clear line of reasoning. Often at the expense of 
brevity, the researcher has taken great care to ensure trustworthiness by explaining each logical 
inference. This step is taken not only to provide a clear line of reasoning, but because the 
expectation of philosophical investigation is to provide the reader with the mean by which she 
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both can follow the line of reasoning in order to come to the same conclusions and in order to 
provide complete transparency to that every logical step can be questioned.  
The final chapter will provide “reflective commentary.” This reflective commentary is 
yet another means by which the dissertation seeks to provide trustworthiness as well as 
transparency. Moreover, this this particular credibility tool is especially appropriate for 
philosophy as such reflective commentary has a long history as an essential philosophical 
component. To engage in reflective commentary will also be a moment of hermeneutic 
participation with the reader. In so doing, the researcher will reach out to the reader with his own 
internality articulated in prose in order to engage the heart of the discourse ethical enterprise. 
Essential to this project is the realization that, to “apply discourse ethics” requires more than 
following Habermasian principles of universalization, it requires engaging others in active 
dialectic in order to produce the best possible argument. This dissertation will attempt to engage 
other theorists and researchers dialectically through their presentation, here, but that does not 
suffice. The reflective commentary is the moment when the reader becomes actively involved in 
not just the theoretical dialectic, but the personal reflective reasoning presented by the researcher 
through his reflective commentary.  
The researcher’s background is particularly useful for this project. He has experience as 
an educator both on the post-secondary level and as a high school teacher. The researcher also as 
an MA in practical philosophy and applied ethics, and so he is particularly well suited for the 
exploration of ethical concepts afforded by this investigation. As such, he is well positioned to 
provide a thick description of the constructs investigated in this dissertation, and has attempted to 
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demonstrate the process of thick description through the detailed analysis of philosophical 
methodology presented here in chapter 3.   
In order to provide a level of external examination of the credibility of this project the 
work of Thomas Kuhn (1977) will be used in chapter 6 to help ensure the quality of the construct 
developed in chapter 5. In his work “Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice” Kuhn 
detailed 5 criteria for theory evaluation, particularly in science. Kuhn, whose work is seminal in 
the philosophy of science, provides a well-recognized, well-grounded, means by which to 
evaluate the quality of a theory. Although this work is not a scientific one, the criteria presented 
by Kuhn remain applicable to any theory when attempting to gauge its usefulness as a theory. 
Thus, to the degree it is applicable, Kuhn will be used here to evaluate the construct developed 
through this dissertation.  
Transferability 
 The data presented here are highly transferable. The questions explored here will lead to 
numerous other questions for future research because of the highly transferable nature of the 
project. Although the project focuses on the roles of faculty in post-secondary institutions, the 
concepts and construct developed here are applicable to the entirety of the educational discipline. 
This investigation, because it engages the nature of teaching, the nature of research, and the 
nature of philosophical inquiry can be applied to any question regarding education, research, or 
philosophical analysis. This work because of its engagement with role theory and development 
of a role theoretical model that relies on discourse ethics, can be used to develop understanding 
of roles in any organizational or social context.  
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Dependability 
 The methodology discussed her in chapter 3 provides dependability in so far as there is 
the employment of overlapping methods, such as role theory and philosophical inquiry, and 
detailed description of the method employed so that this investigation can be repeated. The 
documents analyzed here, in order to investigate the nature of our discourse regarding faculty 
roles, are accessible to anyone who wishes to similarly review them, and the modes of 
investigation are all richly detailed.  
 As mentioned previously, the researcher’s beliefs and assumptions are grounded in 
Foucault and skepticism. His own intuitions are such that knowledge remains elusive and human 
construction of knowledge is deeply embedded in power relations. As such, the potential 
shortcoming of bias in this work is particularly concerning as the traditional empirical means 
used in educational research to evaluate data are set aside in order to engage philosophical 
analysis. However, this project seeks to provide a construct that itself can be evaluated through 
empirical means.  
The research here does not involve subjects of any kind, human or otherwise. All 
investigation has been of documents and theories that are available to the general public either as 
published online by institutional websites, published in academic journals, or published as texts. 
The University of North Florida Institutional Review Board was consulted and they determined 
that this research project was not subject to IRB review.  
Chapter summary/conclusions 
 This chapter firstly sought to exemplify the practice of philosophical analysis. The 
presentation of the work was such that it both detailed the arguments laid out by theorists who 
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argue for the application of philosophy to education and acted, itself, as an example of 
philosophical analysis. The arguments made by Scriven and Soltis were given special attention in 
order to better understand how philosophers of education conceptualize the role of philosophy in 
educational discourse. Their thinking, though, was largely focused on analytic definitions of 
philosophy, but the philosophical analysis, here, demonstrated that philosophy is more robust 
than analysis and is best understood as a “lived experience.” Thus, the analytic definition of 
philosophical analysis may be best understood as “conceptual analysis” while philosophical 
analysis, itself, includes the holism of lived discourse—it is a life of inquiry through dialectical 
engagement. The questions posed in this dissertation are especially appropriate for a 
philosophical methodology as they require, first, the establishment of clear constructs that 
themselves can be investigated and examined. The research questions, however, also 
demonstrate a need for normativity—for a theory of best understanding and practice. This 
analysis, therefore, is one such that it requires a philosophical thesis such that one can both 
develop a defined construct for the purposes of theoretical and empirical examination and such 
that one can suggest a best framework for understanding the roles in question. Thus, this chapter 
argued that it is discourse analysis that is best suited for the development of the construct, as 
discourse analysis provides both an ontological and logical frame for understanding the way 
social discourse produces phenomena and because the normative force of Habermas’ work 
provides a grounding set of imperatives that guide the development of a construct that itself has 
normative force.  
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CHAPTER 4: DATA, ANALYSIS, AND RESULTS 
Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the presentation of data. In the case of philosophical inquiry, 
“data” often means “ideas.” Some of the material presented here may be considered data in the 
more commonly-used qualitative sense. Specifically, some of the information here may 
be0020considered similar to document analysis. The goal, however, has not been to create an 
empirical study in which a selected sample of documents can be analyzed to generate 
understanding of a certain construct as created through those documents. Rather, a larger scope 
of documents will be analyzed for the purpose of generating the construct “faculty roles.” 
 Presented here will be the roles of faculty as inscribed by universities. Six 
research/teaching university faculty handbooks have been examined for their inscription of 
faculty roles and responsibly in terms of teaching and research. According to the Carnegie 
Classification of Institutions of Higher Education, there are 99 institutions that are classified as 
“high research activity” (RU/H). There are also those considered to be “very high research 
activity” (RU/VH). For the purposes of this dissertation, those institutions were limited to those 
that are considered to be “high research activity” that also have a strong teaching emphasis. 
“Very high research activity” universities were omitted from examination due to the fact that the 
potential unequal emphasis on research over teaching may create a skewed view of the general 
inscription of faculty roles in favor of research. It should be noted, however, that there are 
currently eight more universities classified as RU/VH, thus there may be reason to believe that 
more faculty are required to engage in “very high” amounts of research as opposed to “high” 
amounts of research.  
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This dissertation, however, applies the philosophical Principle of Charity. The Principle 
of Charity suggests that when engaging in analysis or discourse it is most logical to assume that 
the ideas analyzed or one’s opponent is coming from the strongest and most rational positioning, 
rather than from the most easily-refuted position. If part of the researcher’s assumption in this 
work is that universities will be more research-driven more than teaching-driven (due to the  
numerous articles reporting the intense pressure to publish), then it is important that when 
collecting data the researcher does not  seek out data to act as confirmation for his bias. Rather, 
the Principle of Charity should be applied, and we will assume that universities do not emphasize 
research over teaching. 
 Rather than analyze the handbooks of “RU/VH” research universities, we will analyze 
the handbooks of those that are only “RU/H” universities under the assumption that those that 
are only “highly” research-focused also focus heavily on teaching. In this way, the researcher 
bias that universities focus more on research can be addressed, and, also, if those universities that 
claim to also be teaching-focused show a tendency to prefer research over teaching, then one 
may conclude that those universities deemed “very high” in research activity are even less 
focused on teaching in preference for research. Thus, we will engage the generation of faculty 
roles as if it is true that universities do engage in an honest attempt to require faculty be both 
teachers and researchers to the best of their ability. The universities were chosen randomly, but 
only those that had online handbooks freely available to the public were considered. Note that 
the goal is not to understand how faculty handbooks at universities understand faculty roles; 
rather, examination of these handbooks will assist the researcher in developing a broader picture 
of faculty roles as inscribed by those institutions. 
203 
 
 A series of professional research associations’ ethical codes are also presented and 
analyzed here. Again a broad spectrum of research associations have been included, including 
the AERA, APA, and the MLA. In order to understand the role “researcher,” it is important to 
understand how the professional associations of researchers inscribe researcher responsibilities. 
As universities expect faculty to be active participants in research and in the professional 
associations governing their particular disciplines, the examination of these documents emerges 
from the roles of faculty as described by their institutions. To be researchers at the university 
means to participate in professional associations, conduct their research in ways that are 
approved by those professional associations, and publish in formats and journals associated with 
those professional associations. 
 To uncover the culturally embedded assumptions that generate faculty roles, we must 
move beyond organizational role theory and organizationally inscribed roles. Thus, we will also 
consider the work of seminal theorists as they describe the ethical obligations of teachers and 
professors. Effort has been made by the researcher to focus on ethical discussion particular to the 
professoriate, but focus has not been limited to such discussions. Again, the social construct of 
“teacher” must be considered in order to uncover the embedded assumptions that construct our 
concept of teacher. The theorists who discuss this work play an important role in this work, as 
we must acknowledge that what a teacher does and what she should do are two different things. 
The first two categories of data examined here are inscribed roles that must be followed by 
faculty and researchers in order to continue performing those roles. The ethical obligations 
described by these theorists, however, are suggestions and arguments, enunciated expectations, 
but they may not describe what we as a society actually inscribe and require of our teachers in a 
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codified way. Thus, we may see a tension between the inscribed roles and the ethical obligations 
required by ethical theory. Effort will be made, however, to analyze these works in a way to find 
as much consistency and coherence as possible between the data sets. This final data set, 
however, will provide the groundwork for developing the Habermasian analysis of the faculty 
construct as a whole. As the work is developed, the researcher will note ways in which the ideas 
presented can be understood as coherent. Preliminary analysis will be conducted as well in order 
to provide the basic philosophical groundwork for chapter 5.  
 Particular attention will be given here in chapter 4 to the Habermasian notions of 
lifeworld and systemsworld. The data will be considered from the lifeworld/ systemsworld 
dichotomy, while at the same time remembering that this binary generates a whole construct. 
However, as discussed by various theorists, understanding different roles and role 
responsibilities as more or less focused on the lifeworld or the systemsworld will provide an 
insight into potential conflicts between the roles. Moreover, as discussed by Habermas, 
understanding of whether or not more primacy is given to those aspects of a role that are 
associated with the systemsworld may provide insight into difficulties society has with 
incorporating that role into the lifeworld. Full synthesis and generation of the most coherent 
construct conjoining “teacher” and “researcher” is reserved for chapter 5.  
 Given the above, a hypothesis can be formulated about the data: as mentioned previously 
in regards to concerns about bias, I suspect the definitions and inscriptions of faculty roles by 
institutions in the handbooks and in research guidelines to be dominated by a systemsworld 
epistemology. Thus, the researcher can further avoid concerns about bias, as that bias is now 
formalized as a hypothesis as opposed to a general intuition that may consciously or 
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unconsciously guide the collection of data. Rather, I will seek evidence that disproves that 
hypothesis. If, however, the evidence seems to support the hypothesis, then the normative shift 
taken by this dissertation as the “ought” will bring back to mind—for faculty as well as for 
administrators—the lifeworldly grounding or definitions of faculty roles, as this grounding is 
what ultimately defines the educational process as a dialogical interaction focused on growth in 
knowledge, skill, and character. 
Faculty Roles as Inscribed in University Handbooks 
In discussing the inscription of faculty roles, it is important to note that not all 
universities make their faculty handbooks available to the general public. The documents 
discussed here include only those universities that provide access to their faculty handbooks to 
the general public through their .edu websites, for free.  So we cannot say that the analysis is 
comprehensive. Rather, in the case of discourse analysis, we can view it as an investigation into 
a slice of the discourse. We will examine some of the dialectic and investigate the imbedded 
assumptions of that dialectic. In some ways, the work here is akin to reconstructing a dialogue 
when one only has a transcript of one of the two speakers. One can develop at least a limited 
understanding of what both speakers are saying by using logic to infer from the responses of the 
known speaker. In this way, we engage a discourse-ethical and hermeneutic move; we assume 
that the documents are meant to be understood by a public that shares similar grounding 
assumptions about discourse and ethics. In so doing, we can reconstruct the model of faculty 
generated by these documents in such a way as to make a coherent picture. 
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The University of Memphis 
 Of the university handbooks reviewed, The University of Memphis provides some of the 
most detailed requirements of their faculty in its faculty handbook. The handbook clearly 
discusses teaching and researching roles in its presentation of tenure and promotion guidelines. 
The University of Memphis’ handbook also provides definitions of teaching and research as 
applicable to the university. However, like most of the handbooks reviewed, The University of 
Memphis emphasizes the fact that tenure and promotion also follow guidelines laid out by 
particular departments. What counts as “good research” may differ from department to 
department not because of quality, but because of medium. For example, journal publication may 
be most appropriate for a philosophy department, while creative writing may require publication 
of books, and the music department may prefer international concerts.   
The University of Memphis, like all of the institutions whose handbooks were reviewed, 
is largely focused on describing the hierarchy and structure of the university. It begins with a 
brief history of the university and then details the committee structure, bureaucratic structure, 
and academic organization.  The handbook then addresses faculty roles. The role discussion, 
however, does not include the roles of teacher and researcher. Rather, the roles discussed are 
hierarchical: chairperson, administrators, ombudsperson, grievance committee, graduate faculty, 
and faculty senate. Similarly, the handbook addresses issues of policy and procedure: how to file 
grievances, language requirements, benefits, leaves of absence, compensation, and awards.  
 The handbook does spend some time addressing issues of instruction and research. In the 
section titled “instruction,” the handbook details the requirements of faculty in the classroom. 
Largely, this section addresses legal issues such as student confidentiality and academic 
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dishonesty. The grading system is also explained, as are class rolls. It is explained that faculty 
members must attend class and keep office hours. The rest of the section addresses how to deal 
with inclement weather, faculty absences, and commencement. There is also brief mention of 
services to which faculty can refer students who are in need of help. 
 The section titled “research and service” also does not clarify the roles of faculty 
members as researchers. Rather, it provides the framework of bureaucracy for them in order to 
assist them in navigating the research system of the university. Faculty members are provided 
information regarding the hierarchy of the university in regards to research and details the 
administration. Requirements regarding copyrights and patents are also addressed. The research 
and service section closes by addressing regulatory issues, consulting, centers of excellence, and 
the appropriate use of technology resources.  
 Most of the documents reviewed restrict their discussion of faculty and researcher roles 
to their sections on promotion and tenure. There are some that also discuss faculty 
responsibilities outside of tenure and promotion, and those will be discussed here. It is important 
to note, however, that the focuses on promotion and tenure are likely the result of the fact that 
promotion and tenure usually require that the faculty member excel in the two roles the 
university requires them to play. To quote the University of Memphis handbook: “The quality of 
the faculty of any university is maintained primarily through the appraisal, by competent faculty, 
and administrative officers, of each candidate for tenure and promotion” (p. 57). Thus, as 
promotion and tenure require that a faculty member has been both an effective teacher and 
researcher, it is there that these documents most often discuss what is required of faculty in terms 
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of teaching and research. Unlike the other faculty handbooks reviewed here, the University of 
Memphis provides “definitions” of teaching and research. The handbook states of teaching: 
Teaching is central to the purposes and objectives of the University of Memphis. It 
encompasses classroom instruction, course development, mentoring students in academic 
projects including dissertations, testing, grading, and the professional development of the 
faculty member as a teacher. Mentoring students at all levels is an important aspect of 
teaching; creative and effective use of innovative teaching methods and curricular 
innovations is encouraged. (p. 59) 
The document then goes on to remind the reader that the definition of teaching should be 
“adapted to different disciplines” (p. 59).  It appears, here, that mentorship is central to the 
“definition” generated by the university. While this is not an actual definition, as it does not 
identify denotatively, connotatively, or ostensively what a teacher is, the paragraph does explain 
the expectations of a teacher, thus meeting some of the need to understand how faculty roles are 
inscribed through faculty handbooks.  
The embedded assumption in the description of the teaching role is the idea of 
mentorship. The university assumes that one knows what mentorship means. “Mentoring 
students at all levels” brings to mind an idea of a kind academic relationship in which the faculty 
member guides the student through difficult work. Of the handbooks reviewed, it is the only one 
that implies a kind of care on the part of the faculty member. To be a mentor suggests more than 
a cold, distant grading relationship, and brings to mind an in-depth relationship in which the 
faculty member is invested in the welfare of the student. The document does not state this 
directly, however. The mention of mentorship is brief, and is couched in language that is far 
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more systems-oriented, focusing on requirements that the faculty member hold class for the 
entire class time, that she engage in professional development, and that she prove her 
effectiveness through student success. 
 Similarly, the University of Memphis handbook defines scholarship by what it does 
rather than what it is. Due to the multi-disciplinary nature of the university, the handbook takes a 
multi-disciplinary approach to the presentation of the different means by which faculty can meet 
their research requirement.  
Scholarship is a discipline-based, multidisciplinary activity that advances knowledge and 
learning by producing new ideas and understanding. Scholarly contributions include 
peer-evaluated, discipline-appropriate works such as books, articles, chapters, films, 
paintings, performances, and choreographic or theatrical design. Scholarship can be 
divided into five sub-categories: application, creative activity, inquiry, integration, and 
the scholarship of teaching. Each department, considering its relevant discipline or 
disciplines, may emphasize contributions in some subcategories more than others, as 
described in its mission statement and other relevant departmental documents. Individual 
faculty are not expected to contribute in all five subcategories of scholarship. Some 
overlap in the meaning of the five subcategories is inevitable, and a particular scholarly 
contribution may fall under more than one subcategory. These subcategories are: 
• Creative activity should be fully accepted as scholarship in departments where such 
work is appropriate to both professional specialization and teaching. It includes, but is not 
limited to, choreography and dance performance; creative writing; direction and design of 
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plays; exhibitions of visual arts such as paintings, sculpture, and photography; direction 
of film and video; and musical composition and performance.  
• Inquiry involves rigorous investigation aimed at the discovery of new knowledge 
within one's own discipline or area of study; it often serves as the basis for other forms of 
scholarship and may result in scholarly publications, funded research, and presentations 
at professional meetings.  
• Integration makes meaningful connections between previously unrelated topics, facts, 
or observations, such as cross-disciplinary synthesis or an integrative framework within a 
discipline that results in a publication or presentation in a suitable forum.  
• The scholarship of teaching focuses on transforming and extending knowledge about 
pedagogy, including appropriate textbooks or educational articles in one's own discipline. 
Innovative contributions to teaching, if published or presented in a peer-reviewed forum, 
also constitute scholarship of teaching. The "scholarship of teaching" is not equivalent to 
teaching. Classroom teaching and staying current in one's field are not relevant criteria 
for evaluating faculty on the "scholarship of teaching."  
• Engaged scholarship now subsumes the scholarship of application. It adds to existing 
knowledge in the process of applying intellectual expertise to collaborative problem-
solving with urban, regional, state, national and/or global communities and results in a 
written work shared with others in the discipline or field of study. Engaged scholarship 
conceptualizes "community groups" as all those outside of academe and requires shared 
authority at all stages of the research process from defining the research problem, 
choosing theoretical and methodological approaches, conducting the research, developing 
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the final product(s), to participating in peer evaluation. Departments should refine the 
definition as appropriate for their disciplines and incorporate evaluation guidelines in 
departmental tenure and promotion criteria. (p. 60)  
Note that much more time is given to the discussion of scholarship by the handbook than of 
research. This may be only due to the fact that the university seeks to clarify the numerous ways 
faculty can meet their research obligations, while teaching can only be done as “teaching.” Just a 
moment’s research into “teaching,” though, reveals that there are many different ways in which 
teachers can engage their profession as educators. Thus, this suggests that the university is either 
a) not concerned with or b) unaware of the many different modes of teaching. Regardless, what 
emerges is a document that focuses more on the details of research than on the details of 
teaching. 
What remains unclear in reviewing the document is exactly how much research is 
required of the professor. Specifics regarding whether the professor has contributed enough to 
knowledge are left undiscussed, likely in order to allow the individual departments to make its 
own determinations regarding scholarship. Similarly, what counts as a “good teacher” is not 
discussed in the handbook. Promotion and tenure are granted to those faculty members who 
demonstrate “good teaching” through student success, departmental evaluations, and student 
evaluations. The exact requirements for teaching and research are left to the department. 
Members of the faculty are required to conduct themselves ethically, particularly in terms of 
research, by avoiding plagiarism, but the requirements for teaching roles and researching roles 
remain unclear despite the driven definitions. The work is largely one that engages the 
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systemsworld; it seeks to set down policies and address bureaucratic issues, and there is little 
engagement with the lifeworld of leadership and learning. 
Oklahoma State University 
 The other handbooks reviewed do not attempt to give definitions of teaching and 
research. They are all similar to the University of Memphis faculty handbook in their discussion 
of policy and administrative hierarchy, but the University of Memphis faculty handbook 
provides the most information regarding how faculty should approach teaching and research in 
order to gain promotion and tenure. The Oklahoma State University faculty handbook provides 
no definitions of teaching or research. It also provides very little information regarding how the 
faculty gains promotion and tenure. This is to say that despite the length of the appendix 
dedicated to promotion and tenure, very little information is given regarding what faculty must 
do to earn promotion or tenure. Rather, the section is dedicated to detailing the ways in which 
committees are appointed, explaining the hierarchy of professors and promotion, and the benefits 
of promotion and tenure. The expectations of faculty as teachers and researchers are 
encapsulated in two paragraphs: 
1. Effective classroom teaching and classroom related duties: Teaching is the primary 
duty of instructional faculty. Faculty are charged with the responsibility to challenge and 
motivate students, to maintain high academic standards, and to help students think 
independently in order to understand concepts and solve problems. Faculty must also 
work with a diverse student body and instill in them the confidence to be successful. To 
accomplish these objectives, faculty must remain current in their respective fields, must 
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continually improve their teaching methods, and must contribute to the development of 
the curriculum.  
2. Scholarship: Faculty are expected to remain current and active in their fields of study. 
This may be accomplished by pursuing advanced courses or degrees, continuing 
education, or obtaining special license of certification. Faculty are encouraged to attend 
and make presentations at professional meetings. (p. 96) 
The above two paragraphs seem to once again suggest that teaching is connected to the idea of 
free and “independent” thought. Note that primacy appears to be given to teaching over research: 
“Teaching is the primary duty of instructional faculty.” Scholarship also does not emphasize 
publication, but rather continuing education and participation in professional meetings. The 
document also does include the brief statement: “Faculty have the professional responsibility to 
provide quality learning experiences for the student. Faculty are expected to meet their classes at 
scheduled times. In cases of illness or any other emergency, the faculty will notify the 
department head so that appropriate action may be taken” (p. 23). Thus, there is an expectation 
of “quality teaching,” though what the phrase means, exactly, is never clarified. Additionally, no 
mention is made of journal publication, unlike some of the other documents reviewed here.  
Like the University of Memphis, faculty are encouraged to engage in a mentorship, as 
seen in the selection from the handbook below: 
Active participation in the OSU-Oklahoma City student experience: Faculty need to 
be concerned with developing the whole potential in the students as future leaders. 
Faculty must be willing to serve as role models, academic advisors, mentors, and 
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sponsors of student organizations. Faculty should also take advantage of any 
opportunities to recruit students and promote the institution. (p. 96) 
We see, then, a repeated emphasis on the idea that faculty members should in some way 
“mentor” students. It is important to note that this idea falls neatly into the lifeworld. The idea 
that students should be addressed as whole people for the purpose of their personal betterment is 
an idea that is not reducible to purely systemsworld organization. What is missing is detailed 
discussion of mentorship and what it entails. Moreover, note the systemsworld commitment of 
these handbooks: while they do take the time to explain how faculty will be evaluated, they do 
not ever include how that evaluation will include mentorship. Rather, the evaluations are 
restricted to student success ratings, student reported evaluations on surveys, and classroom 
visits. So on the one hand, the handbooks seem to suggest the importance of the lifeworld; on the 
other, they create a system of measurement that emphasizes the systemsworld and does not seem 
to consider the lifeworld notions expounded as sufficiently essential to good teaching as to be 
included in evaluation of faculty. 
Interestingly, in the case of Oklahoma State University, the only evidence of the 
importance of research and scholarship is mentioned briefly when discussing appointment of 
instructors: “Individuals must present evidence of scholarship, teaching ability, and practical 
experience” (p. 97). This requirement seems to carry over to the appointment of assistant, 
associate, and full professors, but that implication is not stated directly. The handbook, however, 
does state a professional ethic that reveals the university’s stance on scholarship far more than 
the discussion of promotion and tenure: the fact that promotion and tenure are heavily influenced 
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by individual departmental requirements and individual committee evaluations suggests that 
although scholarship may seem under-emphasized, it may not be so. 
 The statement of ethics suggests that scholarship is rather important to the university: 
The handbook claims that the faculty endorses the “American Association of University 
Professors' 1966 statement on Professional Ethics” (p. 109). The Statement on Professional 
Ethics is rich with information regarding perspectives on teaching and researching that are 
omitted from the discussion of tenure and promotion. However, given that tenure and promotion 
require that the faculty member be professionally ethical, it stands to reason that promotion and 
tenure, in the case of Oklahoma State University, require that faculty display the qualities 
expressed in the Statement. The statement is quoted below: 
The following statement was drafted by the American Association of University 
Professors and was edited by Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, to make it gender 
neutral.  
1. Professors, guided by a deep conviction of the worth and dignity of the advancement 
of knowledge, recognize the special responsibilities placed upon them. Their primary 
responsibility to their subject is to seek and to state the truth as they see it. To this end 
they devote their energies to developing and improving their scholarly competence. They 
accept the obligation to exercise critical self-discipline and judgment in using, extending, 
and transmitting knowledge. They practice intellectual honesty. Although they may 
follow subsidiary interests, these interests must never seriously hamper or compromise 
their freedom of inquiry.  
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2. As teachers, professors encourage the free pursuit of learning in their students. They 
hold before them the best scholarly standards of their discipline. They demonstrate 
respect for students as individuals, and adhere to the proper roles of intellectual guides 
and counselors. They make every reasonable effort to foster honest academic conduct and 
to assure that the evaluation of students reflects their true merit. They respect the 
confidential nature of the relationship between professor and student. They avoid any 
exploitation of students for their private advantage and acknowledge significant 
assistance from them. They protect their academic freedom.  
3. As colleagues, professors have obligations that derive from common membership in 
the community of scholars. They respect and defend the free inquiry of their associates. 
In the exchange of criticism and ideas, they show due respect for the opinions of others. 
They acknowledge their academic debts and strive to be objective in their professional 
judgment of colleagues. They accept their share of faculty responsibilities for the 
governance of their institution.  
4. As members of their institution, professors seek above all to be effective teachers and 
scholars. Although they observe the stated regulations of the institution, provided they do 
not contravene academic freedom, they maintain their right to criticize and seek revision. 
When considering the interruption or termination of their service, they recognize the 
effect of their decision upon the program of the institution and give due notice of their 
intentions.  
5. As members of their community, professors have the rights and obligations of any 
citizen. They measure the urgency of these obligations in the light of their responsibilities 
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to their subject, to their students, to their profession, and to their institution. When they 
speak or act as private persons, they avoid creating the impression that they speak or act 
for their college or University. As citizens engaged in a profession that depends upon 
freedom for its health and integrity, professors have a particular obligation to promote 
conditions of free inquiry and to further public understanding of academic freedom. (pp. 
133-134)  
Above, one sees a work rich with enunciated teacher and researcher roles. Note, firstly, that the 
role of faculty as researcher is stated first. It is stated in paragraph four that “professors seek 
above all to be effective teachers and scholars.” Thus, primacy is given to research as the first 
stated responsibility of faculty members, but then placed second in primacy when document 
articulates what faculty should “seek above all.” The statement on professional ethics therefore 
seems to place equal emphasis on the importance of teaching and researcher. 
 There is no discussion in the statement on professional ethics of the ways research and 
teaching should buttress each other. The connection between the two, however, is not difficult to 
uncover. Faculty are required to develop and improve their “scholarly competence,” while at the 
same time they are required to “encourage the free pursuit of learning” in their students. These 
two imperatives are consistent. In order to most effectively encourage learning in her students, 
the professor must herself be competent. Moreover, as the document suggests, she models 
scholarly endeavor for her students, both through her teaching and in her professional endeavors.  
 One may assume that being “effective scholars” indicates that some level of publication 
is required, as participation in and contribution to the body of knowledge is expected. One also 
sees some of the implications of the mentorship roles expected of the faculty. To be a mentor, in 
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this case, seems to mean that one guides students toward academic freedom. Moreover, the 
document is a lifeworld document that includes the importance of community dialectic. The 
emphasis is not on hierarchy, structure, or system evaluation, but, instead, on normative 
performance—specifically the dialectical participation in a community that includes scholars, 
students, and general stakeholders. 
An important assumption also revealed through a Habermasian analysis of these 
documents is the realization that faculty, according to the Statement on Professional Ethics to 
which the university proscribes, are expected to pursue “truth as they see it,” yet, there is no 
mention of “teaching” that truth. Rather, faculty members are encouraged to foster free learning, 
and are, repeatedly, admonished to respect students. Thus, one realizes that the document 
suggests that professors are obligated to become as knowledgeable as possible, and that one 
should engage in the production of knowledge with her colleagues. Simultaneously, the faculty 
member should not be indoctrinating students with what she “sees” as knowledge, but, instead, 
through her teaching and through her example, should foster the same voracious pursuit of 
knowledge exhibited by the professor herself. Teaching, thus, is not—at least suggests the 
Statement on Professional ethics—a profession dedicated to enforcing knowledge, but, rather, 
the action of helping others find it for themselves. 
 The Oklahoma State University handbook, thus, does present a picture of faculty in a 
lifeworld way, albeit only in the appendix. The handbook itself is focused largely on the 
systemsworld and the establishment of policy for the purposes of managing, organizing, and 
structuring the university. The handbook seems to emphasize research less than the other 
handbooks considered here, but, again, that focus shifts when considering the Statement on 
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Professional Ethics included in the appendix. Without further research into actual departmental 
policy, one cannot ascertain through the handbook if professors are simply not expected to 
publish. However, the designation of the university as a high research university suggests that 
this is not the case. Rather, the document may simply assume a synonymy between “scholarship” 
and “publication.” That embedded synonymy, however, would suggest not just a systemsworld 
perspective on teaching, but a systemsworld perspective on publication. Yet, to be a scholar must 
mean more than to produce quantifiable articles and books that can be evaluated by the system. 
To be a “scholar” connotes a broader holism of participation in knowledge through dialectic, 
reading, discourse, presentation, teaching, and contribution to the world of knowledge. If the 
university has created a synonomy between scholarship and publication, then much lifeworld 
connotation of scholarship has been lost.  
The University of Miami 
The University of Miami provides a handbook that details a great deal of policy and 
procedure. It is rather detailed in regards to the hierarchical nature of the university and in 
regards to university policy on benefits, appointments, termination, administration, and so on. 
Always, however, these issues are addressed from the perspective of a generalized procedure. 
Details regarding what would cause termination are omitted in favor of discussion that only 
details the procedure if one terminates her contract or it is terminated by the university. Due to its 
detailed nature, the University of Miami handbook provides a useful definition of tenure for its 
faculty that illuminates the systems nature of the university. Insofar as this is the case, the 
handbook provides the “meaning” of tenure. To say that one will provide the “meaning” of a 
term connotes a robust and rich description. However, one may, instead, infer that “meaning” 
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may reflect, only, a legalized terminology restricting what a term means by virtue of indicating 
“this term does not entitle you to anything beyond…” as a predicate.  Interestingly, the definition 
of tenure provided by the University of Miami seems to avoid providing meaning in any sense 
other than in the most legalized and systematized way. It does, however, mention briefly the 
expectation that faculty should participate in teaching and research: 
Meaning of Tenure  
(a) Faculty members having tenure shall have appointments continued from year to year 
without necessity for annual or other renewal.  
(b) Tenure implies that the faculty member shall accede to reasonable requests to 
redistribute efforts among various duties including teaching, research, and clinical service 
where appropriate, to accept classes assigned, whether in day or evening hours, and, in an 
emergency and for the period thereof, to accept such other reasonable assignments as 
may be deemed necessary by the University.  
(c) Tenure does not imply any promise of promotion or any regular increase in salary, but 
it does assure the faculty member of participation in any general change in the salary 
scale. It also assures the faculty member of provisions for general working conditions on 
the same basis as other faculty members in the same academic areas who have similar 
professional activities and duties. (pp. 56-57) 
The above says little about the connotations of tenure. It does not reflect on the importance of 
tenure. Other handbooks, we have noted and will note again, connect tenure to freedom of 
expression and inquiry. The University of Miami, however, is careful to understand tenure as 
part of an organization, a way of providing benefits that must be clarified, defined, and limited.  
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 Similarly, the University of Miami also defines scholarship and tenure in terms of tenure 
and promotion.  Like the definition of “tenure,” the definitions are not robust in the sense of the 
lifeworld. The definitions provided below are specifically intended to express what is expected 
of faculty if they are to achieve promotion. In so doing, they effectively inscribe faculty roles as 
scholars and teachers. 
Scholarship 
Scholarship embraces inquiry, research, and creative professional performance and 
activity. Scholarship is required for effective teaching and is the obligation of all 
members of the faculty. Scholarship may be judged by the character of the advanced 
degree, by contributions to knowledge in the form of publication and instruction, by 
reputation among other scholars and professionals, and by the performance of students. 
The scholarly function of a university requires the appointment of faculty members 
devoted to inquiry and research. Among the criteria for evaluating research are the 
publication of books by nationally recognized presses and of articles and reviews of a 
scholarly nature in books, periodicals, technical reports, and other forms of publication 
nationally recognized in the profession; the direction of scholarly work by students 
working on advanced degrees; professional awards and fellowships; membership on 
boards and commissions devoted to inquiry; and the judgment of professional colleagues.  
Scholarship may be demonstrated by significant achievement in an art related to a 
faculty member's discipline, such as creative works, original designs, or original 
procedures. National recognition of such activities is demonstrated by: commissions, 
awards and prizes from nationally recognized bodies; performances with nationally 
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recognized companies; invited presentations, exhibitions, lectures and performances 
before nationally recognized bodies; invitations to teach master classes or lead intensive 
workshops at nationally recognized institutions; and reviews of performance and creative 
works in nationally recognized journals, magazines and newspapers. 
Promotion, tenure, and merit salary increases should recognize these scholarly 
achievements. Whenever possible, chairs shall reduce other duties for faculty engaged in 
these activities.   
C9.3 Teaching 
The educational function of a university requires the appointment of faculty who are 
effective teachers. The means of evaluating teaching effectiveness include: (1) the 
informed judgment of colleagues; (2) the performance of students; and (3) student 
opinion of teaching effectiveness. Promotion, tenure, and merit salary increases should 
recognize outstanding achievements in teaching.  (pp. 57-59) 
Perhaps most noticeable is the much greater detail regarding research and what constitutes 
research as described by the University of Miami than given to teaching. The discussion of 
teaching is almost a passing reference in comparison with the details on research. Note that the 
discussion of scholarship also provides a justification for the importance of scholarship as “[t]he 
scholarly function of a university requires the appointment of faculty members devoted to 
inquiry and research” (p.57).  Moreover, note that scholarship is further emphasized as also 
essential for effective teaching. However, no such statement is made about teaching as essential 
to good scholarship. Thus, the handbook seems to suggest a relationship in which scholarship is 
supervenient upon effective teaching.  
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It is made clear in the handbook that publication is one of the means by which faculty 
members are evaluated, if appropriate to their field of scholarship; otherwise, creative works are 
considered instead. Effectiveness in teaching, rather than a series of disjunctive research 
opportunities, is determined by a conjunction of colleague evaluation, student performance, and 
student evaluation of the professor. Note, however, that no discussion is given to how such 
evaluations will be conducted. It is unclear what qualities of teaching will be evaluated by 
colleagues. It is also unclear what student performance means. Likely it means student success 
on examinations. This may lead to standardization of end of course examinations in order to 
provide a means by which to judge faculty success against each other. If student performance 
suggests quantifiable achievement on examinations, then the emphasis is again on the 
systemsworld. However, student performance may mean student success in the world outside of 
college, the ability of students to think for themselves, or evaluation of student-generated 
projects, creative works, and their contribution to the body of knowledge. If so, such 
performance would suggest a lifeworld perspective on the part of the university.  
Some further clarification regarding the role of faculty as constructed by the University of 
Miami faculty handbook is achieved by examination of tenure candidate files. In order to earn 
tenure, faculty must develop a file containing the following:  
1) Teaching evaluation- student evaluations, peer review through classroom visits by 
tenured faculty 
2) External evaluations- five letters from experts in the field of scholarship 
3) Candidate’s statement-written statement of contribution to knowledge of the profession.  
(p. 63) 
224 
 
Notice that firstly faculty members must demonstrate effective teaching. Again, this 
effectiveness is determined through student and tenured faculty evaluations. Note also, however, 
that the second and third requirements both hinge on the professor’s scholarship. Both require 
evidence of the professor’s contribution to scholarship. There seems to be an assumption, then, 
that teaching itself is not a contribution to scholarship. While the third requirement may allow for 
a professor to assert that she has contributed to knowledge of the profession by teaching the 
profession, there seems to be an implicit assumption that to contribute to the knowledge of the 
profession means to publish. That focus on publication is further emphasized by the fact that the 
candidate’s statement does not require an explication of one’s teaching goals, teaching ethic, or 
personal teaching philosophy. The sole focus of the statement is the clarification of one’s 
contribution to the field. This quantifiable, utilitarian—and somewhat capitalistic—focus on the 
production of tangible contribution falls neatly into the systemsworld epistemology.  
Clemson University 
The focus of the Clemson University Faculty handbook is largely on the structure of the 
university and the makeup of various committees. There is little discussion of the intricacies of 
promotion and tenure. The work does, however, provide some information about the means by 
which faculty are evaluated. As in previous cases, one can assume that the standards of 
evaluation reflect the expectations of the roles performed by faculty. While these roles are then 
not inscribed in the most literal sense, they are performance-expectations that fit neatly into an 
understanding of faculty roles as understood through organizational role theory.  
 Thus far, much of the data are best understood and organized through the lens of 
organizational role theory. Inscribed expectations through a systemsworld approach as well as 
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performance expectations of actors reflect an understanding of actors as agents in the world who 
are given scripts and must act out those scripts within the organizational setting. Note, however, 
that symbolic-interactionist role theory is also necessary for understanding the roles as they are 
presented through the university handbooks. As in the case with Clemson University, some roles 
are not inscribed, but instead are represented or constructed through a defining epistemology that 
guides the university. This is to say that while Clemson University does not provide much in the 
way of details regarding the inscribed roles of faculty for promotion and tenure, they do provide 
a “General Philosophy” that acts as a means by which to understand the symbolic gestures that 
generate the faculty roles. Presented below is the General Philosophy of Clemson University. 
General Philosophy  
Institutions of higher learning are communities of scholars in which faculty gather to 
seek, teach, and disseminate knowledge for its own sake rather than for any immediate 
political, social, or economic goal. Such institutions are conducted for the common good 
and not to further the interests of either the individual faculty member or the institution as 
a whole. The attainment of that common good depends upon the free search for truth and 
its free expression.  
Academic freedom is essential to these purposes. Colleges and universities can fulfill 
their missions only when their faculties enjoy the academic freedom to pursue knowledge 
without fear of pressure from sources inside or outside their institutions. For this reason, 
academic freedom is a right and not a privilege to be granted or withheld. As will be indi-
cated below, however, such freedom carries with it commensurate duties and 
responsibilities.  
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It is the policy of Clemson University to preserve and defend academic freedom by 
vigorously resisting all efforts from whatever source to encroach upon or restrict it. In 
policy and in practice, the University and its accrediting agency, the Southern 
Association of Colleges and Schools, adhere to the 1940 Statement of Principles on 
Academic Freedom and Tenure of the American Association of University Professors 
(AAUP), which has long been recognized as providing reasonable and authoritative 
guidelines for American institutions of higher learning. The section on academic freedom 
below essentially reiterates the principles set forth in this statement, with some 
modification and extension consistent with its intent and with later declarations by the 
Association. (p.10) 
 Notice that Clemson University firstly begins with the assertion that universities exist as 
entities in which the actors who comprise it “seek, teach, and disseminate knowledge for its own 
sake.” The charge to “seek” knowledge is given primacy, here, and it can be understand that it 
means scholarship. Interestingly, however, this particular philosophy preserves the notion that 
scholarship can be distinct from research, as the third telos is “disseminate.” One often assumes 
that to “disseminate” knowledge means to “teach;” however, Clemson University states teaching 
as well. This distinction, then, between “teach” and “disseminate” may suggest that 
disseminating means producing knowledge and casting it out into the world for consumption 
while teaching means actively participating with students in knowledge inquiry. Thus, it may 
well be that Clemson University’s philosophy places learning on the part of faculty first, 
(perhaps because such knowledge is a prerequisite for teaching) then requires that faculty teach, 
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and then, finally, requires that they share that knowledge with the public at large not for any 
political purpose, but only because knowledge itself is intrinsically valuable. 
 The statement of philosophy then focuses the rest of its efforts on the instantiation of 
academic freedom as fundamental to the overall university ethic and telos. The statement, in 
some ways, is less a philosophy and more a declaration of independence and of intent. The 
General Philosophy states that Clemson University will resist “all efforts” to restrict it. Thus, we 
see, again, the emphasis by a university on the importance of academic freedom. This emphasis 
was an unexpected result of the analysis of faculty roles. Repeatedly, the documents charge 
faculty with the mandate that they should generate a world of free thought and unfettered 
learning. The general philosophy of Clemson University may be understood as generating 
faculty roles of teaching and research as two expressions of the belief that free thought and 
unfettered learning are intrinsic goods entrusted to the professoriate.  
 Perhaps as a result of its philosophy, the Clemson University faculty handbook provides a 
more robust picture of what teaching entails than some of the other handbooks. Consider the 
“evidence of student learning” as a multi-faceted tool for understanding faculty teaching as 
described by the handbook: 
Evidence of Student Learning in Evaluation of Faculty Teaching is an important process 
requiring a multi-faceted approach. Research supports the use of multiple sources of 
evidence in evaluation, and effective evaluations should include at least three of the 
following: 
a) Evidence-based measurements of student learning (such as pre- and post-testing or 
student work samples) that meet defined student learning outcomes; 
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b) Evaluation (by peers and/or administrators) of course materials, learning objectives, 
and examinations; 
c) In-class visitation by peers and/or administrators;  
d) A statement by the faculty member describing the faculty member’s methods and/or a 
teaching philosophy;  
e) Exit interview/surveys with current graduates/alumni; 
f) Additional criteria as appropriate for the discipline and degree level of the students; 
and,  
g) A statement by the faculty member of methods or philosophy that also describes and 
documents how feedback from student rating of course experiences or evaluation 
instruments above were used to improve teaching.  
The University provides a standard form that meets the minimum requirements of current 
research-based practices for student rating of course experiences. This form must be 
approved by the Scholastic Policies Committee of the Faculty Senate. Individual 
departments and faculty may develop questions supplemental to the University’s 
minimum standard questions or employ comprehensive supplemental questions, but the 
standard questions are required. (p. 72) 
Note, here, the repeated mention of philosophy in the above evaluative construct. Although 
“philosophy” as they use it has little in common with the term as we use it in this dissertation, it 
does suggest that faculty should be metacognitive in regards to the guiding beliefs that ground 
their pedagogy. Faculty should be able to articulate why they do what they do and the teleology 
that guides them as teachers. The above evaluative construct allows for both systemsworld and 
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lifeworld understandings of faculty as teachers. While there are structured surveys that measure 
student success and “evidence-based” measurements using pre-and post-testing, there are also 
exit interviews and statements of philosophy that act as qualitative data sets. Simply, to evaluate 
a faculty member using the above construct, one would be unable to simply look at a chart or a 
set of numbers that represent the effectiveness of her teaching. Rather, one would have to 
investigate many forms of representation in order to understand the faculty member’s 
effectiveness not just in terms of a set of grades given or a graduate rate, but as a holism of 
epistemology, pedagogy teleology and ethics.  
 In its brief explication of the expectations of faculty in promotion and tenure, faculty 
roles are largely defined from a systemsworld perspective. There does not seem to be primacy 
given to research over teaching or teaching over research, but the expectations of faculty to do 
research are significant. The documents outline the set of teaching expectations as follows: 
 Teaching 
 • Identification of course needs and the development of curriculum, plans, course 
outlines and educational objectives. 
 • Incorporation of new knowledge and teaching techniques into course, laboratories, 
short courses and other educational endeavors.  
• Presentation of subject matter in an effective manner through lectures, discussions, 
examinations, etc.  
• Motivation of students and establishment of rapport with students to improve the 
learning process.  
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• Attention to responsibilities such as meeting classes promptly, maintaining office hours 
and filling out reports. 
 • Professional growth and scholarly achievements as evidenced by experience, 
educational attainments, commitments to reading and study, productive scholarship and 
professional contributions beyond the scope of regular duties. 
• Advising of students on academic matters. (p. 91) 
Note that the expectations require both that faculty meet clear organizational ends as well as a 
vague gesturing towards the import of new knowledge. Teaching, however, is not treated solely 
as an industrial enterprise; faculty members, for example, are expected to develop a “rapport 
with students to improve the learning process.” So while the understanding of teaching and its 
multi-faceted intricacies remains vague, there is allowance here for an understanding of teaching 
that includes the lifeworld. The presentation of research expectations is similar: 
 Research  
 Identification of specific research projects contributing to priority research needs.  
 Development of sound research proposals culminating in funding.  
 Execution of research in competent manner.  
 Completion of research and reporting of findings in appropriate publications and/or at 
professional meetings.  
 Attention to responsibilities such as providing timely reports, supervision of graduate 
students and technicians, and development of research facilities.  
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 Professional growth and scholarly achievements as evidenced by experience, 
educational attainments, commitment to reading and study, productive scholarship 
and professional contributions beyond the scope of regular duties. (p. 91) 
Two immediate conclusions emerge from analysis of the research expectations: 1) Research is 
understood in part as deeply connected to publication and/or the dissemination of knowledge 
through professional meetings; and 2) Scholarly achievement is expected to be an integral part of 
a faculty member’s participation in the university. Note, interestingly, that “scholarly 
achievement” in addition to “professional growth” are emphasized heavily. An emphasis on 
“scholarship” would allow for the possibility that faculty could perform their role as researcher 
by acquiring knowledge through meticulous and methodological research, but the expectation 
here is not only that this acquired knowledge should be disseminated, it should be noteworthy. 
Thus, while on one hand the Clemson University faculty handbook presents faculty roles from a 
broader lifeworld perspective than other handbooks reviewed here, the handbook also 
understands faculty roles as requiring significant and praiseworthy scholastic “attainment.”  
Thus, we note that a lifeworld understanding does not preclude an understanding of faculty that 
places heavy emphasis on publication. What is perhaps is most significant, then, is the 
understanding of a lifeworld focus as one that emerges from the belief that publication should be 
conducted for the betterment of the community and due to the intrinsic worth of knowledge while 
the systemsworld perspective views publication as a quantifiable means by which to evaluate 
faculty.  
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Florida Atlantic University 
Florida Atlantic University’s handbook is the second shortest of the documents reviewed. 
At only 86 pages, the document focuses almost exclusively on delineation of the university 
hierarchy. The document explicates the divisions between various campuses, the administrative 
structure, and the policies that govern the university. The expectations of faculty are restricted to 
a section designated for university policies. The breakdown of that section is below: 
INSTRUCTIONAL POLICIES  
 Academic Calendar  
 Course Syllabi 
 Class Meetings  
 Classroom Requests  
 Student Attendance  
 Office Hours  
 Examinations  
 Final Examination Schedules  
 Grades  
 Posting Grades  
 Instructions for Faculty to Input Grades  
 Classrooms  
 Grade Reviews  
 Course Evaluation  
 Academic Program Assessment  
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 Academic Honesty  
 Dealing with Disruption  
 Disruptive Behavior  
 Threatening Behavior  
 Anti-Discrimination and Anti-Harassment  
 Fees for Course Materials and Supplies  
 Textbooks and Materials  
 Accommodations for Disabilities (pp. 3-4) 
The instructional policies, as they are policies, never discuss teaching philosophy, pedagogy, or 
expectations of the faculty as facilitators of free thought. Rather, the discussion of instructional 
expectations is restricted specifically to university policy in the systemsworld—expectations of 
timeliness, policy on disability, requirements for office hours, and so on. It is unclear what is 
expected of faculty as teachers beyond that they should attend class, teach, and meet the legal 
requirements expected by the university.  
 Similarly, the discussion of research is vague. The document presents research in terms 
of a basic structure and presents avenues for assistance in conducting research. The document 
presents research as follows.  
RESEARCH  
 Faculty Research Programs  
 Centers and Institutes  
 Sponsored Programs  
 Research Integrity  
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 Use of Human Subjects in Research  
 Use of Animals in Research and Teaching  
 Research Accounting  
 Intellectual Property  
 Florida Atlantic University Research Corporation  
 Research Communications (p. 4)  
There are no definitions given. Why and how research should be conducted is left outside of the 
document. Researchers are expected to conduct themselves ethically and are expected to follow 
university policy in conducting that research. They are provided information regarding policies 
on human subjects, non-human animal subjects, intellectual property, and other legal issues. As 
presented by the handbook, Florida Atlantic University seems to follow a systemsworld model of 
the construction of faculty roles. Faculty are expected to perform their roles within a structure 
that they must maintain. 
This is not to say the university handbook is entirely without teleology or ethical 
grounding, only that the discussion of teaching and research themselves are solely discussed 
from the systems perspective. Early in the document, there is an expression of teleology through 
“mission” and “values.” To quote,  
Florida Atlantic University is a public research university with multiple campuses along 
the southeast Florida coast serving a uniquely diverse community. It promotes academic 
and personal development, discovery, and lifelong learning. FAU fulfills its mission 
through excellence and innovation in teaching, outstanding research and creative 
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activities, public engagement and distinctive scientific and cultural alliances, all within an 
environment that fosters inclusiveness. (p.12) 
Here we see an emphasis on the idea that faculty should engage innovating teaching and 
“outstanding research.” It is left unclear what exactly such teaching and research entail, however. 
The document continues to present its values: 
Florida Atlantic University values an academic environment that facilitates intellectual 
growth through open and honest expression. The University is committed to excellence at 
all levels of the educational and creative experience, to success for all students, and to 
development of the capacity to make reasoned and discriminating judgments with respect 
for differences and diversity in ideas. Lifelong learning encourages the continual use of 
the mind. The University plays a vital role in the life of the surrounding community, in 
society, and as an engine for economic development. (p. 12) 
The document continues to elucidate a series of values that include community participation and 
a significant emphasis on academic freedom, while also focusing on economic and systemsworld 
concerns. Thus, we see again the focus on the idea that universities are deeply dependent on 
academic freedom. Florida Atlantic University, as stated in its values, also encourages free 
thought and creative expression on the part of its faculty and students. The presentation of values 
fits neatly into a lifeworld understanding of the university. 
 There is also the inclusion of a brief mention of annual evaluation. The document 
discusses the importance of the annual evaluation for the purposes of promotion and tenure, but 
does not include any details regarding the expectations of faculty or how they will be evaluated 
other than by tenured faculty and the administration. The document states, “The basic purpose of 
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the annual evaluation is faculty improvement in the functions of teaching, research, service and 
other duties that may be assigned” (p. 61). Thus, we can conclude that faculty are expected to 
perform, effectively, the roles of teacher and researcher, but as to what exactly comprises those 
roles, the document remains unclear. One may infer, however, from the university mission and 
values, that those roles include innovative teaching, facilitation of knowledge acquisition and 
creative work on the part of the students, as well as faculty participation in publication and 
contribution to the general body of knowledge.  
Temple University 
 The Temple University faculty handbook is the shortest of all those reviewed here. The 
document is only twenty-one pages long. Interestingly, however, a significant portion of the 
document is not dedicated to the discussion of hierarchy or organization. Rather, the document 
focuses largely promotion and tenure, faculty ethics, and condition of employment. Given the 
length of the document itself, it cannot be said that the document discusses those topics in more 
detail than the other handbooks, but proportionally, significantly more time is given to them than 
in the other handbooks.  
 The document does not go into great detail regarding the promotion and tenure process. 
Basic structure is laid out and then the document details the basic expectations of faculty in a 
lifewordly way. Consider the explication of teaching as an expectation for promotion and tenure: 
a. Effective teaching has many manifestations. It comprehends classroom instruction and 
a broad range of faculty-student relationships. The following are among the traits valued 
in the teacher: command of subject, familiarity with advances in the field, ability to 
organize material and to present it with force and logic, capacity to awaken in students an 
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awareness of the relation of the subject to other fields of knowledge, grasp of general 
objectives, ability to vitalize learning, ability to arouse curiosity toward further and more 
independent learning, ability to stimulate advanced students to highly creative work, 
maintaining a sufficiently high standard of achievement, and fairness and judgment in 
grading. The teacher’s personal attributes such as social graciousness and sense of humor 
are also important. 
b. The extent and skill of the faculty member’s participation in the general guidance and 
advising of students and his or her contribution to student welfare are of importance in 
the appraisal of the teacher’s value to the University. (p. 7) 
Thus, the document recognizes effective teaching as multi-faceted and deeply embedded in 
faculty-student relationships. The document says little about evaluation in terms of 
standardization or performance, and focuses on ideas such as “awakening” and “awareness.” 
Perhaps most unusually, there is even a brief mention of a “sense of humor” amongst effective 
faculty. This presentation then is almost without explication of the system of organization and 
evaluation and focuses heavily on the personal qualities of effective teaching that are expected of 
faculty. Also important is the inclusion in (b) of student welfare. Student wellbeing is only 
mentioned on occasion in any of the other documents in terms of student academic achievement. 
The Temple University faculty handbook, however, makes no such distinction. Faculty are 
required to contribute to student welfare—one assumes first academically, but not necessarily 
solely. 
 The document similarly addresses faculty scholarship in a way that can be understood as 
integrated with the epistemology of the lifeworld. The document states,  
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2. Scholarship and Creative Work 
a. Research and Publication. In most of the fields represented in the program of the 
University, publications in media of quality are expected as evidence of scholarly 
interest. Quality of production is more important than quantity. Each of the following is 
valued according to its quality and significance: scholarly books, textbooks, reviews, 
reports, articles in scholarly and professional journals, and participation in projects of 
scholarly interest. 
b. Works of Art. In certain fields such as art, music, and literature, distinguished creation 
receives consideration equivalent to distinction attained in research. Public recognition as 
reflected in professional awards; the assignment of unusual tasks and commissions; the 
acceptance of the faculty member’s work in permanent collections or its publication in 
leading professional journals; invitations to participate in significant exhibits; and any 
other public honor on the local, national, or international scene are valued. 
c. Professional Recognition. Demonstrated professional distinction is recognized as a 
criterion for promotion. In certain areas as music, drama, and speech, distinguished 
performance is considered. The faculty member’s record is scrutinized for evidence of 
achievement, leadership, and the development of new ideas. (pp. 7-8) 
Thus, again, one sees a similarity between this treatment of scholarship to that of the Clemson 
University faculty handbook. Faculty members are expected to achieve distinction in their fields 
of expertise, but not necessarily as a matter of publication for the purpose of systemic evaluation, 
but for the purpose of participation in the world of knowledge. It is made clear that a qualitative 
perspective will be taken when evaluating faculty scholarship: “quality of production is more 
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important than quantity.” Regardless of the medium in which the faculty member works, she is 
expected to produce work of worth and note by the scholastic or creative community. Thus, one 
notes, again, that a lifewordly orientation does not necessitate one in which scholarship is placed 
secondary to teaching or undervalued. Quite the contrary: it seems as if Temple University 
places heavy emphasis on faculty scholarship and publication as necessary for promotion and 
tenure, but specifically because such work meets the fundamental purpose of the University as a 
perpetuator of academic freedom. 
 Note that the Temple University handbook does not present a guiding philosophy, 
mission, or set of values. The work is generally, as was the case with the Clemson University 
Handbook, made up of clearly inscribed expectations in favor of enunciated expectations. That 
does not mean that the university does not have a guiding philosophy or values but, rather, in 
presentation of the faculty expectations, much greater emphasis is given to academic freedom. 
The document begins, in fact, with this statement on academic freedom: 
All members of the faculty, whether tenured or not, are entitled to academic freedom as 
set forth in the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure*, 
formulated by the Association of American Colleges and the American Association of 
University Professors, as follows:  
(a) Teachers are entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication of the results, 
subject to the adequate performance of their other academic duties; but research for 
pecuniary return should be based upon an understanding with the authorities of the 
institution. 
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(b) Teachers are entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing their subject, but they 
should be careful not to introduce into their teaching controversial matter which has no 
relation to their subject. Limitations of academic freedom because of religious or other 
aims of the institution should be clearly stated in writing at the time of the appointment. 
(c) College and university teachers are citizens, members of a learned profession, and 
officers of an educational institution. When they speak or write as citizens, they should be 
free from institutional censorship or discipline, but their special position in the 
community imposes special obligations. As scholars and educational officers, they should 
remember that the public may judge their profession and their institution by their 
utterances. Hence they should at all times be accurate, should exercise appropriate 
restraint, should show respect for the opinions of others, and should make every effort to 
indicate that they are not speaking for the institution.” (p. 1) 
 Faculty members are given full freedom to research and publish while at the same time are 
asked to show “appropriate restraint” and respect the opinions of others. Participation in the 
university requires that teachers remain pertinent to the topics relevant to the class itself, but at 
the same time there is emphasis on the idea that they should be free from institutional censorship. 
They have special obligations which, rather than being restrictive, require that faculty be as 
educated, thoughtful, and accurate as possible. Taken in conjunction with the explication of 
faculty teaching and researching roles, it seems reasonable to conclude that faculty members are 
expected to participate in teaching and scholarship in a way that frees students and the 
community in general to think broadly, deeply, and effectively for themselves. Academic 
freedom is only curtailed insofar as it should not restrict the learning and free thought of others. 
241 
 
Of all of the documents reviewed, the Temple University faculty handbook focuses the most on 
the lifeworld, perhaps even problematically, to the exclusion of explication of the systemsworld, 
as much regarding the intricacies of faculty evaluation is left unclear. What is not left unclear is 
that faculty members are expected to be active, meritorious participants in the perpetuation of 
free thought and the construction of knowledge of others.  
Summary of Data Collected from University Handbooks 
These documents in conjunction suggest that, at least for these six universities, both 
teaching and research are essential. Teaching is not undervalued, though it is often under-defined 
and under-explained. Perhaps because of the complexity of teaching, or out of respect for 
individual freedom in the classroom, evaluation of teaching is left vague and generally restricted 
to quantifiable evaluative measures such as surveys and student success. Research is clearly a 
primary goal of most of these universities and the idea of scholarship, as presented by the 
handbooks, which assume faculty publish work or produce creative works that are 
acknowledgement worthy and are articulated as inscribed expectations. Heavy emphasis, 
however, is given to the import of academic freedom as both a fundamental necessity and as a 
fundamental goal of the university through enunciated expectations insofar as those expectations 
are written down, but do not act as codified rules. They are stated, but not measured. Faculty 
members are expected to be perpetuators of academic freedom both as teachers and as 
researchers. 
 It also seems clear that most of these handbooks describe the role of the faculty in terms 
of the systemsworld. The very universities, themselves, are usually presented with a brief 
historical narrative and then much more time is given to the actual explication of the 
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organization system itself. The evaluation of faculty, as belonging to a well-defined hierarchy, is 
also systematized in a way that is most easily quantifiable. While the tenure and promotion 
processes remain qualitative to greater and lesser degrees depending on the university—as such 
decisions are made by committees—there seems to be evidence that this committee decision 
making process is becoming less a discussion of a holism of teaching and research and instead 
heavily reliant upon the quantifications of annual evaluations. These evaluations most often 
emphasize the importance of research. There seems to be difficulty in articulating exactly how 
good teaching should be evaluated, and thus evaluation of such teaching is relegated to vague 
gestures towards colleague observation and student evaluations. Research, however, often 
receives a good deal more detailed discussion both in regards to what counts as research for the 
universities’ purposes and in regards to the ways in which research should be conducted.  
It becomes clear that professors are expected to produce work that is recognized as 
important by their academic community, but it is unclear if they must be similarly excellent 
teachers. This is to say that while “innovation in teaching” and “teaching excellence” are 
discussed in some of the documents, there is little discussion of what that means, how it can be 
evaluated holistically, and why it is important. Conversely, for most of the handbooks, there is 
no question that faculty members must not just publish, but that they must publish in top-level 
journals, win awards, and receive acknowledgement from the community. There is far less 
discussion of similar excellence in the classroom. The handbooks do not include expectations 
such as, our faculty should be “some of the best teachers in the world,” “receive accolades from 
the community for their teaching achievements,” or “regularly receive acknowledgement and 
praise from students for teaching life-changing classes.” Rather, faculty are expected to engage 
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in professional development, display effective teaching, and engage innovation (often through 
technology).  
 There remains, however, an expectation amongst some of the universities that faculty 
participate in a mentorship role as teachers. For example, when the requirements of tenure and 
promotion of these universities are taken in conjunction with the University of Memphis ethical 
statement, an emphasis on faculty members as expert guides is revealed. The brief, but repeated, 
mention of faculty as mentors as well as the statement that they should foster free learning both 
suggest that faculty members should guide learners without indoctrinating them. Repeatedly 
through these documents one sees an emphasis in mentorship through the production of and 
participation in knowledge by the students. 
In some ways, however, the handbooks do not seem to be in synonymy with the 
importance of mentorship that they themselves require. Rather, the focus seems to be particularly 
on evaluation of professors by virtue of student performance, on the students having gained 
particular knowledge. Little information is given regarding how individual departments should 
evaluate students, but there is no mention in the discussion of evaluation of the idea that faculty 
should be, at least in part, evaluated on whether or not they foster a “free learning community.” 
One sees that the creation of faculty roles by the universities may be in some tension: the 
lifeworld epistemologies that guide some of them require that teachers engage in a robust, 
community-driven, holistic enterprise of mentorship and free thought facilitation, while at the 
same time the means by which those same faculty members are evaluated for their performance 
is often heavily limited to systemsworld gauges of effectiveness. 
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Faculty Roles as Researchers Constructed by Professional Associations 
The next consideration in this document is of professional associations in which professors are 
expected to participate. As in the case of handbooks, there are many associations, and not all of 
them can be addressed here. Rather, this work will focus on some of those most pertinent to 
educational leadership. The work will address those professional associations that are most 
recognized by and relied on by faculty, as those associations have the greatest impact on how 
faculty members are expected to perform their roles. These associations are specifically research 
associations. Questions of teaching expectations and the generation of teacher roles will be 
addressed later. These associations will be specifically reviewed for their construction of 
researcher roles in order to better understand the way the community constructs the faculty 
through the holism of its dialectic.  
The American Psychological Association 
 The first professional association ethical code addressed here is that of the American 
Psychological Association (APA). It is APA guidelines for citation that structure this 
dissertation. The APA standards guide much of educational leadership and educational research 
in general. The full statement of ethical principles of the APA is included in the appendix. The 
following principles are articulated by the APA in its Code of Conduct: 
Principle A: Beneficence and Nonmalficence 
Principle B: Fidelity and Responsibility 
Principle C: Integrity 
Principle D: Justice 
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Principle E: Respect for People’s Rights and Dignity 
The document makes it clear that these are general principles rather than ethical standards, 
because they are “aspirational” in nature. APA members are expected to be inspired by these 
principles rather than view them as obligations.  
 According to the APA principles, members are expected to aspire to benefiting research 
participants. The goal should not just be to do no harm (certainly no intentional harm); it is also 
to benefit others. It is important to note that this does not mean that research is justified when it 
benefits someone. The principles state that psychologists “strive to benefit those with whom they 
work and take care to do no harm” (2010, p. 3). Thus one is unlikely to justify research that does 
harm, or does nothing for the participant. Members should aspire to benefit participants, not just 
use them to achieve a “greater good.” The principles also state that members should aspire to 
work well with each other and develop collegiality. They should strive to be persons of 
integrity—thus they should be honest and trustworthy. Justice requires that members strive to 
benefit all people who can benefit from their work, and the final principle encourages them to 
respect the personhood of everyone with whom they work and everyone who can be impacted by 
their work.  
 Thus, an understanding of researchers and practitioners who are members of the APA 
recognizes the importance of research as a form of beneficence. To engage in the improvement 
of the world with participants through research means to attempt to benefit as many as possible, 
including the participants. This idea echoes the beneficence requirements of the Belmont Report, 
a document that moderates all research conducted on human participants in the United States. 
The Belmont report, a grounding document for APA guidelines of the treatment of human 
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participants (which will be discussed more in depth shortly), requires that research be conducted 
with respect for persons, with beneficence, and with respect for justice, which are all 
expectations echoed by the APA. Research, thusly, must not be conducted for the sole benefit of 
the researcher or one particular group. It should be conducted in a way that is just and brings 
benefit to all to whom the research applies; it should also respect the rights and dignity, the 
personhood, of the participants. Participants should never be used to the researcher’s end. She 
must always recognize that participants are full moral agents entitled to informed consent, 
respect, autonomy, and honesty. The conjunctions of beneficence and justice act to push research 
beyond just a means by which to gather knowledge; researchers become mandated to conduct 
research for the purpose of benefiting as many others as possible. 
The Responsible Conduct of Research (RCR).  
The APA also follows a series of principles designated Responsible Conduct of Research 
(RCR). These principles include “most of the professional activities that are part and parcel of a 
research career, as defined by federal agencies” (p. 1). The document is included as an 
additional resource on the APA webpage for the code of ethics. It is expected that APA 
researchers use the RCR specifically to guide them in conducting research. The ethical 
principles discussed above are intended for all members of the APA and psychologists in 
particular. The RCR, however, is specifically intended to structure research activity. The RCR 
states the following nine principals: 
• Collaborative Science  
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Collaborations take place in a variety of forms, including the borrowing and lending of 
supplies, resources and equipment between researchers; seeking input from experts in 
different disciplines; and partnering with colleagues who have similar backgrounds or 
fields of knowledge for fresh ideas and abilities. 
• Conflicts of Interest and Commitments  
Conflicts of interests or commitments are not inherently negative; rather, the way in 
which the conflict is managed is important. 
• Data Acquisition, Management, Sharing and Ownership  
This site is designed as a central location for viewing and retrieving shared data archives 
relevant to psychological science. 
• Human Research Protections  
Research with human participants plays a central role in advancing knowledge in the 
biomedical, behavioral and social sciences. 
• Lab Animal Welfare  
APA has supported and continues to support efforts to improve laboratory animal welfare 
through the implementation of policies and regulations that both maintain the integrity of 
scientific research and sustain the welfare of such animals. 
• Mentoring  
Mentoring less-experienced researchers is a professional responsibility of all scientists. 
The ultimate goal of the mentor is to establish the trainee as an independent researcher. 
• Peer Review  
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Positive peer reviews contribute to increased funding opportunities, academic 
advancement and a good reputation. 
• Publications Practices and Responsible Authorship  
Although researchers can disseminate their findings through many different avenues, 
results are most likely to be published as an article in a scholarly journal. 
• Research Misconduct  
Institutions should have procedures in place to investigate—and, when appropriate, 
report—findings of misconduct to the Office of Research Integrity (ORI). They should 
also have policies that protect both the whistleblower and the accused until a 
determination is made. (p. 1) 
Note that these expectations are rather lifeworldy in nature. Rather than presenting a set of rules 
and procedures, they act as a set of enunciations that guide the process of research. That 
lifeworld epistemology is reflected in the inclusion of other persons and their welfare into a 
dialectic in which collaboration and mutual respect are desirable. 
 Each facet of responsible conduct is further detailed by the APA and paraphrased here. 
Collaboration, which is an ever-increasing aspect of research, should be well planned and 
documented. Researchers should take care to be open and honest with each other, keeping all 
researchers fully informed regarding the research process. Conflicts of interest may be inevitable. 
However, those conflicts should not be ignored or dealt with in silence. Researchers should seek 
outside observation and honestly report conflicts of interest in order to maintain objectivity.  
Human research, while invaluable to the acquisition of knowledge, is also capable of great harm. 
For that reason, the APA references the Belmont Report as a grounding document for the 
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treatment of human subjects. Unlike the charge of beneficence to human participants, the 
treatment of non-human animals does not require beneficence. Moreover, harm may be done to 
laboratory non-human animals if necessary. However, researchers should endeavor to do as little 
harm as possible and seek alternative avenues when possible.   
Mentoring is a responsibility of all research scientists, according to the APA. Researchers 
and their students should develop an agreement early on, detailing the responsibilities and 
structure of their research arrangement. The process should be to the benefit of the student, and 
the researcher should prepare the student to go forth and conduct their own research once having 
acquired the knowledge provided by their mentor. It is essential that peer-reviewers have the 
necessary expertise to provide useful information about the research they review. Impartiality is 
essential, and reviewers should seek to be as objective as possible; if they cannot do so, or are 
unable to separate themselves from a conflict of interest, they should not act as a reviewer in that 
case. Accurate and honest reporting of research is essential and particularly the purview of the 
primary author of a research article. It is expected that the researcher be open regarding the 
methodology and procedures used, and all those responsible for authorship should be credited for 
their work accordingly. Research misconduct occurs when a researcher purposefully fabricates, 
plagiarizes, or misrepresents data. This conduct should be reported by any who are made aware 
of it, and the consequences can be severe, especially in regards to one’s employment at a 
research institution and participation in the APA. 
 The APA RCR further instantiates the idea that researchers should at the very least do no 
harm. Although the imperative for general beneficence may seem less than in the guiding 
principles of the APA, it is not. It is important to note this especially because one may read these 
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documents and conclude that if one is a psychologist one must be beneficent, but if one is simply 
a researcher that uses APA guidelines, one need not be so concerned. Note, however, that the 
treatment of human participants directly references the Belmont Report. Although the RCR does 
not, itself, discuss beneficence, it directs the reader to the Belmont Report for details regarding 
human treatment. As noted previously, the Belmont Report does clearly require both beneficence 
and justice. Thus, the APA RCR is making a general statement about researchers that is not 
necessarily applied only to APA researchers: good research follows ethical practices, particularly 
beneficence.  
 Interestingly, the RCR also pushes researchers to be outwardly beneficial in two other 
ways as well. Firstly, there is the consistent theme of honesty and openness. Researchers should 
provide as much information as is relevant to not only their colleges, but to the public. Their 
research should be revealing in terms of their own methodologies and provide the means by 
which others can reconstruct their work. The work should be published so as to be available and 
beneficial to the public. Secondly, researchers are not only encouraged, but almost admonished 
to act as mentors. The document makes it exceedingly clear that an essential responsibility of 
research is teaching others. Moreover, while that mentorship may be beneficial to the researcher, 
it should be conducted with the ultimate goal of enabling the mentored to conduct her or his own 
research independently. Thus, we see again a directive that researchers be outwardly focused on 
beneficence and lifeworldly values.   
 The Belmont Report 
Some brief discussion of the Belmont Report is warranted, as it governs much—though 
not all—of faculty research. The Belmont Report was written as the result of the National 
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Research Act (1974). The National Research Act created the National Commission for the 
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavior Research. The Commission was 
charged with identifying basic ethical principles that ground the conduct of research involving 
human subjects and developing guidelines for researchers to follow to maintain ethical standards. 
The Belmont Report does not make recommendations for administrative action; it is largely 
intended to be a statement of departmental ethical policy.  
 The Report, published in 1979, uncovered three basic underlying ethical principles that 
should ground ethical research. I suggest that this effort on the part of the Commission was, in 
fact (though not intentionally), a Habermasian one. The Commission was not charged with 
“generating” principles; it was charged with determining the underlying principles of ethical 
research. The result of this search for basic underlying assumptions that govern our actions 
resulted in a lengthy appendix to the Belmont Report that includes the thoughts of experts and 
specialists in many fields of ethics and research. This conglomeration of thoughts creates a 
dialectic; the result of that dialectic, when analyzed and investigated, is a discourse ethical 
understanding of ethical principles that results from uncovering the basic rules that governed the 
ethical dialectic. I suggest that, in the same way that one can uncover the basic rules of dialogue 
through investigation of dialogue, one can uncover the basic rules of ethics—insofar as they are 
an assumed part of our dialectic—through the investigation of dialogue about ethics. This is not 
to say something so mundane as that one discovers the ethical beliefs of others through 
conversation about ethics, but rather that one can uncover the normative assumptions that govern 
how we think about ethics when we discourse about ethics. One may realize that throughout the 
dialogue there is just a basic assumption that one should not purposefully do harm. No one may 
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directly state that belief in the course of the conversation; that assumption just guides the 
dialectic and acts as a basic axiom upon which the conversation rests.   
 Through a perhaps Habermasian investigation, the Commission uncovered three 
principles that govern the way experts think about ethics and research: 
1) Respect for Persons 
2) Beneficence 
3) Justice 
Respect for persons, as described by the Belmont Report, incorporates two ethical principles: 1) 
We should respect the autonomy of others; and 2) Those who are not autonomous should be 
protected. The Belmont Report cashes out respect for autonomy as giving “weight to 
autonomous persons’ considered opinions and choices while refraining from obstructing their 
actions” (part B, para. 3). Simply, we should not force others to participate in research and we 
need to respect their choice not to do so. One should avoid coercive measures, including denying 
participants information pertinent to the research project that may have caused them not to 
participate in the project if they had known. One may understand this principle of recognizing 
the personhood of others in terms of them being more than objects of our research. One should 
respect other agents as capable of decision-making processes that deserve our consideration: 
“Respect for persons demands that subjects enter into the research voluntarily and with adequate 
information” (part B, para. 6).  Moreover, if the agent is not autonomous—i.e. a child, a student, 
a prisoner and so on—we should protect them rather than use them as an easier means by which 
to accomplish our goals. As SoTL research has been a significant consideration in this 
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dissertation, it is important to note that SoTL, as it often uses one’s own classroom population, 
must be careful not to violate the “respect for persons” principle.  
 Beneficence is defined in the following way by the Belmont Report: “Persons are treated 
in an ethical manner not only by respecting their decisions and protecting them from harm, but 
also by making efforts to secure their well-being” (part B, para. 7). The document suggests that 
one must go beyond normal obligations when conducting research with participants: one must 
firstly do no harm and secondly maximize possible benefits and minimize possible harms. This 
requirement not only means that researchers must move outward in their scope by virtue of 
making sure that their work does good; it also means they must also be forward-looking in 
regards to the outcomes of their research. One cannot simply meddle in the lives of others 
without considering the impact of the research project on those lives. Moreover, one cannot just 
assume that the research is harmless and, thus, not problematic. One must also make sure that 
engagement with participants is such that one foresees benefit to participants through their 
participation.  
Anecdotally, I have noted among some university administration the tendency to assume 
that this beneficence need only mean that: 1) The research does not harm the participant; and 2) 
Someone, though not necessarily the participant, is benefited. Such an interpretation of 
beneficence not only seems intuitively short-sighted, but it also does not take entire set of the 
ethical principles espoused by the Belmont Report into account. Respect for persons suggests 
that we are aware that others wish to be benefited and often hope that their participation in 
research will benefit themselves in some way, if only by virtue of knowing that the information 
gleaned through them will help others. Note, though, that to receive this benefit, they must know 
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what they are doing. At the very least, the beneficence principle requires that researchers try to 
benefit participants, particularly in conjunction with the respect for persons principle, as we 
cannot just use participants as means to our ends.  
 Again, in the case of SoTL, research examples present themselves immediately.  A 
professor may wish to use a class assignment for research purposes. She hopes to improve her 
chances for tenure by publishing the results of the study. She may, for example, teach two 
sections of the same class in two different ways but use the same assessments in both classes. In 
one class she may use lecture, and in the other a Socratic questioning style. She knows from 
previous experience that the students respond better to the Socratic style, but she wants clear 
evidence that she can publish. She has no intention of ever telling the students what she is doing 
or why she is doing it, so the students are just a ready sample to use for her SoTL research. In 
conversation, when asked if she is violating the principle of beneficence, she argued that she is 
benefiting many other students through this project. The publication will help improve the 
effectiveness of many other teachers in her field. Her rationale is insufficient, though; she 
violates, here, respect for persons.  
The students are being used solely as a means to the professor’s ends. She is not taking 
the students’ autonomy into account, and is thus violating the principle of respect for persons. 
She cannot be said to be following the principle of beneficence, either, as she is not “maximizing 
the possible benefit.” The same may be said for those who justify research in an institution as 
being beneficial for the degree as a whole, though not necessarily beneficial for student 
participants. The institution is neither respecting those students’ autonomy if it engages research 
using the student population without their consent, nor acting beneficently if it does not seek to 
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maximize the benefit to those student participants. Moreover, in such cases, if there is a 
population that is being used solely for the purpose of benefiting someone else, regardless of the 
impact on them, it is also unjust. 
 Justice, according to the Belmont Report, requires that benefits be fair in their 
distribution. “An injustice occurs when some benefit to which a person is entitled is denied 
without good reason or when some burden is imposed unduly” (part B, para. 11). The justice 
principle, of course, engages a great deal of complexity. Defining what is equal and unequal, and 
what equal treatment means, is often unclear. What is clear is that researchers should endeavor to 
equally distribute the potential benefits of research. They should not choose populations, for 
example, to benefit from the research simply out of personal preference. The professor in the 
example above may choose to engage the Socratic dialectic with the class she likes better, 
knowing that they in fact will perform better; in so doing, she is violating the principle of justice. 
We must take into account whether or not populations are “being systematically selected simply 
because of their easy availability, their compromised position, or their manipulability, rather than 
for reasons directly related to the problem being studied” (part B, para. 13) In the case of 
research involving students, these concerns seem to be always relevant and should be given 
careful consideration. 
It is important to note, however, that much of the research that faculty members conduct 
does not involve human participants at all. Much research conducted by faculty is, rather, a 
creative endeavor involving either the creation of art or the development of articles that rest upon 
investigation and analysis of literature, philosophy, history, and the humanities. So it may stand 
to reason that the Belmont Report may not apply to those faculty members. The Report, 
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however, does reveal much of the ethical grounding that guides our conversations about 
research. At its core is not just the idea that researchers should not do harm, but that they should 
benefit others. That core assumption applies to all research, regardless of human participation: 
the work researchers do should benefit the community in some way. 
In many ways the Belmont Report is a systemsworld document. As a document generated 
by the government, it details a great deal regarding policy and practice. However, from the very 
beginning of the work, it engages lifeworld epistemology through the series of its three 
enunciated principles. The ethics described by the Belmont Report cannot be clearly codified. 
One cannot say exactly how much beneficence one has shown or the amount of justice that has 
been met. Rather, the work requires that researchers focus on a larger picture of their actions and 
their impact on the world as well as reflect on their own motivations. One can never know if 
another is truly beneficent or simply presenting a spurious image of beneficence in order to gain 
trust. It is thus the onus of the moral agent to reflexively examine her own conscience and align 
herself with principles such as beneficence. This reflexive act that is mediated by engagement 
with the world is a discourse ethical one—one that requires one to mediate the actions of the self 
through engagement with the social dialectic of the lifeworld.  
The American Educational Research Association 
 The American Educational Research Association (AERA) is an association specifically 
dedicated to research. While it is APA style that is most often used by education in citation and 
paper format, it is in the AERA that educational researchers are most likely to have membership. 
As perhaps the premier organization in educational research, the AERA has a considerable 
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influence over educational research and researchers. Thus, the ethical code of the AERA has a 
substantial normative force in education.   
 The ethical code of the AERA sets forward five principles that guide the action of 
educational researchers. These principles, moreover, are the axioms from which the more 
specific ethical standards emerge. Thus, the principles that are most fundamental will be 
discussed here, as those principles describe not just what one should do, but what kind of person 
one should be. One will note numerous similarities to the principles set by the APA, particularly 
insofar as the principles act as a set of lifelong guiding values.  
The AERA firstly commits itself to “Professional Competence.” According to the AERA, 
educational researchers should “adhere to the highest possible standards that are reasonable and 
responsible in their research teaching, practice, and service activities” (p. 3). Note that the 
preceding statement references the three role requirements of faculty at most universities. Thus, 
the AERA code of ethics specifically orients itself to the entirety of the education professoriate. 
Competence, then, according to the AERA, is achieved through the consistent growth of the 
researcher in her field. She should stay abreast of new information and technologies and remain 
at the forefront of education. She must use the competence in ways that accurately represents her 
expertise, and never misuse it for personal gain.  
 The second principle of the AERA is “Integrity.” Integrity to the AERA is deeply 
connected to fairness, and thus to justice. Educational researchers should be worthy of “trust and 
confidence” (p. 2) Thus, they must not purposefully do harm or jeopardize the welfare of others. 
Integrity also suggests that educational researchers do not falsify, plagiarize, or misrepresent 
data. They should be transparent in their research practices. To be a person of integrity, 
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according to the AERA, all aspects of one’s professional life demonstrate the qualities of 
honesty, fairness, and respect. The notion of integrity—to be consistent, stable, and 
trustworthy—by definition seems to require that one be trustworthy not just in one area of one’s 
life, but in all. If one is only trustworthy when conducting research, but not when teaching, then 
one lacks integrity, if the notion includes consistency. Arguably, to be a person of integrity 
would suggest that this trustworthiness extends beyond one’s professional life into one’s 
personal life, but the AERA does not require this.  
The third principle is “Professional, Scientific, and Scholarly Responsibility.” This 
standard requires that educational researchers maintain the highest possible standards. In so 
doing, those standards include the standards of science as well as of their university. Researchers 
must take responsibility for their work. Thus, they must do all they can to make sure that their 
work does no harm. Educational researchers have responsibility to each other and are responsible 
for the trust given to the domain of educational research. In this way, educational researchers are 
a community and must maintain within that community the highest possible standards of 
conduct, regulating each other and themselves. In so doing, they review each other’s research 
and act as objective judges of that research, even when in disagreement. Researchers must be 
willing to consult with other researchers for assistance in research as well as when ethical 
concerns arise.  
Fourthly, Educational Researchers must have “Respect for People’s Rights, Dignity, and 
Diversity.” This principle incorporates both notions of justice and respect for persons. As stated 
by the AERA, “Educational researchers respect the rights, dignity, and worth of all people and 
take care to do no harm” (p. 3).  Researchers have, then, a special obligation to protect 
259 
 
participants. In respecting diversity, there should be no bias against one group or in favor of 
another, and the benefits of research should be distributed among as many participants and 
greater community members as possible. This respect for persons requires that participants not 
be used solely as a means to the researchers’ ends. It also requires that researchers respect the 
fact that others have differing values, attitudes and opinions from their own. Respect for the 
dignity of others suggests that educational researchers should not use coercion or force. They 
must respect the autonomy of others, even if they disagree in some way with those others. Notice 
again the importance of “do no harm” as an emergent imperative from this principle.  
The final principle, “Social Responsibility” emphasizes the importance of community. 
Community is a notion that is twice underscored through the discussion of grounding ethical 
principles of the AERA. Educational researchers are required to be aware of their responsibilities 
to the many communities in which they participate, including scientific and professional. They 
must make their knowledge public in order to benefit as many as possible. They must “strive to 
advance scientific and scholarly knowledge and to serve the public good” (p. 3). Note, here, that 
educational researchers are not just under the imperative to do no harm, nor are they only 
required to benefit their community; they are required to make public their work so that it is 
available to all. 
The AERA also provides a list of professional standards that emerge from their guiding 
principles. The first standard, “Scientific, Scholarly, and Professional Standards,” is a self-
referential statement that applies to all of the standards. It states, “Education researchers adhere 
to the highest possible standards that are reasonable and responsible in their research, teaching, 
practice, and service activities. They rely on scientifically, scholarly, and professionally derived 
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knowledge and act with honesty and integrity” (p. 3). This first standard clearly emerges from 
the first principle stated by the AERA, and as it requires that educational researchers follow the 
highest possible standards, guides the formulation of the rest of the standards:   
2. Competence 
3. Use and Misuse of Expertise 
4. Fabrication, Falsification, and Plagiarism 
5. Avoiding Harm 
6. Nondiscrimination 
7. Nonexploitation 
8. Harassment 
9. Employment Decisions 
10. Conflicts of Interest 
11.  Public Communications 
12. Confidentiality 
13. Informed Consent 
14. Research Planning 
Implementation, and Dissemination 
15. Authorship Credit 
16. Publication Process 
17. Responsibilities of Reviewers.  
The above is presented very much as part of the systemsworld. The AERA provides clear 
guidelines that require that the researcher note her place in the system and the ways in which she 
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should and should not engage in that system. Even so, one notes that in every aspect of research 
the AERA requires that researchers place the welfare of others before their own professional 
success, maintain transparency, respect the autonomy of others, participate fully in the research 
community, and distribute the benefits of their work to the largest population possible.  
 Thus, the principles, unlike the standards, of the AERA are importantly focused on 
community in a lifeworldly way. Twice emphasized in the five principles, community plays an 
essential role in the research process. Immediately eliminated from the imagination is the picture 
of a lone researcher toiling madly for her own unfathomable purposes. Rather, she is part of a 
community of researchers who seek to benefit as many as possible through their combined 
efforts. Moreover, she is a member of a community of scholars, the scientific community, and 
her professional community. Assumed in these principles is the responsibility one has to one’s 
communities. The work seems to suggest that by virtue of membership, one takes on 
responsibility both for the welfare of those communities, as well as for the impact on others by 
those communities. Perhaps because of the power of the scientific community to both do harm 
and to sway the public at large, the research community is tasked repeatedly with its 
responsibility to others. It must do no harm, as we are reminded by the APA and by the Belmont 
Report.  
 Perhaps most underscored by the ethical principles of the AERA is the notion of respect. 
Researchers are tasked with respecting their community, respecting the welfare of others, 
respecting differing opinions, respecting their colleagues, respecting the dignity of participants, 
and respecting research. Every principle either explicitly or implicitly requires that researchers 
respect something. Interestingly, this notion of respect allows for two imperatives: one must 
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“take care” to not harm a thing, as well as “be careful of” that thing. To respect research, for 
example, requires that one be open and transparent about research and seek to always improve 
the body of knowledge, but also that one respect the dangers and power of research to do harm. 
Similarly, one who is respectful of the dignity of others does not infringe on that dignity but also 
recognizes the importance and power of dignity. Thus, respect is emphasized repeatedly as a 
means by which to reduce harm, but also to recognize danger and worth.  
This notion of respect may well emerge from the importance in research of avoiding 
paternalism, and thus the work lacks clearly codified inscribed expectations. Given the power of 
the scientific domains to manipulate the public and the great knowledge collected by its 
practitioners, it can be easy to assume one knows what is best for others regardless of their 
values, opinions, and beliefs. Instances like the Milgram Experiment, the Tuskegee Syphilis 
Study, and the Willowbrook Study all serve as reminders of the harm that can be done by 
researchers in the name of knowledge. The confidence that one knows what is best for others or 
that one is in a superior position and thus can ignore the autonomy of others has been repeatedly 
shown to be a danger faced by researchers. Thus, the AERA does not just require researchers to 
do no harm and be beneficent, but also to show respect. They must acknowledge the power and 
dignity of others, respect their differences, and acknowledge their worth. 
Note, once again, that there is an outwardly-driven standard of beneficence required by 
an ethical standard. The AERA standards do not allow researchers to benefit only themselves or 
their own community of knowledge. There is a consistent reminder that their work must benefit 
the public good. Thus, although the term “beneficence” is not used, beneficence is nonetheless 
required. The researchers are required to benefit others through their work and must seek to 
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avoid all potential jeopardy to their participants and to society as a whole. Their work must 
expand outward and benefit others outside of the research community. As researchers must 
respect the dignity and rights of others, they are under the obligation to make good any 
assurances of benefit to their participants. One cannot promise participants that the research will 
benefit them in order to coerce their participation, knowing that such a benefit is unlikely. 
Although the focus of the principles is on the “public good,” the requirement of respect for 
dignity of participants also requires that the benefits of research include participants, as they do 
not exist solely as a means by which to produce knowledge for others. Participants are 
recognized for their dignity as individual agents of worth, as we have seen in the previous 
documents as well. 
Modern Language Association 
Finally, here we will briefly consider the Modern Language Association MLA 
“Statement of Professional Ethics.” The MLA statement is included here in order to incorporate 
the roles of professors as researchers who do not usually conduct research on participants. One 
may find a radically different set of axioms governing an ethical code that does not emerge out 
of the Belmont Report, as the others do.  The MLA is the association to which many English 
professors belong. The citation and style guide is overwhelmingly used by those writing in 
English and in many other disciplines. Thus, the MLA has tremendous sway amongst the 
professoriate.   
The MLA Statement begins with the following preamble: 
As a community of teachers and scholars, the members of the MLA serve the larger 
society by promoting the study and teaching of the modern languages and literatures. In 
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order to embrace this enterprise, we require freedom of inquiry. However, this freedom 
carries with it the responsibilities of professional conduct. We intend this statement to 
embody reasonable norms for ethical conduct in teaching and learning as well as in 
scholarship. (para. 1) 
Note that the MLA firstly begins with a statement regarding the scope of research. The members 
of the MLA are expected to recognize their responsibility to promote the study of modern 
languages and literature as a service to society as a whole.  The wording, “the members of the 
MLA serve the larger society” assumes that the members are required to serve, to benefit, 
society, and the means by which they do so is through the advancement of language and 
literature. Note also, similar to the discussion of university handbooks, there is an emphasis on 
free inquiry. Yet, the recognition of this free inquiry also brings on responsibility of 
“professional conduct.” 
The Statement of Professional Ethics holds six premises to be true. To paraphrase, 
1) Tenured faculty members are responsible for protecting free inquiry. Faculty 
members have ethical obligations to everyone including students, colleagues, 
institutions, their communities, the profession, and society. 
2) Intellectual integrity. As teachers and scholars, they must responsibly use evidence in 
argumentation and maintain fairness in judging the arguments of others. 
3) Because the MLA values free inquiry, members should not exploit, harm, harass, 
discriminate, or misuse others.  
4) Members must respect the free inquiry and diversity of inquiry of others.  
5) Teaching and inquiry must respect culture and diversity 
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6) Judgment of the usefulness of inquiry should not be used to limit freedom of research. 
(para. 2-7) 
These statements repeatedly remind members of the importance of free inquiry. However, that 
free inquiry should not harm others. Members are also reminded that they have a responsibility 
to the welfare of others. In fact, the scope of the MLA premises includes the whole of society. 
Thus, despite the lack of human participants, MLA scholars are reminded that they should not 
harm others but should use their research in ways that best benefit society. 
 The MLA also includes descriptions of ethical conduct in teaching and learning and in 
scholarship. The descriptions are lengthy lists of expectations for teachers and scholars. These 
lists provide a useful picture of the expectations of teachers and scholars, and, thus, of the roles 
of teachers and scholars. The lists of expectations are included in the appendix.  
 The descriptions of ethical conduct in teaching and learning by the MLA include the 
requirement that teachers represent the value of free inquiry to their students, evaluate their 
students fairly, respect their students’ privacy, provide direction to students, provide continuing 
guidance, and provide career counseling to students. Notice that the ethical statement heavily 
rests on the idea that teachers are guides. This idea of being a guide through intellectual 
development, to free thought, and to a career reminds one of the mentorship required by some of 
the handbooks. Teachers, reminds the MLA, guide students for their own benefit. Teachers are 
required to help students and never misuse them. The responsibility that teachers have to their 
students requires that faculty members always seek to benefit the students intellectually. 
Moreover, teachers are required to be objective and fair. They should be just in their dealings 
with students, not favoring some over others. Teachers must be unbiased and professional in 
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their evaluation of students for the students’ benefit. The aim of teaching appears to be the 
production of free thinkers who themselves will be able to mentor others similarly.  
 The document then continues to list the requirements of ethical conduct in service and 
scholarship. The full list is also included in the appendix. The document requires that scholars 
assist their institutions, acknowledge their intellectual debts, reflect well on their institution, 
judge the work of others fairly, and keep the confidentiality of others. In this section, one sees 
once again the importance of integrity in scholarship. Scholars are required to be transparent 
regarding where ideas come from, and out of respect acknowledge those who help them. There is 
no discussion of whether or not research itself should benefit the community, but there is 
emphasis on the idea that faculty members have responsibility to others. Confidentiality must be 
maintained, respect for the institution and colleagues must be maintained, and fairness must be 
maintained. Thus, in all aspects of the researcher’s life, she must have integrity—she must 
maintain respect for others and for her community.  
 There is a notable difference between the MLA Statement of Professional Ethics and the 
others discussed here. The MLA document says nothing about the treatment of human 
participants. One can only assume that if an MLA researcher were to include human participants 
in her work she must consult with her IRB and would be required to follow the standards of the 
Belmont Report as well as of her institution. Despite this lack of discussion, there remains the 
heavily-embedded assumption that MLA members should benefit others. Their scholarship, it 
seems, must be directed toward the promotion of free thought; members are required that they 
serve society as a whole.  
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As teachers, members are reminded of the vulnerability of their students and the 
importance of mentoring them toward an autonomous state of intellectual excellence. The 
highest standards of research and scholarship require that members engage objective and 
respectful argumentation. Thus, one sees again the importance of fairness as well as respect. 
These are themes found in all of the statements of ethics discussed here: respect, integrity, and 
community.  Respect is engaged whenever there is discussion of dignity and autonomy. Issues of 
intellectual freedom and transparency also evidence the importance of respect, both for 
knowledge and for the work of others. The notion of respect carries with it the importance of 
doing no harm and never using others selfishly.  Integrity is required whenever there is 
discussion of the importance of justice, fairness, and objectivity. Integrity is uniformly required, 
as all of the ethical codes require consistent ethical action in all parts of one’s professional life. 
Integrity assumes that agents are honest and fair. Community emerges in all discussion of social 
responsibility, the treatment of institutions and colleagues, and the perpetuation and 
dissemination of knowledge and free thought. This notion of community carries with it the 
importance of beneficence: one must recognize the importance of others and seek to benefit the 
community.  
 This community focus is most effectively understood as a lifeworld expectation of the 
MLA. There is not clear positioning of the professoriate or the precise expectations of its 
members as inscribed by their association. Rather, the MLA enunciates the roles and 
responsibilities of professors as part of a self-reflective communitarian act.  
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Summary of Data Collected from Professional Associations’ Guidelines for Ethical Research 
This self-reflective communitarian act is common of all of the documents examined in 
section two—likely the tendency of the ethical codes of professional associations to rest upon 
lifeworld epistemology—whereas the handbooks in section one were often grounded in 
systemsworld epistemology. This is likely the result of the fact that one cannot ground ethics in 
the systemsworld. One can ground expectations in a systems way, requiring specific actions in 
relationship to the larger system as a whole, but the very notion of ethics expands outward in a 
way that requires the consideration of the community in a way that cannot be firmly codified. 
One cannot determine the needs of others without engagement with others in communal and self-
reflective dialectic, and those needs and responsibilities shift as the individual needs of the 
members of the community shift. One, thus, must engage the ethical world from a holistic 
perspective that engages agents and their needs, rather than just systems and policy. Thus, the 
ethical codes here remain vague in some ways in regards to how, exactly, members will meet 
their responsibilities. Members are, instead, asked to be virtuous agents who can use their self-
reflexive agency to determine the best course of action.  
 
Faculty Roles as Discussed by Philosophers of Education 
This final section will address the perspectives presented by philosophers of education on 
the roles of professors and teachers. Four philosophical works will provide a non-institutional 
picture of faculty roles. The works discussed previously, in sections one and two of this chapter, 
emerged from universities themselves or were generated by associations that meet the scholastic 
ends of universities.  As a result, despite the goals of universities and professional associations 
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being grounded in the lifeworld, much of the data presented thus far are best understood through 
the systemsworld epistemology and organizational role theory. The philosophers discussed 
below, however, assist in understanding faculty roles beyond the systemsworld, as roles deeply 
embedded in the lifeworld as well.  
Kenneth Strike and Jonas F. Soltis (2004) 
 The first text addressed here, The Ethics of teaching by Kenneth Strike and Jonas F. 
Soltis (2004), provides a practical approach to ethical deliberation in the field of education. Of 
primary focus in the text is the ability to present means by which teachers may solve ethical 
questions pertinent to education. The text takes the time to address some traditional ethical 
methodologies such as utilitarianism and deontology, but rests its final consensus on practical 
deliberation and community dialectic as the most appropriate means by which for educators to 
address questions of ethics in education.  
 The authors rely heavily upon reflective equilibrium as a motivation and methodology for 
ethical deliberation. Note, however, that this reflective equilibrium as discussed by Strike and 
Soltis is externalized as community dialectic, rather than relying solely on a Rawlsian tendency 
towards internalized reflective equilibrium that needs to engage community dialogue. The 
externalizing move made by Strike and Soltis, however, is coherent with Habermas and 
discourse ethics. Strike and Soltis wrote, 
We see the purpose of ethical deliberation as seeking to achieve agreement on principles 
that regulate human action while respecting the equal worth and the interests of all. We 
suggest that reflective equilibrium in the appropriate standard for such activity and that 
extensive dialogue is a requirement for its achievement. (2004, p. 97) 
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It is this “extensive dialogue” that is of the greatest import to Strike and Soltis’ text in addressing 
ethical concerns in teaching. 
 The engagement in the profession of teaching requires a particular focus on the interest of 
others. According to Strike and Soltis, professionalism should include service to the community, 
in part because it is the community that provides them with the authority to make decisions for 
the best interest of individuals in the community: 
When authority over decision is transferred to professionals, how are we to be sure that it 
is exercised in the interests of the people? The usual response to this question is that 
professionals are taught an ethic that emphasizes maintaining professional standards and 
client welfare. Thus it is the training of professionals, their initiation into an ethic of 
professional responsibility and service, which primarily serves to ensure that 
professionals serve the public. (2004, p. 102) 
Professors, thus, as professionals entrusted not only with the welfare of individual students, but 
with the generation of knowledge and the development of understanding, are under a special 
obligation; they must “serve the public.” Moreover, the academy itself is in a particular position 
of generating professionals and professionalism, both through the university’s production of 
professionals and by virtue of the fact that it is through the university metanarrative that 
professionalism in individual fields is defined. 
 [T]he case for professionalism rested not only on the idea that professionals possess 
knowledge that puts them in a position to make good decisions, but also on the belief that 
the practice of professionals is governed by an ethic that emphasized professional 
responsibility and client welfare. (2004, p. 108) 
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Thus, faculty members are under a special onus to exemplify professionalism, and, if Strike and 
Soltis were right, to serve the community as those entrusted, as professionals, with the public 
good. 
The text, however, does not solely focus on the ethical obligations engendered by 
professionalism. Strike and Soltis (2004) focused specifically on the means by which teachers 
can meet their ethical obligation through ethical dialogue. That dialogue should not remain 
internal. Rather, ethical dialogue that is intended to meet the professional obligation to do public 
good must include the public. In so doing, educators internalize themselves as part of the 
community and reduce the paternalistic problems associated with Otherness and marginalization: 
Dialogue often strengthens community. It can reinforce a sense of common enterprise 
and thereby create a sense of membership. Through dialogue the school can be 
transformed into my school, its goals into my goals, its activities into my activities. When 
decisions are achieved through dialogue, individuals who participate are more likely to 
own decisions and to care conscientiously for their implementation. Even when dialogue 
fails to achieve agreement, it may foster respect and understanding. (2004, p.110) 
This dialogue is driven by the fundamental onus on the teaching professional to do good. Notice, 
however, that she is not doing good for them; she is now, through dialectic, through the 
Habermasian process of discourse, generating for herself an internality of the other upon whom 
the self is now supervenient. This reflective dialectic places the self as indebted to, in need of, 
and as generated by the community in which she has become an instrumental piece—a piece that 
has been trusted with great responsibility to do good and great potential to do harm. 
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In engaging in community dialectic, one seeks—argued Strike and Soltis (2004)—
reflective equilibrium. Again, note the Habermasian ideal: the theorists suggest that one does not 
seek solely the equilibrium experienced by a Cartesian self, excised from the dialectical world, 
but the equilibrium of a dialectical and symbolic actor who shares in the act of world-making.  
These ideas suggest that discussion is essential to ethical deliberation. Ethical 
deliberation should be thought of as a social activity conducted cooperatively. The 
reflective equilibrium that is sought in ethical dialogue is a social outcome. Persistent 
disagreement indicates that reflective equilibrium has not been achieved (2004, p. 113) 
As a result, ethical deliberation by teachers  
… should be seen as a social and dialogical activity leading to two observations about the 
ethical lives of teaching in schools… First, the character of schools in our society 
typically makes the ethical reflection that teachers engage in a solitary affair. Teachers 
work in self-contained classrooms. There are few forums in schools where it is natural to 
discuss ethical issues. Moreover, many schools are hierarchically structured in ways that 
interfere with any real dialogical process. As a consequence, teachers are unlikely to have 
much opportunity to engage in open and undominated ethical dialogue.  (Strike & Soltis, 
2004, p. 113) 
Note, here, that this first observation may not necessarily apply to the university. Theoretically, 
universities are built in order to promote dialogue. Questions of ethics and policy are often under 
discussion both in and outside of university classrooms. However, the point regarding hierarchy 
remains true in the university system. There are those who are invited to department meetings to 
participate in discussions of policymaking and ethics, and those who are not—adjuncts, for 
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example. Whose voice is heard, who is invited into the conversation, and how dissent is treated 
is heavily institutionalized and grounded in the hierarchy of the university. It may well be that 
there are those who teach in the university system who are not welcome to speak on questions of 
policy or ethics by virtue of their low placement in the hierarchy. 
 Strike and Soltis’ second observation seems especially appropriate to the university 
system and faculty roles: 
Second, teachers need to be careful in how they think about their own integrity in ethical 
decision- making. If one thinks of ethical deliberation as something one does alone, one 
may also think of the resulting choices in an uncompromising way… People who draw 
this [kind of uncompromising] conclusion run the risk of irreconcilable conflict with 
others who may have reflected with equal conscientiousness but reached different 
conclusions. (2004, pp. 113-114) 
Those who are accustomed to “professing” may find themselves especially in danger of the 
pitfalls of uncompromising ethical positions. While one may not be wrong, one may find that 
such tenacity is death to dialogue. If one wishes to engage in the development of a communal 
reflective equilibrium, one must recognize that ethical decision-making is not something one can 
do by oneself for the community. Professors are especially in danger of such uncompromising 
views, as it is their very intellectual excellence that has led them to a career focused specifically 
oriented towards the development of knowledge itself. Thus, there is a tremendous chance that a 
professor has spent much more time thinking about questions (particular meta-level, teleological, 
and ethical questions) than those outside of the university. This does not, however, negate the 
argument made by Strike and Soltis. The professor’s expertise is exactly why she should engage 
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in community ethical deliberation. Her goal is not to develop answers only for herself, but to 
develop answers that can be shared for the public good. Doing so, however, requires engaging 
the public—both in order to assist the public in developing that knowledge and understanding, 
and in order to understand the public good and what that very phrase means and necessitates. 
 It is through the emphasis on reflective dialectic that Strike and Soltis (2004) developed 
their answer to the question, “What is the fundamental aim of teaching?” The development of 
knowledge and understanding for the public good as a professional dedicated to that good results 
in the conclusion that promotion of dialogue is the fundamental goal of education if education is 
a domain oriented to the doing of public good through the generation of knowledge. 
In our view, the compelling matter is growth as a moral agent, as someone who cares 
about others and is willing and able to accept responsibility for one’s self, as someone 
who can engage in open, undominated dialogue with others about a common life and 
accept shared responsibility for the group’s life. Promoting this kind of development is 
what teachers ought to be fundamentally about, whatever else it is that they are about. We 
are first and foremost in the business of creating persons. It is our first duty to respect the 
dignity and value of our students and help them to achieve their status as free, rational, 
and feeling moral agents. (p.120) 
Note that what one sees echoed throughout the various texts analyzed here is the notion of free 
agency. The ability and skillsets necessary to engage in free thought that enhances the agent’s 
ability to flourish is a key component of education as described by Strike and Soltis (2004). The 
promotion of the community’s welfare—beneficence—similarly remains a primary focus of 
these philosophers, as it did in much of the work previously discussed. Generation of that 
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welfare again takes on the quality of mentorship and the lifeworld through the notion that 
teachers should, while respecting the dignity and value of students, help them to achieve a status 
as free, rational thinkers. There is no question, then, that the role of teacher as defined by Strike 
and Soltis carries with it significant expectations for teachers generated through their community 
dialectic. These expectations may not be inscribed, but they are embedded in the cultural 
discourse itself—the fact that teachers must guide others to a flourishing state of free thought 
emerges from the basic premise that teachers should help produce knowledge in others that 
benefits the student as well as the community.  
Peter Markie (1994) 
 Peter Markie (1994), in his edited volume Professor’s duties: Ethical issues in college 
teaching, began very much in a philosophical vein: He addresses the most basic definition of 
terms. 
Professors teach, and the verb is transitive; what we teach is the subject matter and those 
to whom we teach it are the students… Teaching produces knowledge, and knowledge is 
true belief based upon good reasons. To teach is to guide students through the course 
material in such a way that they come to form a series of rationally based true beliefs 
with regard to it. (p. 3) 
Note that to Markie (1994), teaching is less a matter of generating understanding or free thought, 
and more a direction towards the acquisition of justified, true, belief—a fairly common, if not 
somewhat antiquated, philosophical definition of knowledge. Interestingly, Markie argued that 
teaching itself produces knowledge, rather than scholarship or inquiry. His epistemic picture 
seems to be very much a correspondence concept. There is truth, and it is the responsibility of 
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teachers to illuminate that truth for students. By virtue of exposing students to the truth, teachers 
produce in them a belief that is both true and justified, and thus teaching literally produces 
knowledge.  
 Markie (1994) also noted that it is the responsibility of professors to engender particular 
virtuous qualities of character in their students. “Professors also represent certain values. We are 
supposed to inspire our students by communicating a vision of intellectual excellence and to help 
them acquire the qualities needed to make that vision a reality in their lives” (1994, p. 4). It is 
here, then, that we find Markie also emphasized a notion akin to free thought and inquiry. This 
free thought, however, is not directed toward a picture of dialectic or communal production of 
knowledge, but rather the best means by which to help students guide themselves to the truth. 
It is especially important in Markie’s argument that professors engage in scholarship. He 
argued that scholarship was essential to the teaching enterprise, not for some “production of 
publication” reason, but because scholarship means to be an actual practitioner of the field one 
teaches about: “Finally, to be a professor is to be engaged actively in one’s intellectual discipline 
in a way that support one’s teaching. To be a professor of philosophy is to be a philosopher, to be 
a professor of mathematics is to be a mathematician, and so on” (Markie, 1994, p.4). It is 
essential to Markie that professors be both experts and exemplars. Expertise is required for active 
participation in the field, and that expertise is consistently improved upon by that same active 
participation. Moreover, for students the professor acts as an exemplar in the field; in order to 
guide the students to excellence in the field, the professors themselves must model that 
excellence and participation. Beyond acting as exemplars, Markie argued that it is the role of 
professors to use their participation in their disciplines in a way that improves their pedagogy. 
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“…the expectation is not simply that professors actively engage in their disciplines; it is that we 
engage in our disciplines in a way that supports our teaching. Professors bring the practice of 
their discipline into the classroom” (1994, p. 5). Thus, if she does not practice her discipline, the 
professor cannot bring it into her classroom. 
Sidney Hook (1994) and Peter Markie (1994) 
Not every philosopher in his volume agrees with Markie, however, regarding the import 
of active practice in a discipline for professional competence. For example, Sidney Hook (1994) 
wrote,  
The primary function… of the liberal arts teacher is to help young men and women to 
achieve intellectual and emotional maturity by learning to handle certain ideas and 
intellectual tools. This requires scholarship, and familiarity with current research but not 
necessarily the capacity to engage productively in it. (p.88) 
Note the importance to Hook of intellectual guidance. Hook’s notion is a good deal more in line 
with the mentorship and lifeworld instantiation of teaching alluded to by some of the other works 
analyzed here. In the juxtaposition of Markie and Hook, one sees the dichotomy that categorizes 
many of the handbooks reviewed here: On one hand, teaching is a systemsworld enterprise that is 
oriented toward a quantifiable production of knowledge and thus one’s own participation in 
research helps further establish one’s competence to teach; on the other, teaching is a lifeworld 
engagement for the purpose of helping guide others to the most fulfilling participation in their 
own lives beyond participation as part of a system.  
 Hook (1994) argued that there were four basic characteristics of a good teacher as 
professor: 
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1) Intellectual Competence 
2) Patience for the Incompetence of Others 
3) Improvisation 
4) Knowledge of Human Beings 
It is absolutely necessary to be an expert in the field one teaches, according to Hook. One cannot 
teach without being competent on multiple levels: not only must one know the field, one must be 
competent enough to engage students effectively. Moreover, the professor must be so competent 
that she can help guide students to success in the field. Notice, however, Hook moved beyond 
the somewhat austere correspondence picture painted by Markie (1994) by continuing on to 
describe the qualitative competencies of good teacher from a lifeworld perspective: a good 
teacher realizes that students do not know the material as she does and is willing to help guide 
them through their experience. She does not believe that the truth is so obvious that students 
should simply grasp it. Students must construct the truth for themselves and, thus, good 
professors can tolerate and engage disagreement.  
The classroom is an ever changing and consistently shifting environment. Thus, the most 
competent professors can improvise in regards to shifting pedagogical needs of their students but 
in terms of their curricula, as well. A rigid lesson plan may ignore the individual learning needs 
of students, and result in class that lacks engagement. 
What the teacher must aim at is to make each class hour an integrated experience with an 
aesthetic, if possible a dramatic, unity of its own. Without a spontaneity that can point up 
the give and take of discussion and a skill in weaving together what the students 
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themselves contribute, preparation will not save the hour from dullness. (Hook, 1994, p. 
94) 
The curriculum, thus, must be flexible to the aesthetic whole produced by the class. The 
construction of knowledge, rather than the presentation of knowledge, requires that the teacher 
be prepared to go where the class takes her, while at the same time using that impetus to guide 
the class to free thought and understanding. The picture drawn by Hook brings to mind the way 
sailors use competing winds to their advantage to drive their boats. 
 Finally, Hook (1994) described teachers as practical psychologists. Being an effective 
professor of any subject means to be a studier of students. One must come to know the 
motivations in the class and what pedagogical tack will best facilitate learning for that class and 
those students. Hook argued that often college teaching is not on the frontier of research. To 
teach college courses often means to present information that is well-established and old. Thus, 
intellectual vitality cannot always come from scholarship; at times it must come from the new 
discovery of old information.  
[W]hen a theorem is being derived for the twentieth time or when an elementary point in 
the grammar of a foreign language is being explained or when the nerve an old 
philosophic argument is being laid bare, [intellectual vitality] lies in experiencing the 
situation as a fresh problem in communication rather than one in personal discovery…it 
consists in getting the students to reach the familiar conclusion with a sense of having 
made their own discovery. (Hook, 1994, p. 95) 
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Again, one sees Hook emphasize the importance of knowledge construction. Professors engage 
students in a process of free thought that creates its own vitality even if the problems discussed 
have, seemingly, already been solved long ago. 
 This is not to say that the correspondence epistemology of Markie and the coherence 
epistemology of Hook are necessarily incompatible in their practical application. Granted, the 
result of their deferring epistemologies seems to result in the generation of an age-old opposition 
between philosophical models of learning that are behavioristic and constructivist. However, 
regardless of the learning model, professors must be engaged with students in an active pursuit of 
inquiry. Whether that inquiry is the literal production of knowledge or the constructivist 
generation of understanding is not nearly as important as acknowledging the communal and 
dialectical core of the teaching endeavor as presented by both models. Good professors engage 
learners and must be so competent in both their discipline and in teaching that they can guide 
those learners to what are often, for the learner, radical new ideas.  
 There is more to be said by Markie, however, regarding the enunciated roles of professors 
beyond the onus to be good teachers. As somewhat more systems-theoretical in his approach, 
Markie—perhaps more than any other theorist discussed here—was very clear regarding 
professorial responsibilities. He stated,  
…each university, and so each professor, has an obligation to serve the goal of 
intellectual advancement and knowledge. Professors in the sciences have an obligation to 
guide students to knowledge of true theories in the sciences. Professors in the arts have an 
obligation to guide students to knowledge of excellent works in the arts. (p. 23)  
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Again, one sees the emphasis on knowledge production and “truth.” Markie, however, is not 
unaware of community and the role it can play in education. He also wrote, “Fine teaching, 
active scholarship, and regular publishing are ideally connected in each professor’s career: 
teaching is informed by scholarship, which is shared with the community of scholars through 
publication and presentations at professional conferences” (1994, p.76). Good scholarship 
provides a role model for students both in regards to the pursuit of knowledge and to 
participation in the particular field being taught. 
Theodore Benditt (1990) 
The belief that good professors engage in rigorous scholarship is echoed by Benditt 
(1990) in Morality, responsibility, and the university. While some may argue that teaching, itself, 
generates knowledge and is a form of scholarship, Benditt stated, “Teaching does not absolve 
professors of conducting their own research and scholarship” (1990, p. 101) because teaching 
cannot be separated from making truth claims (p.102). Because professors are evidencing truth 
claims that they hope others will come to believe, they must be foremost advocates of inquiry 
into the truth, argued Benditt. He expressed something of a concern that professors will use their 
teaching as an excuse to not to make sure that the truth they espouse is in fact true, the result of 
which being that “a professor cannot teach conscientiously while escaping the need to conduct 
what amounts to a research program” (p.102). Thus, one sees both in Markie and in Benditt 
considerable emphasis on the expectation that faculty members should be scholars in the sense 
that they should engage in research activity for their consumption and intellectual betterment and 
for the purpose of illustrating to their students the best means by which to pursue truth. 
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There is an interesting minor correlation insofar as both of the theorists who espouse the 
importance of research and publication also describe truth in a correspondence way. While a 
coherentist picture allows for scholarship in the classroom with students, even when engaging 
age-old ideas, the correspondence theory of truth seems to drive theorists to believe that 
professors must be at the forefront of the identification and acquisition of knowledge. This 
acquisition of knowledge, however, described by both Markie and Benditt, does not ignore the 
importance of teaching. In fact, the importance of scholarship is couched in terms of the 
importance of teaching. 
…a professor has an obligation to engage in research and scholarship because these are 
integral to conscientious teaching. A professor at the very least must make choices about 
what set of ideas is most nearly correct and therefore worth teaching, and research and 
scholarship are required in making such choices. … Part of the educational enterprise is 
to promote growth and development of students. …Therefore, students should be shown, 
as part of their education, how knowledge advances, and the best way for professors to do 
so is to demonstrate it, to show themselves to student as engaged, in small and 
appropriate ways, in the advancement of knowledge. (Benditt, 1994, p. 103) 
Thus, research may not necessarily be best understood in the professoriate as an end in and of 
itself, but as a servant to effective education. This is not to say that the generation of knowledge 
and understanding is not an intrinsic good, but that when one chooses to add to the responsibility 
of researcher by electing to take on the solemn duties of the professor, there are significant 
additional expectations to do individual good in addition to communal good. 
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Kenneth Eble (1994) 
 Not all theorists are in in complete agreement with Markie (1994) and Benditt (1994). 
There are some significant concerns that pressure to publish causes tension between research and 
teaching. Kenneth Eble (1994) wrote,  
…scholarship must, to some degree, be broken away from the mere doing of, piling up 
of, research. As regards the teaching faculty, the mere counting of articles and citation 
deserves the hostility it has aroused. What I would ask for is more vigorous and specific 
examining of the intellectual activities of a faculty member as they have outcomes in 
teaching. (p. 222) 
Notice that the quotation above is not in direct contradiction to Markie. Eble did not advocate 
against scholarship, just against the needless piling up of publications for no pedagogical 
purpose. Like Markie, Eble advocated for research that demonstrates beneficial outcomes for 
teaching. He went on to state, “[C]ooperation need[s to] gain a larger place against the present 
competitive, free enterprise model. Departments must function as part of the common enterprise 
of educating students who are human beings before and after they are engineers, English majors, 
or physicists” (1994, p. 223). Simply, the quantifiable, systemsworld approach (particularly 
when structuring education as a competitive free market) to publication conflicts with the 
“common enterprise of education” that recognizes students as full human agents who both serve 
and are served by the community. To conduct research as a means by which to forward one’s 
career and present students with a model of excellence in the discipline forgets that students are 
whole persons who need to be addressed as whole persons first, suggests the work of Eble and 
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Hook. One may become so enamored with the pursuit of knowledge that one becomes 
comfortable with leaving students who “just don’t get it” behind.  
Eble was passionate in concerns regarding the treatment of research as the primary goal 
of scholarship and the professoriate:  
I accept scholarship as a necessary part of teaching but please for scholarship broadly 
interpreted to be maintained as the word rather than research. Research is surely a 
subcategory of the many ways a human mind seeks understanding of the world it 
occupies” (1994, p.218). 
 Eble’s work, thusly, suggests that a lifeworldly view of education should take primacy 
over a systemsworldly one, as students should be first recognized as full human persons who 
have thoughts, needs, and feelings of their own, before being consumed by the university as 
potential doctors, lawyers, and engineers. It is the students’ capacity for a flourishing human life 
that must take primacy if research and scholarship are going to serve their most effective 
pedagogical functions. Otherwise, the risk becomes that the professor’s research, as well as the 
students themselves, become the means to an end of a system that is primarily built to produce 
workers—graduating students prepared for work and diminishing the activity of professors to 
only those activities that make the system function.  
Peter Markie (1990) on Objectivity 
In Morality, responsibility, and the university, Markie additionally emphasizes a final 
essential duty of professors—objectivity—which causes Markie to be a staunch advocate against 
professors being friends with students. Such friendships, Markie contended, potentially interfere 
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with a truly invested classroom in which all students are given the best possible chance to learn 
and succeed. He stated,  
The first premise is the general principle that we are prima facie obligated not to engage 
in any activity likely to limit severely our ability to honor our moral obligations…each 
professor has a prima facie duty to give all students equal consideration in instruction, 
advising, and evaluation.” (1990 p. 141)  
To be friends with students is to choose particular students in whom the professor will invest 
more than others. Friendship, as understood by Markie, means to have, or choose to have, duties 
to a particular person before one’s duty to others. Such primacy of duty to one student over 
another would violate his premise that professors are obligated to not limit their ability to honor 
their moral obligations. Markie did not argue against friendship between students and professors 
because of a cold and uncaring focus on academia, but because such friendships prevent one 
from engaging all of one’s students justly and fairly as agents who each deserve the teacher’s 
best self.  
This question, of care, though, is an important one. One wonders if Markie’s picture is 
heavily embedded in the systemsworld understanding of friendship as generated in the rather 
individualistic United States, where, as such, being friends with “me” assumes that one must be 
willing to do things to benefit me before and above others. This picture, though, is not 
necessarily the best picture of care and friendship. It may well be that educators should be 
“friends” with all of their students if “friendship” means that the professor is deeply invested in 
every students’ welfare. Moreover, that friendship is not a mutual friendship, and need not be. It 
is possible for one to care a great deal for something that cannot or does not care in return. To 
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teach means that one wants to see one’s students unharmed, successful, and happy. These are all 
qualities of friendship, but a non-reciprocal friendship, and the teacher must be as deeply 
invested in the uncaring student as in the caring student. Thus, this is not to say that Markie is 
wrong in his belief in objectivity, but, rather, that not all philosophers of education agree that 
such objectivity precludes friendship, if one does not mean a mutual friendship that requires 
special dispensation, unjust obligation, or exclusion of care for others.  
Nel Noddings (2005) 
Nel Noddings (2005) is one of the premier philosophers in the field of the “ethics of 
care,” particularly in conjunction with education. The work discussed here focuses specifically 
on teacher responsibilities. In the article, “Caring in Education,” Noddings (2005) addressed the 
particular challenges to the role of teacher in the United States because of the U.S. focus on 
individualization, which, she argued can impede care relationships. This impediment, however, 
is particularly problematic in education, as she argued that care is essential to effective teaching 
relationships. 
 Effective care requires what Noddings termed “engrossment.” This engrossment means 
that the “carer” is receptive, he “receives what the cared-for is feeling and trying to express” 
(Noddings, 2005, para. 5). This means that a care relationship is more than a “virtue” care 
relationship in which one cares about another’s success. One can be a caring teacher, for 
example, if one wants her students to do well on their exams. This does not mean, however, that 
the students feel as if the teacher cares about them. 
When I care, my motive energy begins to flow toward the needs and wants of the cared-
for. This does not mean that I will always approve of what the other wants, nor does it 
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mean that I will never try to lead him or her to a better set of values, but I must take into 
account the feelings and desires that are actually there and respond as positively as my 
values and capacities allow. (2005, para. 5) 
Note, then, that care is distinguished from concern for another’s ability to succeed. There is a 
kind of communication of emotional content; the teacher is invested in the thoughts and needs of 
the student. 
 One wonders, however, why this kind of care is necessary, particularly in light of 
Markie’s arguments.  Nodding’s argument hinges in the importance of trust in a teaching 
relationship. Students who do not trust that the teacher cares about them are less likely to learn. 
In the States, however, our individualist picture often interferes with such trust. We find it 
difficult to believe that anyone else is genuinely concerned for our welfare. 
The relational view is hard for some American thinkers to accept because the Western 
tradition puts such great emphasis on individualism. In that tradition, it is almost 
instinctive to regard virtues as personal possessions, hard-won through a grueling process 
of character building. John Dewey rejected this view and urged us to consider virtues as 
“working adaptations of personal capacities with environing forces.” (Noddings, 2005, 
para. 7) 
Notice that this notion of “environing forces” and the idea of relational care falls neatly in line 
with the community dialectical picture painted by Strike and Soltis (2004). However, Noddings, 
hinging her thesis on Dewey, pushed the notion further: it is through communicative action that 
students become virtuous—the educator’s concern for students’ welfare moves beyond their 
academic performance, and even beyond them being free thinkers. This idea, though, that we 
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learn in communities through invested dialogue and care with others, is not well accepted in the 
United States. 
 The immediate, ruggedly individualistic response is likely to be one akin to, “Hugs don’t 
teach Math.” The idea that teachers should be deeply invested in their students beyond their test 
scores concerns us. We wonder what insidious motives a teacher may have for caring for her 
students. Notice, however, that the concern we expect teachers to show for students only makes 
sense in the individualistic mindset when displays of care are not genuinely beneficent. We 
understand teachers who want students to do well on tests because those tests reflect well on the 
teacher. We understand teachers who want students to do well in class because it is essential that 
students learn the material so they can contribute to society. Beyond that, we begin worrying, as 
Markie did, about friendship, lack of objectivity, and unfairness, especially with regard to 
friendships between teachers and older students who are unlikely to need affection from their 
teacher during the school day. Caring, one might argue, does not cause learning, and likely may 
just distract from the teacher’s true responsibilities. 
Noddings, however, argued against the strawperson treatment of care. She was not 
advocating that care accomplishes everything necessary in education: “I do not mean to suggest 
that the establishment of caring relations will accomplish everything that must be done in 
education, but these relations provide the foundation for successful pedagogical activity” 
(Noddings, 2005, para 12). The foundation of successful pedagogy is one built on genuine trust. 
Thus, by her view all of the rest of successful teaching requires the care necessary to engender 
trust. 
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 Consider what we ask of students. Even if we leave aside questions of, “How is it 
possible to be a genuine mentor without genuine care for the whole person?” we realize that we 
ask our students to trust us. We ask them do to work they don’t want to do, learn things that often 
are contrary to their intuitions, and believe us when we claim to know the information we share 
with them. These requests we make of our students are especially true in the University. These 
students are no longer compelled to be in school; they elect to be in school because they believe 
the professoriate when it says it can help them. How does one, however, encourage students to 
do the work, take the classes, and open their mind to dangerous and counter-intuitive ideas, if 
they believe we are only interested in ourselves?  
First, as we listen to our students, we gain their trust and, in an on-going relation of care 
and trust, it is more likely that students will accept what we try to teach. They will not see 
our efforts as ‘interference’ but, rather, as cooperative work proceeding from the integrity 
of the relation. (Noddings, 2005, para 9) 
Consider the fact that we know that car salespersons don’t care about us, and, in fact, we know 
they probably want to take advantage of us. Yet, we are still most likely to buy a car from the 
salesperson who is able to convince us that she is really invested in us. Otherwise, if they do not 
engender our trust, we are far more hesitant that we are being sold a lemon. How much more so 
is that the case for a teacher who sees the student over the course of a semester, or a year? 
Teaching requires trust, and it seems that engendering trust in others requires care, or at least the 
deception of care. 
 Additionally, Noddings (2005) again emphasized the importance of dialogue so heavily 
emphasized by Strike and Soltis (2004). “[A]s we engage our students in dialogue, we learn 
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about their needs, working habits, interests, and talents. We gain important ideas from them 
about how to build our lessons and plan for their individual progress” (Noddings, 2005, para 12). 
We realize, then, that the process of teaching and learning is one that should be reciprocal. 
Perhaps what is most missing from the discussion of professorial roles that is included in 
Noddings’ discussion of teaching in general is the idea that teachers should learn from their 
students. One would think this would be especially possible and necessary in the university. 
Markie, for example, spends a great deal of time discussing the importance of research as a 
means by which to inform one’s teaching. What one forgets is that a holistic dialectical kind of 
teaching is also an act of learning and scholarship. To quote Noddings, “Finally, as we acquire 
knowledge about our students’ needs and realize how much more than the standard curriculum is 
needed, we are inspired to increase our own competence” (Noddings, 2005, para. 12). Thus, 
Nodding’s work implies that teaching is an effective means by which to grow as a scholar. 
 In conjunction with the other theorists, Nodding’s picture of teaching drives the 
responsibility of teachers to a new high. Teachers become more than mentors, guides, and 
exemplary scholars; they become deeply invested care-givers for their students. This does not 
indicate a paternal relationship; paternalistic relationships between professors and students may 
preclude effective teaching, particularly as it is dangerous to free inquiry and the construction of 
knowledge through honest engagement with dissenting opinions. Rather, the relationship is one 
in which professors are required to engage their scholarship in a way that informs their teaching 
for the purpose of bettering the life of every student. To engage such a significant burden 
requires that one must care for two reasons: 1) As Noddings noted, in order to establish the trust 
necessary for effective teaching; and 2) Because the amount of effort in terms of scholarship, 
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professional development, emotional investment, grading, and other such demands on time and 
intellect are so significant that one is unlikely to meet all of the enunciated expectations of 
professorship as well as the inscribed responsibilities of professorship without genuine care. It is 
that genuine care that engages the fullness of professorship as both part of the systemsworld and 
as a lifeworld engagement. To be a professor beyond meeting inscribed systemsworld 
expectations means to engage the lifeworld of teaching as well as the lifeworld of scholarship—
an understanding of teaching and scholarship as one deeply embedded in others and community 
relationships.  
Summary of Findings 
 The data presented here cover three fundamental portions of the dialogue that constructs 
the role of faculty as teachers and researchers: faculty handbooks, codes of ethics of professional 
associations, and philosophical perspectives on teacher and professor responsibilities. Thus, one 
may now begin the process of integrating the data in such a way as to generate a coherent picture 
of professorship. We have established, at least insofar as the roles of teachers are presented by 
handbooks, professional associations, and philosophers, that my original hypothesis is not 
supported. Research is not given primacy over teaching, at least insofar as the articulation of 
inscribed roles in concerned. One wonders, then: Why is there so much documentation that 
suggests research is given primacy over teaching, and that professors are placed in the 
unenviable position of violating their expectations as teachers in favor of meeting ever-
increasing demands to produce? 
 The researcher’s intuition is that the answer lies in the systemsworld and lifeworld 
dichotomy, and that dichotomy will be explored further in chapter 5. Established thus far is that 
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there are numerous coherent themes that emerge from an analysis of the discourse. One uncovers 
the importance of mentorship as both essential to teaching and scholarship, as well as a 
consistent belief that free inquiry and free thought are essential to the university and 
professorship. Moreover, there is a consistent theme that scholarship should inform one’s 
teaching, leading the researcher to consider the possibility that scholarship, in the professoriate, 
is supervenient upon teaching, as one’s scholarship should not be self-interested, but consistently 
oriented towards the betterment of one’s ability to educate. 
 The importance of beneficence cannot be over-emphasized in the analysis of these 
documents. Repeatedly, it is seen that the acts of research and teaching should be acts that 
benefit others and engage the lifeworld of the community actively and with care. Teachers and 
researchers must seek diligently to do no harm and, moreover, work conscientiously to benefit 
others through the work that they do. Their professionalization is also a kind of yoke that binds 
professors to the service of the community, as both teachers who must serve the student 
population and as researchers who must serve the entirety of the community. To be a professor 
who does not want to help others seems to rest in direct contradiction to many of the embedded 
assumptions that are fundamental to our communal construction of faculty roles.  
 Finally, although there is argument regarding whether or not active participation in a 
discipline as a publishing researcher is necessary for being a “good professor,” there is a 
consensus that scholarship itself is an intrinsic good that benefits teaching. While there is 
disagreement whether scholarship must mean research (and thusly means one is further obligated 
to produce knowledge that helps others) or the production of knowledge through learning and 
engagement personally and with students in the classroom, there is little disagreement that 
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professors must be scholars. They must be experts who can show others more than 
information—they must be able to show others what expertise means. There are those who 
believe, as Noddings (2005) does, that such mentorship and education can only take place when 
one genuinely cares about ones students. To be an expert is insufficient. One must be an expert 
who wants to facilitate the flourishing of full human persons.  
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CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
Summary and Purpose 
 This chapter addresses the fundamental questions developed through analysis of the data 
presented in chapter 4 and will attempt to draw conclusions from those data. Although 
preliminary analysis of the data was conducted in chapter 4, the philosophical analysis and then 
synthesis of data will take place here in chapter 5. The data—the depictions, descriptions, and 
expectations of faculty roles—presented in chapter five will be considered from the Habermasian 
frame in order to both understand the presentation of the roles through our intersubjective 
generation of human agency and in order to generate a normative construct for future 
development of those roles. The primary goal of this chapter, once the roles are understood, is to 
generate a “best construct” that reflects the roles in their most coherent, mutually beneficial, and 
ethical formulation. 
The handbooks, professional association codes of ethics, and philosophical definitions 
and explications of faculty roles presented in chapter 4 will be analyzed in order to ascertain their 
commensurability, coherence, and interdependence, if indeed any of which are the case. Chapter 
4 has already illuminated those connections and consistencies found between the documents, 
though they will be reiterated here. Again, in order to apply the principle of charity, effort has 
been made to consider the roles, as presented in these various texts and forms, with the 
assumption that they are in fact commensurable. This should not suggest to the reader, then, that 
the actual instantiation of the roles by universities are similarly commensurable.  
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The endeavor, here, is to understand what ways the roles can be consistent in order to 
develop a coherent construct undergirded by the teleology of beneficence revealed by the 
analysis in chapter 4. If the educational medium is itself grounded in the assumption that 
education should be beneficial to students and society, then we must recognize that the same 
teleology also guides the normative thrust of this work. Thus, the application of the principle of 
charity towards the end of producing a construct that integrates the roles as coherently as 
possible while at the same time seeks to produce a construct that is grounded in education as a 
beneficent domain. Other potential philosophies of education—that students should be 
miseducated for governmental purposes, that women should not be educated, or that education is 
in fact bad for learners—may be argumentatively tenable, but violate the grounding assumptions 
of our own educational discourse to such a great degree that incorporating them here would 
require a radically different understanding of education that would no longer be recognizable as 
education, given the grounding presuppositions that emerge from the analysis of our educational 
discourse. Rather, as revealed by the analysis of data in chapter 4, education is undergirded by 
the assumption that education it is beneficent and seeks to benefit as many learners as possible.  
In order to meet these ends, this chapter will firstly address the hypothesis forwarded in 
chapter 4. The hypothesis was forwarded that the presentation by the faculty handbooks, in 
particular, would place teaching as secondary to research. This hypothesis was forwarded for the 
sake of transparency (in order to illuminate and eliminate researcher bias), as well as to maintain 
the principle of charity. One goal of the chapter, then, will be to demonstrate that hypothesis as 
unsupported. As such, this chapter will begin where chapter 4 left off by considering that 
hypothesis and the conclusion reached regarding it in chapter 4. 
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The chapter will apply discourse ethics to further unpack the roles of teacher and 
researcher and uncover the embedded assumptions that undergird our understanding of those 
roles. We will engage Habermasian immanent critique to understand “professor” as constructed 
by our conceptual and policy discourse. Further, the researcher will use this social dialectic to 
consider if either of the roles—“researcher” and “teacher”—are supervenient upon the other in 
order to determine their exact conceptual relationship. Doing so will enable one to consider 
possible explanations for tensions that arise when the roles are instantiated and practically-lived, 
particularly when the expectations of the roles may be in conflict. 
Understanding these possible conflicts will be considered from the perspective of the 
lifeworld and systemsworld. As noted already, the data indicate that conflict between the two 
roles should not be attributed to an inherent inconsistency between them. Rather, explanation for 
the conflict articulated in chapter 1 must be found elsewhere and will likely be found in the 
sublimation of the lifeworld to the systemsworld, which is especially problematic, as education 
itself is fundamentally a lifeworld engagement.  
Finally, the chapter will produce a normative construct, formed both through the 
conjunction of the roles in the most coherent way possible and in a way that best instantiates the 
fundamental concepts defining those roles. As the embedded assumptions undergirding the roles 
of teacher and researcher are revealed, those same embedded assumptions can be used as a 
means by which to guide a construct conjoining those roles. The final hermeneutic synthesis, 
then, should be one that provides both an insight into the fundamental nature of the roles of 
“teacher” and “researcher,” while at the same creating a “best conjunction” that brings those 
roles into alignment under the fusion “professor.” I will suggest that an entirely new 
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understanding of “professor” is created by this construct that rejects the etymological grounding 
of its seemingly symbolically identical homonym.   
The Hypothesis 
Chapter 4 forwarded the hypothesis that the documents investigated—the faculty 
handbooks in particular—would place teaching as secondary to research. This hypothesis was 
demonstrably false. The falsity of the hypothesis is especially clear in the case of the 
philosophers examined in chapter 4. While some of the philosophers, particularly Markie and 
Benditt, argued for the essential nature of research to good professorship, by no means did they 
suggest that teaching was unimportant; quite the contrary. The importance of teaching is made 
clear by virtue of the fact that Markie and Benditt noted the importance of research in part 
because good researching informs good pedagogy. Professors’ research enables them to maintain 
excellence in their field; thus, they are able to teach students material that is current and accurate 
to the best of their knowledge. Moreover, the professor should be an exemplar to the students of 
what it is that members of a particular profession do. Finally, Markie and Benditt argued that the 
pursuit of knowledge is itself is an intrinsic good, and good professors model the importance of 
inquiry through their own active pursuit of inquiry. 
Interestingly, while one would think that the professional associations (which are 
primarily focused on research) would emphasize, at least implicitly, research over teaching. 
Again, this was not the case; the APA, the AERA, and the MLA seem to recognize that their 
members are, in fact, often educators. Thus, they take careful effort to make ethical constraints of 
research not only in terms of research, but also in terms of teaching. For example, both the APA 
and MLA discuss mentoring. The APA recognized the importance of teaching even for those 
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scientists who are not professors, insofar as the APA mandates that they should actively mentor 
others in the field. The AERA gestures to the importance of educating in its repeated emphasis 
on sharing knowledge with the community. The AERA places special emphasis on sharing 
research with as many people as who can be benefited by it. The MLA similarly takes time to 
discuss the importance of educating the community, but also specifically discusses expectations 
of teachers and the importance of enabling free inquiry in students. Thus, is cannot be said that 
even professional research organizations fail to articulate the importance of teaching, and, most 
clearly, they certainly cannot be said to approve of any harm done to others for the sake of 
research. 
 Given the research discussed in chapter 1, however, there seems to be some reason to 
believe that universities themselves give primacy to research over teaching. As such, that 
primacy could evidence itself through the expectations of faculty expressed through faculty 
handbooks. The faculty handbooks did, in fact, focus heavily on research, but made no mention 
of the importance of research over teaching. Thus, in terms of inscribed expectations, the 
handbooks do not place teaching as secondary to research. One wonders, however, if unwritten 
enunciated expectations, or hidden expectations, may communicate the primacy of research, and, 
to some degree, the handbooks may imply the primacy of research insofar as there is often much 
more detail regarding research expectations presented in the handbooks than regarding teaching 
expectations. However, the handbooks also regularly mention the primacy of teaching as a goal 
of the university, the importance of promoting free inquiry in students, and the active mentoring 
of learners by their professors. In discussion of evaluation and expectation, research is often 
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discussed in greater detail than teaching, but in discussion of goals, values, and philosophies of 
the intuitions, teaching is given a primary position. 
The treatment of teaching and research by universities through their handbooks seems to 
suggest that evaluation of research may currently lend itself more easily to the systemsworld and 
teaching to the lifeworld. Simply, handbooks, themselves, are already predisposed to a 
systemsworld epistemology by virtue of the fact that the handbook is intended to articulate the 
structure and the hierarchy of the institution. There is no question that most of the handbooks 
discussed here dedicate significant pagination to the policies and processes that support and 
generate the institutional bureaucracy. Perhaps, then, the handbooks, already embedded in the 
systemsworld, often detail the systemsworld requirements of research in greater depth than 
teaching simply because research lends itself more easily to tangible and quantitative products.  
While the handbooks never note a particular number of publications required for tenure 
and promotion, the handbooks seem to articulate the requirements of research in tangible ways: 
the handbooks make mention of the importance of “journal publications, book authorship, 
creative works, and performances,” all of which can be enumerated. More tellingly, such 
quantifiability in terms of publication lends itself more easily to systemsworld expression when 
attempting to articulate what “good research” means than when attempting to articulate what 
“good teaching” does. Simply, one wonders, how does an institution systematize and quantify 
“good teaching?” Of course, the institutions do attempt to do so. The documents quantify good 
teaching in terms of student evaluations and “student success and performance.” Perhaps, then, 
the fact that the institutions often emphasize teaching excellence as a primary goal, yet under-
discuss what the expectations are, is the result of the difficulty of expressing the lifeworld of 
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teaching using systemsworld language. Regardless of the reason, and regardless of their failure 
to clearly illustrate balanced expectations, it cannot be said that the institutions value teaching 
less than research, at least insofar as articulated in their faculty handbooks. 
The Question Emergent from the Failure of the Hypothesis 
What becomes, then, a primary question in this dissertation is the question, “Why, then, 
does so much research seem to indicate that good teaching is threatened by institutional emphasis 
on research?” If the documents reviewed here are reflective of the way faculty roles are 
generated by our communal dialectic, then teaching should not be threatened by primacy of 
research. The ethical questions raised by the practice of faculty research, particularly by SoTL 
research, would be a non-issue. If good teaching were truly the most fundamental goal of the 
university and research were truly only used in service of that goal, there would be little 
evidence, one would think, that professors would be willing to use students as research 
participants in order to promote their own research agenda knowing that it is not in the best 
interest of the students. However, as Neill (2008) noted, there has been an increased professor 
engagement in “ethical gray areas,” which suggests that there is a tension between teaching and 
research that is not made clear in faculty handbooks alone. Thus, despite the evidence presented 
in chapter 4, one cannot simply shrug one’s shoulders and suggest, “Clearly, teaching and 
research are deeply connected, and there is no tension.” The holism of the dialectic suggests that 
the tension is very real.  
The answer is likely found through Habermas. The lifeworld at the core of human 
existence can be structured and organized, but not reduced to the systemsworld. As the lifeworld 
is the essence of human experience, the systemsworld cannot actually replace the lifeworld; 
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without the lifeworld, there can be no systemsworld. A problem exists, though: because the 
systemsworld is more easily quantifiable and easily fits a system in which human life is also 
quantified for purposes of organization and institutional advancement, the systemsworld can gain 
social primacy over the lifeworld. We have ample evidence in the U.S. that the institutions that 
organize human life focus on the hierarchical and logistical aspects of social participation over 
the dialectical and personal ones. Simply, the systemsworld fits, thought does not justify, a 
capitalist notion in which persons are treated as “resources” that should be managed and 
organized in a way that best suits the organization. Thus, there is reason to believe that a tension 
exists between the genuine human need to be an active participant as a person in the lifeworld 
and the organizational preference for dealing with human agency in a systemsworld way. 
I suggest that part of the way in which systemsworld-oriented organizations and societies 
attempt to address the need of persons to live in the lifeworld, yet at the same time the 
organization’s preference to engage only in the quantifiable simplicity of the systemsworld, is by 
feigning lifeworldly instantiation.  
Consider as a simple analogy the requirement that when customers enter certain stores, 
the employees are required to greet them. That requirement does not meet systemsworld needs. It 
takes time and focus away from whatever organizational activity the employee could be doing in 
order to engage a needless, “Hello! Welcome to…” Yet, many companies require that the 
employees do so. Why are employees required to do something that distracts them from the 
system needs of a company? Likely, the greeting fills a lifeworldly need on the part of customers 
to feel welcomed and treated as full persons in the life of the company; because the 
systemsworld cannot replace the lifeworld, the human actor does not want to believe—despite 
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the obvious evidence that she is nothing more than a wallet to the company—that she is only part 
of the systemsworld. Thus, in order to achieve its systemworld ends, the company must 
participate—at least superficially—in the lifeworld.  
Notice the result, in the example above, when lifeworld participation is grounded in, and 
motivated by, systemsworld needs. In the case of the employee who must welcome customers, 
she often does so in a distracted way. She is not saying, “Welcome!” because she is genuinely 
glad to see the customer; she is doing so because she is required to in order to meet the 
systemsworld needs of the company. The customer is likely to respond similarly, or not at all. 
Thus, the lifeworld dialectic has never been actually engaged. The systemsworld has only 
feigned a lifeworld engagement. Simply, there is reason to believe that because human actors 
wish to be treated as full lifeworldly persons, organizations that are embedded in the 
systemsworld will feign lifeworldly processes and interactions in order to achieve desirable 
actions from actors.  
I suggest, then, that part of the seeming discrepancy between the results of the data in 
chapter 4 and the theorists discussed in chapter 1 is the result of the fact that organizations like 
universities, even if they are embedded in the systemsworld, cannot gain the full participation 
they desire from their members without at least feigning participation in the lifeworld. This 
accounts for the many actions organizations take that make it appear as if they are deeply 
invested in the individual welfare of their members while at the same time taking actions that 
they know are not in those same interests. True grounding in the lifeworld, however, would 
likely require a community investment and a kind of qualitative calculus of success that would 
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often mean immediate failure in a systemsworld economy competing with those organizations 
that wholly structure themselves in alignment with systemsworld values.  
Universities, as they are pressured to orient themselves further and further to an economic 
system that does not recognize the values of the lifeworld, must also maintain that they serve the 
lifeworldly values that led to their establishment in the first place, but survival in a system that 
cannot measure the worth of an education of free inquiry, critical thought, and personal growth 
requires that the universities take actions in direct contradiction to the lifeworld claims of their 
university philosophies, missions, and values. Perhaps it is as simple as this: the university, in 
order to continue to draw actual human students and faculty who are oriented to the lifeworld 
must espouse the values of the lifeworld, but cannot fully actuate those values without 
endangering their positioning in the systemsworld.  
In order to justify their value to a public that demands accountability in terms of student 
performance on standardized examinations, conferral of degrees that promote employment in 
high-paying jobs, and high “customer satisfaction” as displayed by faculty evaluations and 
“ratemyteacher.com,” universities must require that faculty take actions that are, in fact, in 
contradiction to a holistic education focused on student flourishing regardless of monetary gain. 
Moreover, as evidenced by the common U.S. assumption of “a happy life” as synonymous with 
“great personal wealth,” one can see that as the populous becomes further and further acclimated 
to the synonymy of personal lifeworld success with quantifiable financial systemsworld success, 
universities begin orienting their faculty handbooks to definitions of teaching and teaching 
success in ways that focus on standardized systemsworld values. The conflict arises because they 
must also claim to promote free thought— by definition, free thought cannot be standardized.  
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Thus, perhaps there is a contradiction between the practical lived experiences of professors who 
report a tremendous tension between their teaching and research expectations and the 
presentation of faculty roles by university handbooks. 
Regardless, the falsity of the hypothesis suggests that, at least as they are presented by 
institutional documents, the roles of teacher and researcher need not be inconsistent. It is true 
that due to the fundamentally student-driven onus of teaching, if research were given primacy in 
faculty expectations, an immediate incoherence may arise—if faculty are expected to give 
primacy to publication, they may have good reason to use their students as research subjects, 
resulting in role conflict. Similarly, if teaching is given primacy, role conflict may arise if faculty 
are unable to meet the primary demands of their teaching load while at the same time being 
expected to publish. Interestingly, however, although some institutions may seem to focus more 
one role than another, there is good reason to believe, given the data, that even in those 
institutions that heavily emphasize publication, it is expected that the research benefit students. 
Thus, as both teaching and researching are expected to be teleologically grounded in 
beneficence, as became clear in chapter 4, they share a consistent grounding. As such, this 
chapter, having discussed the failure of the hypothesis and its implications, can now begin the 
work of developing an understanding of teacher and research roles such that a coherent, and 
normatively grounded, construct conjoining the roles can be developed.  
Habermasian Immanent Critique of the Data 
To conduct immanent critique of the data analyzed in chapter 4 means to engage the 
works self-reflexively from the perspective of their own domain-presentations.  Thus, the works 
are examined using their own axiomatic claims as the foundation for identifying the 
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consistencies—and perhaps inconsistencies—that construct, from the perspective of each work, 
particular domains of understanding. Key to this analysis is identifying the embedded 
assumptions that structure the dialogue. These embedded assumptions may be understood to 
some degree as enunciated expectations insofar as they are fundamental to the dialogue (they 
could be made clear, but need not be articulated or inscribed). Similarly, the embedded 
assumptions may also be understood in terms of logical inference. For example, assumptions 
may act in conditional ways, suggesting that a series of inscribed expectations logically 
necessitates a particular embedded assumption to ground those expectations. The goal in this 
section, then, is to complete the work begun in chapter 4—to understand the expectations both 
articulated and silently embedded into our social dialogue that generate faculty roles.  
Much of the discussion of the works in chapter 4 is best understood through the 
perspective of organizational role theory: understanding the roles as presented by the handbooks 
is often a matter of considering issues of organization and inscribed roles. This is not true for all 
of the documents discussed in chapter 4, however. Within the handbooks, statements of 
philosophy and codes of ethics are often better understood in a symbolic-interactional way that 
enables one to consider the embedded expectations that are not stated explicitly, yet are clear 
implications of the inscribed role expectations.  
Markie notably discusses professorial roles in a very systemsworld way that is best 
understood through organizational role theory. Professors have responsibilities to 
organizations—both as institutions and as communities—and those responsibilities can be 
clearly inscribed and enunciated. Professorial roles fall neatly into a hierarchy of responsibilities 
and duties from a Markiean perspective. However, neither organizational role theory nor 
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symbolic-interactionist role theory allows for a multiple-perspective consideration of these 
various works as different voices within the same community dialectic. Organizational role 
theory would require reduction of the roles discussed to a kind of hierarchy, understanding 
faculty as actors performing organizational scripts, and symbolic interactionist role theory would 
incorporate the Mead-like frame of actors as participating with each other in a role-making 
symbolic event. To bring the two together, and view the entirety of the conjunctions of the work 
as an act of discourse, requires a new perspective of role theory—community-dialectical role 
theory—that understands actors as active participants in their own rolemaking and in the 
rolemaking of others through a multifaceted dialectic that incorporates both organizational 
structure and symbolic interaction.  
Community-dialectical role theory enables us to do more than investigate the roles of 
actors in organizations or examine the interactions of those actors as generators of scripts and 
perspectives: it enables us to conjoin disparate epistemologies of human agency to create a 
robust picture of the role expectations. Simply, organizational role theory enables the 
understanding of faculty handbooks, symbolic-interactionist role theory enables the 
understanding of the codes of ethics as they are symbolically mediated cultural constructs, 
discourse ethics enables us to understand the philosophers who discourse about education, and it 
is in community-dialectical role theory in the Habermasian-grounded epistemology that these 
disparate perspectives can be conjoined into a dialectical holism.  
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Figure 5. The Habermasian Conjunction of Disparate Perspectives into a Dialectical Whole.  
This is all to say that this immanent critique will move beyond the immanence of individual 
documents, each of which is grounded in a different ontological and epistemic understanding of 
role-making, into the immanence of domain generated through the conjunction of different kinds 
of documents,. This section, then, will briefly revisit the presentation of roles by each document, 
consider the implications of each domain, and then consider the dialectic produced by their 
conjunction. 
The faculty handbooks discussed in the first section of chapter 4 largely focus on the 
bureaucracy of their corresponding universities. There is a heavy systemsworld emphasis, as the 
universities dedicate significant pagination to the organizational structure and the placement of 
faculty within that structure. The handbooks, given that evidence, exist largely for the purpose of 
maintaining the system-generated organization by the interaction not of persons, but of roles in a 
hierarchical structure.  Thus, there is minimal discussion of teaching and the expectations of 
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teaching within that structure. Teaching expectations are, in most cases, relegated to those 
sections that articulate the requirements for promotion and tenure. Similarly, research is also 
most often discussed in those sections of the handbooks dedicated to promotion and tenure. 
There is, however, more lifeworldy mention of teaching and researching in the statements of 
philosophy and value in the documents. 
The University of Memphis does emphasize teaching excellence and research excellence. 
The handbook discusses mentoring as an integral part of teaching, and it is expected that 
professors mentor students at all levels. There is a heavy systemsworld emphasis on research and 
scholarship as publication. Faculty are expected to publish and forward knowledge in their 
domain. They are expected to collaborate for the betterment of their urban, regional, state, 
national, and global communities. In so doing, faculty should seek knowledge and produce 
knowledge.  
Oklahoma State University detailed the expectations of research less than the University 
of Memphis and the University of Miami. Teaching, although expectations are left 
underdiscussed, is considered “the primary duty of instructional faculty.” Similar to the 
University of Memphis, there is emphasis of mentorship as an expectation of faculty. Although 
scholarship is somewhat underemphasized in the handbook, the faculty’s social responsibility to 
knowledge is articulated. Faculty should seek and state the truth and they must develop their 
scholarship in order to do that. Faculty are expected, as teachers, to promote the free pursuit of 
knowledge. The expectations of teacher roles are made most clear in the appendix on 
professional ethics. Interestingly, the handbook seems to treat scholarship and research as 
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synonymous and, thus, as reducible to the systemsworld, while at the same time treating teaching 
as a scholarly activity that produces knowledge.  
The University of Miami, much like the University of Memphis, places emphasis on 
faculty as devoted to scholarship and research. Teaching is not a kind of scholarship, whereas in 
the case of Oklahoma State University, it may be inferred from the language of the document 
that teaching is so essential to the university goal to produce knowledge, that teaching is a 
scholarly activity, though not necessarily scholarship. The University of Miami, however, is 
clear regarding the importance of publication. The Faculty must publish, or the equivalent in 
their field, in order to be successful. This handbook, in particular of those discussed here, fits 
neatly into the systemsworld frame.  
The Clemson University faculty handbook clearly articulates that faculty should seek, 
teach, and disseminate knowledge. As such, the Clemson University handbook—more than the 
other handbooks—allows for the possibility of distinguishing between scholarship, teaching, and 
publication. Whereas the other handbooks often allow for a conflation between scholarship and 
publication, in particular, Clemson seems to suggest that seeking knowledge may be different 
from disseminating knowledge, and to disseminate knowledge does not necessarily mean that 
one is engaged in teaching. There is heavy emphasis on academic freedom both on the part of the 
faculty and in terms of promoting free inquiry in the students. Of particular interest, there is a 
more lifeworldly approach to teaching evaluation in the Clemson University handbook than in 
the other handbooks through the use of a holistic portfolio… Moreover, similarly lifeworldly, 
Clemson emphasizes the importance of scholarship for the betterment of the community, a theme 
that begins to emerge across the handbooks along with teaching as mentorship. 
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The Florida Atlantic University faculty handbook returns to a systemsworld approach, 
particularly in the discussion of faculty expectations. Faculty expectations are specifically 
oriented to the rules and requirements of faculty in terms of grading, timeliness, and attendance 
procedures. However, the mission and values presented by Florida Atlantic University are 
lifeworldly; they emphasize community, inclusiveness, recognition of diversity, and excellence. 
Again, the theme of academic freedom emerges through this handbook and is further 
underscored in the handbook by the valuing of “honest expression” and “lifelong learning.” 
The Temple University handbook, more than any of the other handbooks discussed here, 
presents itself through a lifeworld epistemology. The handbook emphasizes the development of 
caring relationships with students as essential to teaching role. Similar to other lifeworld values 
of the other handbooks, there is discussion of free learning, though in the case of Temple 
University, there is more proportional time given to the responsibilities of professors to promote 
critical thought, creativity, and inquiry. Of particular lifeworldly interest is the fact that Temple 
University is the only institution to mention the importance of a sense of humor and 
“awakening” amongst their faculty. It is incredibly difficult, if not impossible, to quantify and 
systematize a teacher’s ability to have a sense of humor or promote awakening. In order to 
promote student awakening scholarship is couched in terms of faculty responsibility to 
perpetuate academic field and advancing knowledge. 
From the handbooks one can infer that teaching is integral to the purposes of the 
universities discussed here. To a greater or lesser degree, these universities expect teachers to be 
excellent, though they are unclear what “excellence” means. In many cases, excellence is 
measured through systemsworld thinking (student evaluations and performance on 
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examinations), but some institutions engage a more robust notion of excellence as a matter of 
enabling lifelong learning and awakening. Shared amongst almost all of the institutions, often at 
the forefront of their missions, is free inquiry and academic freedom. The institutions seem to 
position themselves as bastions of discussion and discourse in which ideas can be engaged 
without fear of censorship.  
One can also infer from the handbooks that while teaching is often evaluated in a 
systemsworld way, there remains an expectation that teaching be deeply invested and care-
related. The emphasis on mentorship, academic advising, and investment throughout the 
handbooks suggests that, at least in terms of inscribed roles, teachers should invest in students as 
persons not simply as receptacles for professor knowledge. Thus, faculty should be available to 
students as resources for academic and professional development. To ignore a student who asks 
for assistance in application to graduate school, for advice in pursuing a career in in the 
professor’s field, or for help with academic struggles is to fail to meet the expectations of the 
handbooks. The teacher must demonstrate care for students by investing in each student as a 
person with genuine potential to participate in the world of inquiry.  
Similar themes emerge from analysis of the guidelines for researchers established by 
professional associations. The APA requires that researchers be beneficent, collaborative, honest, 
open, and invested in their communities. Furthermore, researchers must actively participate in 
mentorship. The Belmont Report similarly requires beneficence and justice, as well as 
investment in others as autonomous persons. Moreover, researchers must engage in research in 
ways that benefit as many in the community as possible. The AERA requires competence, 
integrity, and social responsibility. In requiring integrity, the AERA requires that the research be 
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worthy of trust by virtue of seeking to do no harm. Social responsibility, as is the case with the 
APA, requires that the researcher engage the community in a beneficial way reminiscent of the 
justice criterion of the Belmont Report. The MLA, which engages little, if any, research with 
human participants, also requires an active focus on the benefit the research can do for society. 
Moreover, the MLA values free inquiry, a value regularly espoused in the faculty handbooks, 
and aligns itself with the APA with an emphasis on the importance of mentorship. 
Thus, the analysis of our community dialectic as inscribed through documents produced 
by universities and professional organizations reveals the expectations that professors be mentors 
who promote free agency through the development of lifelong learners with passion for free 
thought and intellectual inquiry in order to best promote the welfare of the community and to 
bring the whole of humanity to greater understanding of the world. Those Habermasian themes 
of mentorship, free thought, and community are at the core of the inscribed expectations of 
teachers. I suggest that this mentorship notion, itself, is a care-laden concept that requires 
professors to invest in their students as full and autonomous persons deserving of respect. Thus, 
embedded deeply into the lifeworld of teaching is the belief that those who teach should benefit 
the student, the community, and our understanding of the world because they care. There is, of 
course, also a systemsworld of teaching which requires that faculty follow the rules and 
procedures established by their organizations, but those systemsworld processes, as Habermas 
contended, are supervenient upon there being a teacher who is already sufficiently invested in the 
students, in the university, and in the community that such fundamental expectations can be 
taken for granted. 
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I suggest, revealed by a Habermasian immanent critique, that the danger of the 
systemsworld is not the fact that it is organizational. Quite the contrary: organization is wholly 
necessary for an effective university system. It is, rather, that because the systemsworld cannot 
account for or evaluate the lifeworld, that the lifeworld can be forgotten and taken for granted 
because lifeworld assumptions are so embedded, so tautologically assumed, that they can be 
forgotten. In the case of invested professors who care deeply for their students and for the 
generation of knowledge and understanding, one assumes that the professor should have those 
qualities; thus, the concern becomes evaluation of those qualities that may not come so naturally 
and are far more easily evaluated and observable. In the same way that one assumes that a 
rational agent engages in a conversation because she truly does want to communicate, she wants 
to understand and to be understood (otherwise there would be no point in her participation in the 
first place), we may well assume that those who elect to engage in teaching care, because care is 
so fundamental not just to the role expectations of teachers, but to the definition of teaching 
itself.  
Concerningly, however, the deep embeddedness of such assumptions does not 
sufficiently maintain the truth of those definitions if the lifeworld becomes secondary to the 
systemsworld. The necessary organization and structuring of the systemsworld becomes the focal 
point of evaluation, measurement, and judgment of value, and the grounding assumptions that 
generated the need for the system in the first place become forgotten and, perhaps, even cast 
aside. The inscribed expectations of professors—for example, that they produce a certain 
percentage of students with a certain range of scores on end-of-course evaluations, produce a 
certain number of published articles, and participate in a certain number of university 
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committees—become the focus, if only because they are inscribed, far easier to evaluate, and 
quantifiable. Inscribing the fact that the university requires all of this in order to make sure that 
the faculty member is an active scholar who engages the world of knowledge with students in a 
way that better enables them to participate in a world of free thought with respect and dignity for 
their personhood because she cares about them and the community would be both onerous and, 
one would hope, unnecessary, as it is assumed that this is the person she is by virtue of electing 
to be a professor in the first place. Thus, the lifeworld of the professoriate becomes sublimated to 
the systemsworld not because the lifeworld is unimportant but because it is assumed and difficult 
to quantify. 
The expectations of the professoriate articulated by the philosophers examined in chapter 
4 further underscores the importance of understanding faculty as firstly lifeworld participants. 
Beneficence, a non-quantifiable, qualitative requirement that one do a hazily defined “good,” 
again immediately appears, as discussed by Strike and Soltis (2004). Community similarly 
immediately emerges, both an enunciated and inscribed expectation. Moreover, Strike and Soltis 
dug far more deeply into the lifeworld of the professoriate in their emphasis on the importance of 
community dialectic for the solving of ethical problems in teaching. Teachers should engage in 
dialectic for the purpose of solving problems. This problem-solving capacity need not be 
restrained to immediate applied ethical problems that emerge in the world of teaching, but it is a 
cornerstone of inquiry itself. Thus, scholarship emerges as a dialectical process, a kind of 
community engagement, through Strike and Soltis, which incorporates many voices for the 
beneficent purpose of helping all agents generate understanding.  
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Srike and Soltis (2004) seemingly suggested that it the onus of the teacher to be not just 
an active participant in a dialectical and community epistemology, but a beneficent guide through 
the process of that inquiry. Note that I say here a beneficent guide through the process of inquiry 
rather than a beneficent guide to the truth. Free inquiry is likely hindered by the professorial 
belief that one has truth and others should believe it. Rather, the emergent assumption of 
teaching from analysis of the handouts and the ethical guidelines is that free inquiry is something 
mentors enable and foster rather than define and demand. One sends students out into the world 
with the ability to find or generate truth, rather than with the truth itself. To assume that one has 
truth is likely to result in one’s unwillingness to engage students in an active process of 
communal learning—a process deeply embedded in an understanding of professors as scholars 
who themselves are constantly and consistently seeking to learn more. 
Markie’s correspondence theoretical approach to teaching is perhaps more sympathetic to 
an understanding of professors as disseminators of knowledge. Professors have a duty to produce 
knowledge, and they do so by bringing students to the truth. The “having” of truth, then, is 
knowledge. This production of knowledge is of such fundamental import to Markie’s work that 
professors must do nothing to endanger that production. Thus, one sees the importance of justice 
as a theme emerge again, as professors must be objective and provide all students with equal 
access to truth. The professor, as the exemplar in her field of study, must be a scholar in order to 
provide a true example to the student of what it means to be a participant in that discipline. Even 
so, note that this more correspondent notion of truth still places the professor in a position of 
mentorship and guidance. She must use every tool at her disposal to help students achieve truth.  
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Moreover, Markie did not necessarily say that professors are keepers of the truth. If 
professors are scholars, that means that they remain actively invested in finding the truth. Their 
job, then, is to be scholars with their students. And thus, something of an equivalency emerges 
from a correspondence truth understanding of professorship and a coherentist truth 
understanding of professorship—both understand professors as learners who themselves have 
developed their own excellent inquiry to the point where now their pursuit of knowledge and 
understanding can include guiding others through their own trials of inquiry. Embedded in this 
understanding of professorship is a normative strand—that because they have the ability, and 
because knowledge is so very valuable and beneficial to the community, professors should assist 
others in their pursuit of learning. Moreover, even if that normative push fails, it remains true 
that robust and holistic learning is more likely to occur in dialectic with others; thus, the 
professor, if she truly is invested in understanding, is rationally mandated to engage others in a 
learning dialectical process, if only to forward her own development and understanding.  
The repeated theme of community, then, emerges from an immanent critique of the 
philosophical work: Strike, Soltis, and Markie can be understood as proponents of both 
knowledge as essential to community and the obligation of teachers to serve the community. 
Similarly, Noddings’ work can be understood in a communal way. The production of trust 
through care in order to develop a classroom environment of beneficent learning is a 
communally-embedded notion. Embedded in Noddings’ work is the presupposition that one 
should want to benefit the community, and thus one will endeavor to engender the trust 
necessary to do so. That teachers should care, I suggest, is an inscribed expectation for teachers 
in line with Noddings’ care ethic in order to maximize learning, but there is also the enunciated 
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expectation, embedded and assumed through her discourse, that a teacher has an obligation to her 
students and it is through her recognition of that obligation that she gains the students’ trust—
because the students recognize the teacher has that obligation as well. In other words, to couch 
Noddings only in terms of caring about students in order to maximize learning potential does her 
work a disservice; she reveals, implicitly, the teacher as a servant to the community of learners 
who have opened themselves to her and the tremendous harm she can do, because they believe 
her when she tells them that she is there to help and that what she is teaching can and will benefit 
them. While she says little about research, one cannot escape the community obligation 
engendered by those who can do research. Repeatedly through these documents one sees the 
requirement that those who teach share as much beneficial knowledge as possible with others, 
and, thus, Noddings may be read as one who also, particularly as she is a scholar herself, 
supports the notion that professors should publicize their knowledge to the benefit of the 
community. 
Something of a tension does arise between theorists like Hood and Benditt, who 
disagreed regarding the requirement that professors conduct research. Benditt argued that 
professors must conduct what amounts to a research program in order to exist as an exemplar in 
her field for her students. Hood, however, argued that the nature of free thought is such that the 
professor engages scholarship by virtue of creating knowledge with the students. While Benditt’s 
correspondence picture requires that faculty engage research in order to constantly validate the 
truth claims they espouse, Hook argued that intellectual vitality does not require research, but 
rather active discovery, which may occur in the classroom as well as in the laboratory. Thus, 
once again, one sees a potential tension between teaching and research. Note, however, that it is 
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not a tension between the importance of teaching and the importance of research. Rather, it is a 
tension between whether or not good teaching can take place without engagement in research on 
the part of the professor. 
 Scholarship as a Dialectical Holism 
This tension between the two thinkers, however, may not be incommensurable. I 
suggest—and am supported by Eble (1994)—that the problem is one that results from the lack of 
distinction in terms. Habermasian critique enables us to unravel the terms and their meanings as 
revealed by the discourse, and to reconstruct them coherently, given the axioms grounded by 
their own dialectical domain generation.  Recall that Eble wrote, “I accept scholarship as a 
necessary part of teaching but please for scholarship broadly interpreted to be maintained as the 
word rather than research. Research is surely a subcategory of the many ways a human mind 
seeks understanding of the world it occupies” (1994, p.218). Thus, the Hook-Benditt tension may 
be resolved by understanding scholarship as a broader term that incorporates both research and 
teaching. 
If scholarship is the active engagement in the world of inquiry and knowledge in order to 
produce understanding, then teaching is a form of scholarship. Teaching is a process for which 
the teleology is understanding and the form is inquiry—professors ask questions and suggest 
answers and provide guidance in the inquiry investigations of their students. Thus, teaching is a 
scholarly activity. Research, similarly, is scholarship if to do research means to engage the world 
through inquiry in order to understand. Researchers ask questions, produce potential answers and 
investigate the tenability of those answers through dialectic with the community of scholars and 
through application of their thoughts and theories to the world. Thus, again, we see a teaching 
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role subsumed under scholarship. That professors should be good scholars is a given, as both the 
role of teacher and the role of researcher are forms of scholarship. 
That teachers must know the truth seems unnecessary, but that they must be scholars, that 
they must understand scholarship, that they must understand how to pursue knowledge, 
particularly knowledge in the domain they teach, seems to be of the utmost import. While there 
are numerous reasons it would be unreasonable to assert that teachers must “have” truth, as what 
we “know” is often spurious and revisable, it is not unreasonable to assert that they should be 
excellent scholars insofar as they understand how to pursue knowledge, how to investigate 
meaning, how one may attempt to distinguish between truth and falsity, and how to establish at 
least tentative truth claims within the defining confines of a particular intellectual domain. Thus, 
it is possible that, as scholars, teachers do research yet do not necessarily publish.  
This is all to say that a discourse analysis of the works presented in chapter 4 reveals that 
research and publication are not necessarily the same thing. The understanding of scholarship 
revealed above, embedded in the very ways we think about and dialogue about professorship, 
suggests that to publish means to do a particular thing with the information produced through 
research. The systemsworld definition of research as requiring publication ignores the 
lifeworldly embedded axiom that research is published not for publication sake but for the 
benefit of others and to broaden our communal understanding of the world. Thus, to do research 
means to engage in inquiry, to try to understand through active and rigorous investigation, and to 
publish means to present that understanding.  
Publication, however, should not be relegated to only the dissemination of that 
understanding through a few highly respected journals read by very few members of the 
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populace. If publication in those highly respected journals results in the dissemination of that 
understanding to other experts who then use that knowledge to benefit the community and share 
that knowledge with the community, then the requirements of the codes of ethics discussed here 
are met. If, however, that knowledge stays locked in the journal and is read only by a few other 
professors, then it does not meet the normative requirements of the codes of ethics guiding 
researchers discussed here.  
The problem of doing as much good as possible, interestingly, places the humanities in a 
potentially different position that many of the sciences. A medical practitioner may publish in a 
highly respected journal read by a very small percentage of the populous. That small percentage, 
however, uses that knowledge in a way to benefit the community at large in immediate and 
significant ways. The English professor who publishes her work on Samuel Beckett cannot make 
the same claim to the general good done by her publication if her work in a top tier journal is 
read by a few who will similarly read and cite her work only to publish in the same journal. 
Would she be better able to meet her publication responsibility by discussing that idea in 
community seminars, writing layperson-accessible texts that summarize her idea, or holding 
literary debates on campus? Given that even the systemsworld-oriented handbook recognized 
that different academic domains may have different means of publication—music and 
performance for example—even within the world of literature, there are different means by 
which to “publicize” one’s work.  
The question of whether professors are doing enough to bring their understanding to the 
community is a good one, though beyond the scope of this project. Perhaps something of a 
mediating realization, however, is that by continuing to participate in inquiry through academic 
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publication, the professor is also participating with her peers in a rigorous process of 
argumentation and idea building that propels them all to greater excellence as scholars, and thus, 
potentially propels them to greater excellence as teachers, and, thus, though the journal 
publication may not reach as many people, it does still do significant intellectual and pedagogical 
good. Either way, what we come to realize is that publication can take on numerous forms, and, 
thus, the guiding frame for that publication should be scholarship, insofar as the normative force 
of scholarship is the betterment of one’s understanding and the understanding of others. 
What I am suggesting here is not new and is far more thoroughly discussed by Ernest L. 
Boyer (1990) in his Scholarship Reconsidered: Priorities of the Professorate. Boyer was 
similarly motivated to understand scholarship, particularly in the professorial context, because of 
“competing obligations” that are emerging in universities. I contend, further, that these 
competing obligations, as discussed in chapter 1, are beginning to result in role crisis for some 
professors who find themselves torn between conflicting—not just disparate—expectations. 
Boyer developed the distinction between various forms of scholarship as the scholarships of 
discovery, integration, application, and of teaching (p. 16). “Scholarship of discovery” is that 
scholarship that produces new knowledge and is that to which I am referring when I discuss 
research. Scholarship of integration is “serious disciplined work that seeks to interpret, draw 
together, and bring new insight to bear on original research” (p. 19). This dissertation itself may 
be an example of “scholarship of integration.” Much publication, particularly in the humanities, 
falls into this form. “Scholarship of application” seeks to understand the ways knowledge can be 
applied to benefit the community, and, in many cases, actively does so. Research in the field of 
education often falls into this category.  
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[T]eaching begins with what the teacher knows. Those who teach must, above all, be well 
informed, and steeped in the knowledge of their fields. Teaching can be well regarded 
only as professors are widely read and intellectually engaged….great teachers create a 
common ground of intellectual commitment. They stimulate active, not passive, learning 
and encourage students to be critical, creative thinkers, with the capacity to go on 
learning after their college days are over. (pp. 23-24) 
To redefine teaching as a scholarly practice, then, is not a new idea, and, suggested Boyer, is 
grounded at least as far back as Aristotle. I suggest, then, that engaging the lifeworld of the 
professorship requires evaluating professors not in terms of publication, but in terms of 
scholarship. 
Although far more cumbersome than simply evaluating professors based on journal 
publication, understanding professors as scholars in a full and robust sense requires the 
possibility that some professors—by virtue of their dynamic activity with their students—are in 
fact meeting their scholarly expectations. Consider a professor who is actively engaged in 
community projects with her students. Such “community learning” may be something she does 
not have the time to write about and publish in a journal. However, she and her students spend a 
significant amount of time engaging the community in ways that bring knowledge to the 
community as well as result in growth and learning on the part of the students and the professor. 
We would be remiss to suggest that she is not a scholar: she is an active scholar engaged in the 
scholarship of application. Moreover, the potential response, “She is not meeting her research 
responsibility, because although her research may be beneficent, it is unjust as its benefits are 
localized to that one community,” is inconsistent with our patience with and the encouragement 
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of professors who publish in small but highly respected journals in their own obscure fields of 
endeavor.  
The field of philosophy, for example, is proportionally small. I believe, for example, my 
own publication on the treatment of disability by Samuel Beckett in three of his short stories is 
important. While I hope it is read, I do not delude myself in the belief that even if I were to 
publish it in a highly respected journal in philosophy or English, that it would have a significant 
impact on even my home community of Jacksonville. I would be content, however, knowing that 
the understanding I attempted to generate benefited some who will use that knowledge to benefit 
others, who will do similarly, and so on. I would be mistaken, however, if I believe that my 
publication in that journal makes me a scholar of greater import or greater impact than the 
community-action scholar who engages the homeless community of Jacksonville, Florida. To 
quote Boyer (1990), 
We need scholars who not only skillfully explore the frontiers of knowledge, but also 
integrate ideas, connect thought to action, and inspire students. The very complexity of 
modern life requires more, not less, information; more, not less participation. If the 
nation’s colleges and universities cannot help students see beyond themselves and better 
understand the interdependent nature of our world, each new generation’s capacity to live 
responsibly will be dangerously diminished. (p. 77) 
Thus, I suggest that a more inclusive dialogue regarding scholarship and professorship is not just 
warranted by virtue of the potential benefits to knowledge and human life, but also because the 
very grounding of scholarship as revealed by our dialectic is one that suggests scholarship is not 
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publication, but the engagement in active inquiry for the production of understanding to the 
benefit of as many possible.  
Synthesis: The Normative-Beneficence Teleology of Teaching as a Care 
This understanding of scholarship and teaching in a correspondence theoretical way is 
consistent with community-dialectical role theory as defining of professor as a holistic scholar, 
not creating a dichotomy. While creating greater distinctions and relying on Boyer to better 
understand the different kinds of scholarship has proved incredibly valuable, it is important to 
note, at the same time, that what is occurring here is a Hegelian synthesis, a collapsing of 
distinctions at the same time as a recognition of the ways in which concepts, through thesis and 
antithesis, propel each other towards new understanding. Teaching and scholarship are 
integrated, not two different roles. That realization is perhaps the most important revelation 
gleaned from our Habermasian investigation. Perhaps, yes, they exist in a supervenient 
relationship, but it is complex and interwoven. Teaching is a kind of scholarship, yet, at the same 
time, scholarship in the professoriate is supervenient on teaching insofar as being a good scholar 
emerges from the requirement that one be a good teacher. I recognize that the preceding 
statement leads to a series of objections, most obviously, “What of the researcher who does not 
teach?” I suggest that there is no such thing. To write, to engage others in the dialectical 
intercourse of prose, is to provide others with the potential to gain greater understanding of the 
world. It is one’s prose, one’s ability to coherently communicate with others, which determines if 
such publication is simply dissemination or if it is teaching. Yet, even that understanding of 
teaching and dissemination may not be sufficient to distinguish between those who publish as 
teachers and those who just publish.  
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Perhaps the difference between dissemination and teaching may be couched in Noddings’ 
understanding of teaching as a care-driven endeavor. Those who disseminate do not care all that 
much, but those who teach do care. It may be only intention that truly, at its core, makes the 
difference. “What of all of the evidence that good teaching also involves…?” one may reply and 
fill the blank with one of an innumerable pedagogical recommendations for effective teaching 
(from wait time, to 1-3 positive feedback, to aligned instruction, and so on). To that question, I 
say that anything with which we can fill the blank evidences the teacher’s caring, as she is 
endeavoring to find a best practice that benefits students. Caring is not a “best practice”; it is an 
affective state, a status of being that requires a complete commitment to that which is cared 
about. We have not been able to find one final and simple answer to the question of, “How can 
we teach most effectively?” because there is no one answer to the question. There are too many 
different kinds of knowledge and too many different kinds of learners to say, “All good 
education requires this particular pedagogical device.” However, we can say with fair 
confidence, if Noddings is correct, that good education requires care and is defined by it, and 
when we find an effective strategy used by a teacher it is also synonymously used by a teacher 
who has struggled to find a strategy that works for her with those particular students—in other 
words, she cares.  
What emerges, then, from this project is a kind of “dialogical care ethic.” Nodding’s 
concept of the care ethic when shaped by discourse ethics suggests that the best means by which 
to generate the outcome of care, assuming that one who cares wishes to benefit the other, is to 
engage in a holistic dialectic in order to produce understanding of the other through reflective 
voicing. In the same way that one requests that research participants review interview transcripts, 
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review conclusions, and suggest improvement to one’s research, one should, when engaging care 
relationships with others seek to voice them, benefit them, through an act that is not just self-
reflective, but is guided by the other. The product of such a beneficent dialectic is an 
understanding that is greater than the sum of the solipsistic positionings of the agents trying to 
understand. Perhaps inexpressible in literal language, one comes to understand the other in way 
that may be best analogous to metaphor. The “what-it-is-likeness” of the other’s experience 
cannot be reduced to the utterances of the “understanding” other, but the dialectical act, the 
process itself, produces an understanding that, if only for a brief moment, fuses the horizons of 
the engaged agents who seek dialogue for beneficent aims.  
To then answer the question, “What should a professor do with this knowledge?” 
becomes “She should engage in robust dialectic, particularly with one’s students.” The 
separation between faculty and students often may seem insurmountable. The production of 
understanding, though, seems to require that one engage one’s student not only in dialectic for 
the production of knowledge on the part of the student, but for the purpose of producing 
understanding with a teleology of beneficence. The critical pedagogue would then be under the 
onus to seek to understand her students through dialectic because she cannot assume that her 
professorship alone is sufficient to determine what is in the best interest of the students. 
Education through a dialogical care ethic becomes a manifold epistemology—a series of 
outwardly spiraling redefinitions of what is best educational practice through a holistic, and yet 
singular, rich engagement with each student in a fusion of horizons.  
What one should do, then, is recognize that the understanding one seeks cannot be 
expressed through dissertation, but must be individually reached. I cannot profess to know what 
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one takes from this experience, exactly. Nor can I divine the readers’ context or understand her 
original positioning. I can only suggest that each professor, if she seeks to end role ambiguity, 
engage in a self-reflective, critical-etymological journey through dialectic with others. To ask 
one’s students, “How do you define professor?” is not a wholly insane proposition. If we are to 
serve our students, why is it that we let our institutions define our role, rather than those whom 
we can do the most harm and those who have placed their trust in us? My intuition is that such 
dialectic will lead many educators to a realization of servant leadership, to an understanding of 
one’s role as not one of mastery but rather of service. We serve the students, and thus, we must 
engage them in our ethical discourse if we wish to truly generate an understanding of how we 
can best instantiate our roles as educators.  
Thus, perhaps, the core assumption, before we can understand any other expectations of 
teachers, is simply the assumption of caring; one researcher may publish her numbers and not 
care about the impact her work will have on her publication’s intended audience, while another 
does the exact same thing but does care, and I suggest that the ontological status of those 
seemingly equivalent actions is radically changed by the intent, converting the latter into a 
“teacher.” Moreover, because the second researcher cares, if the intention argument is 
insufficient to make my case, there is good reason to believe that she will continue to struggle to 
find ways to make those data do good. She will not be satisfied with that one moment of 
publication; she will apply and pursue that data and their consequences to the greatest possible 
good, thus leaving us with the ever-present evidence of effectiveness that our systemsworld 
approach to the world demands of us and, again, find herself defined as a teacher, as one 
dedicated to beneficence. 
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To apply Kögler’s (2012) work on Otherness and self-identity, one may consider an 
analogy between the self-reflective creation of identity through recognition of Otherness and the 
generation of the definition of education through our intersubjective social consciousness as 
necessitating beneficence. Thus, I suggest, we cannot understand teaching as teaching without 
understanding it as teleologically beneficent—not only for Habermasian reasons concerning the 
nature of discourse and the generation of terms through discourse, but because as students, our 
recognition of the Other as teacher presupposes our own existence as student for whom the 
teacher seeks to do good, and as teachers the recognition of the Other as student presupposes 
one’s existence for the purpose of benefitting students.  
The Habermasian frame further provides guidance in the teleology and normativity of 
this chapter, particularly insofar as reflection on the data reveals that both the roles of teacher 
and researcher throughout the various role presentations in multiple documents assert the 
importance of beneficence. I will argue that this reflection rests the importance of beneficence on 
the necessity of the lifeworld. In other words, one need not feel that an illicit move has been 
made by virtue of allowing the teleology of beneficence to guide the development of the 
construct, as the embedded assumptions revealed through analysis of the works suggest that 
benefiting others is essential to our very understanding of teaching, education, and research. 
Though, perhaps, teaching could be defined differently, the role expectations embedded into the 
very dialectic that constructs the roles of “teacher” and “researcher” are infused with the idea 
that teaching, and thus the research supervenient upon it, should do good.  
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The Decoupling of Teaching and Scholarship 
Problematically, the systemsworld approach bifurcates the scholar as teacher and 
researcher, perhaps in order to make evaluation easier, but leaving open the question of the 
researcher’s obligation to students. If she is separate from “teacher,” this separation causes role 
conflict between the roles of beneficent teacher and prolific teacher. As the data demonstrate, 
however, that bifurcation is not rational: it is not emergent from examination of the 
presuppositions that ground professorship and does not best met the community obligations, 
research obligations, or teaching obligations of professorship. There are numerous ways the 
holism of a professor as a generator of knowledge with students could be instantiated. The 
question of how one may effectively evaluate that holism in a qualitative way would likely be a 
massive research undertaking on its own.  
What suffices for this project, however, is the realization that as one attempts to uncover 
the assumptions that lead to the teaching-research tension established by the discussion in 
chapter 1, one comes to recognize the problems of the attempt to separate teaching and research 
from scholarship for systemsworld purposes. Note, for example, how such thinking could misuse 
philosophies discussed here. Markie and Benditt, in particular, could be misused to justify the 
trend of looking down at K-12 teachers from the ivory tower: if being a good scholar cannot 
include being an excellent teacher as a generator of knowledge, than any teacher who is not 
conducting a research program is not a scholar. This idea, though, that teachers are not scholars, 
is particular to the West, and, I argue, the result of the demands of the systemworld to make 
evaluation and quantification easier.  
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The systemsworld approach—particularly the capitalistic approach to agents as 
quantifiable goods who can be used to the benefit of the economy—has resulted in a hierarchical 
perspective not just of teaching and research, but of dialectic as well. Notice, for example, that 
the argument being constructed here allows for the possibility that teaching and research need 
not be understand hierarchically. If, however, the discourse of capitalism, of “betterness than 
others,” is the foundational form of discourse used to produce understanding in a society, then 
the members of that society will not be able to conceive of disjunctions, of Derridian binaries, 
without Othering one member of the set in favor of another.  
The very structure of our thought requires that we view every distinction, every binary, as 
one that must have a more important and a less important; thus, the bifurcation of teaching and 
research, must—given the capitalist discourse of U.S. society—result in placing one over the 
other. Given the systemsworld preference of U.S. capitalism, it only stands to reason that the 
more quantifiable “research” will emerge as the preferred, and “teaching” will become the 
othered—a distinction I believe we see borne out in society as researchers are generally 
considered erudite and are well respected, while teachers (particularly in k-12) are often treated 
as the incompetent disseminators of the knowledge generated by their far more competent 
colleagues (“Those who can, do. Those who can’t, teach.”).  
Perhaps the only treatment for such a problem is greater inclusiveness and the 
reintegration of teaching and research. Perhaps, if universities truly wish to continue to promote 
the values they espouse in their handbooks, despite the cumbersome systemsworld 
consequences, they should eliminate the distinction between teaching and research and instead 
discuss “scholars.”  The Habermasian inclusion of all voices for the generation of knowledge is a 
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lifeworldly value that grounds the very free thought espoused by universities. Without it, 
universities are redefined, as Slevin (2001) described, as diploma markets. To quote Boyer 
(1990), however, 
 The aim of education is not only to prepare students for productive careers, but also to 
enable them to live lives of dignity and purpose; not only to generate new knowledge, but 
to channel that knowledge to humane ends; not merely to study government, but to help 
shape a citizenry that can promote the public good. (p. 78) 
Such communal and holistic dialectic, however, is increasingly interpreted as communist in the 
States. The constant undergirding belief that competition makes all things better, and that 
improvement always means that one must be better than another, does not allow for the 
possibility that learning can take place communally and that all students should benefit from it. 
Yet, our demand that research be just and benefit everyone causes a role conflict for us. We want 
teachers who do the best they can to teach equally, so we standardize both curriculum and 
evaluation, doing a disservice to the lifeworld realities that each person learns and flourishes 
differently and that an effective, caring teacher does what she can to aid her students in these 
quests. This is all at the same time that we ground our definitions and dialectic in the idea that 
there must always be a winner. Thus, policy initiatives like “Race to the Top” take place. The 
very notion of “Race to the Top” is capitalistic—students compete for resources and those 
institutions that provide the best education win those resources, as they have evidenced their 
superiority by producing winning students. Yet, at the same time, what teacher in her right mind 
actually wants her students to compete for the basic necessities for their success? The idea that 
some students get “to the top” suggests that other students do not get to the top. What purpose is 
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served by rewarding these successes, given that the reasons other students lose the “race” may 
include abuse, poverty, lack of resources, mental disability, and so on?  
Our supposedly just society is in tension with itself, and that tension is borne out in the 
dichotomy we have produced between “teacher” and “researcher,” which is resulting in role 
crisis for those professors who wish to be amazing teachers while at the same time meet the 
competing demands that they produce tangible research. To use Habermas’ terminology, there is 
an “uncoupling” of teaching from research, and of teaching and research from scholarship. This 
traumatic uncoupling of roles that are dependent on each other both ontologically and 
normatively occurs because of the default assumptions that undergird U.S. discourse—that there 
must be a distinction, that scholarship cannot be a holism, and that we must be evaluate those 
individual components in quantitative ways that demonstrate a benefit not to people but to the 
economy, to the system.  
This uncoupling discussed above mimics the uncoupling Habermas describes when 
discussing the ways in which the systemsworld may begin to drive the lifeworld. The agents 
engaged in the horizons of the lifeworld are left devoid of meaning and understanding, as that 
which gives their lives purpose is placed second to systemsworld drives.  
To quote Habermas (1985), 
On this plane of analysis the uncoupling of system and lifeworld is depicted in such a 
way that the lifeworld, which is at first co-extensive with a scarcely differentiated social 
system, gets cut down more and more to one subsystem among others. In the process, 
system mechanisms get further and further detached from the social structures through 
which social integration takes place. As we shall see, modern societies attain a level of 
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system differentiation at which increasingly autonomous organizations are connected 
with one another via delinguistified media of communication: these systemic mechanisms 
– for example, money – steer a social intercourse that has been largely disconnected from 
norms and values, above all those subsystems of purposive rational economic and 
administrative action that, on Weber’s diagnosis, have become independent of their 
moral-political foundations. (p.154) 
Where, once, agents participated in a lifeworld of work and generated meaning through it which 
resulted in the accomplishment of the goals of the systemsworld (those quantifiable and 
necessary ends that themselves do not have meaning), now they pursue the quantifiable ends as a 
means by which to produce meaning. Anecdotally, I have noticed this phenomena when 
engaging students with the question, “What do you want to do with your life?” This question is 
uniformly answered with, “I want to be happy.” Upon probing students to explain what will 
make them happy, they will most often, “Making money and having a good job.” Notice that not 
even the secondary lifeworldly value of “having a good job” gains primacy over the 
systemsworld functional value of money. It is the quantifiable, yet vacuous, meaning provided 
by money that they seek, because they have been taught that it provides happiness.  
The idea that one should pursue a flourishing life, which may or may not involve making 
money, is absurd to my students. This is a phenomena described by Habermas (1985): 
The transfer of action coordination from language over to steering media means an 
uncoupling of interaction from lifeworld contexts. Media such as money and power 
attach to empirical ties; they encode a purposive-rational attitude toward calculable 
amounts of value and make it possible to exert generalized, strategic influence on the 
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decisions of other participants while bypassing processes of consensus-oriented 
communication. Inasmuch as they do not merely simplify linguistic communication, but 
replace it with a symbolic generalization of rewards and punishments, the lifeworld 
contexts in which processes of reaching understanding are always embedded are 
devalued in favor of mediasteered interactions; the lifeworld is no longer needed for the 
coordination of action. (p. 183) 
Students no longer need robust and rich human concepts to justify action or to generate meaning. 
To ask my students what a story is about always results in a description of the plot. Students do 
not answer the question with, “It is about love” or “It is about the nature of human existence.” 
The stories they read are reduced to their necessary, yet meaningless, systems components, the 
actions and events—the functional components of the work. As Habermas contends, perhaps this 
shift is necessary and productive, insofar as it enables modernity. The decoupling of the system 
and the lifeworld produces a freedom for the system that enables much greater efficiency, while 
at the same time enabling the system to reach back into the lifeworld and marginalize it.  
Thus, my engagement with my students has revealed to me the deep decoupling 
described by Habermas of the lifeworld from the systemsworld. Students do not read to gain 
meaning, to understand life, or to better understand themselves; they do so to ingest a plot that 
they can regurgitate for systemsworld ends. The question of, “Yes, but what does this all mean?” 
has become absurd and unnecessarily cumbersome in a world—a systemsworld—in which such 
qualitative concerns only slow down the functional capacities of the system: getting grades, 
graduating, and finding work that will hopefully result in having the money they so hope will 
make them happy. 
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Note that the lifeworld and the systemsworld are both essential. There is only a question 
of supervenience: “Which should drive the other?” If the lifeworld drives the systemsworld, then 
the structures, hierarchies, quantifiabilities, and systems are oriented towards the generation of 
meaning, for the purpose of creating value and generating flourishing human lives. When the 
systemsworld drives the lifeworld, meaning is forgotten because it is unnecessary for describing 
the functionality of a system. In the case of the university, one need not discuss student 
“awakening,” as Temple University does, if the systemsworld drives the lifeworld; “awakening” 
becomes evidenced through student success on quantifiable measures, and shortly the purpose of 
the entire endeavor is forgotten in favor of the functions which are recognizable by a 
systemsworld epistemology.  
We can sum up by saying that tendencies toward bureaucratization are represented from 
the internal perspective of organizations as growing independence from elements of the 
lifeworld that have been shoved out into systems environments. From the opposite 
perspective of the lifeworld the same process presents itself as one increasing 
autonomization, for areas of action converted over to communication media and 
systemically integrated are withdrawn from the institutional order of the lifeworld. This 
constitution of action contexts that are no longer socially integrated means that social 
relations are separated off from the identities of the actors involved. (Habermas, 1985, 
p.311) 
While this separation allows for inclusion and distance from lifeworldly power, the lifeworld 
drives the systemsworld, the awakening of students may be the primary goal, and numerous 
forms of evaluation are used to evidence that awakening, while at the same time, it is recognized 
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that only through our intersubjective dialectic that this “awakening” can be communicated. 
Moreover, it cannot be enumerated in a functional way. It can be described through metaphor 
and expressed through narrative, but the experience of it is a qualitative state that we can only 
hope and trust our dialogue can communicate to some degree. Without the narrative that gives 
purpose to our systemsworld actions, “[t]he objective meaning of a functionally stabilized nexus 
of action can no longer be brought into the intersubjective context of relevance of subjectively 
meaningful action” (Habermas, 1985, p.311). If the intersubjective context of self-making and 
meaning-making through authentic human interaction is the ontological nexus of our university 
life, then whatever teleology emerges will be grounded in human flourishing. Simply, if the 
lifeworld drives the systemsworld of the university, a goal such as “awakening,” despite the 
numerous necessary quantifiable and systemsworld oriented measures used to evidence it, is 
never forgotten. 
One sees, then, something of a correlation between the sublimation of the lifeworld to the 
systemsworld and the sublimation of teaching to research. Teaching is a lifeworldly form of 
scholarship that engages other actors in a holistic dialectic in order to develop communal 
understanding. Research often takes on the systemsworld connotation of a quantifiable process 
of producing information for consumption by the public. Teaching and research, like the 
lifeworld and the systemsworld, are both essential. They depend on each other; they are 
symbiotic. Good teaching requires knowledge—the production of knowledge, the pursuit of 
knowledge—both in regards to the specific discipline being taught and in regards to the 
knowledge of pedagogy for best educating students. Research, similarly, requires teaching, as it 
must be expressed and shared with others. The consumption of knowledge by the public requires 
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that it be taught, even if only in the most narrow sense of being shared. More broadly, research 
as understood through our communal dialectic as evidenced by the codes of ethics of 
professional associations discussed in this dissertation, is wholly grounded in teaching. Simply, 
the drive to be a good teacher necessitates the drive to be a good researcher. Thus, being a good 
researcher is similarly contingent on being a good teacher, because teaching drives the need for 
research. This mutual interdependence that cannot rationally be uncoupled mimics the 
interdependence of the lifeworld and the systemsworld. 
It is important to note that an understanding of Habermas suggests that the uncoupling of 
the lifeworld and the systemsworld is not necessarily bad, insofar as it is productive, and entails 
modernity. Moreover, the freedom from social identity itself allows for engagement with the 
lifeworld that is impossible without reflection on the lifeworld through the systems perspective. 
Consideration of the potential analogous relationship constructed here, however, gives one pause 
in regards to Habermas’ own perspective of such decoupling. Given the damage done to 
education and to the notion of educator when such decoupling becomes more than a useful 
heuristic device, perhaps review of the decoupling of the lifeworld and the systemsworld is 
similarly, and innately, harmful. It may well be that our observation of the damages done in 
education by the numerous systems segregation—teaching from scholarship, research from 
teaching, the lifeworld of scholarship from the systemsworld of research, and so on—is only the 
result of the commodification greed that seems to motivate most—if not all—social systems in 
the world. I suggest, however, that the decoupling may act as an evacuating device: to view the 
lifeworld through the systemsworld is to view it through a lens that cannot grant meaning. Thus, 
the primacy of the systemsworld in the States has evacuated what should be the dialectical 
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productivity of modernity of meaning. Meanwhile, to view the systemsworld through the 
lifeworld perspective is to infuse it with meaning, perhaps even inaccurately so, yet such 
meaning-making is necessary for human purpose-making and understanding.  
In the same way in which the unchecked and un-reflected uncoupling of the lifeworld and 
the systemsworld is damaging, so is the uncoupling of teaching and research. The colonization of 
the lifeworld of teaching by the systemsworld has ramifications that reverberate far beyond 
concerns for the role crisis experienced by the professoriate and into the policymaking that 
determines the treatment of students by an institution. 
For a public domain such as the schools, the analogous demand for deregulation and 
debureaucratization meets with resistance. The call for a more strictly pedagogical 
approach to instruction and for a democratization of decision-making structures is not 
immediately compatible with the neutralization of the citizen's role; it is even less 
compatible with the economic system-imperative to uncouple the school system from the 
fundamental right to education and to closecircuit it with the employment system. From 
the perspective of social theory, the present controversy concerning the basic orientations 
of school policy can be understood as a fight for or against the colonization of the 
lifeworld. (Habermas, 1985, p. 371) 
Moreover, in the context of teaching and research, when it is the systemsworld that drives the 
lifeworld, meaning is lost and the horizons of the lifeworld diminish, and when it is research that 
drives teaching, the value of knowledge and the value of students can be forgotten in favor of the 
demand that as much knowledge be produced as possible. This knowledge production would no 
longer be understood even in Markie’s correspondence sense of justified true beliefs acquired by 
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students, but instead as marks and statistics on paper of interest. When teaching drives research, 
students are not in danger of misuse by professors because it is never forgotten that the value of 
research is to benefit students and the community. Conversely, when the systemsworld of 
research drives the lifeworld of teaching, professors may lose sight of the value and meaning that 
established the need for research in the first place.  
Praxis 
This correlation between the lifeworld-systemsworld and teaching-research pairs of 
course treats this particular understanding of research as a functional producer of information. 
This understanding of research, however, should not be confused with “scholarship.” I suggest 
that scholarship is a lifeworldly endeavor invested in numerous values such as the worth of 
knowledge, understanding existence, producing purpose, and the establishment of meaning. 
Thus, it may be possible to reduce one’s understanding of teaching to a systemsworld 
“dissemination” and find a similar correlation and series of problems that arise when the 
systemsworld of “teaching dissemination” drives the lifeworld of scholarship. The reduction of 
teaching to a systemsworld dissemination is more difficult because of the Habermasian 
assumptions that undergird teaching and care. I mention it, however, because, as the U.S. system 
is becoming increasingly systemsworld-oriented, such a reduction may be taking place and 
merits further research.  
Particularly, one realizes that the popularity of online education, particularly mass-online 
education, may result a sublimation of scholarship to a dissemination, or diploma-market, end. 
Thus, the reduction of the import of good scholarship found in many schools that are under 
increasing pressure to graduate students for quantifiable purposes may be understood as the 
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result of decoupling teaching from the lifeworld of scholarship. Moreover, this understanding 
may explain why such a decoupling has already taken place in the k-12 system. Because teaching 
is not recognized as scholarship and because k-12 teachers are under greater and greater pressure 
to produce students who can perform certain functions on standardized exams, and graduate 
students regardless of any concerns for the students’ whole educational welfare, fewer and fewer 
primary and secondary school teachers live in the lifeworld of scholarship. This is not to say that 
they do not exist in the horizons of scholarship as a teaching enterprise, but one does note that as 
the demand and respect for scholarly activity diminishes, teachers seem less and less motivated 
by education and knowledge and are more and more motivated by quantifiable ends such as pay 
and student pass rates.  
Consider for example, anecdotally, my shock at how many teachers simply show movies 
during the last week of high school. My own students were incensed that I continued to work 
with them for educational purposes; we continued to teach and learn. The rationale behind my 
colleagues’ behavior seemed to waver between fatigue and the fact that there were no more 
exams for the students to take—thus further embedding in the students’ minds that, despite our 
claims to the contrary, that it really is only the exams that matter. Once having completed the 
exam, there is no more reason to learn. I suggest that this reduction of the worth of learning is 
due to the sublimation of scholarship to the systemsworld of dissemination, an activity that is 
now confused with teaching. It also explains why students who do poorly and are in danger of 
not graduating high school may still be granted a diploma by removing them from their 
nonacademic courses, removing them from the courses that are not necessary for graduation, and 
removing them from the course that they do need to graduate (most often English 4) so that they 
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can complete the “course” using a computer program. Having done so, the student demonstrates 
that sufficient information has been disseminated and a high school diploma can be conferred. 
This is all to say that the role of teacher and the role of researcher are, to use Biddle’s 
terminology, interdependent. We can parse the definitions out in many ways, but if they are both 
forms of scholarship, each definition is only a single perspective of a greater whole that cannot 
actually be broken apart without evacuating the components of meaning.  
The normative implications for faculty roles then begin to emerge and praxis reached—
the theoretical becomes embodied, and in this case the embedded suppositions become the 
driving normative force of applied ethical action. The foundational necessity of the lifeworld and 
the supervenience of the systemsworld upon it creates a series of rational normative implications 
for the roles of teacher and researcher. If the systemsworld cannot drive the lifeworld without the 
evacuation of meaning of the lifeworld, and there is an analogous connection between the roles 
of teacher and of researcher, then researcher roles cannot drive teacher roles. This is simply 
evidenced, again, by results such as researchers using their own students for research purposes to 
the detriment of their students. If the professor is driven by a systemsworld perspective of 
researcher, and the lifeworldly value of the students is lost or forgotten, then harm may be done 
to the students, and the very purpose of teaching is lost.  
The foundational nature of the lifeworld results in a series of foundational axiomatic 
presuppositions that ground the lifeworld of teaching and of scholarship. Teaching, as the 
intersubjective dialectic analyzed through chapter 4 indicates, must  
 include all voices 
 be oriented toward the welfare of the community 
342 
 
 be beneficent—oriented towards doing good selflessly for individuals, and 
 foster free thought and inquiry. 
To eliminate any of these is to create a definition of teaching that is contradictory to the very 
essence of what we mean when we say “teacher.”  To understand teaching as lifeworldly is then 
to recognize teaching as dependent on research but also that which drives research, as is 
evidenced by the codes of ethics established by professional associations discussed here. 
Teaching, in the epistemology of the lifeworld, is, I suggest, best understood as “caring 
scholarship.” One may engage in scholarship without care, but one may not do so and be a 
teacher. The very impetus for teaching is care, and that care is absolutely essential for the 
effectiveness of the teacher, and for maintaining the lifeworldly beneficence embedded in our 
notion of teacher. Thus, there are many ways to engage scholarship, but when done so with care, 
one is doing so as a teacher. 
One may reply, “But if scholarship includes scholarship of discovery, then that would 
assume that one is teaching even when one reads something of interest.” I am willing to assent to 
that proposition without losing any of the meaning or power of the idea of caring scholarship. 
One can be a teacher of oneself, and there is a great deal of Eastern philosophy that supports the 
notion that finding enlightenment often requires silencing external voices. Moreover, one is 
engaging with a teacher through the act of caring about the knowledge. Even if the 
“disseminator” of the information was not a teacher, and did not care, the reader, through the act 
of caring, turns the work into a teaching work; she creates for herself a teacher in the same way 
that Marcel Duchamp looked at a snow shovel and turned it into art, not by changing the snow 
shovel, but by changing perspective. The disseminator is thus transformed, perhaps unwillingly, 
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into a teacher—the intersubjective roots of agency and selfhood go far deeper than a prima facie 
understanding of meaning-making through conversation, but reach into the rich earth of the 
plurality of voices generated by minds that understand themselves as Self and Other. We are 
reminded of Mead and the heart of symbolic interactionism, that the world is generated through 
our dialogical interpretation of symbols, our social definitions of reality. It is the perception that 
is key to the construction of meaning, and it is our perception, though communally defined, that 
grounds our world creation. 
It is essential to remember that it is through our intersubjective dialogue that we voice 
others. That voicing brings with it tremendous power, as well as danger. That power is the power 
to experience a work of art and its intention in ways never intended by the artist, who now 
“speaks to you” in a radically new way. The artist is voiced, and the intersubjective dialogue 
continues, as we seek to include others and their perspectives. This Habermasian 
intersubjectivity is at the heart of professorship. Through both the act of teaching and the act of 
research, the professor reaches out into the world to both share and acquire knowledge and 
understanding. She voices her students in order to empathize with them, recognize their needs, 
and provide the right mentor for them, and she voices the often long-dead scholars who share 
new insight with her through her prose.  
Her own publication is a teaching act, driven by care for the community in order to meet 
the needs of others. Recall the rational result of the dialectical logic of discourse ethics: 
All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects that general observance can 
be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone's interests, and the consequences 
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are preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for regulation. (Habermas, 1985, 
p. 65) 
The understanding of the caring scholar as one who engages the multiplicity of voices, the 
chorus that constructs the lifeworld in order to facilitate the production of meaningful human 
agency, is grounded in the course conclusion of discourse ethics—that all affected, and I suggest 
all potentially affected, matter. Caring scholarship is a way of meeting the Habermasian 
principle of universality in order to understand the needs of others, to give them a place in the 
dialectic through research (perhaps through interviews, perhaps through reading, perhaps through 
observation), and it is an attempt to provide for them the scholar’s own voice, to be voiced by 
them in order to either meet with their approval or become subject to their correction.  
This work is such a voicing. It is my attempt to both voice numerous other theorists, 
while at the same time sharing my own voice for the purposes of bringing the work of Biddle, 
Noddings, Habermas, and the others into our communal dialectic, while at the same time 
opening myself to the corrections of others who find flaws in this rationality or who determine 
the norms prescribed to be invalid because I have not taken into account the needs of all. 
The final synthesis must take into account Habermas’ own potential failure to include all 
voices as indicated by Honneth. The production of identity, through Honneth’s theory of 
recognition, requires that we not only engage others in dialectic but that we seek to recognize our 
own dependence on the recognition of others for the formation of the self. Our identity formation 
through our communal dialectic is not just a matter of engagement in others in rational discourse; 
it is the recognition of our collective interdependence on the Other for our very existence. As 
argued by Kögler, it is the agency of the Other that allows for our existence as an Other through 
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the exchange of perspectives. Thus, the conjunction of professor roles as established through the 
dialectical analysis here suggests that professors do not just voice their students, do not just 
recognize their students, but they exchange perspectives with their students and with the 
community that constructs their identity as professors. That perspective exchange, that shared 
voicing, enables the professor to empathize with and care for the students more effectively, but 
also enables her to understand how she is experienced and created not just by her students but by 
the communal dialectic and the Others who construct and recognize her—hence the dependence 
and obligation engendered through the act of professorship.  
Like all agents, professors are dependent on others for identity formation. That identity, 
however, takes on additional obligations, as it includes the scholar roles of teacher and 
researcher. A professor is formed as an advocate for knowledge, a mentor for students, a 
producer of understanding. She is required, by the very definitions that bind her, and the agents 
who create her, to do good for the community as a scholar, and thus as a teacher and as a 
researcher.  
The result of the conclusions reached here is a radical reconstruction, a new etymology of 
professorship. The construct of professor, informed by the presuppositions revealed by the 
reviewed text that professors promote free thought and inquiry, respect all voices, and follow a 
teleology of beneficence oriented toward the welfare of the community, results in an 
understanding of professor grounded in robust care—care for students, care for knowledge, care 
for colleges, care for the institutions that promote free thought, and care for the many 
communities not only in which she participates, but for which she has the potential to do good. 
The new etymology bursts a Derridian understanding of the professor as “one who professes” 
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and replaces it with a notion that remains outwardly engaged, but grounded in lifeworldly 
intention. She who professes, she who disseminates, is vulnerable to the uncoupling of the 
lifeworld from the systemsworld; she is vulnerable to the colonization of the lifeworld by 
systemsworld functional values because she is not necessarily professing for a narrative.  Our 
linguistic constructs need not have correlation between their signifier and their signified, 
between the speech act and the concept to which it refers. Thus, I propose critical etymology—
the revisioning of language to meet critical theoretical ends.  By “critical etymology” I gesture 
toward Paulo Freire (1970) and Habermas simultaneously. Freire’s 1970 Pedagogy of the 
Oppressed generates the construct of “critical pedagogy” by conjoining the pedagogical act with 
the passion-driven intellectual freedom production of critical theory in action. Thus, education, 
by Freire’s, and other critical pedagog’s, lights was an action that should be grounded in helping 
student uncover the hidden meanings, authorities, and frameworks that generate their 
epistemology, thereby enabling students to recognize marginalization, manipulation, and both 
obvert and subtle acts of control.  
Critical etymology, like critical theory and critical pedagogy, engages examination of the 
intersubjective dialectic that produces constructs while also engaging the perspective that critical 
pedagogy, vis-à-vis Freire, should be a constructive engagement driven by a teleology of 
beneficence—to engage research that itself seeks to better the lot of the marginalized. So by 
“critical etymology” I mean to conjoin the Derridian deconstructive act of term analysis with a 
normative intersubjective beneficent enterprise. To engage in critical etymology is to both seek 
to define and redefine terms that 1) produce better understanding in the context of our 
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hermeneutic dialectical frame and 2) produces normative definitions—“should” definitions that 
can acknowledge “this is not what term x does mean, but this is what it could and should mean.” 
If “professor” is defined through the conglomeration of faculty handbooks, the role is one 
largely best described as a series of institutional responsibilities. To deconstruct the term 
suggests that professors “profess.” There is little to suggest, then, that, in tandem, these two 
definitional understandings of professorship move beyond the systemsworld and engage the rich 
intersubjectivity of the lifeworld. Simply, that a professor should care, foster learning, and 
engage in an interdependent dialectic of knowledge building with students is relegated to 
connotative implications and associations of the term “professor.” Problematically, our 
understanding of “professor” leads to tremendous role ambiguity. Professors are denotatively 
defined in one way, but connotatively defined in others. Professors find themselves most clearly 
defined through the systemsworld of their institutions while, potentially, motivated to teach for 
lifeworldly motivations. Let us redefine professorship, then, untether it from its systemsworld 
groundings, and ground it once again in the lifeworld—ground it in a notion of scholarship that 
is inclusive, holistic, free, and most importantly, beneficent. Simply, let us engage in a critical 
theoretical act, an act of critical etymology, and take hold of our definitions and mold them for 
the purpose of generating the best possible social outcome. If it is language that constructs the 
world, there is no reason to ignore the power one has to shape the world through language.  
This notion of critical etymology hinges on more than a kind of post hoc prima facie 
understanding of speech acts as reflecting the world. Rather, what is proposed here is a 
redefining, and thus re-constructing, of the world hinged upon declarative speech acts and 
performativity. To redefine oneself, for example, as “American” in order to exit British rule, is to 
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do more than provide a new name to an old object; it is to generate an entirely new construct. 
Constructs, recall, are not physically instantiated; their construction hinges on our social 
interaction, and it is through that symbolic mediation and dialectic that they are created and 
destroyed. We are reminded of our previous discussion of Hacking’s discussion of social 
constructs. As such a construct, the formulation developed here not only describes an existing 
reality—the construction of “teacher” and “researcher” as generated through our embedded 
presuppositions—but also constructively produces a new integrated reality of existing faculty. 
The construct is a radical, yet backward-looking, reconstruction of a physical instantiation in the 
world: faculty members. I suggest that those agents, however, who also participate in the 
construct “professor” while simultaneously being the construct “professor” should encompass 
“teacher” and “researcher” roles through the mediating concept of “scholarship” as the praxis 
correlated term to professor thus alleviating much role ambiguity for a beneficent purpose. 
“Professor,” thus, is not just redefined, nor is it just deconstructed; it is re-constructed, critically, 
to the end of benefiting the agents who co-create its reality, instantiation, and meaning.  
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CHAPTER 6: IMPLICATIONS, SUGGESTIONS, AND REFLECTIONS 
Summary of Concerns and Analysis Established in Previous Chapters 
 In the case of philosophical analysis it is often appropriate to go a step beyond the 
summarization of findings. Philosophy, as a self-reflective enterprise, requires of the thinker that 
she consider the implications of her ideas for others as well as for herself. Thus, this work 
warrants a sixth chapter that itself specifically focuses on the “What now?” that results from the 
findings discussed previously. Not only does the self-reflective gesture act as additional means 
by which to establish credibility, it acts as further demonstration of the very hermeneutic 
inclusive dialectic discussed throughout the dissertation. Simply, this final chapter seeks to 
include the reader in the communicative positioning of the author in such a way that both 
acknowledge the author’s phenomenal epistemology while acknowledging the externality of the 
reader to that positioning. I seek to include you in what, hopefully, becomes less a didactic 
statement of my own thoughts and more a dialectical engagement with other minds. 
 This work has attempted to understand the conjunction of faculty roles of “teacher” and 
“researcher” as well as generate a best construct for the generation of those roles. The 
dissertation has, firstly, established the developing tension between the roles of faculty as 
“teacher” and as “researcher.” An increasing number of articles engage the role conflict between 
the two, particularly as constructed by post-secondary institutions. Conflicts range from ethical 
concerns about the misuse of students for SoTL research to the reduction of quality research and 
institutional pressure to graduate more students. These tensions seem to be the result of 
conflicting societal, economic, and academic pressures that require institutions to hold the 
professoriate to greater accountability by requiring faculty to publish more and demonstrate their 
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worth through significant and quantifiable publication while professors receive pressure from 
institutions to fail fewer students, teach more, and focus on the practical endeavor of bringing as 
many students to educational institutions in order to maintain funding. The result of these 
tensions highlights the need for more research concerning the consequences of dividing teaching 
and research and pitting them against each other, as well as for establishing what the best vision 
for the conjunction of faculty roles should look like.  
 Review of the literature established that there is significant development in sociological 
and philosophical understandings of roles. The work of Bruce J. Biddle has established role 
theory as a mainstream model for understanding humans as actors who participate in and 
perform societal scripts. The theoretical models for role theory, however, remain divided and 
often are limited to particular perspectives of human interaction, noticeably leaving out the 
importance of dialectic and community in the understanding of script performance. In light of the 
development of communitarian and hermeneutic understandings of identity formation, this work 
forwards a new perspective on role theory—“community dialectical” role theory, a conjunction 
of organizational role theory and symbolic interactionist role theory. Community-dialectical role 
theory understands human actors as engaged in numerous roles established through numerous 
community constructs, each of which providing inscribed, enunciated, and covert scripts that 
govern human action while at the same time understanding those actors as developers of the 
scripts of the Other through symbolic interaction through the holism of social dialectic. Thus, the 
dissertation established “role theory” as the theoretical framework and “community-dialectical” 
role theory as the conceptual framework. 
351 
 
 In identifying the best methodological means by which to answer the research questions 
posed by the dissertation, it was established that it would need to first delve into the most basic 
understandings of roles as generated by social definition and discourse. Thus, the method of 
“philosophical analysis” was determined to be the best means by which to develop understanding 
of roles while at the same time generating a construct that could be applied to the generation of 
those roles and a means by which to reduce role ambiguity both in terms of those who seek to 
understand faculty roles. It was also determined to be the best means by which to reduce the very 
role ambiguity potentially experienced by those in the professoriate who find themselves, as 
agents manifested through the symbolic interactions that generate their role expectations, defined 
in a multiplicity of conflicting ways. Due to the fact that philosophical analysis is an under-
discussed research methodology in educational leadership, the dissertation both justified and 
demonstrated the use of philosophical analysis in chapter 3.  
The dissertation explored what “philosophical analysis” means and established that there 
is a history of educational work that uses philosophical methodology. That work, however, often 
limits itself to conceptual analysis, focusing solely on the rigorous development of and 
understanding of definitions. After the linguistic turn, however, a broader understanding of 
philosophy is possible: philosophy is not limited to being a tool for definition, but is also the 
holistic lived-experience of rigorous inquiry. Thus, discourse ethics and hermeneutic 
understandings of human experience through engagement in the robust social dialectic that 
comprises human life was determined to be the best means by which to pursue this research 
project. Discourse ethics enabled the researcher to both investigate the presuppositions that 
axiomatically ground and generate faculty roles while at the same time providing a framework 
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for developing a normative construct that can guide institutional formation of those roles and 
reduce the role ambiguity that results, conceptually, from the tensions generated by the 
systemsworld and lifeworld  when placed in irrational opposition.  
 In order to engage a robust picture of faculty roles the dissertation engaged in a 
philosophical document analysis. A series of texts including faculty handbooks, professional 
association ethical codes, and philosophical writings on professorial responsibilities were 
analyzed. As these works were analyzed, a series of themes emerged. Perhaps most obvious was 
the disjunction between the tendency of the handbooks to engage a systems-approach to the 
presentation of roles and the tendency of the philosophical documents to engage the lifeworld 
perspective. The handbooks often focused on hierarchical and organizational necessities of 
institutional life, spending very little time understanding faculty in terms of broad relationships 
with each other, the institution, and the students. Interestingly, however, they tended to engage 
the lifeworld when discussing the mission, values, and philosophies of the institutions. Still, the 
longer documents, in particular, did little to exhibit that concern for those lifeworldly values in 
the actual inscription of faculty expectations.  
The importance of lifeworld values, however—as presuppositions that regulate the 
generation of faculty roles—became even clearer when the handbooks were considered in 
conjunction with the professional codes of ethics. The codes of ethics inscribe the requirements 
of beneficence, free thought, and community engagement as essential to the role of the professor. 
When reflecting on the handbooks, one finds that expectations of mentorship, the promotion of 
free thought, and responsibility are similarly presuppositions espoused, particularly in the values 
statements of the universities. These themes were further emphasized by the philosophers 
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considered in chapter 4 who, without exception, had extremely high standards of the 
professoriate as both invested teachers and scholars. The sole tension between them was concern 
for the definition of scholarship—as requiring journal publication or as a broader engagement in 
the world of knowledge and inquiry. The data do establish, however, that the construction of 
faculty roles through these documents does not give researching prominence over teaching. The 
documents present the two roles as deeply integrated and mutually interdependent—as roles that, 
through their conjunction, act to continually better each other thus eliminating much role 
ambiguity. 
To speak to the individual leaders who guide an institution, my home institution of the 
University of North Florida, for example, would be to suggest to them that reconceptualization 
and reframing of the organizational philosophy might be warranted. By this, I do not mean that 
the mission statement or the philosophy as stated by the university are themselves flawed. 
Rather, I suggest that to engage in a discourse analysis of the actual behaviors of the university 
may reveal that the institution does not, as it claims, place students first. Moreover, it may be 
acting in tension to its own primary research goal of adding to the general body of knowledge by 
virtue of losing focus on the very purposes of research themselves. Simply, review of UNF 
would encourage its leaders to examine whether the institution has placed systemsworld goals 
first under the assumption that the institution’s admirable lifeworldly goals are met through the 
systemworld aims. In the same way that a high school may mistakenly place standardized test 
scores as more important than the holistic education of its students for their flourishing under the 
assumption that success on the standardized test is indicative of that flourishing, UNF may find 
that emphasis on quality control, quantifiable teacher evaluations, numbers of research 
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publications, retention, and graduation rates place secondary the most significant lifeworld goals 
for which the institution exists—the benefit leaners and through that benefit contribute to the 
knowledges that themselves serve humanity.  
If, for instance, the university is disinclined to categorize students as “a vulnerable 
population” due to the fact that such a categorization may make quality control more difficult 
insofar as a vulnerable population should not be subject to an institution’s research aims, it has 
lost direction and now acts contrary to its core purpose. –The result of which is likely to be 
faculty members who experience role ambiguity, cognitive dissonance, and career 
dissatisfaction, and they may be unsure why. Similarly, students may express that they feel 
manipulated and used by the institution. They may feel that despite the claims of the university, 
they are not placed first, and that they are savvy enough to know that such claims are only 
another manipulation used to accomplish university ends. Thus, the findings here encourage 
university leaders to engage in deep self-reflection regarding the very nature of their enterprise, 
to engage in robust dialectic with both the students and faculty, and to reexamine whether or not 
the institution is in fact that which it claims to be. Research suggests, though not necessarily at 
UNF, that faculty are experiencing such tension and ambiguity to greater and greater degrees as 
discussed in chapter 1. The goal of institutional leadership, to at least some degree, should be to 
resolve role tensions and role ambiguity.  
 Philosophical analysis of the data suggests that the role of faculty is in a tension that must 
be resolved before further role conflict divides the construct “professor” further. It is unclear 
why, given the data, there seems to be an increasing tension between the two roles, particularly 
the tendency to subjugate the role of teacher to that of researcher, but it may be due to an 
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analogous relationship between the pair “teacher” and “researcher” and the pair “systemsworld” 
and “lifeworld.” The systemsworld and the lifeworld are mutually interdependent, but the system 
may “colonize” the lifeworld when needed to organize the lifeworld and understand the lifeworld 
through the clear and efficient systemsworld lens obfuscates the necessity of the lifeworld as the 
driving force behind the generation of the system in the first place. The lifeworld values that 
generate the system may be so assumed as to be, at times, forgotten, in addition to being complex 
and difficult to quantify for economic aims. Regardless, what is most fundamental is the 
realization that, like the systemsworld-lifeworld dichotomy, the distinction between teacher and 
researcher is purely heuristic. Even more than the systemsworld and lifeworld understandings of 
human life, the roles of teacher and researcher are mutually dependent and inseparable, 
particularly when one understands “researcher” to mean scholar. 
 Scholarship is a necessity of teaching, and is at its best when, like the systemsworld, the 
lifeworld drives its instantiation. Scholarship, as more robustly defined in this dissertation, takes 
on the lifeworldly characteristics of dialectical inquiry and production of knowledge through 
participation with the community. Thus, there may be reason to believe that the production of 
knowledge through effective teaching in the classroom may, itself, qualify as scholarship. This 
gives us reason to conclude that institutions that emphasize scholarship as essential to the role of 
the professor should engage a more holistic and qualitative evaluation format for understanding 
their faculty as scholars. While perhaps messier and less efficient, such evaluation would better 
capture a robust understanding of the scholarship of their faculty while at the same time 
maintaining the primacy of the lifeworld of inquiry as a driving force behind the existence of the 
university. To do otherwise is to potentially lose the philosophical foundations of the institution 
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to the systemsworld perspective of management and organization, thus divorcing the university 
from the very scholarly values it seeks to uphold. To investigate the roles of the faculty from the 
discourse ethical and hermeneutic frames is to reveal the professor as best defined as a “caring 
scholar.”  
The definition of “teacher” is far too broad when understood through the context of the 
lifeworld to omit active and invested researchers from our understanding of “teacher.” Perhaps 
they are not in a classroom, but neither was Socrates, and to require that teaching be understood 
in such a limited way is to once again allow systemsworld efficiencies to dictate the values that 
are best driven by the lifeworld. The caring scholar, then, is a perspective of professor that 
understands her role as one of beneficence driven by care, free and rigorous inquiry, and respect 
for and participation in the community. This understanding of professor not only emerges from 
the examination of the presuppositions that govern our dialectical understanding of professor, but 
emerge logically from an understanding of the Habermasian principle of universality: all voices 
must be included in the dialectical understanding of the professor, who, in order to ensure this, 
must be invested in the welfare of those voices, and through her scholarly engagement seeks to 
both understand and benefit those voices. This final stage of redefinition of the term “professor,” 
I term “critical etymology”—the defining of terms both through the investigation of the most 
basic dialectical axioms that govern our term-making while at the same time purposefully 
driving that term-making in a way as to better society. This critical etymology, I believe, 
emerges directly from discourse ethics as both a means by which to develop understanding 
through the investigation of the assumptions that govern our discourse and a means by which to 
engage the world ethically and logically through the inclusion of all voices.  
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Limitations of the Study  
 The limitations of this study are largely empirical. Although empirical data are analyzed, 
no experiment is conducted, and understanding is generated largely through logical analysis and 
engaged discourse. Thus, we cannot make any substantive conclusions regarding the actual 
instantiations of faculty roles by universities, nor can we articulate how faculty feel about those 
roles or live them. We are limited to an understanding of the roles as generated through analysis 
of a limited section of our social discourse. The work is primarily focused on construct 
development, and, as such, is itself a theoretical model that may be used by other works in order 
to understand how faculty roles are lived and actualized. As a theoretical model, the construct 
developed here carries with it the limitations of any theory and should be evaluated based on its 
conceptual merits. Thus, the work of Thomas Kuhn (1977), here, is used to assess the strengths 
and weaknesses of the developed construct and the understanding of faculty as “caring scholars.” 
 Kuhn articulated the following criteria for evaluation of theoretical models in science: 
1. Accurate: The theory is grounded in empirically sufficient observations and 
experimentation. 
2. Consistent: The theory is internally consistent and externally consistent with our other 
theories 
3. Broad Scope: The consequences of the theory extend beyond its original intention 
4. Simple: The theory is a simplest explanation; it does not multiply unnecessary variables 
5. Fruitful: The theory reveals new phenomena or relationships between them. 
 Kuhn’s criteria demonstrate, again, that the greatest limitation of this work is empirical 
experimentation. The work is grounded in a great deal of observation, however. Numerous 
358 
 
documents were reviewed and analyzed. Thus, although the work is not lacking in empirical 
grounding, the true test of its validity will be the application of the theory to lived world of 
faculty roles. Whether or not theorists determine the construct developed here to be sufficient for 
the explanation of their own observations cannot yet be determined. The work has specifically 
sought to produce a construct that is both internally consistent and consistent with the dialectical 
presuppositions that ground our role making. The work has sought to resolve unnecessary 
inconsistencies between the roles of teacher and researcher, as there need not be any. As the 
work is grounded in the embedded assumptions that generate faculty roles, the work is externally 
consistent.  
Implications of the Study 
The scope of the work is yet to be determined, yet there seems to be good reason to 
believe the work extends beyond the formation of faculty roles in post-secondary institutions. 
The work likely has implications for the evaluation of and importance of scholarship amongst k-
12 teachers, the understanding of researchers as teachers, and the use of philosophical analysis in 
educational research. The work has sought simplicity insofar as it has identified the common 
grounding axioms that emerge through an analysis of our discourse. In the redefinition of 
professor as “caring scholar,” the work seeks to ground professorship in the most fundamental 
lifeworld values possible without the inclusion of extraneous variables that, themselves, can be 
addressed through consistent application of the construct. Upon reflection, I do believe the work 
to be fruitful, though that conclusion is better determined by other theorists. It does, at least, shed 
light on our communal understanding of and generation of faculty roles. Thus, using Kuhn’s 
359 
 
criteria, the work does appear to, within the limitations of philosophical analysis, address those 
limitations and provide a functional construct that itself can be evaluated and used to evaluate. 
Implications for Theory Development   
 There are tremendous implications for theory development as a result of this dissertation. 
There are numerous theoretical models that have been proposed by the author that themselves 
may be revised, expanded, criticized, and rejected. The notions of community-dialectical role 
theory, philosophy as a lived experienced of inquiry, professor as defined as “caring scholar,” 
and critical etymology are all themselves grounding for the development of theories that either 
rely upon those notions as constructs or axioms or ground themselves in the rejection of those 
concepts. Regardless, the work provides rich ground for other theorists to do significant work in 
developing their own models in response to the ideas forwarded here.  
Implications for Research  
 The implications for research are significant. The work challenges the systemsworld 
model of research and forwards instead a lifeworld epistemology of research that understands 
researchers as invested scholars—as teachers. The work challenges the systemsworld trend 
toward the use of students as participants in research—their work in particular—without their 
knowledge and consent. It reminds researchers that the very grounding of their enterprise is 
beneficence itself, and that if research uses others as a means to an end and does not seek to 
better the welfare of the community, as well as the participants, it is inherently flawed. The work 
challenges researchers to accept the heavy mantle of teacher in their work so that they are 
themselves reminded that care should be a primary drive behind human inquiry. The lust for 
knowledge is well-respected in this document, but we must remind ourselves, as Habermas did, 
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that it is the inclusion of voices in our dialectic that makes such dialogue possible in the first 
place. If our research is not inclusive, if it does not participate in the community, it is at odds 
with the very core of what it means to be a scholar.  
Implications for Leadership, Policy Formulation, and Implementation 
 As a dissertation completed within a department of educational leadership, it is important 
to note its implications for leadership. Of course, prima facie, the answer is obvious: “teachers 
are leaders; therefore this work applies to leaders insofar as they are teachers.” Such an answer, 
however, glosses over the depth of the discourse ethical construct and its implications for 
leadership. What kind of leaders are teachers? Moreover, what are the implications for 
administrators and leaders in education who do not, at least as we commonly define it, teach? I 
will consider below that a way to frame this question is to understand teaching and those who 
participate in the teaching enterprise through administration as engaged in what our embedded 
assumptions reveals to be “servant leadership.” Simply, to analyze our dialectical framing of 
teaching reveals that teaching is a kind of service—it seeks to benefit those who are taught. In 
service to students, teachers act as mentors (as the analysis of university handbooks has 
repeatedly revealed) guiding students on paths that the teachers themselves have already begun 
to clear. Thus, both serving and leading are implicit and embedded in our most basic dialectical 
understanding of teacher, and those who administrate cannot administrate effectively without 
recognizing that service is the goal and leading is the means.  
 Servant leadership as discussed by Robert K. Greenleaf (1991) described the servant-
leader as a “servant first” (p. 13). The desire to lead, or perhaps the necessity of it, emerges from 
the desire to serve. According to Greenleaf, servant leadership “begins with the natural feeling 
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that one wants to serve, to serve first. Then conscious choice brings on to aspire to lead. That 
person is sharply different from one who is leader first, perhaps because of the need to assuage 
an unusual power drive or to acquire material possessions” (p. 13). The goals of the servant 
leader, therefore, are to benefit those whom they serve, rather than themselves. Greenleaf 
suggested that the best test for such leadership was to ask,  
Do those who are being served grow as persons? Do they, while being served, become 
healthier, wiser, freer, more autonomous, more likely themselves to become servants? 
And, what is the effect on the least privileged in society; will they benefit, or, at least, not 
be further deprived? (pp. 13-14) 
Thus, Greenleaf suggested, the best means by which to ascertain if one is in fact a servant leader 
it to examine impact one has on followers and all stakeholders.  
 Greenleaf’s criteria clarify a potential tension created by those totalitarian leaders who 
seem to benefit their own people. Perhaps through that leader’s actions, the national will of the 
people is enacted, though Greenleaf suggested that one must also take into account the least 
privileged in society. The impact on other stakeholders, even outside of the scope of one’s 
“official” leadership capacity matters. Without stating it as such, Greenleaf’s work gestures 
towards the inclusion of the Other.  
The implications, then, for this work on our understanding of educational leadership is to 
recognize that the professor, as a teacher, is defined at her conceptual core as a servant leader. 
The implication of service, however, goes beyond serving students in the case of professorship, 
as the previous works discussed here also suggest that the professor has role obligations to 
knowledge and to her community. Thus, as a leader she remains a servant to her students, to 
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knowledge, and to the community. That service is verbalized through the university faculty 
handbooks and the philosophies of thinkers like Markie and Noddings as descriptions of the roles 
that should be played by faculty. Discourse analysis suggests that service defines professorship, 
and perhaps this is where some tensions and role ambiguity for professors lie. If professors are 
treated as if they are better and more important than the students, or if, implicitly or explicitly, 
professors are encouraged to place their research (and thus their own prestige and the prestige of 
the university) above the welfare of the students, then the professor fails to be a servant both to 
the students and, I contend, to knowledge itself.  
Publication for the purpose of tenure, prestige, and institutional obligation is not service 
to discourse, understanding, or even to some vague notion of truth. It is service to ends that can 
compromise the integrity of one’s research. Hastily written articles published out of desperation, 
requirement, and greed are far less likely to engage the deep, diligent, and highly reflective 
inquiry that best helps promote human understanding. Furthermore, such a shift in focus away 
from service to students and their community engages the students as subjects rather than 
participants in professors’ research projects as well as decreases the likelihood of a truly robust 
and engaged communicative action between students and teachers as builders of knowledge 
together. What is lost is the idea of the servant leader, according to the discourse-ethical 
framework, which transforms the leader into someone who empowers the other, who is both 
leader and servant, who is willing to exchange the roles between all participants so as create the 
conditions for building a truly shared and rational community. Caring scholarship is lost; one 
cares less about student welfare, generative understanding, and community welfare and more 
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about systemsworld bureaucratic ends for the perpetuation of an institution and a career that may 
no longer serve the primary ends of education.  
The obligations that define professorship suggest that Greenleaf’s criteria may be an 
effective means by which to ascertain the effectiveness of a professor as servant leader as well as 
of an institution insofar as it promotes, enables, and actualizes service. One only need ask oneself 
if the professor or the institution in fact benefit students and the community robustly and 
holistically; conferral of degrees is insufficient. Consider the fact that Thomas Jefferson would 
not allow the conferral of degrees at the University of Virginia. He believed them to be 
pretentious and argued that truly devoted learners would learn to better themselves regardless of 
a degree. The tendency of institutions to justify their actions by the belief that “students are 
benefited by the conferral of a degree, and to increase the prestige of the degree is to increase 
that benefit” moves away from our own deeply embedded understanding of the import of 
educational pursuits—that education itself is valuable. Learning is essential to flourishing. I 
would like to suggest the ever-increasingly contentious proposition that students are more 
benefited by learning than they are by degrees. This is not to say that institutions should not be 
concerned about taking students’ money without providing a genuine benefit. This may, rather, 
suggest that at its core education is harmed insofar as it becomes profit-seeking.  
To educate for the purpose of money, to charge students, compromises the intrinsic value 
of education. The educational act becomes a capitalistic exchange wherein if students cannot 
make their money back, their education has been a waste. The simple solution, conceptually, is 
to make post-secondary education free. Thus, even those students who exit their institutions 
without high-paying jobs have not financially indebted themselves for “no reason.” One wonders 
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if institutions will, for much longer, be able to continue to justify their worth beyond degrees. As 
general education requirements are cut, humanities eliminated, and students rushed through their 
degree programs, one wonders if our institutions of “higher-learning” can continue to justify 
such a lofty (and rather offensive to k-12 institutions) label. Perhaps “institutions of the fewest 
number of years possible in order to attain a degree that will make you money” would be a better 
descriptor.  
This document, then, promotes the idea that service is one of the most effective means by 
which to evaluate the effectiveness of a professor and of educational institutions. However, even 
to recognize teaching as a kind of servant leadership is insufficient for understanding the full 
depth of the implications of this work for leadership; reflection on teaching as a kind of service 
in which one places the needs of others in primacy over one’s own needs (particularly as those 
whom are served are a vulnerable population) is insufficient, as one still wonders, “How do the 
findings reflect on leadership in general?” 
 The answer to the question, “What are the implications for this work on leadership?” 
emerges when one reflects on the fact that leadership, itself, can be understood from either a 
systemsworld or a lifeworld perspective not unlike professorship. Simply, more positivist notions 
of charismatic leadership like those explored by Max Weber (1922/1958) place the systemsworld 
as primary. Other concepts of leadership such as servant leadership and authentic leadership 
engage the idea that at the core of the leadership construct is the imperative to do good and to 
help those who are led. Thus, the same tensions that challenge the university challenge the very 
notion of leadership. If the prevailing notion of leadership is one grounded in the idea that one 
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should serve the system rather than the lifeworld a conceptual crisis arises because the core 
motivation for leadership is placed as secondary to systemworld aims. 
 In saying this, one recognizes that the world seems motivated by systemsworld leaders. 
Greenleaf argued that, “we live in the age of the anti-leader, and our vast educational structure 
devotes very little care to nurturing leaders or to understanding followership” (1991, p. 4). Both 
research and anecdotal experience seem to suggest that we desire charismatic, powerful leaders 
who will place the good of the system over individual needs. Certainly the shift in linguistic 
understanding of The United States from These United states after the Civil War suggests that 
our general social impetus is towards unification and our glorification of leaders often hinges on 
their ability to sacrifice the needs of some in order to maintain, for example, “The Union.” While 
in the case of The United States the preservation of the Union had the tremendously beneficial (if 
not unintended) consequence of ending legalized slavery in the United States, other examples of 
the willingness of the population to embrace “unity” and charismatic leaders do not always end 
so happily. Napoleon, in particular, was so beloved for his power of unification that after both 
failure and exile the French people were willing to follow him once again into disaster.  
 The above is noted because it is a natural counter to the claim that leadership is, at its 
core, oriented toward doing good and service. To engage in a brief analysis, however, reveals 
that the underlying assumptions that motivate followers are beneficence-based, as they are 
oriented towards their well-being. Those who follow even inauthentic transformational leaders 
such as Hitler and Napoleon presumably do so because they believe it is in their own best 
interest, however much their true interest may either be distorted (as with racism or other 
abhorrent ideologies). The rise of nationalism in Europe during the Enlightenment only adds 
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credence to that claim. The very nationalism that would become twisted into fascism had its 
origins in the French revolution and German social philosophy. Thinkers such as Herder (1784), 
Fitch (1807) and Hegel (1820/1991) constructed arguments based on observation and reason to 
suggest that there were in fact groups of individuals that are best understood as a unity for their 
own well-being. The arguments of Fitch and Herder noted the ways in which location and 
language both function to generate a “family” of people. To quote Herder (1784), 
Nature brings forth families; the most natural state therefore is also one people, with a 
national character of its own. For thousands of years this character preserves itself within 
the people, and, if the native princes concern themselves with it, it can be cultivated in 
the most natural way; for a people is as much a plant of nature is a family, except that it 
has more branches. Nothing therefore seems more contradictory to the true end of 
governments than the endless expansion of states, the wild confusion of races and nations 
under one scepter. An empire made of a hundred peoples and 120 provinces which have 
been forced together is a monstrosity, not a state-body. (p.152) 
Those families of people, then, are themselves best understood as a unified group which is 
benefited by the preservation of the larger whole, suggested Herder. What one comes to realize is 
that there is a philosophical undercurrent that informs our understanding of leadership and 
followership.  
 G. W. Friedrich Hegel’s work, famously, brought the more simplistic arguments of Fitch 
and Herder into the philosophical realms of metaphysics and epistemology. While today we 
cannot follow this metaphysics of a trans-individual super subject, the state, his understanding of 
history and language rightly suggested that unification of a people transcended any physical 
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understanding. To be a rational individual agent, according to Hegel, was to understand the 
whole as necessary and as a rational incarnation of the summation of shared, unified wills. The 
Geist, spirit (or mind) that emerges, though not a physical entity, is the spirit that moves history, 
the collective will that results from the reasoning of many minds through time. To quote Hegel 
(1820/1991), 
The state is the actuality of the substantial will, an actuality which it possesses in 
the particular self-consciousness when this has been raised to its universality; as 
such, it is the rational in and for itself. This substantial unity is an absolute and 
unmoved end in itself, and in it, freedom enters into its highest right, just as this 
ultimate end possesses the highest right in relation to individuals [die Einzelnen], 
whose highest duty is to be members of the state. (1820/1991) 
The rational will of the substantial unity, then, is actualized by the emergent leader who may be 
described as the Geist personified. In our context, which is defined by the intersubjective 
communicative theory of discourse ethics, the leader’s role transforms from a charismatic leader 
to move masses, to one who empowers the agents to become rational participants in the shared 
construction of the state as community.  
 The fact that the human animal seems most motivated to follow powerful, aggressive, 
and often violent leaders is not evidence against the claim that leadership is grounded in 
beneficence and the search for one’s well-being, only that it is grounded in the belief in the 
rightness of personal beneficent teleology. The rationalizations that justify conquering, 
subjugating, or murdering others do not contradict the claim that leaders should be beneficent; 
they just add evidence to our belief that leaders should benefit us. It would be wholly irrational to 
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follow a leader who one believes will do one harm. So, at its conceptual core, leadership is 
grounded in beneficence. Otherwise, the very idea falls apart—i.e. Whatever a leader does, she 
had better benefit me, otherwise she will not have me as a follower. Yet, again, according to 
discourse ethics, the highest form of rationality is to understand that we have to develop the 
rational capabilities of agents, in our case the students, such that they can discern charismatic and 
fascist leaders form those that enable a democratic self-government, as Jefferson, for one, had in 
mind. 
 I suggest, then, that this normative core of beneficence is at the heart of many social 
tensions experienced by leaders today. The motion described by Gilligan of an ever-widening 
sphere of care and interest places many contemporary leaders in an untenable position. While at 
one time to be an industry leader may have meant only that one need benefit one’s stockholders, 
it is becoming increasingly difficult for leaders to maintain such narrow focus. The very idea of 
expanding beyond stockholders to stakeholders expressed the communal and care-based 
principle of expanding leadership such that everyone’s voice is heard, that everyone is led to 
realize their potential and receive the fullest ‘benefits’ from their education.  
 Historically speaking, what one comes to realize is that leadership has always been 
grounded in beneficence, or at least in its promise for some, and as the world becomes 
increasingly aware of the personhood the Other, leaders are expected to have broader and 
broader spheres of interest and a greater and greater capacity to maximize the benefit for many 
disparate persons. Such a positioning is already difficult, as the Hegelian unity may be untenable 
when the groups themselves are so diverse as to not share interests. (Note, however, that seeking 
such shared interest remains desirable, as those who do not may well find themselves at war due 
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to conflict of interests; discourse ethics and our application of its principles to teaching and 
research as servant scholarship are meant to promote a culture in which shared interest can be 
rationally determined by means of mutually respectful deliberation.) The deepest challenge, 
however, becomes the realization that in a capitalized system of commodification, leaders are 
expected to espouse and maintain systemsworld values while at the same time meeting the 
lifeworldly requirement that the hopes, dreams, and personal interests of the individual agents 
represented by that leader are simultaneously pursued and respected.  
The implications, then, for this work on Educational Leadership, then, is twofold: 1) 
Educational leaders leader are often either teachers or their role is to facilitate teachers in 
teaching and, thus, they are either servants to students, knowledge, and the community or they 
are servants to service. The findings here reveal that teachers and administrators have been 
placed in a conceptually untenable position that need not be so. Simple readjustment of our 
notions such that the lifeworld is given primacy would go a long way to resolve those tensions. 
2) Leadership, as a generalized construct, has at its conceptual core the assumption of 
beneficence. As leaders are mandated to benefit ever growing and ever more disparate 
populations, that teleology of beneficence must be maintained if the leader is to accomplish her 
aims, maintain her position, and maintain the integrity of the leadership notion. What is revealed 
here is that leadership itself is now suffering from the ever-increasing focus on the systemsworld 
and its bureaucracies as more important than the individual purposes and goals that result in the 
generation of the systemworld to actualize those goals in the first place. We claim that 
systemsworld leadership means the charismatic herd-following mass-oriented ‘leader,’ whereas a 
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servant leader ‘leads’ by empowering the agents involved in the community as a diversified yet 
shared unity.     
 Primarily, the work has sought to produce a construct that itself may be used to evaluate 
our instantiation of the professoriate. Rather than solely evaluating the professoriate through a 
systems perspective (graduation rates, failure rates, performance on surveys, and publication), 
the work proposes a holistic evaluation model based on the lifeworld of the professoriate. 
Professors should be understood and evaluated for their ability to engage and promote the 
lifeworld of learning, and such evaluation requires the inclusion of qualitative as well as 
quantitative measures. More importantly, such understanding requires that one view the 
professoriate and our evaluation of professors from a holistic perspective—the qualitative should 
not be reduced to the quantitative for efficiency and organizational purposes. Understanding the 
roles of professors requires a robust dialectic, inclusive of the communities that they serve. The 
implication, then, for educational policy is significant: this work requires of institutions a 
significant revision on their instantiation of professor. Not only should evaluation practices be 
revised to include lifeworldly values and evaluative measures, but the university should be 
challenged to replace the notion “researcher” with the notion “scholar” as a means by which to 
include the many different forms of research in which a scholar may participate.  
This work’s implication for practice is largely reflective and personal. The thrust of this 
work requires that practitioners of research and teaching reflect on themselves and whether or 
not they genuinely engage in their practice for beneficent, scholarly, and community-invested 
reasons. In the end, the ability of a university to actually determine if a professor is genuinely 
invested in the lifeworld of learning is impossible. One can only seek to observe the 
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consequences of one’s actions, which is already a systemsworld investigatory perspective, in 
order to infer that one does or does not hold the values espoused by the institution. While the 
consequences of the actions of an agent or an organization are rather telling in regards to their 
intentions, they do not enable the observation of the intentions themselves. For this reason, 
robust engagement in discourse is imperative. Professors must remain active in discourse, both 
inside and outside of the realm of academic publication. Their investment in communal dialectic 
regarding their own roles and the instantiation of those roles will play a determining role in the 
creation of “professor” into the future.  
Suggestions for Future Research  
How do professors understand their roles as teacher and as researcher? 
 How do university administrators and leaders understand the roles or teacher and 
researcher? 
 How do students understand the roles of teacher and researcher? 
 What measures do universities use to evaluate professors participation in the lifeworldly 
values of their institutions? 
 How do university IRB’s address the potential problems emerging of the use of student 
work in SoTL research? 
 Are the actual instantiated roles of faculty as teacher and researcher commensurable? 
 How do faculty understand “care” and its relationship to professorship? 
 Does role ambiguity in the professoriate produce cognitive dissonance, role stress, and 
role strain? 
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Reflections on the Study 
 The final component of this project enables the author to do three things: further ensure 
credibility through a reflexive process that enables transparency and true dialectic with the 
reader, share his own thoughts on the construct developed, and present final conclusions. Such a 
final reflection should provide a brief insight into the mind of the researcher, providing the 
reader with an opportunity for full engagement and the ability to reproduce the reasoning that 
results in the conclusions drawn through this work by virtue of participating in a moment of 
identity-sharing through dialogue with the author.  
 This work has been an opportunity for me to investigate a concern that has grown more 
and more pressing as I have spent the last 17 years as a post-secondary student. I have been a 
student at the University of North Florida, now, for the greater part of my life. While the 
university has afforded me the most amazing opportunities of my life, I have also become rather 
jaded regarding the educational enterprise, and I have a cynicism that has only gotten worse as I 
began teaching in high school. While I find that many of the educators I know are willing to 
recognize the problems caused by students—largely as a result of student apathy, ignorance, and 
laziness—I see little done to address the problems emerging from educators themselves.  
Perhaps only because I have come to know more about universities as I stay longer at my 
own institution, I feel as if I have seen a greater willingness on the part of educators and, more 
often, policy makers to do students harm. So in pursuing this project, my main concern was to 
look at a small portion of one tension that I experienced myself, and found an-ever increasing 
body of research to support—disengagement on the part of professors in favor of their research 
projects. I recall one well-respected professor once telling me that “pedagogy” was a term used 
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by the Education Department to avoid having to do real work. I recall also once being told by 
another professor not to work on a research project with someone because that person “only had 
an EdD.” In many ways, my experience has been one of dismissal and disregard in the academy 
for education—which, given the mission of the university itself, is fascinating.  
My years have presented me with numerous professors who seemed to have little 
engagement with their students, and I often wondered how it was that professors could actively 
do so much harm to their students. Once, as an undergraduate student, I had a professor say to a 
classmate and me something derogatory, homophobic, and accusatory all at the same time. That 
same professor still receives scathing criticisms on his student evaluations, yet his tenure protects 
him. I have seen, on the other hand, deeply invested professors who I came to love treated with 
tremendous disrespect and ushered out of the university for numerous reasons, but most tellingly 
because they do not publish enough, or do not publish in a way that is respected by their 
institution. Of course, as only a student, I do not see behind the scenes. So I do not know what 
other facts play a role in the institution’s treatment of its faculty, but even so, my heart goes out 
to them.  
Even as an adjunct, I never saw behind the scenes because, despite the deeply inclusive 
nature of the chair of the department I worked for, the university itself does not provide adjuncts 
with a voice. I was voiced only by my chair, and had he not seen fit to include adjuncts in faculty 
events, it simply would not have been so. I remain grateful to him to this day. Yet, the actions of 
the faculty I have known, who are truly invested in their students, stand out to me, and that fact I 
find concerning. Deep concern, deep inclusiveness, the willingness to do whatever is necessary 
for those to whom we, as teachers, have committed our lives, should be the rule, not the 
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exception. It was for this reason that I chose the members of my committee that I did. These 
members are not only experts; they are faculty members who I could say from personal 
experience were always willing to help their students. We have not always agreed on what is best 
for students, and I can honestly say that I have been in severe arguments with everyone on my 
committee before and during my dissertation, both academically and sometimes, personally. Yet 
they have never given me reason to believe that they would not do what they believed was in my 
best interest as a student and as a person. They, I believe, are often the exception, and if I were to 
take a guess often find themselves at odds with an educational system that is becoming more 
corporatized and market-driven. So, I wanted to know what distinguished the best professors I 
know from the many I have experienced who seem at odds with themselves, with their students, 
or with education.   
At its heart, I think this dissertation demonstrates that there need be no division between 
the scholar and the teacher. My goal in pursuing this project was not to demonstrate the 
converse, though I hope that it has. My understanding of professors as researchers was an image 
of research that distracts and distances one from the on-the-ground, in-the-mud battle that is 
teaching. I was wrong. Our systemsworld perspective of research left me with a 
misrepresentation of the role of scholarship in professorship, and I do not believe that I am the 
only person who had been deceived by the systems perspective that is coming to dominate the 
university system. I have come to believe through my research that good teachers are always 
good scholars, by definition, and that the attempt to disentangle the two can only do harm to the 
lifeworld of learning.  
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 Reflecting on this work, I am in some ways concerned that it too clearly reveals my own 
positioning regarding care and education. I am deeply sympathetic to care theory, and wonder if 
I can justify basing education on care even without my own personal belief systems. Discourse 
ethics alleviates this concern, at least to a degree, due to its high level of objectivity and 
grounding in logic. To ground one’s ethic in logic may seem, at times, counterintuitive due to the 
highly affective perspective we take to ethics, but often yields the most intuitive results. It is not 
uncommon to criticize ethicists who seek to gain ethical insight through logic; they are accused 
of doing so due to a lack of emotional content, virtue, or care. Yet, thinkers like Kant, Rawls, and 
Habermas make demands of us that are not only extensive, but reasonable. It may well be that 
the human inclination to ground our ethical positions in intuitions and feelings primarily acts as a 
means by which to enable us to do what we want and justify it in a way we find most pleasing, 
which establishes a weaker foundation for ethics than objective rationality does. 
 Then, as it is the case that I am deeply concerned for the welfare of students, particularly 
at the hands of universities that tend to treat those students as wallets to be cleverly parted from 
their dollars, it is important that the conclusions I reach are not simply indicative of that concern. 
My own bias, my belief that the university system is quickly becoming a tool of marginalization 
rather than a force to combat it, may be wrong. Nevertheless, my intuition is that, fifty years 
from now, the privatization of the university system at the hands of those who seek a profit will 
be largely complete. By this, I do not mean that the private educational management companies 
will control all universities; that seems unlikely, and too obvious. Rather, I mean that our social 
system will continue to push the universities further and further toward the goal of producing 
producers.  
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The university system will function largely, if not solely, as a means by which to mass-
produce relatively literate workers who can engage in an economy of information. The 
institutions, themselves, will no longer truly promote free inquiry, lifelong learning, or deep 
critical and skeptical thought. Engagement in the humanities will give way to the need to 
“educate for work.” Literature will become an unjustifiable course offering when compared with 
composition, and composition will be considered at its best when it prepares students to write for 
employers. In fact, there are likely those who would read this paragraph itself (though I doubt 
they would be willing to suffer through the care-theoretical philosophical “mumbo-jumbo” that 
is the rest of the dissertation) who would articulate the exact opposite point. They would suggest 
that we do a disservice to students if we do not prepare them for work, and the lifeworldly 
question, “But does that mean we are preparing them to live?” would be seen as a needless 
complexity, and equivocation that is best left to be determined at home in a holy place. 
 I think that the professors, as they have come to believe that survival requires a job, just 
like everyone else, will allow themselves to be pushed further and further away from the 
lifeworldly values that brought them to scholarship in the first place. They will find themselves 
conceding more and more to the systemsworld in order to “survive” in a system that cannot, by 
its very definition, understand the value of what they do and who they are. Then, the universities 
will die. The human drive for full, flourishing agency will likely never end, but we seem, at least 
in the States, content to pretend that we are flourishing and to pretend that others care. Our 
demand that our universities are worthless unless we exit them with the ability to become 
wealthy will eliminate the drive for full and robust learning from education. 
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 This dissertation, itself, is just a shout into the void. We can theorize as much as we like, 
but we cannot change the fact that human beings are willing to trade lifeworldly investment in 
themselves for panem et circenses. We wish to be entertained and fed. Perhaps after the collapse 
of the university as we know it, centuries from now, there will be another resurgence of learning 
from the dark. Perhaps humanity will find itself despondent as it gropes around helplessly for 
meaning and once again recognize the import of the high energy state of learning for the purpose 
of producing agency. That time is not now, however. We are observing the close of the age of 
Enlightenment here in the U.S., if indeed we ever had one. Our greed is such an easily 
manipulated vice that we now allow others to educate our children into a system of 
indoctrination, marginalization, and meaningless work. In the end, I believe that “scholars who 
care” is a laughable notion in a society in which the systemsworld cannot quantify or recognize 
the value of care, or even the value of scholarship beyond the production of goods and power.  
 Thus I will conclude in the following way: Through this discussion of faculty roles, there 
is an essential component of the professoriate that has not been discussed: service. The reason for 
this omission being that the role of service, the role of “servant,” is no longer essential to 
professorship. Faculty members are pushed to teach, and pushed to publish, but they are not 
pushed to serve. True, they are required to participate on committees, but that is a dramatically 
evacuated systemsworld picture of service. Reading carefully, one might note that it may well be 
the lack of stewardship that allows for the uncoupling of teaching from scholarship in the first 
place. The idea that educators are servants—servants to students, servants to knowledge, servants 
to the community—has been lost to the idea that they must demonstrate service to the institution 
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by performing a functional committee role. I conjecture that it will become harder and harder to 
find institutions that allow community service to count for tenure and promotion as time goes on.  
Yet, it is that idea of service that is at the heart of caring scholarship, and, I believe, at the 
heart of education. It is the belief that, first and foremost, we are servants to others in need of our 
help that drives scholars to do the most good they can—to share their knowledge with others for 
no other reason than because it is the right thing to do. If, perhaps, when we hood our doctors 
and promote our professors, we considered those acts not just ones of celebration and merit, but 
of yoking, acts of solemn assimilation into a lifetime of service to a cause far greater than our 
individual selves, we could return our universities to their own best selves as servants to learners 
to the end of enlightening everyone.  
Epilogue 
As a final thought, it is important to note that little has been said about the implications of 
the shift in faculty roles for the roles of students. These two roles, however, are deeply 
intertwined. We cannot have one without the other—they act as a Derridian binary and define 
each other. Thus, shifts in faculty roles will significantly impact student roles. By my lights the 
shift in faculty roles as further defined solely in terms of the systemsworld has series and 
somewhat dystopian implications not just as consequences for students, but for the roles students 
play. As students become ever increasingly the servants of the intuition, meant to feed its need 
for funding as an ever replenishable supply of paying bodies the students take on a sacrificial 
quality.5  
                                                 
5 Here then we engage a kind of philosophical “thought experiment” both using discourse ethics and role theory to 
ask ourselves, “If faculty roles become x then what do the roles of students become?” We cannot know for sure 
what the consequences will be, but the implications of our sublimation of the professoriate to the systemsworld 
rather than to the lifeworld are ominous indeed.  
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I am reminded of Rene Girard’s (1977) Violence and the Sacred. Most eloquently, Girard 
described the deep need humanity feels for violence. The text suggests that the act of human and 
animal sacrifice was a means by which to mitigate and meet human demands for violence in a 
justifiable way. This is to say that the sacrificial act is deeply embedded in society as a construct 
and as a means by which to keep peace within society. Of course, today we believe we have 
moved beyond such things. It isn’t hard to see, though, that we have developed other forms of 
outlet for violence, like our criminal justice system. We do not reform criminals so much as 
punish them; rather than creating prisons that are communally engaged, educative, kind, and 
supportive for the purposes of rehabilitation, we send people to prisons that are repressive, 
miserable, overcrowded, underfunded, and abusive.  
As soon as the judicial system gains supremacy, its machinery disappears from sight… In 
the case of sacrifice the designated victim does not become the object of vengeance 
because he is a replacement, it is not the “right” victim. In the judicial system the 
violence does indeed fall on the “right” victim; but it falls with such force, such 
resounding authority, that no retort is possible. (Girard, 1977, p. 22) 
I think, though, that there are other more subtle metaphors and outlets for our desires to seek 
retribution and revenge, and one may well be our students and schools.  
Ever increasingly, it seems we become more comfortable in universities with placing 
students on the metaphorical sacrificial alter. We are willing to use their work without their 
knowledge for institutional advancement; we know that many of them will fail and do little or 
nothing to prevent those failures; we use them for athletic teams that do them bodily injury, 
interfere with their studies, and provide no support once they can no longer play. There is 
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something to be said about the old stereotype of the professor who tells students to look around 
at the students next to them, because those people will have failed by the end of the semester. 
How is that failure, though, not the failure of the professor as well? I believe because on some 
level we have constructed an understanding of student and teacher that makes the student a 
deserving sacrificial victim to the university. Those who fail are offered up as evidence of rigor 
and institutional integrity. The need for violence has been economized into a need for “quality 
and verifiable evidence of practical and useful production” on the part of the university. 
Likely the “student as sacrificial victim” metaphor seems almost absurdly extreme and 
unfair. Consider, though, that Girard wrote, 
The sacrifice serves to protect the entire community from its own violence; it prompts the 
entire community to choose victims outside itself. The elements of dissention scattered 
through the community are drawn to the person of the sacrificial victim and eliminated, at 
least temporarily, by its sacrifice. (1977, p. 8) 
The number of students who fail, and the pride we seem to take in that failure, suggest that some 
need is met by that failure. Moreover, even in those cases in which professors are pressured to 
pass students, often at the expense of learning suggests that we are willing to sacrifice the 
students’ long term welfare for an immediate societal aim of mass producing a competent and 
willing work force. Thus as cuts are made to humanities and students are pushed through the 
system at the expense of knowledge of self and society, their very lifeworlds are sacrificed to 
meet the demands of the systemsworld. 
What I am suggesting, however, is not so much a physical instantiation of sacrifice, but a 
psychological and metaphorical one. I am suggesting that the motion to systemsworld and away 
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from the lifeworld leaves us with both the ability and the need to generate Others to which harm 
can be directed. Contemporary society does not allow for random violence, nor does it likely 
even acknowledge the harm done in constructing persons as purely systemsworld entities. 
Nevertheless, the harm is there. Our hopes, dreams, passions, and purposes are unfulfilled, 
ignored, and perhaps even reviled by a system that values production and makes commodities 
out of humans.  
 I cannot help but wonder if this is how our post-secondary institutions have come to 
generate the students as potential sacrificial victims. They are an unregarded other. Even when 
we seek to maintain passing rates, it is not out of love or care, but out of a need to justify 
institutional worth. It may well that many professors and even the institutions themselves have 
come to resent the student-Other who comes to the institution often ignorant and lazy. I recall 
once a professor confiding in me that a student had angered him and that he was going to 
“crucify” the student. Institutionally, I have observed a similar phenomenon: a tendency to direct 
harm towards students who can do nothing to stop that harm. Perhaps by electing to be in the 
program in the first place we see them as willing sacrifices.  
The concern is that it is hard to care for a sacrifice. It, the sacrifice, must be kept at a 
distance. It must be an Other, perhaps even a loved and respected other for its willingness to be 
sacrificed, but an Other nonetheless. But if we allow retribution to be taken out on students, how 
can we be said to be caring scholars? Students appear to be becoming simply a means to an 
end—a means by which to achieve our own institutional and professional goals. Most 
worryingly, the sacrificial act becomes a means of absolution. Simply, when our students fail 
miserably, leave the classroom crying, or are used for some research or institutional aim, we do 
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not have to feel guilty. It was a willing sacrifice and their loss is economized into a greater 
societal gain at the expense of their lifeworld and ours. 
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APPENDIX 
APA Code of Ethics, Principles 
This section consists of General Principles. General Principles, as opposed to Ethical Standards, are aspirational in 
nature. Their intent is to guide and inspire psychologists toward the very highest ethical ideals of the profession. 
General Principles, in contrast to Ethical Standards, do not represent obligations and should not form the basis for 
imposing sanctions. Relying upon General Principles for either of these reasons distorts both their meaning and 
purpose. 
Principle A: Beneficence and Nonmaleficence  
Psychologists strive to benefit those with whom they work and take care to do no harm. In their professional actions, 
psychologists seek to safeguard the welfare and rights of those with whom they interact professionally and other 
affected persons and the welfare of animal subjects of research. When conflicts occur among psychologists' 
obligations or concerns, they attempt to resolve these conflicts in a responsible fashion that avoids or minimizes 
harm. Because psychologists' scientific and professional judgments and actions may affect the lives of others, they 
are alert to and guard against personal, financial, social, organizational or political factors that might lead to misuse of 
their influence. Psychologists strive to be aware of the possible effect of their own physical and mental health on their 
ability to help those with whom they work. 
Principle B: Fidelity and Responsibility  
Psychologists establish relationships of trust with those with whom they work. They are aware of their professional 
and scientific responsibilities to society and to the specific communities in which they work. Psychologists uphold 
professional standards of conduct, clarify their professional roles and obligations, accept appropriate responsibility for 
their behavior and seek to manage conflicts of interest that could lead to exploitation or harm. Psychologists consult 
with, refer to, or cooperate with other professionals and institutions to the extent needed to serve the best interests of 
those with whom they work. They are concerned about the ethical compliance of their colleagues' scientific and 
professional conduct. Psychologists strive to contribute a portion of their professional time for little or no 
compensation or personal advantage. 
Principle C: Integrity  
Psychologists seek to promote accuracy, honesty and truthfulness in the science, teaching and practice of 
psychology. In these activities psychologists do not steal, cheat or engage in fraud, subterfuge or intentional 
misrepresentation of fact. Psychologists strive to keep their promises and to avoid unwise or unclear commitments. In 
situations in which deception may be ethically justifiable to maximize benefits and minimize harm, psychologists have 
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a serious obligation to consider the need for, the possible consequences of, and their responsibility to correct any 
resulting mistrust or other harmful effects that arise from the use of such techniques. 
Principle D: Justice  
Psychologists recognize that fairness and justice entitle all persons to access to and benefit from the contributions of 
psychology and to equal quality in the processes, procedures and services being conducted by psychologists. 
Psychologists exercise reasonable judgment and take precautions to ensure that their potential biases, the 
boundaries of their competence and the limitations of their expertise do not lead to or condone unjust practices. 
Principle E: Respect for People's Rights and Dignity  
Psychologists respect the dignity and worth of all people, and the rights of individuals to privacy, confidentiality, and 
self-determination. Psychologists are aware that special safeguards may be necessary to protect the rights and 
welfare of persons or communities whose vulnerabilities impair autonomous decision making. Psychologists are 
aware of and respect cultural, individual and role differences, including those based on age, gender, gender identity, 
race, ethnicity, culture, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, disability, language and socioeconomic status and 
consider these factors when working with members of such groups. Psychologists try to eliminate the effect on their 
work of biases based on those factors, and they do not knowingly participate in or condone activities of others based 
upon such prejudices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
396 
 
 
 
 
 
MLA Ethical Code 
Statement of Professional Ethics 
Preamble 
As a community of teachers and scholars, the members of the MLA serve the larger society by 
promoting the study and teaching of the modern languages and literatures. In order to embrace 
this enterprise, we require freedom of inquiry. However, this freedom carries with it the 
responsibilities of professional conduct. We intend this statement to embody reasonable norms 
for ethical conduct in teaching and learning as well as in scholarship. The statement's governing 
premises are as follows: 
 
1. The responsibility for protecting free inquiry lies first with tenured faculty members, who may 
be called on to speak out against the unethical behavior or defend the academic freedom of 
colleagues at any rank. In addition, faculty members have ethical obligations to students, 
colleagues, and staff members; to their institutions, their local communities, the profession at 
large, and society.1  
 
2. Our integrity as teachers and scholars requires the responsible use of evidence in developing 
arguments and fairness in hearing and reading the arguments of both colleagues and students. 
 
3. As a community valuing free inquiry, we must be able to rely on the integrity and the good 
judgment of our members. For this reason, we should not 
 exploit or discriminate against others on grounds such as race, ethnicity, national origin, 
religious creed, age, gender, sexual preference, or disability 
 sexually harass students, colleagues, or staff members  
 use language that is prejudicial or gratuitously derogatory 
 make capricious or arbitrary decisions affecting working conditions, professional status, 
or academic freedom 
 misuse confidential information 
 plagiarize the work of others2  
 practice deceit or fraud on the academic community or the public 
4. Free inquiry respects variety in the modes and objects of investigation, whether traditional or 
innovative. We should defend scholarly practices against unfounded attacks from within or 
outside our community.  
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5. Our teaching and inquiry must respect our own cultures and the cultures we study.  
 
6. Judgments of whether a line of inquiry is ultimately useful to students, colleagues, or society 
should not be used to limit the freedom of scholars to pursue their research.  
Ethical Conduct in Teaching and Learning 
1. Teachers should represent to their students the values of free inquiry. 
 
2. At the outset of each course, teachers should provide students with a statement on approaches 
to the course materials, on the goals of the course, and on the standards by which students will be 
evaluated. 
 
3. Teachers should offer constructive and timely evaluation of students' work and specify the 
times and places when teachers are available to consult with students. 
 
4. Teacher-student collaboration entails the same obligation as other kinds of research. Teachers 
and students should acknowledge appropriately any intellectual indebtedness. 
 
5. Teachers whose research in any way includes students as subjects must make clear the 
obligations, rewards, and consequences of participation.3  
 
6. Teachers, in devising requirements for written work and oral discussion, have an ethical 
responsibility to respect both students' privacy and their emotional and intellectual dignity. 
 
7. Teachers should keep confidential what they know about students' academic standing, 
personal lives, and political or religious views and should not exploit such personal knowledge.4  
 
8. Teachers must provide unbiased, professional evaluation of students seeking admission to 
graduate study or applying for financial support. 
 
9. Teachers should provide direction to students, especially graduate students; should respect 
their scholarly interests; and should not exploit them for personal or professional ends. Teachers 
should not expect students, graduate or otherwise, to perform unremunerated or uncredited 
teaching, research, or personal duties. 
 
10. Teachers working with teaching assistants have a special responsibility to provide them with 
adequate preparation, continuing guidance, and informed evaluation. 
 
11. Teachers must weigh the academic performance of each student on its merits. 
 
12. In overseeing and responding to the work of graduate students, whether they are in courses or 
at the thesis or dissertation stage, advisers should periodically inform them of their standing in 
the program. 
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13. Before graduate students begin searching for jobs, advisers and teachers should provide them 
with adequate and timely counseling and should be prepared to write honest and constructive 
letters of recommendation. Advisers or teachers who doubt their ability to evaluate a student 
fairly should decline the task of furnishing such a letter. 
Ethical Conduct in Service and Scholarship 
1. Scholars in positions of leadership should assist their institutions in devising and 
implementing policies and procedures that promote a positive working and learning 
environment.  
 
2. A scholar who borrows from the works and ideas of others, including those of students, should 
acknowledge the debt, whether or not the sources are published. Unpublished scholarly material 
— which may be encountered when it is read aloud, circulated in manuscript, or discussed — is 
especially vulnerable to unacknowledged appropriation, since the lack of a printed text makes 
originality hard to establish. 
 
3. Scholars should ensure that their personal activities in politics and in their local communities 
remain distinct from positions taken by their universities or colleges. They should avoid 
appearing to speak for their institutions when acting privately.  
 
4. As referees for presses, journals, and promotion and tenure committees, scholars should judge 
the work of others fully, fairly, and in an informed way. A scholar who has any conflict of 
interest or is so out of sympathy with the author, topic, or critical stance of a work as to be 
unable to judge its merits without prejudice must decline to serve as a referee or reviewer. A 
scholar with a personal relationship that prevents an unbiased evaluation should turn down an 
invitation to serve. 
 
5. Referees should discharge their tasks in a timely manner; they should decline invitations 
whose deadlines they cannot meet. Undue delay in review or publication justifies submission to 
another outlet, provided the first editor is informed. 
 
6. Members of review committees must keep confidential all information about individuals, 
departments, or programs under evaluation.  
 
7. Faculty members planning to resign an appointment should give timely, written notice of this 
intention in accordance with institutional regulations. Until the existing appointment ends, they 
should not accept another appointment involving concurrent obligations without the permission 
of the appropriate administrator.  
Conclusion  
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This document focuses on the ethical obligations of members of the modern language profession. 
A common understanding of such obligations will enable us to exert appropriate restraints in 
exercising our responsibilities as scholars, teachers, and students and to promote ethical behavior 
in our departments and institutions. 
History 
"Statement of Professional Ethics" was adopted by the Delegate Assembly in 1991 and published 
in Profession 92. Earlier drafts were prepared by an ad hoc committee of the MLA appointed by 
the Executive Council in 1987, following a Delegate Assembly recommendation that such a 
committee be designated to "study professional ethics and provide MLA-endorsed guidelines" 
("Professional Notes" 382). The committee members who prepared the statement were Barry 
Gaines, University of New Mexico; Lawrence Poston, University of Illinois, Chicago (chair); 
Roslyn Abt Schindler, Wayne State University; Mario Valdes, University of Toronto; and Louise 
Vasvari, State University of New York, Stony Brook. 
 
This original statement was substantially revised in 2004 by the Committee on Academic 
Freedom and Professional Rights and Responsibilities, whose members were Carla Freccero, 
University of California, Santa Cruz; Lisa Justine Hernández, Saint Edward's University; Sue 
Hintz, Northern Virginia Community College; Genaro M. Padilla, University of California, 
Berkeley; Andrew Parker, Amherst College (chair); and Gema Peréz-Sánchez, University of 
Miami. 
Notes 
1 When a faculty member's fulfillment of ethical obligations is reviewed, care should be taken 
that it, like other subjects of evaluation, is not arbitrarily or capriciously judged. Any actions that 
may lead to the nonrenewal of an appointment, to the dismissal of a tenured faculty member, or 
to other such sanctions should be pursued in accordance with generally accepted procedural 
standards. See especially the "1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure" 
of the American Association of University Professors, endorsed by the MLA in 1962 and 
augmented with interpretive comments in 1970, and the related AAUP "Recommended 
Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and Tenure." 
 
2 In this statement we adopt the definition of plagiarism given in Joseph Gibaldi's MLA Style 
Manual: "Using another person's ideas or expressions in your writing without acknowledging the 
source constitutes plagiarism.... [T]o plagiarize is to give the impression that you wrote or 
thought something that you in fact borrowed from someone, and to do so is a violation of 
professional ethics.... Forms of plagiarism include the failure to give appropriate 
acknowledgment when repeating another's wording or particularly apt phrase, paraphrasing 
another's argument, and presenting another's line of thinking" (6.1; see also Gibaldi, MLA 
Handbook, ch. 2). It is important to note that this definition does not distinguish between 
published and unpublished sources, between ideas derived from  
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colleagues and those offered by students, or between written and oral presentations.  
 
3 Such relationships impose on researchers a special responsibility to guard the students involved 
from such abuses as breach of confidentiality and research-related harm. Scholars should inform 
themselves of and observe institutional regulations and guidelines on the use of human subjects 
in research. 
 
4 Teachers should familiarize themselves with the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act 
(FERPA, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g; 34 CFR Part 99). As explained in the section of the United States 
Department of Education's Web site devoted to the act, FERPA is "a Federal law that protects the 
privacy of student education records. The law applies to all schools that receive funds under an 
applicable program of the U.S. Department of Education. FERPA gives parents certain rights 
with respect to their children's education records. These rights transfer to the student when he or 
she reaches the age of 18 or attends a school beyond the high school level" (Family Educ. 
Rights). 
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    Florida Philosophy Conference, (2006). 
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Thesis Development, UNF, Department of Education, (2012). 
Critical Thinking, UNF, Academic Center for Excellence, (2008, 2009, 2010). 
Organization and Planning, The Art Institute of Jacksonville,(2009). 
Grammar and Style, The Art Institute of Jacksonville, (2009). 
Professionalism, The Art Institute of Jacksonville, (2009). 
 
SERVICE: 
 
President, English Graduate Organization, (2011-2012) 
Reader, Florida Philosophical Association, selection committee, (2012). 
Session Chair Florida Philosophical Association (2012). 
Logic Coach, UNF Doctoral Proposal Group, summer (2012). 
President, The UNF English Graduate Student Organization, (2012).  
Rater, The Center for Community Based Learning, UNF, (2012). 
College of Arts and Sciences Advising Search Committee Member, (2010). 
Reader Canadian Philosophical Association (2009 and 2010). 
Reader North Florida Philosophy Conference (2008, 2009, 2010). 
Committee Member: UNF, Taskforce for Undergraduate Advising (2009-2010). 
Florida Philosophical Association Session Chair (2009). 
Reviewer, UNF College of Arts and Sciences Advising Review Board (2008). 
Committee member, Student Advisor: UNF College of Arts and Sciences Review, (2007). 
Florida Philosophical Association Session Chair, (2006). 
President, Music Student Advisory Council, (2002-2003). 
Vice-President, Music Student Advisory Council, (2001-2002). 
 
MEMBERSHIP:  
 
American Education Research Association 
Pi Lambda Theta 
Sigma Tau Delta 
Florida Philosophical Association  
Phi Kappa Phi  
Golden Key International Honors Society 
UNF English Graduate Organization 
 
REFERENCES: 
  
Dr. James Beasley                     
 University of North Florida English Department, Rhetoric  
 Director of the Rhetoric and Composition Program 
 
Dr. Chris Gabbard                                         
 University of North Florida English Department 
 Previous Graduate Program Director 
 
Dr. Chris Janson                                            
 University of North Florida Department of Education and Human Services 
 Professor Doctoral Program 
 
Dr.  Hans Herbert Kögler                              
 University of North Florida Philosophy Department 
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 Department Chair 
 
Dr. Tru Leverette                   
 University of North Florida English Department 
 Online English Professor 
 
 
 
